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ABSTRACT
American professional social science experienced unprecedented institutional 
growth during and after the Second World War. This was due in part to the increased 
need for techniques in human resource management among government, military, 
corporate, and educational institutions, as well as for strategies o f individual adjustment 
in a rapidly changing postwar culture. Social scientists were enlisted to help produce 
social technologies for a society confronting new patterns of work, domestic life, and 
community. Scientific representations of the individual underwent reassessment and 
modification as a result. The general expansion of science and technology during this 
period also catapulted individual scientists beyond the academy into new positions of 
public authority. This dissertation examines the careers o f two prominent social scientists 
cum public intellectuals and their contrasting visions of the individual as an efficient 
automaton and a multidimensional whole.
The behaviorist psychologist B. F. Skinner and the cultural anthropologist 
Margaret Mead both made central contributions to American social science and the 
scientifie depiction of human nature in the twentieth century. Mead and Skinner each 
crafted a unique vision of humanity and applied it to their respective critiques of postwar 
American culture. Their social theories were shaped not only by scientific research and 
experimental methodology but also by the expectations of emerging public constituencies 
during the postwar decades that placed different demands on conceptions o f the self and 
human potentiality in American society.
By examining the reciprocal exchange and appropriation o f social scientific and 
popular images of the individual, this project contributes to a growing canon in the 
history o f science that addresses the cultural history of American social science. 
Specifically, my research on Mead and Skinner as public intellectuals and as 
representatives o f American culture has three main objectives.
The first objective is to explore their scientific depictions o f self and society in the 
context o f burgeoning bureaucracy and technocracy in America during the first half of 
the twentieth century. Skinner’s vision of the self epitomized the calculated efficiency of 
scientifically informed techniques of systemization and control in American technocracy. 
This mechanistic vision of human potential in the social sciences had its roots in various 
management-oriented strains of progressive era social reform initiatives. The 
phenomenon of Taylorism, as I argue, is one among several examples. Mead’s view of 
the holistic self, diverse in its potentiality, yet unique in each individual and culture, 
however, was bom of the liberal Democratic response among humanist social scientists 
and progressives to these dehumanizing trends. While Skinner’s vision of future culture 
entailed a scientific meritocracy, Mead’s designs on post-World War Two social 
management promoted an interdisciplinary contingent in the social sciences dedieated to 
the fulfillment of American democracy.
The second objective of this dissertation is to examine the popularization of 
Skinnerian and Meadian science, teehnology, and social ideology among various public 
audiences in postwar American culture. While previous scholarship has examined this 
process largely from the vantage point of Skinner’s and Mead’s own opinions, my 
research explores some of the specific ways in which their meehanistic and holistic
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visions of the self and society were appropriated, critiqued, and transformed in the 
popular discourse on the changing image o f modem humanity. As I demonstrate, 
Skinner’s vision of the programmable self had a profound and long lasting influence, for 
example, on public education and corporate training programs in the United States and 
abroad. Mead’s holistic vision of the self, one informed by her accounts of cultural 
diversity across the globe, became the subject of both criticism and praise among social 
science professionals involved in the rapidly expanding ‘expert’ advice industry in the 
postwar decades. Mead’s participation in this industry, and her application of 
comparative cultural anthropology to advice on child rearing, education, and the search 
for individual identity, became inextricably linked to the politics of social reform and 
liberation among second wave feminists and the youth counterculture in the 1960s.
A third aim of this dissertation is to use these narratives on the public careers of 
Skinner and Mead as case studies in considering how conflicting images of human nature 
in modem social science reflect the broad cultural tension between a desire for 
unencumbered human freedom and independence on the one hand, and the need for 
mechanisms of social control that will help society mn well on the other. The fact that 
Skinnerian and Meadian visions of the self catapulted their inventors to public celebrity 
in postwar American culture at the same time indicates that Americans have teamed to 
embrace both images of human nature. Americans apply both images of the self 
selectively in defining individual identity and refining the myriad systems of individual 
and social management in modem life.
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CHAPTER ONE
ARCHITECTS OF THE SELF: PROGRESSIVE ERA ROOTS AND POSTWAR
PUBLIC CAREERS
Following the Second World War, professional social science in the United States 
experienced an era of unprecedented institutional growth partly as a result o f the 
increased need for human resource management in governmental, military, eorporate, and 
educational institutions. As social scientists were enlisted to help produce technologies 
for a society struggling to adjust to changing patterns o f work, family life, and 
community, scientific representations o f the individual underwent reassessment and 
modification. The tremendous expansion of organized science, and the proliferation of 
technology, during this period also catapulted individual seientists beyond the academy 
and into new positions of public authority as expert commentators on postwar American 
culture. The present study examines the social technologies, public commentaries, and 
social reform theories of two prominent and widely known American scientists, the 
psychologist B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) and the anthropologist Margaret Mead (1901- 
1978), with regard to their respective and contrasting scientific visions o f the individual 
as an efficient automaton on the one hand, and as a multidimensional whole on the other.
Through historical consideration of the social scientist as a social critic and public 
intellectual, 1 will examine the connections in these case studies between theory 
construction in the research setting and the participation o f scientists in the broader 
culture. How, for example, are we to explain the rise in American culture of such a cult 
figure as B. F. Skinner, who achieved unprecedented public notoriety for his social
technologies and his vision of future society? In what ways did Margaret Mead’s famous 
anthropological studies of primitive societies inform her critique o f American social 
mores and contribute to her public authority as an internationally known commentator on 
American postwar culture? How did their participation in public debates concerning 
social reform influence the construction, execution and reception of their scientific 
research?
Their influence on public perceptions of anthropology and behavioral psychology 
has forced historians of these disciplines to reexamine Mead’s and Skinner’s place in 
social science and reinterpret instances where their contributions were marginalized by 
colleagues and contemporaries. Much of the scholarship by social seientists and 
historians on Skinner and Mead has focused on their contributions to academic 
psychology and anthropology. In such studies, their participation in public debates is 
either deemed irrelevant or significant only insofar as it incurred criticism from their 
colleagues about the scientific merits of their research. A smaller number o f studies have 
attempted to assess Skinner and Mead as public intellectuals, but in many eases these 
treatments have been insular, addressing their public celebrity from the perspective of the 
scientists themselves. In the process, unjustified generalizations about the audiences of 
science in postwar American culture have been invoked to explain why Skinner’s and 
Mead’s opinions were either accepted or rejected. Only a few scholars have discussed in 
detail both how Skinner and Mead were talked about outside the social science profession 
and how their ideas were incorporated into real-world technologies and practical 
strategies of social adjustment.
By focusing on the scientific and public careers o f Mead and Skinner, I will 
combine American social and cultural history with the history of social science. The 
intersection of these narratives will be the “se lf’; the study will explore scientific 
depictions of the self, i. e., human nature, and their influence on contemporary debates 
about social management in American society in the post-World War Two era.'
My study of Mead and Skinner as public intellectuals and as representatives of 
American culture thus has three main objectives. The first is to explore their scientific 
depictions of self and society in the context of burgeoning bureaucracy and technocracy 
in America during the first half o f the twentieth century. I will argue that Mead and 
Skinner represent two distinct, divergent perspectives on human nature and that these 
divergent perspectives were central to both modem social science and American culture. 
Indeed, their lives and works mark the changing course o f twentieth century thought on 
modem American life. Their scientific methodologies and theories o f social engineering 
were products o f progressive era reform ideology, and they were shaped in tum by the 
subsequent politics of social reform during the Interwar period, the Cold War, and the 
1960s social protest movements. Given the overall progressive commitment to a 
systematic and scientific approach to the organization o f material and human resources. 
Mead’s and Skinner’s theories o f scientific social reform, in some instances, appeared 
strikingly similar. For the most part, however, their individual approaches to the central 
concept o f the “se lf’ led to very different conclusions about, among many other things.
’ By way o f defining ‘science’ in social science for purposes o f the present treatment, I mean those 
investigations into human behavior that produce not only an understanding o f  diversity in human nature 
and culture but also o f regularities in behavior that afford some measure o f  prediction, if  not direct control, 
over human phenomena. Certainly, Skinner and Mead were both interested in these aspects o f a potential 
‘science o f culture,’ but it is clear that Skinner, unlike Mead, was much more focused on the laboratory 
manipulation and experimental control o f human potentiality.
the proper role of science in government and the viability o f American democracy. 
Skinner’s vision of the self epitomized the calculated efficiency of scientifically informed 
techniques of systematization and control in American technocracy. This mechanistic 
vision o f human potential in the social sciences had its roots in various management- 
oriented strains o f progressive era social reform initiatives. The phenomenon of 
Taylorism, as I argue, is one among several examples. Mead’s view o f the holistic self, 
diverse in its potentiality, yet unique in each individual and culture, however, was bom of 
the liberal Democratic response among humanist social scientists and progressives to 
these dehumanizing trends. While Skinner’s vision of future culture entailed a scientific 
meritocracy. Mead’s designs on post-World War Two social management promoted an 
interdisciplinary contingent in the social sciences dedicated to the fulfillment of 
American democracy.
The second objective of this dissertation is to examine the popularization o f 
Skinnerian and Meadian science, technology, and social ideology among various public 
audiences in postwar American culture. While previous scholarship has examined this 
process largely from the vantage point of Skinner’s and Mead’s own opinions, my 
research explores some of the specific ways in which their mechanistic and holistic 
visions o f the self and society were appropriated, critiqued, and transformed in the 
popular discourse on the changing image of modem humanity. I also will examine how 
Mead and Skinner, in presenting their thoughts to public audiences, dealt in a common 
set of postwar cultural themes and metaphors that guided their discussion of social 
change. Both used the evolutionary concept of adaptation, a concept central to postwar 
science, to discuss the relationship of the individual to the surrounding environment.
They also invoked the physical and visual dimensions of the laboratory to discuss 
comprehensive social change as well as child rearing and education reform. Both 
Skinner and Mead also used the rhetoric of human potential to discuss how social 
engineering could transform human nature. While Skinner used these metaphors to 
construct a mechanistic vision of self and society in the postwar decades, Mead had 
begun to employ them in constructing a humanistic and holistic science of culture as 
early as the 1930s.
By deconstructing the rhetorical and technological tools that Mead and Skinner 
used to mass market their critiques of American culture in the postwar decades, I will 
draw new distinctions between their scientific research findings and the content of the 
knowledge products that they deployed to meet public demands for techniques of social 
adjustment. As I will demonstrate, Skinner’s vision of the programmable self had a 
profound and long lasting influence, for example, on public education and corporate 
training programs in the United States and abroad. Mead’s holistic vision o f the self, one 
informed by her accounts of cultural diversity across the globe, became the subject of 
both criticism and praise among social science professionals involved in the rapidly 
expanding ‘expert’ advice industry in the postwar decades. Mead’s participation in this 
industry, and her application of comparative cultural anthropology to advice on child 
rearing, education, and the search for individual identity, became inextricably linked to 
the politics o f social reform and liberation among second wave feminists and the youth 
counterculture in the 1960s.
The third aim of my study will be to use my narratives on the public careers of 
Skinner and Mead as case studies in considering how conflicting images of human nature
in modem social science reflect the broad cultural tension in modem America between a 
desire for unencumbered human freedom and independence on the one hand, and the 
need for mechanisms o f social control that will help society mn well on the other. In 
tracing the popular appropriation and transformation of Skinner’s and Mead’s visions of 
human nature in the postwar decades, I will show how these two public intellectuals 
contributed to the ongoing debate in American culture over the place and face of the self 
in modem society. In this endeavor I will combine different aspects of the canon of 
American cultural history and historiography with that of the cultural history o f science. 
Such combinations have been explored tentatively by historians o f the social sciences, 
and only to a limited extent in the cases of Mead and Skinner. With regard to 
philosophical considerations conceming the self, the pairing o f Skinner and Mead allows 
us to examine how Americans contended with the existential and political implications of 
an increasingly technocratic society over the course o f the twentieth century. The fact 
that Skinnerian and Meadian visions of the self catapulted their inventors to public 
celebrity in postwar American culture at the same time, I argue, indicates that Americans 
have leamed to embrace both images of human nature. We apply both images of the self 
selectively in defining individual identity and refining our myriad systems of individual 
and social management in modem life.
My juxtaposition of these two social scientists does not stem from any 
contemporary professional association between Skinner and Mead. Although Skinner 
and Mead undoubtedly were aware of each other as public scientists, they were not 
scientific rivals. I will argue, however, that in their capacity as high-profile 
spokespersons for different perspectives in the human sciences, they exemplified
distinctive research methodologies that were characteristic of a community of 
practitioners in social science. Such theoretical and methodological differences, 
moreover, were correlated strongly with disciplinary growth and diversification in the 
opening decades o f the twentieth century. Mechanistic and holistic images o f the self 
each exerted a powerful influence on the postwar development o f the applied social 
sciences (therapeutic, administrative, and industrial) and their incorporation into 
commerce and government.
The history of the social sciences in the early twentieth century reveals strong 
developmental connections to the phenomena of American urbanization and the rise of 
progressive era social management. The progressive era was exemplified in a number of 
strains of social reform dedicated to mediating the complexities o f urbanization. Clearly, 
no one movement characterized progressivism as a whole. Progressives generally were 
committed to municipal reform and social welfare/melioration through the analysis of 
social phenomena and the efficient systemization of material and social management. 
There were, however, basic cleavages within progressive reform ideologies that had 
profound eonsequences for the development o f the social sciences. They also shaped the 
scientific commitments o f individual scientists like Skinner and Mead who received their 
training when progressive reform ideals still held sway. The most important cleavage for 
the present study involves the distinction between those progressives who espoused the 
virtues of the sciences in designing efficient “technologies” of social control, and those 
generally affiliated with the Social Gospel, philanthropy, labor, and social welfare 
perspectives on reform. The latter group embraced forms of social melioration that were 
designed to preserve democracy and human dignity in the face of dehumanizing trends in
industrialism and technocracy. The former group, meanwhile, sought to find security in 
order and efficiency, and expert management.
Managerial reform ideology often entailed the conceptualization o f the individual 
as a standardized machine whose efficiency and production could be enhanced by the 
study of behavior as influenced by the surrounding environment. Another line of reform 
ideology upheld a holistic and dynamic vision of the self, defined not by technological 
systems, but rather by personal history and experience, by culture and community, and by 
individual uniqueness and agency. This divergence in the image of the self had important 
implications for how human nature would be studied and defined in the twentieth century 
by a new generation o f social scientists. Many historians have pointed to the central 
significance o f Frederick W. Taylor and the ideology o f Scientific Management, for 
example, in linking broad trends in urban management with science and teehnology, as 
well as with the cult of the scientific expert in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
America.^ Indeed it can be argued that the popular message of Taylorism familiarized 
many Americans with social science for the first time at the tum of the century.
 ^ See the collection o f essays edited by Daniel Nelson regarding the influence o f Scientific Management on 
management and industrial production theory in the twentieth century, especially his essay entitled 
“Scientific Management in Retrospect,” in A Mental Revolution: Scientific Management Since Taylor, ed. 
Daniel Nelson (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1992), 5-39. See also Stephen P. Waring, “Peter 
Drucker, MBO, and the Corporatist Critique of Scientific Management,” in A Mental Revolution, 205-36. 
Waring has argued that Scientific Management evolved into a fundamental management tenet o f 
bureaucratic administration in American industry and government in the twentieth century, and into a 
political philosophy o f social management. See his extended discussion in Taylorism Transformed: 
Scientific Management Theory Since 1915 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1991). For a 
discussion o f the influence of Scientific Management on the famous Chicago school o f management theory 
see Robert H. Nelson, Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond (University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). Robert Kanigel has also explored the influence of 
Scientific Management in what is surely the most exhaustive and informative biography o f Taylor to date. 
Taylorism and the scientific approach to all systems in our society — social, industrial, educational, 
domestic, and otherwise cultural -  is, as he says, quoting from Edward Brye Hunt’s 1924 review of 
advances in Scientific Management theory, “part o f our moral inheritance” as Americans. See Robert 
Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma o f Efficiency (New York: Viking 
Penguin, 1997), 7, quoting from Scientific Management Since Taylor: A Collection o f  Authoritative Papers, 
ed. Edward Eyre Hunt (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1924), xiv.
To be sure, however, neither Skinner nor Mead thought o f themselves as 
progressives, nor did Skinner see himself as a direct inheritor o f Taylorism. There is to 
my knowledge no evidence that Skinner was familiar with Taylor or the philosophy of 
Scientific Management.^ The similarity between Taylorism and Skinnerian behaviorism,
As Kanigel notes, many late twentieth-century social critics, literati, and historians including 
Jeremy Rifkin, Anson Rabenbach, Peter Drucker, Robert Reich, Stephen Waring, Richard Pfeffer, Harry 
Braverman, and Neil Postman have discussed scientific efficiency and productivity, and our obsession with 
time, scheduling, and organization, as hallmarks o f  American culture that have their origin in Scientific 
Management. Further evidence o f our thoroughly “Taylored lives” is addressed in the equally exhaustive 
cultural survey by Martha Ban ta. She has scoured the literary and popular press o f the early twentieth 
century to reveal the sources o f our enduring cultural penchant for theory making and system building, and 
our want o f scientific explanations o f human behavior. Industry and the social sciences took up the cause 
o f technocracy and social reform in the belief that ‘the system’ would eventually solve all problems of 
adjustment in the factory, the government, and the household. System making, as Martha Ban ta 
demonstrates, became the chief industry of “engineers, psychologists, business leaders, anthropologists, 
political strategists, domestic scientists, product designers, [and] literary critics.” See Martha Banta, 
Taylored Lives: Narrative Productions in the Age o f Taylor, Veblen, and Ford (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), xi. For a discussion o f Taylorism’s international influence on industry and social 
management theory, specifically in Russia, France, Germany, and Great Britain, see Judith Merkle, 
Management and Ideology: The Legacy o f  the International Scientific Management Movement (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1980).
 ^This contention is corroborated in the research o f Alexandra Rutherford who has also examined Skinner 
and the history o f Skinnerian behaviorism in America. In her investigation o f  Skinner’s behaviorism and 
his behavioral social philosophy in the 1940s (especially his utopian novel, Walden Two, published in 
1948), and that of the technocrats and the Technocracy Movement in the early 1930s, Rutherford discusses 
their ideological similarity and their common intellectual heritage in the work o f  classical behaviorists John 
B. Watson and Ivan Pavlov. Both Skinner and the technocrats believed in an engineering approach to 
managing society, as well as the primacy o f scientific rationality. Skinner and the technocrats also shared 
an environment-oriented, mechanistic view o f human nature. Rutherford notes, however, that she as yet 
has found no documented evidence that Skinner knew about the Technocracy Movement or its 
philosophies, or that he had any direct contact with members o f  this movement. See chapter three o f  her 
dissertation thesis, “B. F. Skinner and Technology’s Nation: Lessons from Harold Loeb, Howard Scott, and 
the Technocracy Movement,” in “Between the Science o f Behavior and the Art o f  Living: B. F. Skinner 
and Psychology’s Public in Mid-Twentieth Century America” (Ph.D. diss., York University, 2001), 126- 
161. See especially her conclusions in this chapter that start on page 160. Rutherford argues that the 
striking similarities between Skinner’s theories in the 1940s and those of the technocrats in the early 1930s 
has to do with a general rise in the influence of science and technology in American culture. She also 
observes that Americans rejected the idea o f comprehensive technocracy in the postwar decades, choosing 
democracy instead. In the arguments presented herein I contend that similarities among the utopian visions 
o f scientists and technocrats, social reformers, and fiction writers during the 1930s and beyond have to do 
with a broader cultural trend toward bureaucracy and technocracy, and that these trends have their societal 
origin in such things as urbanization and progressivism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. I 
would also disagree with Rutherford that the public rejection of scientific meritocracy as proposed by 
Skinner and the technocrats also signifies a wholesale rejection o f technocracy and the cult o f scientific 
expertise in service o f social management in American culture. While Americans certainly did not wish to 
live in anything like a technocratic utopia (or dystopia, by some reckonings) they certainly did embrace the 
authority o f science, professional expertise, efficiency, organization, and scientific system building in 
making many parts o f American society run well.
as I will argue, is a consequence of the profound effects that broader movements in 
scientific social management had on social science during the progressive era. In 
Mead’s case, her view of progressive politics was shaped by her family experiences.
Both o f Mead’s parents were progressives who were active in grass roots social reform 
movements. Mead, however, concluded that their efforts had been ineffectual in creating 
substantive change in social policy. This, coupled with the disillusionment o f the First 
World War, convinced her and her colleagues in anthropology that a socially relevant and 
politically informed presentation of comparative anthropology would do more for the 
cause of social justice and democracy in the long run. Mead embraced the concern for 
the individual and democracy that meliorative progressivism espoused, but not its 
political agenda for reform. The history of scientific social management thus will he an 
important backdrop in the present study for exploring the tension between contrasting 
images of the self in social science in the American post-World War Two context.
In the 1920s Skinner began to cultivate a reductionist view of the organisms that 
he used in his behavioral psychological experiments, conceiving o f them as devices that 
could he designed to specification. Mead opposed dehumanizing trends in social science 
and American technocracy during the 1920s and embraced instead an interdisciplinary 
approach to anthropology, one that celebrated human dignity and a liberal democratic 
vision of society. Her holistic vision of the individual, as a wellspring o f complex 
biological and psychological potentialities that were intimately intertwined with the 
surrounding world, propelled Mead’s use of comparative cultural anthropology as a 
forum for addressing human injustice, discrimination, and social decay in the 1930s. 
Skinner eschewed any social role for experimental psychology during the 1930s. In the
10
1940s, however, Skinner universalized his operant behaviorism, claiming that his 
methods applied equally well to humans and human society. In Skinner’s emergent 
theories of social management in the late 1940s he rejected all forms of traditional 
political and socio-economic theory, opting instead for the direct management of society 
by expertly trained social engineers. He also believed in the universality o f operant 
psychology in explaining the self and society, to the exclusion o f all other social 
scientific lines o f inquiry. In the course o f his experiments in the 1950s and 60s with 
technologies o f social control, Skinner argued that the reform of social management 
techniques in education and municipal government required that traditional assumptions 
about human autonomy and dignity be left aside and that scientific control o f technocracy 
be embraced. Mead, on the other hand, argued in the 1950s and 60s for a revised social 
welfare system that balanced the needs of the individual with the desire for urban social 
management systems.
By the early 1970s Mead and Skinner each enjoyed a level o f national and 
international recognition that was matched by few others in the social sciences. Many 
Americans became fascinated with their visions o f humanity and society in the postwar 
decades. Their continued influence in the late twentieth century forced professionals in 
the human sciences to re-assess how Skinner and Mead should be portrayed in the 
histories o f their respective disciplines. An examination o f their efforts to promote and 
popularize contrasting visions of humanity thus provides a rich understanding not only of 
changes in cultural identity in postwar America but also of the manner in which theories 
o f humanity and community were reconstituted by scientists in order to meet new public 
demands for techniques in individual and collective social adjustment. In the case of
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Mead and Skinner, an analysis of their published opinions and social manifestos will 
serve as a historical guide to the American struggle to redefine traditional images o f self 
and society in the decades after the Second World War.
Historians, philosophers, literary scholars, and social scientists all have 
confronted the question of the individual, or “self,” in modem times. While philosophers 
have discussed the epistemology and ontology of the self, historians have, quite naturally, 
sought to historicize ideas about the self, examining their evolution throughout the 
history o f western civilization."* As historian Roy Porter has noted, the question of how 
to define the self has undergone innumerable transformations in the twentieth century as 
modems have leamed to cope with industrialized living and with revelations from the 
social sciences. In the American context. Porter cites world wars, economic depression, 
the rise of professional social science, intellectual and literary post-modemism and 
deconstmctionism, and the awareness of non-westem cultural traditions, as figuring 
prominently in our ongoing discourse on the self.^ Nikolas Rose has examined how the 
human sciences in particular have undermined traditional westem definitions o f the self.^ 
Theories of human nature have been developed to fit a society that required definitions of
* The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the rise o f modem natural philosophy, René Descartes’ 
famous disquisitions on the notion o f being, and John Locke’s observation that the self, while possessing a 
unique inner essence, was nonetheless a product o f the social environment. In the nineteenth century the 
self was explored further in the emergent discipline o f psychology through, for example, Sigmund Freud’s 
coneept o f  the uneonscious mind and William James’ speculations on radical empiricism and expanded 
sensory perception. Examples of how the self was defined in different eras o f W estem history are found in 
Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present, ed. Roy Porter (New York: Routledge, 
1997) and Merle Curti, Human Nature in American Thought: A History (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin, 1980). See also Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  the Modern Identity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
 ^ See Roy Porter’s comments in the introduction to Rewriting the Self 11-12.
 ^Nikolas Rose, “Assembling the Modem Self,” in Rewriting the Self, 224-48. See the extended discussion 
in Rose’s book. Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
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personality, intelligence, behavior, and development compatible with bureaucratic and 
industrialized social systems. In Rose’s view, our modem definitions o f the self came 
from non-academic settings — factories, prisons, and classrooms.
Just as historians have sought to understand the self in context, recent scholars 
have called for culturally contextualized histories o f the social sciences. A study of the 
postwar self as constmcted by two prominent social scientists and public intellectuals 
contributes to both the history of the self and the history of the social sciences, as well as 
the history of interactions between elite/professional knowledge and broader 
understandings. The definition of the “se lf’ in the present study thus has scientific and 
cultural dimensions.^ Far from having any universal definition, the self, as Cushman 
says, has been historically defined according to the localized mores o f a given culture. 
The “interpretive hermeneutical definition of the self,” thus also includes, in the 
American context, the “indigenous psychology” of a society as part o f the context-driven 
definition of self. Both the mechanistic and holistic selves in the respective works of 
Skinner and Mead are expressions o f what Cushman calls cultural “artifacts” that 
represent different demands on the individual in American postwar society.*
By examining the reciprocal exchange and appropriation o f social scientific and 
popular images of the self, as defined above, in the postwar decades, this study 
contributes to a growing corpus o f historiography that examines modem American social 
science in cultural context. My contention is that new approaches to human personality 
during this cmcial period in American history were not merely a consequence of
 ^Philip Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural History o f  Psychotherapy (New 
York: Addison-Wesley, 1995).
* Ibid., 23.
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experimental inventiveness or interdisciplinary synthesis but also an outgrowth of 
contrasting social visions among scientists themselves. These distinct social visions had 
their roots in divergent mechanistic and holistic visions of the self, differences that were 
amplified by the broader cultural processes of American urbanization, industrial 
expansion, and the politics of social reform movements o f the late nineteenth and early to 
mid-twentieth centuries. It is thus appropriate to preface my discussion o f Skinner and 
Mead with an overview of these early trends in scientific social management.
Progressive Roots of the Modern Self: Competing Perspectives on Scientific Social 
Reform at the Turn of the Century
Our modem visions of society and the self have their origins in a host of 
interconnected social, economic, and intellectual transformations that took shape in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century in the United States. Modem conceptualizations of 
the individual in society can he linked to changes in patterns o f family, work, and 
community that followed in the wake of industrial expansion and urbanization after 
Reconstmction. With urbanization came the problem of managing increasingly diverse 
and complex human environments.
Many historians have discussed the widespread dislocation that accompanied the 
abandonment of traditional American folkways during this period and the difficulties of 
adjusting to a new urban existence that lacked the familiar social stmcture o f  small town 
life. Traditional family networks were dismpted, and older systems o f community 
maintenance became obsolete in cities where socioeconomic mobility was the model of 
success. Conversely, the late nineteenth century, as Robert Wiebe and Daniel Rodgers
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have noted, also saw cultural, industrial, and political fragmentation in the absence of a 
comprehensive national plan for managing urbanization.^ There was at first no blueprint 
for building urban infrastructure, no set of methods to make urban life run well. Cities 
and their boroughs were sectioned, for example, according to predominant local 
industries, leaving civic administration to the whims of industrial capitalists. There was 
often no coordination of municipal systems for waste disposal, public transportation, 
medical care, and utilities by city government, and no clear understanding of what city 
governments should regulate.'*^
Urbanization also saw fundamental changes in the social values o f the emerging 
professional classes. Many urbanites continued to look to the idyllic small town in 
locating their cultural heritage and in identifying the classic American virtues of 
democracy, independence, individual autonomy, and community solidarity.” In 
attempting to retain some semblance of this identity amidst a new urban environment, 
many Americans invested themselves in an expanding suburban culture. They embraced 
those moral and intellectual merits of professionalism in business management that were 
needed for success in conquering a new urban frontier and scaling its economic ladders.'^
® There were no regulatory standards for new industries and municipalities. The administration o f urban 
social welfare often fell victim to the whims o f unrestricted laissez faire economic practices, exploitative 
and wasteful “rule o f thumb” techniques of industrial management and manufacturing, and the dictatorial 
“boss rule” syndicates o f local politics. See Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a 
Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1998) and Robert H. Wiebe, 
The Search fo r  Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). For more discussion o f the rural-to- 
urban transition in America see Steven J. Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans o f  the Progressive Era 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 76-124.
Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 115-16.
"  Wiebe, Search fo r  Order, 1-10.
Wiebe, Search fo r  Order, 144-47. For further discussion see Eileen L. McDonagh, “Race, Class, and 
Gender in the Progressive Era: Restructuring State and Society,” in Progressivism and the New 
Democracy, ed. Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press,
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Predictably, however, this came at the cost of traditional patterns o f community 
maintenance. The complexity of the urban environment compelled individuals to 
relinquish direct control over their communities and place it in the hands of professional 
managers. Urbanites embraced bureaucracy on a grand scale and cultivated the social 
authority of scientifically inspired systems and ideologies of social management, 
although not without reservation. This need for organized administration, for research 
and development, for information and technical expertise, and for professionally trained 
‘scientists of society,’ was reflected in the gradual transfer of social authority from 
families and communities to trained professionals and bureaucratic agencies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The American ‘pioneer’ virtues that had 
conquered the frontier — individualism, frugality, and practicality — were transformed hy 
agencies o f collective social management into the virtues of precision, control, self- 
reliance and restraint, and impeccable objectivity.'^
Industrial expansion, urbanization, and the subsequent rise o f the cults of 
bureaucracy and efficiency in the early twentieth century also shaped the concept of 
individual human nature. Thomas Haskell has noted that a greater awareness of the 
complex causal “interdependence” between the individual and industrial society
1999), 145-91; Gender, Class, Race and Reform in the Progressive Era, ed. Noralee Frankel and Nancy S. 
Dye (Lexington, KY: University Press o f Kentucky, 1991).
Wiebe, Search fo r  Order, 144-47. See also the comments by Blake McKelvey on this transition and on 
the embrace o f the technical expert in his book, The Urbanization o f  America [1860-1915] (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963), 266. McKelvey expertly explains the lack o f national 
benchmarks as well as the political debates between local communities and states in standardizing 
education, municipalities, social services, utilities, and business/industrial management. Also consult the 
discussion o f scientific objectivity and its connection to mechanical metaphors in Lorraine Daston and 
Peter Galison, “The Image o f Objectivity,” Representations 40 (Fall, 1992): 81-129.
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contributed to a need for systems of social management.''* This increasingly 
environmental approach to human agency, in turn, led to fundamental réévaluations of 
human nature, morality, and individual autonomy. Evolutionary ideas, for example, were 
linked to visions of future societies, and social theorists such as Karl Marx and Herbert 
Spencer began to explore new moral, economic, and political theories. The psychologies 
of William James and Sigmund Freud also challenged the concept o f a preordained and 
static human nature, as well as the complete existential autonomy of the individual.'^ 
Scientific attention gradually turned away from older concepts o f the essences/faculties 
o f “inner man” and toward the analysis of human behavior as determined by 
environmental and social conditions.'® During the progressive era social scientists thus 
took greater measure of economic forces, history, human biology and biochemistry in 
tracing the causal connections between individual human behavior and society.'^
The cultural and scientific underpinnings of Meadian anthropology and 
Skinnerian behaviorism have their origin in these nineteenth-century humanistic
Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence o f  Professional Social Science: The American Social Science 
Association and the Nineteenth Century Crisis o f  Authority (Urbana, IL: University o f Illinois Press, 1977), 
42-44.
Ibid., 245-46. See also the related comments by R. Laurence Moore, “Directions o f Thought in 
Progressive America,” in The Progressive Era, ed. Lewis L. Gould (Syracuse; Syracuse University Press, 
1974), 38-40. While James acknowledged the interdependence o f the individual and the surrounding 
environment, he nevertheless argued against a positivist view o f the self and society. James’ voluntarist 
view of human agency stressed the significance o f  independent causal variables created by the individual in 
social and biological contexts. For James, the concept o f individual will could be accommodated in 
psychology. His emphasis on the importance of studying individual uniqueness became a hallmark of 
humanist psychology in the twentieth century that was championed by social scientists such as John Dewey 
and Margaret Mead. Many first generation social scientists in the years leading up to the progressive era 
sought balance between positivist and voluntarist perspectives on human nature. See Haskell’s comments 
on page 249. For more on James’s philosophy see Haskell’s references on page 246, note 12, to William 
James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longman’s Greene,
1897).
Wiebe, Search fo r  Order, 148; Moore, “Directions o f Thought,” 38-40; McKelvey, Urbanization, 264.
Haskell, Emergence o f  Professional Social Science, 251.
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(voluntarist) and mechanistic (positivist) approaches to human nature in the social 
sciences. This particular theoretical and methodological bifurcation of perspectives on 
the self among different communities of researchers in the twentieth century was part of 
the broader public and professional responses to urbanization. The era o f social reform 
movements in America between the late 1880s and the start o f World War One thus 
figures prominently in tracing the origins of contrasting visions o f the self and society 
that were represented in Mead and Skinner in the 1920s and 30s.
The transition between the agrarian populist movement o f the 1890s and the era 
of progressive reform between 1900 and 1914 also saw the politieal migration of social 
management professionals into government and industry.'* Although the political heart of 
populism was centered in the small rural town, a place that embodied the classic 
American individualist virtues of a life based in the land, the movement was actually a 
response to trends in rural-to-urban migration, immigration from Europe, corporatism, 
urban expansion, and widespread political corruption. Populism, as Richard Hofstadter 
argued, was an attempt to preserve a tradition of political democracy that began in the 
individualist economic structure of the farm setting.'^ As expressed by William Jennings 
Bryan and the Populist Party, and in the Social Gospel movement, both rural and urban 
interests forced the federal government into addressing the social and economic problems 
caused by industrialism. In the late nineteenth century members o f the traditional 
professions (law, medicine, and clergy), along with laborers, were increasingly displaced
Richard Hofstadter discusses this transition in his classic study, The Age o f  Reform: From Bryan to F. D. 
R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 92, 133.
Ibid., 5-8.
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by the power of corporate in te re s ts .B o th  of these communities organized themselves 
into unions and professional societies in order to reclaim their access to capital and to 
political influence. Populism was not, however, an attempt to create soeial democracy, 
but, rather, a drive to expand public access to an industrialized economy.^'
In the decade before the Great War, lawyers, engineers and technieians, 
businessmen, clergymen, and aeademics were able to gain control o f the populist political 
leadership, bring it under a common “progressive” banner, and nationalize their political 
agenda during the Roosevelt administration.^^ Progressive politics upheld rural interests 
and championed democracy and the freedom of the individual. A patemalistie sense of 
social responsibility among urban professionals was coupled, however, to a healthy 
respect for the necessity of industry and eorporatism in organizing urban life.
Progressive leaders shared with their populist constitueneies a desire to see corporate 
monopolies broken up and corruption in local government rooted out. But part of their 
motivation stemmed from the distinct professional advantages they felt were inherent in 
maintaining a well-regulated society; it would increase their chances o f success in a 
growing economy.^^
The progressive era saw the establishment of various grass roots movements 
among populists, moral reformers, and ‘management’ progressives dedicated to political, 
corporate, and municipal reform and regulation. Collectively, they fostered a broad 
public awareness o f the social problems associated with the haphazard administration of
20 Ibid., 66, 92.
Ibid., 10.
Ibid., 131-33, 153-65.
Ibid., 214.
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organized labor, the factory, housing, and public works that had characterized a laissez 
faire capitalist economy in nineteenth-century America. The advent o f the metropolis 
and mass culture also had given way to new dimensions of poverty, labor exploitation, 
and government corruption.^'* As a result, working-class activists, religious reformers, 
and middle-class professionals mobilized in support of corporate trust busting, the 
enactment o f child labor laws, environmental resource conservation, food quality 
regulation, and the expansion of popular representation in government (primarily through 
public référendums, primaries, and direct elections). These are often counted among the 
many accomplishments o f the social reform movements during the progressive era.^^ 
Revisionist historians of progressivism, however, downplay the role of social 
activists and muckraking journalists in establishing actual regulatory reforms in the 
federal government. The drive to eradicate industrial exploitation and waste, as well as to 
curtail political corruption, Gabriel Kolko and Charles Noble have claimed, actually 
originated among the ranks of a fiscally and politically conservative elite o f corporate 
m anagers .R egu la tion  may have served some progressive aims, Kolko observed, but its
Melvin G. Holli, “Urban Reform in the Progressive Era,” in The Progressive Era, 133-52. See also 
Diner, A Very Different Age, 50-75 and John Buenker, Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973).
From an essay by the noted historian John C. Burnham for Progressivism, a set o f essays edited by 
Burnham, John D. Buenker, and Robert M. Crunden (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., 1977). 
See also the accounts o f reformers and democratic reform movements in Kevin Mattson, Creating A 
Democratic Public: The Struggle fo r Urban Participatory Democracy during the Progressive Era 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).
Gabriel Kolko characterized progressivism as an essentially conservative movement for this reason. See 
Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph o f  Conservatism: A Reinterpretation o f  American History, 1900-1916 
(London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). For further discussion o f reform during the interwar and 
1960s periods see Charles Noble, Welfare As We Know It: A Political History o f  the American Welfare 
State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Noble suggests that radical political reform has never 
had a strong political power base or the capital resources to marshal a sustained influence over the tenor of 
legislation. Reformers usually have had to compromise with the power elite in industry.
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negotiation actually took place among industrialists and politicians who were interested 
in preserving a corporate-centered political power structure. Most politicians o f this era, 
including Theodore Roosevelt, believed in “political capitalism,” or the role of 
government in helping to stabilize the national economy by catering to business interests. 
Regulation was in reality a way to consolidate and integrate industries and preserve their 
positions of power in the organization of major industries, public utilities, and 
municipalities. It also offset the decentralizing forces o f regulatory initiatives among the 
states, as well as the radicalism of moral and populist progressives.^^ Roosevelt’s 
Progressive Party privately upheld the need for strong corporate infrastructure while 
publicly preaching progressive social reform.
Ironically, as Daniel Rodgers has observed, it was political democracy that 
forestalled both radical reform on a national scale and the complete co-opting of public 
industries by private interests. American Progressives did not accomplish nearly as much 
social welfare reform as their European counterparts. American reform was gradual and 
non-uniform with few substantial changes made to the regulation o f public works and 
city planning (other than reforms in zoning laws) by the early twentieth century. The 
overly ambitious aims o f progressives to remake cities into “collective households” did 
not materialize, and urban reform took shape slowly through a combination of public and 
private interests working in close association with the federal government.^*
Kolko, Triumph o f Conservatism, 5-6, 76, 111, 205.
Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 158-65. As the title o f Rodgers’ study indicates. Progressive reform in 
America must be examined in relation to international urban reform, especially in Britain, France, and 
Germany. Proponents o f urban reform such as Henry C. Adams, Richard T. Ely, and Albert Shaw 
advocated comprehensive municipalization based on what they had seen o f reform projects in European 
cities. Controlled by landed classes, European administrators instituted social welfare programs more 
efficiently than their American counterparts. See comments on pages 131-55.
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Moreover, those among the middle ranks of urban planners, engineers, publie 
administrators, and eonsultants were complieit in the eonsolidation of eorporate power, 
sinee it provided them the opportunity to establish professional autonomy and ‘expert’ 
authority in their new roles as social m a n ag e rs .T h e se  management-oriented 
progressives took up the task of making municipalities operate more efficiently. 
Consultants were enlisted to apply their technical and scientific skills to the streamlining 
of public works and corporations.^*^ A collection o f new regional and national 
administrative associations populated by these professionals formed in the 1890s in order 
to create national standards and procedures and secure greater professional autonomy.^'
The Progressive Era: Liberal Renaissance or Liberal Failure, ed. Arthur Mann (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1963). See especially the revisionist essays by Richard Hofstadter on this “status 
revolution” thesis o f progressive reform, and that o f William E. Leuchtenburg, “True Radicals,” on the rise 
o f  the liberal elite. For more recent commentary on these organizations see Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic 
Crossings, 155. Also important to note here is the history of voting reform and the creation o f the 
referendum as a form o f direct legislation designed to check industrial interests. Although many historians 
have downplayed its effectiveness, Steven Piott notes that the referendum was instrumental in enacting 
legislation related to suffrage, direct primaries, recall elections, worker’s compensation, child labor, the 
eight hour work week, public utilities regulation, and tax code improvements during the progressive era.
See Steven Piott, Giving Voters a Voice: The Origins o f  the Initiative and Referendum in America 
(Columbia: University o f Missouri Press, 2003), 257.
Holli, “Urban Reform in the Progressive Era,” 133-52.
Ibid., 135-42.
Among these administrative associations were the National Municipal League, The League of 
American Municipalities, The American Society for Municipal Improvements, The City Mangers’ 
Association and the American League for Civic Improvements. Blake Mckelvey also notes that many of 
these early agencies grew out o f  privately run charity organizations and Social Gospel moral reform 
movements. These organizations eventually formed relationships with local governments and became the 
progenitors o f  social services agencies. For more on Social Gospel charities see Andrea Tone, The 
Business o f  Benevolence (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1997); Donald K. Gorrell, The Age o f  
Social Responsibility (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988); Hoyt Tandon Warner, Reforming 
American Life in the Progressive Era (New York: Pitman, 1971). Many administrative reform initiatives 
fell prey to political dissension, as Mckelvey says, “between the advocates o f complete home rule and those 
who favored state regulation, between champions o f a broad popular decision o f all issues and the 
proponents o f government by experts, between the believers in municipal socialism and the defenders o f 
free enterprise.” See Mckelvey, Urbanization, 254-57. Ultimately, state control won out over popular 
reform. Among progressives, there was also a cleavage between those who believed in democratic popular 
regulation and those who felt that municipalities should remain under the control o f  a managerial elite.
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In addition to the expansion of urban municipalities and local, state, and federal 
governments, the progressive era was also marked hy a public demand for scientific 
expediency in solving administrative problems connected to urbanization and 
industrialization.^^ Among those progressives who promoted the rationalization of 
industrial management, science and technology became the pathways to genuine and 
substantive social reform. By the early twentieth century the promotion of scientific 
expertise in civil affairs, business, and domestic life dominated much of the public 
discourse about reform id eo lo g y .T h eo d o re  Roosevelt’s natural resource conservation 
initiatives and his campaign for efficiency in government, for example, addressed the 
rationalization o f resource management as a scientific endeavor, one that would ensure 
the preservation of a national industrial economy.^"^ Indeed, as historian Samuel Hays 
argued, congressional debates over the proper uses of land, water, timber, coal, and other 
resources during Roosevelt’s administration were over whether scientific experts or 
legislators should he in charge, and not the conservationist progressive concern with 
protecting natural spaces from greedy private interests.^^
Scientists, Hays argued, wanted a system of resource management that was non­
political and that centered on independent teehnical expertise. They were encouraged by 
a nationwide fascination with the scientific procedures of management and eontrol in the
Burnham, Progressivism, 5.
Ibid., 19; Gould, Progressive Era, ix.
^  Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o f  Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 
1890-1920. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-5.
” Ibid., 142-46.
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1910s/^ Progressive legal scholars such as Louis Brandeis and liberal journalists such as 
Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann believed that the rationalization o f industrial 
processes was a blueprint for social harmony in American society. As proponents of 
scientific social management they argued that philanthropic institutions such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation should concentrate on developing 
scientific methods of social management.^’ Theodore Roosevelt, along with Croly and 
Lippmann, assented to Brandeis’ notion of the cultivation of a competent managerial 
class and the use o f the social “technologies” of scientific management.^* As editors and 
contributors to the well-known progressive magazine. The New Republic, Croly and 
Lippmann championed the evolution of the administrative state as a necessary step in 
social progress. By focussing administrative controls on all areas o f society, they 
claimed, the human potential o f each individual would be maximized. Far from 
oppressing humanity, advocates of what came to be known simply as “Scientific
R. Laurence Moore, “Direetions o f Thought in Progressive America,” 35-54; James Penick, Jr., “The 
Progressives and the Environment: Three Themes from the First Conservation Movement,” in The 
Progressive Era, 115-32. See also a discussion of progressive social science in John C. Burnham, 
“Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive MovemervX,” American Quarterly 12 (1960): 457-65.
Brandeis’ defense o f efficient scientific management over increased labor benefits in the famous railroad 
industry Rate Case o f 1910, for example, sparked a national efficiency craze that appealed to all manner of 
progressive labor advocates, humanitarians, educational reformers, and corporate muckrakers who saw the 
potential o f scientific industrial management in harmonizing the needs of labor with the fiscal controls o f 
big business. See Samuel Haber, EJficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era 
1890-1920 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). Haber mentions that proponents of 
industrial betterment sought harmony between management and labor, citing the model program set up by 
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How Their Relations Are Made Pleasant and Profitable (New York: Lentilhon & Co., 1900); Richard T. 
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Management,” argued that administrative specialization and diversity would end class 
divisions and alleviate social problems as well as preserve the heterogeneity of society by 
ridding it of older and more imprecise forms of soeial management.
Scientific Management was touted as the key to preserving, or rather, 
reinvigorating American democracy.^^ Its promise as a philosophy of soeial management 
attracted a number of high-profile progressive scholars and critics such as Thorstein 
Veblen, Lester Frank Ward, and John Dewey. All of them thought that humanitarian 
social aid, moral uplift, and the control of corporate greed might be realized through the 
scientific study and engineering of human relations, especially in the industrial setting.'*'  ^
They were divided, however, over the extent to which politics and the popular control of 
government should guide the formation of these new bureaucracies o f social 
administration.'” Some “technocrats” went so far as to support the complete separation 
of “inefficient” politics from the business of social administration in order to achieve
Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, 75-83.
Haber observes, however, that despite this nominal support o f democratic representation, the imposition 
o f professional management actually worked against popular control. There was as attempt to distance 
administrative processes from public scrutiny, since many professionals felt that social management would 
run better without public interference. See Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, xii. See similar comments in 
Martin L. Schiesl, The Politics o f  Efficiency : Municipal Administration and Reform in America 1800-1920 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1977), 47-87.
As Haber notes, Croly had written at length on these issues in his famous progressive tract. The Promise 
o f  American Life (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1909), where he argued that large-scale 
administrative social control would allow each individual’s abilities to be properly integrated into the 
workings o f complex society. Lippmann wrote in his books, A Preface to Politics (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1913) and Drift and Mastery (New York: M. Kennerley, 1914), that class conflict 
could only be resolved by organizing industry more efficiently using the principles o f Scientific 
Management. See Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, 82-96.
Indeed, as James Kloppenberg has observed, there were serious limitations to progressive philosophy and 
journalism in practical matters. Despite the literary exhortations o f those like Ely, Dewey, Croly, and 
Lippmann, American conventions and social ethics did not change. Here too, radicals could not offer a 
centralized and politically viable opposition. The clash o f liberal and conservative interests left 
progressives with the sense that democracy was “an endless struggle.” See James T. Kloppenberg,
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effective control. This philosophy of organized administration, as will be demonstrated 
in the present study, would have widespread cultural reverberations throughout the 
twentieth century as it continued to challenge the place and face of the self.'*^
The Case of Frederick W. Taylor: A Turn- of-the-Century Pop Icon of Science and 
Technocratic Social Reform
The philosophy of Scientific Management found its most popular proponent in the 
late nineteenth-century industrial engineer, Frederick W. Taylor. His rise to national 
aeclaim as an advocate of precision and efficiency in all industrial endeavors marks an 
important milestone in the history o f social reform and of management theory that has 
shaped American culture in the twentieth century. There are, as I will argue, important 
links between the scientific social management movements at the turn of the century and 
the careers of B. F. Skinner and Margaret Mead in the decades before and after the 
Second World War. Taylorism, Scientific Management, and its modem technocratic 
counterparts have exerted a profound influenee on American culture and the human 
sciences. Although often associated with industrial management, fiscal and political 
conservatism, and technocratic dehumanization. Taylorism’s basic emphasis on taking a 
scientific approach to the organization and control o f material and human resources was a 
soeietal goal to which both conservative (such as Herbert Hoover and Theodore 
Roosevelt) and liberal progressive (such as Brandeis, Croly, and Lippmann) reformers
Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought 1870-1920 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 415.
This separation philosophy originated with Frank J. Goodnow, who argued that the administrative wings 
o f government should act independently. See Haber, “The Politics o f Efficiency,” 99-116.
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aspired. The story o f Taylorism is also indicative of the same underlying tensions 
between contrasting visions of the modem self, the mechanistic and the holistic, which 
continued to evolve throughout the twentieth century in social science and society.
Taylorism and SM epitomized trends in American industry and society and 
contributed to the development of professional social science. The tendency of some 
historians to locate such broad cultural and scientific trends in the personage of any one 
individual, however, is always fraught with complications and contradictions. The story 
o f Taylor is one among many that have their source in the rise o f the modem American 
metropolis. What is intriguing about the specific case o f Taylorism, as Martha Banta 
suggests, is that organized efforts to popularize the mbric (if not the specific techniques) 
of SM were incredibly successful.'*^
Although no direct professional or personal connection existed between Taylor 
and either Skinner or Mead, each capitalized on a public desire for scientifically inspired 
methods o f social engineering. While each invoked a different image o f the self, both 
images were touted as being “scientific,” and both o f their soeial philosophies found 
reception among public audiences. Like Taylor, Skinner invoked the principles of 
experimental science as a guide to human nature and society. As I will demonstrate, this 
proved attractive to various corporate and public institutions in the post-World War Two 
decades because they emphasized efficiency and active soeial management. Although 
dedicated to promoting scientific social management within a democratic govemment, 
Mead believed that a study of culture and individual psychology, rather than of human
Martha Banta, Taylored Lives: Narrative Productions in the Age o f  Taylor, Veblen, and Ford (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1993).
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behavioral efficiency, should guide the application of soeial science. Mead’s theories of 
scientific soeial reform, unlike Skinner’s, celebrated the uniqueness and diversity of 
humanity and culture, as well as the soundness of democratic politieal institutions that 
supported the individual. Her theories were attractive to various soeial democratic 
reform movements among women and the youth counterculture during the 1950s and 
60s.
“Efficiency,” as many progressive era historians have observed, became the 
watchword of much reform rhetoric. As a virtue o f modem living it was thought to hold 
the solution to all social ills. “Efficiency,” as the historian Samuel Haber declared, 
“meant social harmony and the leadership of the ‘competent.’”'*'* By far the most famous 
proponent of industrial and soeial efficiency, the originator and father o f Scientific 
Management and the inspiration for the cult of effieieney, was the American engineer and 
inventor, Frederick W. Taylor (1856-1915). A mechanical engineer by training, Taylor 
rose to national celebrity with his ‘expert’ testimony in the Rate Case of 1910.'*  ^ With the 
help of Louis Brandeis, Taylor’s seminal tract. The Principles o f  Scientific Management 
(1911), was brought to national fame during the railroad hearings with its serialization in 
the popular mainstream progressive periodical. The American Magazine. Principles 
gained wide public appeal not only as a commentary on the labor debates o f the day, but 
also as an explication o f science-inspired management principles that could be applied 
broadly in American society. Taylor was acknowledged as the leader o f the “efficiency”
Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, ix.
For more on this case see Hays, Conservation and Hugh G. J. Aitken, Scientific Management in Action: 
Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal, 1908-1915 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
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movement in business administration as well as the figurehead o f the social phenomenon 
known as “Taylorism.”'*®
Originally bound for Harvard College in the mid-1870s, Taylor instead rose 
through the ranks o f the Midvale Steel Company in Philadelphia to become its chief 
engineer o f production in the early 1880s. He later took his degree in mechanical 
engineering from the Stevens Institute of Technology. He first began his renowned time 
and motion studies o f factory operations at Midvale where he used a stopwatch to analyze 
the efficiency of workers performing rote tasks. Out of these experiments evolved his 
industrial management philosophy. It focused on the meticulous quasi-scientific scrutiny 
of all the physical movements of workers in the factory. The breakdown of these 
processes into measurable parts, he demonstrated, offered shop managers and factory 
engineers a method for pinpointing and correcting production inefficiencies. In the 1890s 
Taylor was in high demand as a manufacturing consultant and lecturer. He became a 
prominent leader of a professional movement among industrial engineers affiliated with 
the new American Society of Mechanical Engineers to eradicate unscientific techniques 
of production in industry through the “systematic management” and rationalization of the 
factor}' environment.'*^
“Like most contemporary businessmen,” the Taylor biographer, Daniel Nelson 
has observed, “Taylor equated social progress with technological progress. He had little 
regard for philanthropy and a low opinion of labor unions and their intellectual
Daniel Nelson, “The Making of a Progressive Engineer: Frederick W. Taylor,” Pennsylvania Magazine 
o f  History and Biography 103-104 (October, 1979): 446-66. See pages 465-66.
For an appraisal o f this movement see Edward Layton, The Revolt o f  the Engineers: Social Responsibility 
and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1971).
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promoters.”''* Inasmuch as the Principles laid out Taylor’s technical approach to 
manufacturing processes, it also incorporated a philosophy of labor management that 
distinguished between workers and ‘expert’ engineers, pointing to the inefficiency of 
allowing laborers to control the techniques of production. Implicit in Taylor’s 
management philosophy was his transfer of administrative responsibility for all aspects of 
production into the hands of professionally trained engineers and efficiency consultants. 
These experts possessed scientific expertise to direct labor in the most efficient way. 
Taylor argued for the administrative autonomy of management scientists and engineers, 
not only in the factory, but also in all areas o f industrial administration.
Taylor became known worldwide as “Mr. Scientific Management,” a name as his 
most recent biographer, Robert Kanigel, observes, that “rival[ed] Edison or Ford.”''*^
With regard to his management philosophy, Taylor observed in the Principles that it was 
“no single element but rather the combination, that constitute[d] scientific management, 
which may be summarized as:
Science, not rule of thumb.
Harmony, not discord.
Cooperation, not individualism.
Maximum output, in place of restricted output.
The development o f each man to his greatest efficiency and
prosperity.” ®^
These principles reflected the new moral and civic values of urban life, and a departure 
from the rural individualist tradition. Science, as Taylor said, was the “grand equalizer”
Nelson, “Progressive Engineer,” 449.
Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma o f  EJficiency (New York: 
Viking Penguin, 1997), 2.
Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles o f  Scientific Management (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 
1998 ,  C1911), 74.
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in examining all factory operations and human relations. The subjection of human and 
mechanical processes to the rigors of scientific analysis, he claimed, made for a more 
efficient labor force and a fiscally responsible employer. Yet in this simple set of 
management maxims that extolled the primacy of the system, o f production, and the 
maximization of human potential lay a powerful and influential rubric for progressive- 
style social reform — it postulated no less than a science of society.
Indeed, as Taylor graduated from his professional role as an engineer to that of 
industrial reformer and aspiring social critic in the early 1910s, he geared the social 
technologies and inventions of Scientific Management^’ to attract the attention of 
progressive reformers. Written specifically for a lay audience. Principles was not a 
technical manual but a dramatic biographical account of SM’s success in solving 
industrial problems. As Daniel Nelson has pointed out, it was precisely because Taylor 
made the principles o f SM, rather than their technical application, the main subject of 
what was regarded as a “progressive manifesto” that Taylor’s popularity soared in the 
coming d e c a d e s . A s  many Taylor historians and historians o f management theory have 
observed, it was not Taylor’s real-world application of SM but his appeal to seientific 
thinking and the scientific analysis o f the factory environment that made a profound 
impact on the development of business administration theory.^^ SM’s invocation of
51 Hereafter referred to as SM.
Daniel Nelson, Frederick W. Taylor and the Rise o f  Scientific Management (Madison, WI: The 
University o f Wisconsin Press, 1980), 170.
”  To fault Taylor for his failures as a business consultant, many observe, is to overlook his key contribution 
o f a basic framework for the new sciences o f management and control. See Kanigel, One Best Way, 13; 
Daniel Nelson, Frederick W. Taylor, 170-73; Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, ix-x; Scientific Management: 
Frederick Winslow Taylor’s Gift to the World?, ed. J. C. Spender and Hugo J. Kijne (Boston: Kluwer 
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scientific method, or a ‘science-like’ approach to society, in bringing simplicity and 
clarity to complex social phenomena, proved very appealing to management 
professionals.
As Kanigel notes, Taylor’s impact on the workplace and on urban society at large 
was akin to the cultural and intellectual influence o f Freudian psychology, Marxian 
economics, and Darwinian evolutionary theory. Taylor brought the cultural experiences 
o f urbanization and progressive reform together in the ideological framework o f SM. His 
contribution was not an original innovation in scientific research, but rather his 
promotion o f what Kanigel has called the “scientific mindset.” Taylor drew inspiration 
for his “laws” of management from the exact sciences; the rule of induction and 
experimentation determined the parameters of the factory and the nature of human 
relationships.^'* In turn, as Kanigel observes, the Taylorized factory represented for many 
progressives an ideal social microcosm; it was a model o f an orderly and efficient social 
system. Unlike other industrial icons such as Henry Ford, however, Taylor not only 
focused on increasing the improvement of the mechanical means of production but also 
on the direct control o f human beings in order to improve their mechanical efficiency.
His aim was to subject human behavior to the rigors of the system, as defined by science, 
and make them into efficient laboring machines.^^
W. Taylor, The Father o f  Scientific Management: Myth and Reality (Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin, 
I990F
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As Anson Rabinbach has observed, Taylor was not the first seientist to invoke the 
“human motor” machine metaphor of humanity in discussing theories of social reform. 
Nineteenth-century European studies of “labor power” and efficiency in factories 
combined concepts of energy in thermodynamics and entropy theory with the idea of the 
human body as a reservoir of work.^^ What Rabinbach calls scientific and 
“transcendental materialism,” the idea of reducing human activity to motion, energy, and 
productive output, became a key element in European social theory and reform polities. 
The battle against fatigue, the human analogy to entropy, found its counterpart in studies 
o f human inefficiency by Taylor. While Europeans had employed the concept o f the 
human motor and labor power in service o f improving labor conditions. Taylorism 
emphasized managerial control. The result, many workers believed, was dehumanizing. 
The human motor concept in American industrial production theory became far more 
important than it was in Europe.
As a general formula for industrial and social reform, however, SM attained 
widespread public appeal in the early 1910s. The Rate Case and the publication of 
Principles saw “Taylorism” sweep the nation in what came to be known as the social 
efficiency “c r a z e . W h e n  Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover spoke of 
governmental, industrial, and human wastefulness, the touted efficiency as an almost 
patriotic obligation. In the pages of such popular magazines as System, The Efficient Age 
and the Ladies Home Journal, and advice books such as Euther H. Gulick’s The Efficient
Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origin o f  Modernity (New York: Basic 
Books, 1990), 1-5.
Ibid., 240-50.
Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, 51-52.
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Life (1913), efficiency in the workplace and the home was promoted for its morally 
uplifting qualities and as a sign of middle class success.^ Housewives, for example, 
were encouraged to set up “efficiency stations” that would liberate them from inefficient 
housework. The tireless religious promoter. Reverend Charles Stelzle, took up SM as a 
way to increase the effectiveness of conversion campaigns. Educational administrators 
also became fascinated with SM as a way to centralize school management.^' 
Associations of businessmen dedicated to management reform, such as the Rotary Club 
and the Taylor Society, were launched to promote the Taylorization o f business 
management.^^
Although the popular efficiency craze waned by the mid-1910s, scientific 
efficiency as a central concept of production, management, and control grew steadily in 
the 1920s and 30s and achieved international notoriety. As Secretary o f the Department 
of Commerce, Herbert Hoover was among those ardent promoters o f SM who 
campaigned against industrial and human resource wastefulness. Hoover advocated 
“associative” progressivism, an approach to social management that sought a cooperative 
balance between a free-market economy and govemment regulation.^^ He wanted to use 
existing trade and engineering associations to coordinate the scientific rationalization of 
American industries. In his famous “Waste in Industry” report of 1921 before the 
Committee on the Elimination of Waste in Industry o f the Federated American Engineers
“  Ibid., 58.
Ibid, 63-64.
“  Ibid., 72.
Ellis W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover and Economic Stabilization, 1921-1922,” in Herbert Hoover as a 
Secretary o f  Commerce: Studies in New Era Thought and Practice, ed. Ellis W. Hawley (Iowa City, lA: 
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Societies, Hoover called for the formation of a federal network of bureaus that would 
reorganize agriculture, housing construction, and the coal mining industry, and manage 
them under the aegis of the Department of C om m e r c e . H o o v e r  launched the Foreign 
Trade Financing Corporation and the Division of Building and Housing in the Bureau of 
Standards. He also sponsored the Agricultural Credits Act, the first farm subsidy bill, to 
help the agriculture industry market and distribute food products more efficiently.^^
By the end of the 1920s, SM had invaded all aspects o f American life. Hoover’s 
dream of a networked association of govemment bureaus, scientists, and industrialists 
never materialized, but the idea exerted strong influence on New Deal reform initiatives 
in the 1 9 3 0 s . S M  also helped to launch the ‘cult of the expert’ and the birth o f what 
Walter Rautenstraush in the 1930s would term the “technocrat.”^^  Inspired by Taylor- 
style progressive management theory, the technocracy movement of the 1930s promoted 
social management through strict adherence to engineering science and natural law (e. g..
Hawley, “Hoover,” 48. For a contemporary assessment o f Hoover’s work in the department see the 
preface to Scientific Management since Taylor: A Collection o f  Authoritative Papers, ed. Edward Eyre 
Hunt (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1924).
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thermodynamics) and advocated the exclusive authority of technicians and scientists. 
Technocrats such as Howard Scott and Henry L. Ganntt argued that neither government 
nor business alone could run society efficiently. Society, they claimed, should be in the 
hands of engineers. Many organizations such as Technocracy Inc. (headed by Scott) 
were formed to help promote this philosophy.^^ Taylorism also helped foster a new wing 
of professional management specialties such as human relations, industrial engineering, 
and business management. American corporations started efficiency divisions, and new 
graduate programs in management were developed.^^
Taylorism was never without its critics. A hero to management progressives and 
technocrats, Taylor was reviled by laborers who were subjected to his efficiency 
methods. From the beginning of Taylor’s time and motion experiments in the 1880s, 
workers complained that his methods imposed a harsh pace o f production. A year after 
the Rate Case o f 1910, in response to labor protests, Taylor was called to defend his 
methods publicly before the House Committee Investigating the Taylor and Other 
Systems of Shop Management. The introduction o f Taylor’s time studies at the 
Watertown Arsenal in Massachusetts in 1911 had been met with a strike by the 
International Union of Molders, sparking a national c on t r o v e r s y . Fa r  from being the
67 Kanigel, One Best Way, 486-90.
68 For a conlemporary appraisal o f this movement and its philosophy see For and Against Technocracy: A 
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“Great Harmonizer” of labor and capital, Taylor was accused of treating men like 
machines and attempting to co-opt all of their initiative and individual autonomy in the 
workplace.’ ' Time and motion experiments were banned at government-run munitions 
plants in 1915 as a result.’  ^Nevertheless, as Hugh Aitken has observed, Taylorism as an 
organizational philosophy of production management had been firmly engrained in 
govemment factories despite the controversy. The Taylor Society modified its policy 
recommendations to accommodate labor cooperation with management. Taylorism had a 
profound impact on govemment industries as a whole in the 1910s and 20s and was 
incorporated into the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, the Board o f Railroad 
Wages and Working Conditions, and the National War Labor Board.’’
The potential evils of a “Taylored,” or technocratic, society writ large were also 
explored in the 1920s and 30s by humanist social critics like D. H. Lawrence, John Dos 
Passos, George Orwell, and Aldous Huxley. In Evgenii Zamiatin’s 1924 dystopian 
novel, We, fictitious “Taylor’s Tables” o f railroad schedules were expanded to subject 
every aspect of daily life to precise controls, and time was divided between that before 
Taylor (“B. T.”) and after Taylor (“A. T.”).’"^ The implications o f broad based social 
control that were symbolized in SM contradicted the assumption among many 
progressives like Veblen and Lippmann that the general advance of science and
Kanigel, One Best Way, 2-5, 533-36. Kanigel describes Taylor this way on page 17.
Daniel Nelson, “Frederick W. Taylor and the Rise of Scientific Management,” 164.
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technology (mechanical, social, or otherwise) would help preserve American democracy 
and counter the ravages o f unchecked industrialization. Despite the expectation that 
democracy would be advanced by removing the inefficiencies o f the older shop system, 
“industrial democracy” in the factory and society never materialized.
Anyone with direct experience of the thralldom of Taylorism or similar forms of 
industrial management understood that it was thoroughly anti-democratic, more 
compatible with a military social structure than anything else.^^ For progressive 
managers and engineers, as Haber observes, “[ejfficiency provided a standpoint from 
which those who had declared allegiance to democracy could resist the leveling 
tendencies of the principle of equality. Taylorites countered such criticism with the 
assertion that the sacrifice of individual autonomy in the factory was necessary in order to 
preserve equal opportunity for all, and to allow individuals to move up the corporate 
ladder. Considering a nation now defined by corporate models o f bureaucracy, 
technocracy, and the sciences o f social administration, many humanists saw submission 
to the system and loss of individual autonomy as a Faustian bargain.’’ Taylorism 
nevertheless became ubiquitous in American industry after 1915. Industrial engineering
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty Four: A Novel (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1949). On John Dos Passos see 
Thomas P. American Genesis, 188.
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and related areas o f social sciences, disciplines that owed their existence to these 
management developments, moved from organizing production to studying the 
behavioral efficiency o f workers themselves/^
Taylorism thus had perpetuated the mechanization of the worker that had begun in 
nineteenth-century labor theory, an evolution that continued well into the twentieth 
century/^ World War One brought studies of human work related to “fatigue, 
production, industrial hygiene, and ergonomics” to the fore. Enthusiasm for these studies 
continued throughout the interwar period and fueled the technocratic social visions of 
politicians, philosophers, and social scientists.**  ^ The ‘scientization’ o f human nature and 
potential, moreover, contributed to what Rabinbach has termed an American “paradigm 
of social modernity” that was at the center of reform debates and welfare initiatives.
The Great War ended many of the reform movements inspired by the politics of 
progressivism, but it did not dampen enthusiasm for social management ideology or what 
historian Guy Alchon has described as the technocratic mindset among social science 
professionals, private philanthropists, and highly placed government officials (such as 
Herbert Hoover) in the 1920s who advocated the streamlining of bureaucracy through 
scientific, particularly statistical, analysis of social and economic phenomena.*’ When 
interest in government sponsorship of such studies waned after the second world war, 
professionals in economics, social work, municipal administration, and engineering
Ibid., 140.
Braverman, Labor, 180; Aitken, The Human Motor, 272.
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turned to private philanthropic organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Russell Sage Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation for financial support in building 
research centers dedicated to national planning. Much o f the impetus in creating such 
privately funded centers as the National Bureau of Economic Reform and the Federation 
of American Engineering Societies was to generate much needed data on such things as 
business and unemployment cycles. The Taylorites, along with the American Economics 
Association and the American Statistics Association and other professional groups, 
lobbied for such research and for government legislation.^^
This is to say that Taylorism and SM were not the only sources o f the technocratic 
worldview among progressives and professional managers in the 1920s who were 
advocating the rationalization of social management. Many groups lobbied for such 
reforms. Indeed, during the Great Depression in the 1930s, New Deal social welfare 
initiatives were heavily influenced by the ideology of scientific social management and 
technocratic planning that had gained momentum in the 1920s and became part of what 
Richard Hofstadter has described as a period o f economic “intervention” and 
“experimentation” in the 1930s. Debates over reform weighed the merits o f scientific 
rationalization for economic preservation against the need to protect the rights of the 
individual. These discussions, in turn, mirrored the tensions between mechanistic and 
holistic visions of the self in Interwar and postwar social science, tensions that Skinner, in 
particular, would focus on in his challenge to American polity and democracy in the 
1950s, 60s, and early 70s.
Ibid.
Rabinbach characterizes social welfare debates this way in Human Motor, 273. See also the comments 
by Richard Hofstadter in ^ g e  o f  Reform, 273-315.
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The Rise of Modern Social Science and Competing Pathways of Social Reform
John C. Burnham and Burton Bledstein have examined the close relationship 
between professional development and scientific praxis in progressive-era reform 
movements. Professionalism in social administration, the desire for expertise, opened up 
new opportunities for academics, especially in the social sciences. During the first two 
decades o f the twentieth century progressives were allied increasingly with the emerging 
disciplines o f political science, economics, sociology, psychiatry, and psychology. 
Scholars and scientists in these fields provided the theoretical tools and the intellectual 
authority necessary to bring reform schemes into reality. Many scientists in these fields 
retooled their research methods, epistemologies, and technical applications to reflect the 
basic goals of progressive social reform; this entailed the prediction and control o f social 
phenomena.*"^ Indeed, the idea that human environments could be engineered to improve 
humankind was essential to both progressive reform and the professional expansion of 
social science. Social scientists, mechanists and humanists alike, in the early twentieth 
century shared in the universal progressive dedication to municipal and civic stewardship 
and the mission to create techniques of social management and control. Indeed, with 
regard to progressive and social scientific visions of the self, it is important to recognize 
that these perspectives on human nature and social organization varied widely and were 
combined in different way to produce a host of different permutations and interpretations.
^  Bumham, “Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive Movement,” 457; Burton J. Bledstein, The 
Culture o f  Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development o f  Higher Education in America (New  
York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1976), 112-27, 326-27.
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Skinner’s and Mead’s visions of the self, although diametrically opposed to one another, 
are only two among many examples in a continuum in the social sciences.
Dorothy Ross has noted that the confluence of historical and evolutionary 
perspectives in science and political theory, and an awareness o f emerging social forces 
(market capitalism, social diversification, industrial expansion), had a transforming effect 
on late nineteenth and early twentieth-century medical and social science. American 
modernist ideology reflected change and transition in society, and the social sciences 
embraced a neo-positivist appreciation for its lawful nature, especially, for example, in 
s o c i o l o g y . I n  the therapeutic sciences such as psychiatry, organicism and scientific 
materialism relocated mental disease in the nervous system; physical defects were at the 
heart o f any mental ailment.^^ Conversely, the restorative virtues o f psychotherapy also 
began to be included in diagnostic training. Medical professionals saw that improving 
the mental health o f patients might also be a matter o f environment and social adjustment 
rather than merely of heredity or d isease.P sychotherapists moved away from a 
hereditarian view o f human nature and were especially zealous in their efforts to promote 
better environments for children to prevent delinquency and mental illness.
Dorothy Ross, The Origins o f  American Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
146-47. Ross notes that these perspectives were exemplified in the sociologies o f  Albion Small and 
Franklin Giddings, who, along with other academics in economics and political science, were deeply 
influenced by such tracts as Karl Pearson’s Grammar o f  Science (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1892) that outlined a neo-positive approach to human nature. See Ross’s summary article “Modernist 
Social Science in the Land o f the New/Old,” in Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences, 1870-1930, ed. 
Dorothy Ross (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 171-89.
Bumham, “Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive Movement,” 459.
Ibid., 461- See also Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph o f  Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity 
— Environment Controversy, 1900-1941 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
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Social science progressives employed a future-oriented, liberal-historical 
perspective that emphasized a break with the past to revitalize American exceptionalism 
and relocate individualism in theories of social order and control. Social scientific 
professionalization and specialization helped to shift the focus o f theory, however, from 
broad social evolutionary models to research on short-term changes in the 1920s and 30s 
when technocratic visions of social management became popular and statistical 
methodology ruled the day. Technocratic social theory embodied the belief that the 
principles o f science themselves could serve as a guide to social reconstruction and 
alleviate the need for extensive political debate.**
It has been generally acknowledged that the rise o f the behavioral perspective on 
human nature was central to the creation of modem American psychology. John B. 
Watson (1878-1958) is often hailed as the champion of the behavioral movement that 
sought to rid psychology o f introspection and useless theorizing in order to achieve 
prediction and control over human behavior.*^ Watson developed his science with an eye 
toward practical social applications.^^ But as John Mills and Franz Samelson have 
argued, it is a mistake to assume that Watsonian behaviorism inaugurated the behaviorist 
perspective.^' Quite the contrary, progressivism created the American behaviorist
Ross, Origins, 244-50, 387.
Bumham, “Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive Movement,” 462.
^  For an overview o f these characteristics see the introduction to John A. Mills, Control: A History o f  
Behavioral Psychology (New York; New York University Press, 1998).
’ ’ For more on the roots o f the behavioral perspective in American social science see Kerry W. Buckley, 
Mechanical Man: John Broadus Watson and the Beginnings o f  Behaviorism (New York: Guilford Press, 
1989); John Mills, Control: A History o f  Behavioral Psychology, Franz Samelson, “Organizing for the 
Kingdom o f Behavior: Academic Battles and Organizational Polieies in the Twenties,” Journal o f  the 
History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 21 (1985): 33-47; Franz Samelson, “Struggle for Scientific Authority: 
The Reception o f W atson’s Behaviorism, 1913-1920,” Journal o f  the History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 17 
(1981): 399-425.
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perspective, and it pervaded all the social sciences in the 1920s; psyehology was but one 
affected branch. The disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology also 
reflected the behaviorist approach to individual and social dynamics.
In the methodological and research context of modem social science the 
mechanistic view o f the individual made the control o f human nature more direct, 
immediate, and mathematically precise than therapeutic techniques. It is thus no 
coincidence that social scientists by and large adopted the mechanistic approach to the 
self in the opening decades of the twentieth century. The mechanistic approach provided 
the best opportunity for crafting social technologies and institutionalizing the professions. 
Yet, as Skinner and Mead would learn in the course of their early training in science, 
assent to a mechanistic vision of the self in the study of humanity entailed a vision of 
social reform that fundamentally challenged democracy. As a radical behaviorist,
Skinner embraced Tayloresque inductivism and a technocratie vision of social progress. 
Mead, however, opted for a revised scientific methodology wherein social science would 
preserve democracy and the dignity of the individual.
Democracy was challenged, however, during the Great Depression and the 
Second World War. As Mark Smith has observed, social scientists searched for their 
“normative” roles in society in the 1930s. Some (like Skinner) preferred the objective 
purity of methodology and technique, while others (like Mead) sought a broader 
partieipatory role for social s c i e n c e . A l o n g  with many o f their colleagues, Skinner and
Mark C. Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 
1918-1941 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 256-57. For more on the political activism among 
social scientists in the 1930s sec Peter J. Kuznick, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists As Political Activists 
in 1930s America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
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Mead believed that political reform and social progress in the postwar decades would 
stand in direct relation to social science. What vision of the self and what kind o f science 
of society, they asked, would Americans need? As with a study of Taylorism, the 
pertinent historical question is why Skinnerism and Meadism became popular. How did 
these prominent social scientists tap into the American affinity for ‘system’ in organizing 
modem life? Why, in other words, did Mead and Skinner themselves seem to be 
reflections of the American cultural experience?
B. F. Skinner and the “Taylorization” of Behavioral Psychology
For B. F. Skinner, professional isolation in experimental psyehology during the 
Interwar years gave way in the postwar decades to a public fascination with his 
mechanical technologies o f behavior modification, and his radical brand o f social theory. 
Recently, Laurence Smith, William Woodward and other historians o f psychology have 
argued that behavioral psychology, particularly the career of Skinner, should be 
addressed as cultural phenomena in and of t hemse lves .Sk inne r ’s social philosophy 
reflected the modem embrace of technology as part of our collective and individual 
identity. He is, as Woodward argued, the “embodiment o f a technological ideal,” that 
has been incorporated into innumerable areas of education, medicine, business and
”  William R. Woodward, “Skinner and Behaviorism as Cultural Icons: From Local Knowledge to Reader 
Reception,” 7-34, especially pages 8 and 21, and Laurence D. Smith, “Situating B. F. Skinner and 
Behaviorism in American Culture,” 294-315, in B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture, ed. 
Laurence D Smith and William R. Woodward (London: Associated University Presses, 1996). Woodward 
also notes the proliferation o f academic journals dedicated to exploring behaviorism’s influence on 
economic, political, philosophical, and medical thought. The essays in Smith and Woodward, which are 
addressed further here and in the next chapter, most aptly represent the new scholarship on Skinner that 
attempts to evaluate his influence on American culture.
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s c i e n c e . The challenge in studying Skinner, then, is to get beyond his iconic status in 
behavioral psychology, a mythology that he himself helped construct, and explore how he 
was received in the public, and how he himself reflected trends in American culture.^^ 
That challenge is taken up as part of the present study.
My analysis of Skinner’s career contributes to a historiography that examines the 
popular reception of Skinnerian behaviorism and social theory. It places Skinner 
squarely within the context of broader trends in postwar American culture. These trends 
include urbanization and the rise o f social planning in the early 20th century mentioned in 
the previous section, as well as the response of professional social science to such trends.
I contend that the examination of contrasting public articulations o f mechanistic and 
holistic images of the self, as presented in this analysis, carries us farther down the path 
toward understanding Skinner as a cultural phenomenon.
The ideal of social efficiency and the desire for scientific expertise in the urban 
environment were part of a reform ideology, as we have seen, that exerted considerable 
influence on the evolution of the behavioral perspective in psychology in the 1920s when 
Skinner began his career in science.^^ Nils Wiklander has effectively demonstrated that 
Skinner’s aspirations toward a science of social reform began well before the publication 
of his seminal tracts on behavioral social theory in the 1940s. Their true roots, he claims.
Woodward, “Skinner and Behaviorism as Cultural Icons,” 8.
Ibid., 9. It should be noted that Woodward views the studies in Smith and Woodward et al. as part o f the 
sociology o f science, a literature that has contributed significantly to the history o f science over the past 
two decades. Although my study addressed the core o f this historiography, my intent is to present a 
cultural history o f Skinner that forges links to the historiography o f American cultural history.
^  Laurence Smith summarizes the historiography on this connection in relation to Skinner’s status as a 
cultural “product.” See Smith, “Situating B. F. Skinner,” 298.
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lay in his reaction to progressive and neo-progressive reform movements in the early 
twentieth century.^’
Skinner’s desire to apply the behavioral techniques honed in the laboratory to 
projects in social engineering was originally inspired by what the social critic Louis 
Berman described in the 1920s as a the “religion” of behaviorism, similar to the 
efficiency craze at the turn o f the century.^* Skinner’s early experiments with reform 
rhetoric and social criticism came during his “dark period” in the year before he began 
studying psychology. His awareness of the limitations on political and philanthropic 
social planning during the 1920s contributed to his early embrace o f science (inspired by 
his reading o f H. G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, John B. Watson, and others) as the basis of 
social reform. Wiklander demonstrates that Skinner’s experimental overhaul of 
behaviorism in the 1930s was fueled by his long held aspiration toward a behavioral 
science o f society.^ When Skinner moved to recast the methodology and epistemology 
o f behavioral psychology in the late 1930s, his research gave rise to a radical behaviorism 
that emphasized the experimental mastery of the environment, and thus over the
”  Nils Wiklander, “From Hamilton College to Walden Two: An Inquiry into B. F. Skinner’s Early Social 
Philosophy,” in Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture, 83-105. For 
more on Skinner’s “Dark year” experiments in 1926 with a career in writing and social criticism see 
chapter three, “A Hill o f Dreams” in Daniel W. Bjork, B. F. Skinner: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 
1993), 54-75; Alan C. Elms, “Skinner’s Dark Year and Walden Two,” American Psychologist 36 (1981): 
470-79; S. R. Coleman, “B. F. Skinner, 1926-1928: From Literature to Psychology,” The Behavior Analyst 
8 (1985): 77-92.
Louis Berman, The Religion Called Behaviorism (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1927).
^  More specifically, Wiklander points to archival evidence that documents Skinner’s early plans for this 
science. Along with Carl Murchison and Warren Weaver, for example, Skinner participated in a 1934 
work group sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation where he explored the use o f verbal behavior studies 
as the key to managing human affairs. Wiklander also points to unpublished writings on behavioral 
epistemology that are squarely focused on the scientific investigation of human nature. See Wiklander’s 
references to Skinner’s 1932 “Sketch for an Epistemology,” on page 103, note 62, and the published 
version o f his article “The Generic Nature o f the Concepts o f Stimulus and Response,” Journal o f  General 
Psychology 12 (1935): 40-65, in note 63.
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organism. This shift in perspective proved very successful, establishing Skinner as a 
prominent experimental psychologist by the late 1940s.
The origins of Skinner’s operant behaviorism and his philosophy of science also 
can be traced to his exposure as a young man to the inductivism of Francis Bacon, his 
reading o f the behaviorist John B. Watson, and his exposure in college and graduate 
school to the experimental reductionism of the physiologists Ernst Mach, Jacques Loeb, 
and Ivan Pavlov. Skinner began his formal training in psychology at Harvard at a pivotal 
time in the development of experimental psychology. Psychology as a distinct discipline 
by this time was farther removed from its ties with philosophy and the intellectual 
heritage of m e t a p h y s i c s . W i t h  the spread of physicalism and reduetionism in science 
in the 1910s and 1920s, many American psychologists began to explore the mechanical 
and biological dimensions of psychological phenomena. John B. Watson introduced the 
profession and the public to this behavioral psychology in his seminal text o f 1925, 
Behaviorism. He presented an experimental methodology for psychology that was 
inspired by the physical sciences. It emphasized the precise measurement and control of
This transition has o f late received extensive treatment by historians o f  American psychology. The 
history o f behaviorism is in many respects a chronicle o f the drive to move psychology away from 
introspective and philosophical speculation and towards quantification and the laboratory. For a recent 
discussion o f contemporary debates over the connections between mind and body and how to approach this 
question experimentally, see Nadine M. Weidman, Constructing Scientific Psychology: Karl Lashley’s 
Mind-Body Debates (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Dorothy Ross has addressed the 
movement o f political science, sociology, and economics into empirical and scientific investigation in the 
late nineteenth century. Consult her article, “The Development o f the Social Sciences in America, 1860- 
1920,” in The Organization o f  Knowledge in Modern America, ed. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 107-38 as well as her full exposition in The Origins o f  
American Social Science. For an overview o f professional development in psychology during the 
formative years o f the 1920s see Michael M. Sokal, “James McKeen Cattell and American Sociology in the 
1920s,” in Explorations in the History o f  Psychology in the United States, ed. Joseph Brozek (Lewisburg: 
Bucknell University Press, 1984), 273-323 and James H. Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, 
Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929-1969 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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behavior.’®’ Skinner’s indoctrination into psychology at Harvard in 1928 reflected the
confluence of these trends and ideas.
As Laurence Smith has observed, Skinner’s philosophy o f science traces its
origins to Baconian natural philosophy and an exclusive adherence to the observation and
description of physical phenomena.’®^ Like Bacon’s, Skinner’s scientific epistemology
was firmly rooted in the assumption that the study of natural order lay in the exhaustive
accumulation of factual information. Bacon’s main contribution to the Scientific
Revolution in the seventeenth century was his rejection o f artificial systems of
classification and language that were used to explain natural phenomena. Bacon’s New
Organon (1620) outlined a natural philosophy constructed from the gradual accumulation
of facts and the careful delineation of inductive inferences, or “middle axioms,” about
natural law. “As for those who have given the first place to Logic,” Bacon asserted,
supposing that the surest helps to the sciences were to be found in that, 
they have indeed most truly and excellently perceived that the human 
intellect left to its own course is not to be trusted; but then the remedy is 
altogether too weak for the disease; nor is it without evil itself. For the 
logic which is received, though it be very properly applied to civil 
business and to those arts which rest in discourse and opinion, is not 
nearly subtle enough to deal with nature; and in offering at what it cannot 
master, has done more to establish and perpetuate error than to open the 
way to truth ... This doctrine then of the expurgation of the intellect to 
qualify it for dealing with truth, is comprised in three refutations: the 
refutation of the Philosophies; the refutation of the Demonstrations; and 
the refutation of the Natural Human Reason.’®^
101 John B. Watson, Behaviorism (New York: The People’s Institute Publishing Co., Inc., 1925).
Laurence Smith has discussed the relationship between Baconian philosophy o f science and Skinner’s 
behaviorism in his book, Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment o f  the Alliance (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1986). See also his concise summation in Smith, “Knowledge as Power: The 
Baconian Roots o f Skinner’s Social Meliorism,’’ in Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism 
in American Culture, 56-82.
These statements come from Bacon’s introduction to the New Organon entitled The Great Instauration. 
See Francis Bacon, New Atlantis and The Great Instauration, ed. Jerry Weinberger (Arlington Heights, IL: 
Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1980), 12, 25.
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Skinner, like Bacon, Smith asserts, was skeptical of the explanatory efficacy of 
metaphysics, and he opted instead to concentrate on describing the physical regularities 
in nature.
More contemporary figures such as the physicist/physiologist Ernst Mach and the 
biologist Jacques Loeb exerted considerable influence on Skinner’s approach to animal 
and human b e h a v i o r . A s  a student at Hamilton College in the early 1920s, Skinner 
encountered Mach, a proponent of scientific empiricism and logical positivism, in a 
history of science course taught by George Sarton. Skinner read The Science o f  
Mechanics (1893) and was deeply affected by Mach’s views on the essence and purpose 
o f s c i e n c e . M a c h  shared Bacon’s distaste for metaphysical speculation in science and 
his desire to rid scientific language and theory construction of philosophical 
‘i m p u r i t i e s . M a c h ’s idea of causality also was similar to Bacon’s notion o f the 
descriptive laws of nature. Mach described causality strictly in terms of mathematical 
correlation between different sets of empirical data, correlations that had predictive value 
and utility. The ultimate aim of science, according to Bacon, was to obtain mastery over 
the natural world for the benefit of humankind. The functions o f science and technology 
were thus the same. Mach expressed this utilitarian view of science in Darwinian terms.
See the introductory essay in Modern Perspectives on B. F. Skinner and Contemporary Behaviorism, ed. 
by James T. Todd and Edward K. Morris (Westport, CT; Greenwood Press, 1995), xxi -  xxviii. O f 
particular note is the illustration o f Skinner’s intellectual “family tree” on page xxii. On the intellectual 
heritage of radical behaviorism see Eckart Scheerer, “Radical Behaviorism: Excerpts From a Textbook 
Treatment,” in Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture, 151-75. For 
more on M ach’s influence in the sciences see J. T. Blackmore, Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) and J. Bradley, Mach's Philosophy o f  Science (London: 
Athlone Press, 1971).
Bjork, Skinner, 100.
Smith, Reassessment, 42.
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Science, he surmised, had evolved as a tool that aided human adaptation to the 
environment, organizing and channeling nature to productive ends. This goal for science 
— the establishment of control over natural phenomena — would come to define B. F. 
Skinner’s scientific and social-philosophical perspective.
Skinner entered the graduate program in psychology at Harvard in 1928. There 
he studied both psychology and physiology and initially found the latter to offer better 
opportunities for conducting experimental research. His courses in physiology with 
Hudson Hoagland and William Crozier provided a steady diet o f experimentation in the 
reflexes and reaction rates o f animal sub j ec t s . Croz i e r  had himself been deeply 
influenced by his own mentor and Machian disciple, the physiologist Jacques Loeb.'°* 
Although Skinner had read Loeh’s Comparative Physiology o f  the Brain (1900) and The 
Mechanistic Conception o f  Life (1912) as an undergraduate, it was with Crozier that 
Skinner began to explore the possibilities for a scientific study o f behavior, one based on 
the whole organism rather than its dissected parts (as was the case in Ivan Pavlov’s 
studies).
Undoubtedly Skinner found much to admire in Loeh’s technical approach to 
experimental science and the control of biological processes. Loeb’s investigations in the 
1880s of plant and animal tropism and his success with artificial parthenogenesis 
stemmed from his thoroughly positivistic approach to natural phenomena. Through
Bjork, SIcinner, 11.
The most authoritative biography of Loeb to date is Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and 
the Engineering Ideal in Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). For a more recent appraisal 
see, Charles Rasmussen, Jacques Loeb, His Science and Social Activism and Their Philosophical 
Foundations (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1998).
Bjork, Skinner, 65.
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direct manipulation o f cellular and animal behavior, using physical and chemical 
modification, Loeb concluded that biochemistry, rather than the broad, speeulative study 
of evolutionary and physiological processes, was the key to making a precise and 
efficacious science of biology.
Loeb rejected mentalism, as did Skinner later on. Environmental conditions and 
biochemistry, Loeb believed, defined the organism more tangibly than any theory of 
consciousness, will, or volition.” *^ Loeb’s pragmatic and mechanically inspired view of 
life focused on the isolation and manipulation o f biological processes rather than the 
comprehensive understanding of nature. The control o f biological processes became the 
goal of his experimental biology. Well into the twentieth eentury Loeb’s views on an 
experiment-centered life science was the eenter of a debate among biologists over the 
merits of mechanism versus holism in explaining natural phenomena. ' ’ ’ The mechanistie 
orientation in the experimental analysis of behavior exerted a powerful influenee on the 
biological and social sciences. As the historian of biology, Philip Pauly, has observed, an 
engineering approach to life, and an emphasis upon the eontrol of natural processes in
Jacques Loeb, Comparative Physiology o f  the Brain and Comparative Psychology (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1900), especially chapter one, “Some Fundamental Facts and Conceptions Concerning the 
Comparative Physiology o f the Central Nervous System.” See also Loeb, The Mechanistic Conception o f  
Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1912).
' ' ' One o f the early high-profile challenges to Loeb’s The Mechanistic Conception o f  Life came from the 
physiologist Herbert S. Jennings, who argued the merits o f a natural historical model o f behavior as an 
evolutionary adaptive mechanism. The Loeb/Jennings debates o f the late nineteenth century signified the 
ongoing battle between those who embraced the new science o f biochemistry and the methodology of 
laboratory experimentation, and those devoted to traditional natural historical biology (dominated by 
Darwinian evolutionary theory). The ensuing dominance o f mechanism in experimental biology is 
indicated in debates among cytologists. In his rebuttal to Loeb, The Biology o f  the Cell Surface 
(Philadelphia: P. Blackiston, 1939), Ernest E. Just opposed the reduction o f cell biology to physics and 
chemistry. Similar debates about the proper scope o f scientific inquiry, the historical and comprehensive 
versus the experimental and process-specific, influenced behavioral psychology as well. See Philip J. 
Pauly, “The Loeb Jennings Debate and the Science o f Animal Behavior,” Journal o f  the History o f  the 
Behavioral Sciences 17 (1981): 504-15 and Kenneth R. Manning, Black Apollo o f  Science: The Life o f  
Earnest Everett Just (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
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laboratory science, was championed in psychology hy Loeh’s protégé, John B.
Watson."^
In Skinner’s first extended treatment o f experimental behaviorism. The Behavior 
o f Organisms: An Experimental Analysis (1938), the influence of Bacon and the 
mechanistic physiologists was clear. The hook adhered strictly to what Laurence Smith 
has termed a descriptive positivism, relying solely on the measurement o f external 
behavior, with no appeal to nonphysical internal states. As did Mach, Skinner confined 
his evaluation o f behavioral Taws’ to the mathematical correlation o f reflexes and 
response rates. And like Bacon, Skinner took pains to rid his behavioral deseriptions of 
any inaccurate or vague terminology that did not contribute directly to the results of 
experimental f i n d i n g s . L i k e  Bacon, Mach, and Loeb, Skinner’s ultimate aim was to 
establish eontrol over behavior so that organisms might be shaped.
The innovation of Watsonian behaviorism was that it had exeluded consideration 
of inner psychological states and introspection. All behavior thus originated in external 
stimuli whieh, in turn, induced a physical or physiological response in the organism. The 
active reinforcement of a response using direct stimuli constituted classical conditioning. 
The neobehaviorists Edward Tolman and Clark Hull, however, further confined 
behavioral theory to operational definitions by invoking logical positivism. 
Neobehaviorists used nonhuman subjects for greater experimental eontrol, postulating 
that perception and learning differences between humans and animals were o f degree not
See Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life.
B. F. Skinner, The Behavior o f  Organisms: An Experimental Analysis (New York: Appleton Century 
Crofts, 1938), 7.
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kind. Experimental findings could be used in modifying human behavior. In both 
behaviorism and neobehaviorism, the learning process was the center o f study, since it 
represented the core o f adaptation. Using operational definitions the neobehaviorists 
explained behavior using both stimulus/response mechanisms and theories of internal 
drives, intervening mental variables, and operationally defined cognitive maps. '
Skinner’s variation on neobehaviorism combined logical positivism with 
functional analysis and did away with postulating internal events altogether. In addition 
to getting rid o f inner states and theories, Skinner also shifted experimentation away from 
cataloging stimulus/response relationships. His was a radical environmental approach 
that focused on the consequences o f spontaneous behaviors emitted by the organism, 
treating them as the primary keys o f experimental manipulation.
Skinner distinguished two types of behavior. Respondent behavior was elicited 
automatically by a particular stimulus. Operant behavior was spontaneous and required 
no external stimulus. The consequences of behavior could be defined as a “response- 
contingent” stimulus, and spontaneous behaviors could be termed operants.
Consequences that encouraged a behavior could be used in positive reinforcement. 
Environmental contingencies thus set the conditions for behavior, not by applying 
stimulus to the organism, but by passively selecting out those spontaneous behaviors 
(variations) that were advantageous to the organism. In this sense, Skinner drew heavily 
from the Darwinian notion of natural selection. This revelation opened up endless 
possibilities for behavioral engineering. Just as the fixity of species concept was replaced
See the comparison o f behaviorism and neobehaviorism in B. R. Hergenhahn, An Introduction to the 
History o f  Psychology, 4* ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning), 371-401. The description of 
operant behaviorism in the text above is also from Hergenhahn.
54
by variation and natural selection, Skinner rendered the stimulus/response notions of 
classical conditioning obsolete. Moreover, operant behaviorism circumvented the need 
for negative/aversive reinforcement. Instead of punishing for unwanted behavior, the 
reinforcing contingencies could simply be removed until the behavior went “extinct.”
Since operant behaviorism did not rely on maps of specific stimuli in controlling 
behavior, a new controlling variable was needed. By the early 1930s Skinner had noticed 
in his experiments with rats that the strength of a behavior was correlated with its 
response frequency. By manipulating its feeding schedules selectively, Skinner could 
control the rat’s response time in pressing a lever on a food dispenser. Skinner realized 
that this spontaneous ‘operant,’ or lever pressing behavior, implied a mode o f behavior 
selection based on environmental contingencies that affected response rates. In a move 
reminiscent o f Taylor’s stopwatch experiments with factory laborers and the study of 
work efficiency, Skinner brought the key experimental variable o f time into his research. 
By measuring the rates of repetition of operant behaviors, one could discern numerical 
regularities corresponding to general laws of behavior, not unlike those o f natural 
selection.
By re-focusing his experimental attention on time and the role of the environment, 
just as Taylor had done, Skinner did away with the examination of the inner world of 
organisms. Since this inner world was not subject to direct scientific analysis and 
scrutiny, Skinner’s reductive scientific epistemology moved the experimental focus 
outside the organism and described it in terms of environmental contingencies. Similarly, 
Taylor had shifted the focus o f labor studies away from the worker (and all of his 
knowledge and skill) and toward the expert management o f the work environment. This
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same approach to the rat, in Skinner’s case, vastly improved the manipulation of complex 
behaviors. Skinner’s research also convinced him of the praetieal expediency o f this shift 
in perspective. It embodied one of the hallmarks o f good Baconian, and Taylorian, 
science. It established control over the organism, and did so in an efficient manner.
As Skinner moved from rats to pigeons in the late 1930s and early 40s he became 
convinced that the laws of operant behavior were essentially the same for all higher 
organisms. In each case it was a straightforward matter o f defining environmental 
contingencies and learning how to manipulate them. The possibilities for designing and 
constmcting complex repertoires o f behavior seemed endless. Skinner’s enthusiasm for 
the ‘device’ metaphor o f animal nature became the centerpiece o f his research with 
pigeons during the 1940s. His success in engineering pigeons to serve as devices for 
military applications during the Second World War eventually led him to consider the 
implications o f his work for human behavior modification.
By the 1950s pigeons would become Skinner’s experimental prototypes for 
human models of behavioral engineering. Like the neobehaviorists, Skinner believed that 
the processes o f learning, defined operationally, were universal in all organisms and only 
varied in degrees o f complexity. Amidst the chaos of war and the adjustment to what for 
most Americans was a radically new set of cultural contingencies in the postwar world, 
Skinner’s enthusiasm for behavioral science blossomed into a full scale vision o f social 
engineering. He explored this vision in the laboratory and in the literary genre o f utopian 
fantasy. His early thoughts on these phenomena were explored in his utopian novel, 
Walden Two (1946), a tract that outlined the essential components o f a science of human 
social engineering.
Bjork, Skinner, 106-07.
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Skinner also began to test the cultural waters of postwar America, showcasing his 
Harvard research on pigeons and his invention of a new kind o f domestic technology he 
called the “Baby Tender” in the popular press. In these public offerings, Skinner linked 
the marvels of behavior modification to the challenge o f postwar American society. 
Skinner’s career as a social theorist in the 1950s was characterized by considerable 
controversy. He critiqued traditional concepts o f the autonomous, mind-eentered, 
independent and self-contained individual. His defense of mechanistic humanity was met 
by both harsh criticism and marked curiosity among different constituencies of the 
professional and lay public.
Margaret Mead: From Psychology to an Anthropology of Social Reform
In contrast to B. F. Skinner’s scientific objectivism, mechanism, and materialism 
in behavioral psychology, another community o f professional soeial seientists that 
included the cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead opposed seientific reduetionism in 
the study o f human nature and society in the early twentieth century. As described by 
Katherine Pandora, these rebels in professional social science embraced perspectives on 
social reform that differed considerably from the managerial strain o f progressivism."^ 
M ead’s early aspirations toward a socially relevant and politically viable science of 
humanity were shaped by the philosophical and scientific pragmatism of William James 
and the educational philosophy of John Dewey. The preservation o f the individual and
‘ Katherine A. Pandora, Rebels Within the Ranks: Psychologists ’ Critique o f  Scientific Authority and 
Democratic Realities in New Deal America (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1997).
57
the promotion of democracy were the hallmarks of Mead’s reform agenda for social 
science.
In her anthropological studies of the 1920s and 30s Mead argued for a course of 
research that engaged human diversity in the cultures o f the world, and the multiple 
layers o f complexity in the individual person whose will, emotions, and consciousness, 
could not be reduced to statistical representations. The complexity of human nature, she 
and others had argued, necessitated multiple perspectives in the social sciences. To this 
end, Mead lobbied throughout her professional and public career for interdisciplinary 
approaches to the study o f humanity. Skinner’s scientific vision o f the human ‘organism’ 
dispensed with agency and individual autonomy. And while Skinner’s social theories 
touted the merits of a scientific meritocracy. Mead’s science of culture and the self 
promoted social democracy.
Mead argued that a proper study o f the individual entailed the belief that human 
nature possessed a vast wellspring of hitherto untapped potential for adaptation and 
transformation. The most pressing task in social administration. Mead argued, was to 
create environments in the home, school, and community that encouraged the individual 
to move beyond the conventional architecture of everyday perception and experience and 
discover new realms of human creativity and possibility. Whereas Skinner’s early 
experiences with science encompassed a philosophy of precise controls in standardizing 
human behavior, one centered entirely in behavioral psyehology. Mead’s training in 
psychology and comparative anthropology pointed to a multicultural and interdisciplinary 
social science designed to free humanity by engaging its many new frontiers of 
potentiality.
58
Described in 1951 as “America’s foremost woman anthropologist,” "^ Margaret 
Mead had established herself hy the early 1930s as an authority on cultural development 
among both anthropologists and the lay public with her numerous studies of the native 
peoples o f the South and West Pacific, New Guinea, and Bali. Her rise to prominence in 
both professional and public circles was solidified early on in her career with the 
publication o f her famous studies. Coming o f  Age in Samoa (1928) and Sex and 
Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935)."^ Both works critiqued prevailing 
concepts o f gender and human development in anthropology during the 1920s and 30s 
and emphasized the powerful influence of the social environment in shaping human 
behavior and personality."^ A comparative analysis o f cultures. Mead argued, revealed 
that gender, personality, and intelligence were culturally rather than biologically 
determined entities. By the beginning of the Second World War Mead had also 
established her popular reputation as an ‘expert’ on culture and human nature with a 
series of additional studies. Along with other prominent social science ‘celebrities’ such 
as Benjamin Spock and B. F. Skinner, she capitalized on a wave of public interest in the 
social sciences in the 1940s and promoted her own perspectives on individual and social
' “Margaret Mead,” in Current Biography: Who’s New and Why, ed. Anna Roth and Evelyn Lohr (New 
York; H. W. Wilson Co., 1951), 421-23.
Margaret Mead, Coming o f  Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study o f  Primitive Youth fo r Western 
Civilization (New York: Morrow, 1928) and Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies 
(New York: Morrow, 1935).
For an account o f American anthropology and the heredity-environment debates see Hamilton Cravens, 
The Triumph o f  Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment Controversy 1900-1941 
(Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1978). On Franz Boas and the rise o f American 
anthropology see George W. Stocking Jr’s classic history. Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the 
History o f  Anthropology (New York: The Free Press, 1968) and his edited volume, A Franz Boas Reader: 
The Shaping o f  American Anthropology, 1883-1911 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1974).
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adjustment for postwar Americans.'^® Her studies of American culture gave way in the 
coming decades to an extensive series o f popular books, articles, commentaries, and 
symposia that stressed the need to revise traditional concepts o f family structure, gender 
roles, child rearing practices, and educational methods in a period o f rapid social 
transition.
Rosalind Rosenberg has observed that an account of Mead’s early training in the 
social sciences highlights the growing prestige of professional psychology, especially in 
the period immediately after the First World War. The demands o f war mobilization 
helped shape its professional development into the most experimentally rigorous of the 
social sciences.'^' Although she would eventually pursue her doctorate in anthropology 
under Franz Boas and Ruth Benedict, Mead took undergraduate and masters level 
degrees in psychology.
The course that galvanized Mead’s interest in the social sciences in her days as a 
Barnard College undergraduate in the 1920s was given by one o f the founders of modem 
sociology, William F. Ogbum (1886-1959), entitled “Psychological Factors in Culture.” 
Along with W. I. Thomas, Albion Small, and Charles Cooley, Ogbum had been one of 
the central founders of American sociology, practically introducing the field to America 
in the early 1 9 2 0 s . I t  was in Ogbum’s course that Mead gained her first insights into
See, for example, the discussions o f the public interest in social science in Ellen Herman, The Romance 
o f  American Psychology: Political Culture and the Age o f  Experts, 1940-1970 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), and William Graebner, The Age o f  Doubt: American Thought in the 1940s (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1991).
Rosalind Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots o f  Modern Feminism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1982), 207-08.
From the introduction to the 1966 edition o f William F. Ogbum 's signature classic in sociology. Social 
Change: With Respect to Cultural and Original Nature (New York: Delta, 1966, c l 922). See especially the 
introduction by Hendrick M. Ruitenbeek.
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the relationship between the life of the individual and the context o f the surrounding 
social and cultural environment. Ogbum approached the study of human cultures 
temporally, as an adaptive process wherein social conventions, mores, and institutions 
were in a constant state of change and development.’^  ^ Similar themes were explored in 
another o f Mead’s electives at Barnard — anthropology. Again she was introduced to the 
field by someone who had “built the science,” none other than the founder of modem 
anthropology, Franz Boas. Boas applied the same functionalism in Ogbum’s sociology 
to a reworking of anthropological theory. He also brought a politically inspired liberal 
perspective to anthropology that he hoped would foster awareness o f human rights and 
the value o f the individual. Mead had read Boas’ Mind o f  Primitive Man (1911) in her 
introductory psychology course. Boas argued that more could be leamed about human 
nature through comparative cultural studies in the field than through academic debate 
over anthropological theories of cultural evolution.’ '^’
Recalling her days as a student of Boas in the early 1920s, Mead characterized his 
approach to the study of human nature as casting a broad net over all available
Ibid., viii. See also the comments by Donald Martindale on the contributions o f Ogbum in Martindale, 
The Nature and Types o f  Sociological Theory (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1960), 324. Ogbum 
received his doctorate from Columbia in 1912 and taught sociology at Reed College between 1912 and 
1917. He later took a position at the University o f Chicago in 1927 and stayed on there until retirement in 
1952. He was also the editor o f the Journal o f  the American Statistical Association from 1920 to 1926.
As Martindale notes, Ogbum was one o f the modern pioneers o f social and pluralistic behaviorism, a 
departure from the deterministic strains o f organicism, stmcturalism, and relationism in theories o f social 
evolution, one that takes a behavioral view o f social phenomena. Pluralistic behaviorism had its origins 
with Gabriel Tarde and took its modem form under Frank H. Giddings, and later Ogbum. Its primary 
assumption, like that o f Boasian anthropology, is that the history o f social phenomena themselves, rather 
than biological heritage, is more important in explaining the formation of culture processes. See Gabriel 
Tarde, Social Laws: An Outline o f  Sociology, trans. Howard C. Warren (New York; The Macmillan 
Company, London, Macmillan & Co., 1899) and Frank H. Giddings, The Scientific Study o f  Human Society 
(Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1924).
Mead, Blackberry’ Winter: My Earlier Years (New York: W. Morrow, 1972), 111.
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information, utilizing insights from the other soeial seienees in order to ascertain an 
image of the “whole o f man.” '^  ^ Unlike speculative and theoretically based ‘armchair’ 
traditions in anthropology, Boasian anthropology stressed direct fieldwork and faet 
g a t h e r i n g . B o a s  also refrained from adhering strongly to any one set o f guiding 
methodologies or theories o f culture. He was quick to dispel any unifying theory of 
culture, any standardization of data collection or theoretical structure, and indeed any 
notion that his was a new school of anthropology.’ ’^ He pointed to the threat o f single 
determinants in the analysis of human nature (in biology, economics, geography, and 
race) that reflected a desire for universal laws of human nature and c u l t u re .B oas i a n  
anthropology aimed to reconnect human beings with their physical and social 
environments so that the ‘individual’ and the ‘social’ would always be considered 
together.” ^
In her master’s work Mead had addressed the highly controversial debates o f this 
period concerning intelligence testing. Her thesis examined the relationship between 
language proficiency and intelligence scores among Italian immigrants. She asserted that 
the testing methods were culturally biased and ethnically discriminatory.'^” Mead was an
Ibid.
From the introduction by Walter Goldschmidt who edited the collection o f essays by Boas entitled The 
Anthropology o f  Franz Boas: Essays on the Centennial o f  His Birth, Memoir no. 81 o f  the American 
Anthropological Association, v. 61, no. 5, pt. 2, October, 1959 (San Francisco: AAA and Howard 
Chandler, 1959), 1-3.
Mead, Blackberry Winter, 31.
Ibid., 90, 96.
Franz Boas, “Some Problems o f Methodology in the Social Sciences,” in The Hew Social Science, ed. 
Leonard D. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), 84-98. See page 84.
See Margaret Mead, “Intelligence Tests of Italian and American Children,” (M aster’s Thesis, Columbia 
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early dissenter from experimental reductionism and the cultural and biological 
determinism inherent in the psychometrics of the 1920s.
Mead elected to pursue anthropology instead of psychology or sociology. 
Anthropology, she recounted, “dealt with human beings in real life, rather than with the 
accounts o f experiments which other psychologists had done within a laboratory 
setting.” '^’ Mead’s work in Samoa, however, was part o f a field test o f conventional 
theories of adolescence that she later discussed in a psychological c o n t e x t . M e a d  also 
used a host o f testing techniques from psychology in her fieldwork. She used projective 
and cognitive tests developed by Jean Piaget and Muzafir Sherif in her work in Samoa. 
Mead also analyzed children’s drawings, and conducted maze tests to examine their 
cognitive ability, and she modified Rorschach tests for use in the field. Mead was in 
many ways a practicing psychologist as well as an anthropologist, and she published 
research in both disciplines.
By the early 1930s Margaret Mead and her colleague Ruth Benedict had 
established their reputations as groundbreaking anthropologists in the Boasian tradition of 
cultural a n a l y s i s . W h a t  Mead came to regard as ‘laboratories’ o f primitive culture 
made it possible to demonstrate how different social traditions drew from the vast
Mead, History o f  Psychology in Autobiography, 295.
Ibid., 317.
Ibid., 312.
Ruth Benedict, Patterns o f  Culture (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1934).
Patterns o f  Culture, an appraisal of Native American cultures and their histories, came to be 
regarded as a seminal work in comparative cultural studies. In this research, nurture rather than nature 
became firmly established in anthropology as the primary root cause o f individual and cultural character. 
Under this rubric, what few universal human character traits might exist were expressed and modified 
according to the cultural patterns that shaped them.
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wellspring o f human potentialities, manifesting incredible diversity in their social 
institutions and individual ‘natures.’
Mead’s book, Coming o f  Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study o f  Primitive Youth 
fo r  Western Civilization (1925), was one o f the first studies inspired by the Boasian 
functionalist school. In her analysis of Samoan village culture. Mead used the test case 
o f adolescence to examine how the lives o f young adults were patterned by culturally 
specific social conditions. The study brought Mead critical acclaim in the late 1920s for 
its challenge to Western cultural stereotypes about adolescence. Comparative analysis of 
Western and Samoan attitudes toward young adults clearly demonstrated that the classic 
Sturm und Drang model of adolescence was a culturally, rather than biologically, 
determined entity.
Young men and women in Samoa led separate lives for the most part. Group 
distinctions, based upon gender and age, were very uniform and closely defined by a 
community structure relatively unchanged for many generations. In Mead’s view, the 
unique circumstances o f Samoan tribal culture entailed much less stress for females 
during adolescence. In general the emotional stress, the rebellion, existential crisis, and 
trauma o f adolescence were absent in Samoan culture. Mead argued that this was due to 
the overall simplicity o f Samoan society that, in contrast to the West, did not present a 
myriad of contradictory choices about social roles, individual identities, morals, values, 
social philosophies, and career choices. Much o f the anxiety associated with the onset of 
this stage in the life o f young adults in the West simply did not exist in the more 
homogeneous environment of Samoan culture. Social roles, personalities, and identities 
were standardized to such a degree that individuals were not burdened with the task of
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self-definition or assimilation. Mead’s comparisons of character traits in Samoan men 
and women, and those of their Western counterparts, dramatically illustrated the 
influence o f culture on the patterning o f gender and personality. No longer could one 
model o f adolescence be viewed as a component of some imagined universal human 
nature.
Mead reported similar revelations about the cultural construction o f gender and 
sex-based temperament in the early 1930s while studying three different primitive 
cultures in New Guinea. Part o f her intent in surveying the cultures o f the mountain 
Arapesh, the river-dwelling Mundugumor, and the lake-based Tchambuli between 1931 
and 1933 was to extend the analysis used in Samoa. In her book. Sex and Temperament 
in Three Primitive Societies (1935), Mead disproved the conventional connection 
between innate temperament and g e n d e r . P a t t e r n s  that had been associated in the West 
with each sex exclusively were completely muddled by the findings in New Guinea. 
Mead’s comparative studies found no objective scale for measuring sex differences. 
“[A]ny idea that temperamental traits of the order of dominance, bravery, aggressiveness, 
objectivity, malleability, are inalienably associated with one sex (as opposed to the 
other),” Mead said, “is entirely lacking.” '^ ® Such close association between sex and 
temperament seemed again to be a construct of Western culture.
As Mead recalled in the introduction to her book. Cooperation and Competition 
Among Primitive Peoples fl937^,’^^  the main tenets of comparative cultural anthropology
Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (New York: The New American 
Library, 1950, cl935). See the preface to the 1950 edition for these comments.
' “ Ibid., 14.
137 Margaret Mead, Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961
cl 937).
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were part o f the new culture and personality rubric in anthropology founded by Mead
and her cohort in the early 1930s. This was an attempt by Mead and other like-minded
social scientists to bring all the insights and resources from psychology, sociology,
psychiatry, biology, and anthropology to bear upon the study of the individual.
Interdisciplinary studies of human nature were vital to the reform of professional social
science. “The culture and personality approach,” Mead and others asserted,
[D]emand[ed] that these separate disciplines cease to abstract certain 
aspects of human life and study them without reference to the whole 
individual, and to the numbers of whole individuals who make up any 
group. It insists that there is a common meeting ground where the 
hypotheses o f each discipline can be tested out and made relevant to a 
more genuine social science.’ *^
Over the course of an interdisciplinary seminar held in 1934-35, Mead and her 
colleagues set about formulating a collaborative research strategy for the comparative 
study of primitive cultures. Her efforts were inspired by other interdisciplinary 
initiatives, especially those of Lawrence Frank, Edward Sapir, and Harry Sullivan, who 
were involved in integrating the new sciences of human relations in a similar fashion. 
Mead’s seminar panel compiled numerous ethnologies and utilized the diversity of 
disciplinary perspectives among the participants to make a comprehensive analysis of
Ibid., 2.
The “culture and personality” research rubric was explored by several groups o f social scientists in 
the early 1930s. Many o f them were sponsored by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). Mead 
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social habits for each culture in the study. The result was a new strategy for doing
comparative anthropology. It yielded a basic strategy for assessing cultures, not by
extrapolation from artifacts or social evolutionary theories, but by the direct examination
of data concerning the process of cultural definition in time and space. Mead delineated
four general areas o f cultural analysis that seemed most important for eomparative
studies: material environment, technology, social structure, and education. The
conditions of the natural environment, the availability of resources, and the technologies
devised to exploit them determined how people organized their lives. This partly
determined the level of cooperation and competition in a culture, parameters that were
highly relevant to the examination of American society.
By design Mead’s models of personality and culture undermined biological and
even socio-economic determinism. Mead’s researches also showed that the strueture of
social institutions such as the family and the community played an important role in
determining the parameters of individual personality, intelligence, gender identity, and
character. As Mead had learned, only through the knowledge of how social roles are
defined, and how individuals and groups adapt to them, does the social scientist begin to
understand what kind of culture, and individual character, will result. Only by comparing
anthropological findings and histories from many different cultures could patterns of
culture be determined.
...[TJhough the nature of human personality is to some degree defined by 
the very fact of social participation, even before any specific human 
culture has been described, most o f the meaning and richness o f the social 
approach can be grasped only when attention has been given to a 
comparison o f various primitive and advanced societies, in order to see the
Ibid., 14-15.
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personality pattern characteristic o f each set of social arrangements, and, 
within each such generic pattern, the way in which the individual copes 
with the generic problems which the culture defines, the way in which he 
learns to make use of, adapt to, and bend to his own uses the cultural 
situation and the roles he is called upon to enact. This will take us into the 
study of ethnology as we seek an answer to the question: By what specific 
means can the social group shape the personality of the growing 
individual?
The question for Americans, Mead thought, was exactly this. What was the nature of 
American culture? And by what means could individual character be shaped to preserve 
democracy? Mead’s critiques of modem American culture called for a rededication to 
social democracy, with social science in a supporting role, as the only hope for progress 
in a nation where urbanization, war, and depression had seriously compromised the ideals 
o f a free and open society.
Skinner, Mead, and America after the Second World War
American economic expansion in the decades prior to the First World War gave 
rise to the managerial search for order and control in a radically new and evolving urban 
landscape. Professional managers faced similar administrative challenges during another 
period o f social and economic expansion after the Second World War. Historians John 
M. Blum and John P. Diggins, among many others, have described the profound social 
transformations attending the postwar decades, as well as the cultural anxieties that 
accompanied them. A  renewed sense o f  nationalism and the rise o f  America as a world 
power were tempered by recent memories o f the Depression. Americans, as Paul Boyer 
observed, wondered whether new economic, technological, and cultural forces
Ibid., 772.
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(symbolized in technologies like atomic energy) might emancipate or alternatively 
destroy civilization. The symbol of the Bomb reminded Americans that power had to be 
properly deployed and managed. Initially, a fear that a volatile economy might founder 
and plunge the nation into another Depression was widespread in 1945 and 46.'"*  ^“A rest 
in today, wondrous hopes for tomorrow -  but always, in the America o f V-J day, there 
were shadows,” historian Eric F. Goldman observed. “Would events follow the same 
patterns as the last postwar?” ''*^
Attending this acute concern for economic stability in the immediate postwar 
years was a public resurgence of the demand for expert authority and guidance in 
charting the postwar cultural landscape. In her study o f postwar American psychology 
Ellen Herman has demonstrated how the pressing need for efficient methods o f social 
engineering during World War II brought the social sciences to the forefront o f both of 
military and postwar social p l ann ing .Exper imen ta l  behaviorism, for example, had 
attracted attention during the war with its promise of standardizing the training and 
deployment of military personnel, as well as providing solutions for the many 
administrative and logistic aspects of war mobilization.
Among the standard analyses o f this postwar phenomenon and its relation to domestic policy, 
consumerism, and suburban living as forms o f social containment during the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations are John M. Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War H 
(New York; Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovieh, 1976); John P. Diggins, The Proud Decades: America in War 
and Peace,1941-1960 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1988); J. Ronald Oakley, G od’s Country: 
America in the Fifties (New York: December Books, 1985); William Issel, Social Change in the United 
States,1945-1983 (New York: Sehocken Books, 1985); William O ’Neill, American High: The Years o f  
Confidence, 1945-1960 (New York: Free Press, 1986).
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The potential of these and other researches to contribute to applied social 
management after the war helped shape peacetime public administration and 
domestic/foreign policy. James Capshew has discussed the extent to which wartime 
military patronage rescued psychology from the brink o f professional fragmentation and 
dissolution at the end of the 1930s.*'^  ^ The rapid mobilization of psychology for the war 
effort, Capshew observed, required the interdisciplinary consolidation o f various 
specialties enlisted for service in newly created military agencies such as the Office of 
Strategic Services, the Office of War Information, and the Strategic Bombing Survey.''*® 
One o f the principal architects o f the reorganized American Psychological 
Association, Robert Yerkes, actively promoted the image of psychology during the war 
as a ‘hard science’ akin to engineering in its precision and utility. Yerkes, along with 
those like Skinner and Mead, aggressively promoted the link between wartime 
applications of psychological research and future projects in social administration. The 
bulk of experimental research in psychology shifted as well during the war from animal 
to human subjects as a result. The evolution of professional psychology in America both 
during and after the war, as Herman notes, goes far toward explaining why the behavioral 
orientation came again to dominate the social science disciplines as a whole by the early 
1960s.'^’
James H. Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in 
America, 1929-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
For more on these agencies see Herman and Capshew above, as well as Louis E. Hoffman’s article, 
“American Psychologists and Wartime Research on Germany, 1941-1945,” American Psychologist 47 
(February, 1992): 264-73 and Donald A. Dewsbury, “On the Evolution of Divisions,” American 
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The political and economic uncertainties that spawned Truman’s Fair Deal after 
the war, as well as the political scourge of McCarthyism during the late 1940s and early 
50s, were part and parcel of a new social and political conservatism.*'** Many wondered 
whether or not economic momentum could continue without the war machine and 
comprehensive government oversight. Americans in the postwar era also faced a cultural 
“identity crisis” in negotiating new models of family life, community, and work. The 
kind of comprehensive social experimentation that Mead and Skinner hoped would 
follow the war did not materialize. Steven Whitfield and Richard Fried have hoth 
explained how the struggle of Americans to preserve their cultural identity was 
manifested in McCarthyism and fears o f communist insurrection. The threat of 
communism, they argued, masked deep-seated cultural uncertainties within our own 
borders that pitted Americans against themselves.*'*^ Fears of cultural subversion fostered 
the intellectual and political scrutiny of politics, art, academia, and literature. Ideologies 
that smacked of moral or political liberality, or those that postulated far-reaching social
See W. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II (fiissN York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 82. Conservatives again shifted the responsibility for industrial management and social 
welfare into the private sector. Chafe points to the defeat in Congress of Truman’s Full Employment Act of 
1945 as one representative example o f this new mood in postwar American politics.
See Steven Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 
and Chafe, Unfinished Journey. Truman’s invocation o f the Domino theory in his famous 1947 speech on 
aid to Turkey and Greece also highlighted American concerns over the growing consolidation of 
communist power in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. As the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 
took shape in the la te 1940s, the Truman administration fed fears o f communist invasion at home with 
initiatives like the employee loyalty program. The criminal convictions o f Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs, 
the Russian atomic bomb, the fall o f China, and the Korean conflict all but confirmed for many the 
suspicion that communist infiltration was afoot in the United States. New Dealism, liberalism, and forms 
o f unconventional intellectual free inquiry, as Eric Goldman noted at the time, became associated with 
communist social experimentation and subversion.
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experimentation, were considered suspect.'^® McCarthyism reflected the conservative 
desire for social containment and cultural conformity.'^'
Patterns of work, child rearing, socialization and education in the postwar era 
were shaped by an inherently conservative corporatism in the postwar decades. John 
Kenneth Galbraith observed in his famous social commentary The Affluent Society (1958) 
that postwar American culture was modeled in many respects on the military and 
business infrastructure that had helped win the war and make America an international 
p o w e r . W i t h  an emphasis on production and efficiency, it was thought to be the 
guarantor of future economic and social integrity, a promise not unfamiliar to the 
management progressives of previous decades. Many looked to the authority of 
corporate culture for structure and guidance during a time when Americans were 
disconnected even further from the politics and folkways of the past. In the age of 
Eisenhower and consumer culture, when Americans were encouraged to “buy anything” 
in support o f their country, the corporate conglomerate came to represent the social 
architecture that fundamentally redefined individual assimilation into society.
For more on this cultural conservatism see Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in 
Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
This eharacterization is taken from David M. Oshinsky’s classic treatment o f  the McCarthy 
phenomenon in his book, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World o f  Joe McCarthy (New York: The Free 
Press, 1983), 172-74.
John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958).
For appraisals o f the corporatization of American culture, see the contemporary analysis o f the noted 
business journalist and critic William H. Whyte, especially his classic treatment in The Organization Man 
(New York; Simon and Schuster, 1956), as well as the sociologist David Riesman’s study, The Lonely 
Crowd: A Study o f  the Changing American Character, 2"^ * ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951). 
Herbert Gans’ sociological appraisal o f suburban life in 1950s America, however, later challenged this 
stereotypical image o f American domestic culture, claiming that social conformism and homogeneity were 
not as typieal o f suburban culture as many had come to believe. See Gans’ book. The Levittowners: Ways 
o f  Life and Politics in a New Suburban Community (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967). For more on the 
history o f suburban life in America, see Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization o f  
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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The business journalist and critic William H. Whyte and the sociologist David 
Riesman, for example, acknowledged the loss of individualism in corporate America and 
the rise o f the group, and “groupthink,” as models o f assimilation into the new society. 
Conformism, according to Whyte’s The Organization Man (1956) and Riesman’s famous 
study. The Lonely Crowd: A Study o f  the Changing American Character (1951), 
permeated American social institutions. The breakdown of traditional models of family 
and community, Whyte observed, contributed moreover to a public fascination with 
social science, especially as it applied to behavioral engineering and personal adjustment. 
With even more vigor, Americans put their fate in the hands o f social science experts 
who claimed to know how to navigate the postwar cultural w a t e r s . I n  the workplace, 
industrial engineering and the study of human relations witnessed unprecedented 
expansion as Americans struggled to keep productivity high. At the level of individual 
and family adjustment, applied social science and psychology enjoyed a thriving advice 
and counseling industry in which luminaries like Benjamin Spock became celebrities.
In the chapters that follow, I will examine the public reaction to Skinner’s social 
technology and Mead’s depictions of human diversity in light o f the cultural forces that 
shaped American consciousness in the postwar decades. In my discussion o f Skinner’s 
career as a technologist and social theorist in the 1950s I will explore his efforts to 
popularize a science of social engineering in the midst of a culture of containment and 
conformity. I will argue that what might be aptly termed Skinner’s “Taylorization” of 
behavioral psychology, and his attempts to create technologies for popular consumption.
See William W hyte’s assessment o f such trends in his article, “The Social Engineers,” Fortune 45 
(1952): 88-91, 108.
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garnered professional and public responses similar to those that accompanied Scientific 
Management in the progressive era. On a popular level, Skinnerian technologies 
provoked fears about the loss of individual and cultural identity in an increasingly 
managed and systematized postwar existence. Skinner’s behavioral science was carefully 
scrutinized by business managers, industrial engineers, and human relations specialists, 
however, for its potential to increase industrial efficiency and corporate expansion.
With the introduction of his ‘baby tender’ technology in the late 1940s Skinner 
achieved a level of public notoriety that was rare among social scientists. Further 
examination o f his efforts to promote himself as a scientific expert in the area o f domestic 
efficiency will give special insight into how social scientists attempted to answer postwar 
anxieties by crafting scientific wares to fit public demand for technologies o f social 
adjustment. By describing Skinner’s explorations of contemporary social issues through 
the medium of utopian fiction, a better understanding o f the tension between scientific 
aspirations in human engineering and the popular resistance to technocratic images o f the 
self will also be explored. In his utopian novel, Walden Two (1946), Skinner took on 
such pressing postwar problems as the reorganization of American families and 
communities, the imposition of technocracy, and the new social roles o f the sexes.
The clearest and most significant example of the popular appropriation of 
Skinnerian management ideology was his teaching technology in the late 1950s and early 
60s. I will examine how Skinner took advantage o f debates over American public 
education to bring his technologies and his message of social reform to an audience of 
educators, administrators, parents, and corporations who were receptive to the idea of 
accelerated learning. Skinner modified the behavioral image of the self to satisfy each of
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these audiences, speaking about human potential in both mechanistic and humanistic 
terms. Further, the popular appropriation of Skinnerian theories o f learning in the 1960s 
and 70s will show how images o f the self were transformed to meet educational and 
business needs. Public audiences modified the language, techniques, and presentation of 
programmed learning to invoke both images o f humanity.
Finally, I will use my discussion of Skinner’s behavioral manifesto, Beyond 
Freedom and Dignity, published in 1971, to discuss how Skinner took advantage of 
America’s heightened fears of social, economic, and ecological collapse in the late 1960s. 
The cultural climate of the era seemed to be a vindication of Skinner’s prediction that 
societal ruin would be inevitable if Americans did not fundamentally reevaluate human 
nature and human society along the behavioral lines that he delineated. Skinner claimed 
that the embrace o f mechanical man was the only way out of this conundrum. The 
intense controversy that followed the publication o f Beyond Freedom and Dignity has not 
been addressed historically to any great extent. I will address this controversy in order to 
discover the extent to which Americans accepted or denied the mechanized self in light of 
the heightened awareness of war, environmental devastation, racial conflict, inflation and 
urban poverty in the late 1960s and early 70s.
In a period of uncertainty about American democracy in the immediate postwar 
period, Skinner participated in debates on the future of democraey and suggested that it 
was obsolete as a system of social management and control. Mead on the other hand 
lobbied for a social science that would preserve democracy and complement the “third 
force” movements in humanistic psychology during the 1950s that also sought to
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undermine the behavioral orientation.'^^ Like the leaders of the humanistic movement in 
psychology such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, Mead was interested in using 
personality theory to discuss the scientific basis of democraey. With this goal in mind, 
Mead translated her anthropological findings of the 1930s into an evolving critique of 
American culture, one that depicted personality and individuality in such a way as to 
under-gird what she saw as the best of American national character.
As I will demonstrate this critique required Mead to east depictions of gender, 
family structure, and community according to conventional American standards. 
Although Mead’s vision of the holistic self remained intact, she modified it to encourage 
Americans to believe that their cultural traditions were viable in the postwar world. 
Through a study of the reception of her book Male and Female (1949) in the 1950s, 
Mead’s treatment of gender identity will be examined to illustrate how it was informed 
by new psychological interpretations o f the concept o f personality, and how Mead used 
these perspectives to both expand and delimit human potentiality in the sexes. While 
some embraced Mead’s gender differentiation, others like Betty Friedan rejected it. A 
study o f the controversy surrounding Friedan’s critique of Male and Female will reveal 
some dimensions o f the politics of the self in the 1950s that surrounded the appropriation 
o f gender identities.
Mead also participated in the education controversies o f the late 1950s and early 
1960s and addressed the issue o f child rearing and the cultivation of human potential in 
the experimental environments of the home and the classroom. In this instance, and not 
entirely unlike Skinner, Mead used the engineering language of behavior modification to 
promote the cultivation of human potentiality of children who lived in the international
Ellen Herman, Romance o f  American Psychology, 264-65.
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and multicultural environment of the postwar world. Finally, an analysis o f Mead’s own 
social manifesto, Culture and Commitment (1970), also a response to public anxieties 
about social collapse in the late 1960s, will be compared with Skinner’s manifesto in her 
defense of the “personalized” individual over the mechanized self.
In the cases of Skinner and Mead, limited historical attention has been paid to the 
popular reception of their views concerning human nature and identity, or their status as 
purveyors of social technology. Still fewer have attempted substantively to engage the 
popular appropriation o f Skinnerism and Meadism. As many historians o f science have 
observed, science is no less a cultural activity than any other endeavor, and for the human 
sciences especially, historical accounts must engage social science as an expression of 
culture. The goal of the present study is to help close some of these gaps in the 
scholarship on Skinner and Mead and to use their stories to address the role o f science in 
the popular articulation o f the self in modem American society.
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CHAPTER TWO
GAINING CONTROL: FROM OPERANT BEHAVIOR TO SKINNERIAN SOCIAL
THEORY
The general adoption o f  scientific m anagement would readily  in the fu ture  
double the produ ctivity  o f  the average man engaged in industrial work. Think 
o f  what this means to the whole country. Think o f  the increase, both in the 
necessities and luxuries o f  life, which becom es available f o r  the whole country, 
o f  the possib ility  o f  shortening the hours o f  labor when this is desirable, and o f  
the increased opportunities fo r  education, culture, and recreation which this 
implies.
Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles o f  Scientific M anagem ent (1911)'
Well what would you  say to the design ofperson alities?  Would that interest you? The 
control o f  temperament? Give me the specifications, and I ’ll g ive  you  the man! What do  
you  say to the control o f  motivation, building the interests which w ill make men most 
produ ctive  and m ost successful? D oes that seem  to you  fan tastic?  Yet som e o f  the 
techniques are available, and m ore can be worked out experimentally. Think o f  the 
possib ilities!
T. E. Frazier, in Skinner, Walden Two ( I 9 4 S f
B. F. Skinner’s scientific and social philosophy had its roots in the progressive era 
social reform movements o f the early twentieth century, especially with regard to 
concepts o f scientific social management. The progressive response to urbanization and 
burgeoning mass culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played an 
instrumental role in the development of professional social science. The ideals of 
progressive social management -  efficiency and expertise in municipal administration, 
urban reform and social meliorism, stewardship, and the application of science to the 
cause of social progress -  all were ideals that figured prominently in the evolution of 
behavioral psychology as an experimental science o f control.
' Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles o f  Scientific Management (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911), 
142.
 ^B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1948).
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Just as behaviorism began to develop into a separate theoretical and experimental 
branch of psychology in the 1920s, Skinner began his career in science. His reworking of 
behavioral psychology in the late 1930s made the mastery of an organism’s environment 
central to behavior modification. This perspective met with great success in behavioral 
psychology in the late 1940s, and Skinner went on to apply his operant behaviorism to a 
new model o f social management. Skinner was neither a Taylorite nor a neo-progressive 
in the 1920s, nor was he a technocrat in the 1930s. His philosophy of social reform 
nevertheless reflected the social aims of management progressives and technocrats.
As discussed in the previous chapter, few historical appraisals o f Skinner’s life 
and work have succeeded in addressing his public career within the broader context of 
American postwar culture. Daniel Bjork’s 1993 biography, B. F. Skinner: A Life (1993), 
unlike Daniel Wiener’s uncritical homage B. F. Skinner: Benign Anarchist (1996), 
however, does an excellent job of portraying Skinner as an inventor o f social technology 
firmly established in the same tradition as Franklin, Edison, and Bell, and not merely as 
the hero (or villain) of radical behaviorism.^ Instead of tracing the theoretical and 
experimental genealogy of Skinner’s behaviorism, Bjork examines Skinner as an 
American inventor who, from the early stages of his career, considered the political, 
philosophical, and economic import of his technologies and his utopian visions.
Bjork’s Skinner is not a socially isolated experimentalist, but a publicly engaged 
and politically savvy propagandist. He was a scientist who cultivated the skill o f selling 
science as a consumer product and who learned how to retool the presentation of his 
inventions to appeal to different audiences. Skinner was an active participant in
 ^Daniel W. Bjork, B. F. Skinner: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Daniel N. Wiener, B. F. Skinner, 
Benign Anarchist (Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
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American culture. The present treatment extends Bjork’s depiction of Skinner as a 
scientist-inventor by examining Skinnerian social technology as an expression of 
American postwar culture. This is the same vantage point from which the historian of 
science, David Bakan, has discussed the history o f Watsonian behaviorism in America in 
the early twentieth century. The symbiotic relationship between the development of 
behavioral science and professional social management underscores his thesis that 
“[bjehaviorism must be understood as a cultural expression,” and not merely as a 
theoretical and disciplinary development within American psychology."^ Early American 
behaviorism, as Bakan notes, tried to address issues of social adjustment associated with 
a complex urban existence. Embedded in popular responses to behavioral thought and 
technology were opposing impulses — embracing technologies o f social control for their 
utility while also questioning their dehumanizing potential.^
The story of Skinner, like that of Bakan’s Watson, involves the same tension 
between mechanistic and holistic expressions of the self. Understandably, as in Bjork’s 
case, the confines of biography do not allow for a more extended exploration of these 
tensions, although Kanigel’s biography of Taylor, as mentioned previously, is a notable 
exception. My purpose in this chapter and the next will be to situate Skinner within the 
history o f social scientific management theory and technocracy in the United States and
David Bakan, “Behaviorism and American Urbanization,” Journal o f  the History o f  the Behavioral 
Sciences 2 (1966): 5-28. Bakan notes that, like Skinner, Watson, because o f his “personality, temperament, 
rhetoric, and in the many pronouncements that he made concerning the nature o f human 
beings.. .represented those features in the culture which articulated with the behaviorist orientation.” 
Skinner’s rhetoric and social theories were similarly fueled by those in American postwar culture receptive 
to his technologies o f social control. The same, incidentally, was also true o f Taylor’s experiences in 
popularizing scientific management.
® Ibid., 12.
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assess their impact on scientific and popular interpretations of the self. I will discuss the 
public appropriation of Skinner’s theories of social management, especially with regard 
to changes in education theory and administration in the late 1950s and early 60s. The 
present chapter, however, will address the countervailing forces in American culture that 
saw the rejection of Skinner’s mechanized self in the 1950s, as epitomized in his Air Crib 
technology and his utopian vision in Walden Two. In the case o f the Air Crib, I will go 
beyond Bjork’s brief discussion of its connections to the postwar hahy boom, one that is 
focused mainly on Skinner’s perspective.^ Changes in parenting and family structure 
launched a new ‘expert’ advice industry in social science, as well as new markets for 
domestic convenience technologies. Skinner, as Bjork observes, took full advantage of 
these trends.
Further, in considering American utopianism in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, I will examine Walden Two as a novel that fundamentally challenged American 
social conventions as well as the viability of democracy in the aftermath o f World War 
Two. Bjork has noted Skinner’s intentional use of rural imagery to invoke America’s 
agrarian past. In his utopian novel Skinner replaced the traditional American ideals of 
individualism and popular democracy with visions o f scientifically engineered social 
harmony. This substitution was roundly rejected by his humanist critics. ’ Their 
devotion to human dignity over the expediency of systematic technocracy, as Bjork 
explains, is reminiscent of earlier differences between management progressives, who
See related comments in Bjork, Skinner, 130.
’ Daniel Bjork, "B. F. Skinner and the American Tradition,” in B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American 
Culture, ed. Laurence D. Smith and William R. Woodward (London: Associated University Press, 1996), 
35-55. See page 38. Also see the version o f this discussion in Bjork, Skinner: A Life, 207-13.
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stressed the need for human efficiency and organization, and their humanist “liberator” 
critics (such as William James, Mark Twain, Horatio Alger, and John Dewey), who 
resisted these potentially dehumanizing trends.*
While there is no doubt that these critics fed the intellectual and philosophical 
convictions o f liberal democratic progressives in advancing the cause of social reform, I 
contend that the inherent tensions between the mechanized and holistic images of the self 
in these debates persisted in many corridors of American society. Striking the proper 
balance between the two images was also part o f progressivism and subsequent 
movements in social management in the twentieth century. Americans tried to balance 
the ideal of individual human dignity with a desire for technological transcendence 
through systems o f social management.
Many histories o f social science that address its cultural contexts often fail to 
penetrate basic assumptions about “audience” and “the public.” This is unfortunately still 
the case in what is a predominantly internalist Skinner historiography. Psychologist and 
historian Alexandra Rutherford’s recent analysis of Skinner’s public career provides a 
formidable and unprecedented archival survey of the many popular press portrayals and 
criticisms of Skinnerian behaviorism.^ These materials, as Rutherford notes, are vital in
Bjork, “B. F. Skinner and the American Tradition,” 37.
 ^See Alexandra Rutherford, “B. F. Skinner’s Technology o f Behavior in American Life: From Consumer 
Culture to Counterculture,” Journal o f  the History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 39, no. 1 (2003): 1-23 and 
“Radical Behaviorism and Psychology’s Public: B. F. Skinner in the Popular Press, 1934-1990,” History o f  
Psychology 3, no 4 (2000): 371-95.
In citing these articles here for the first time I must acknowledge the similarity between my 
historical appraisal o f Skinner and that o f Rutherford. Like Rutherford, I present Skinner in light o f trends 
in twentieth-century American culture that are reflected in his career as a scientist and public intellectual. 1 
share with Rutherford the conviction that a proper appraisal o f this well-known figure in American 
psychology must go beyond the confines o f diseiplinary history and address his place in, and influence on, 
American culture. Comparison o f our work shows that we have independently marshaled many o f the 
same primary and secondary sources in discussing the connections between Skinner, his public audiences, 
and the broader social trends in American postwar culture that he attempted to address in his social theories
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gaining historical insight into “how psychological knowledge is interpreted, conveyed, 
and received hy its popular a u d i e n c e s . S k i n n e r  is a scientist who to this day continues 
to he regarded as something of a “household name,” (Rutherford’s term) in American 
culture with regard to psychology. Rutherford’s account of Skinner’s many critics is a 
singularly invaluable resource in exploring the relationships between American social 
science and American culture.
Curiously, however, there is less sustained discussion of Skinner’s audiences in 
relation to broad trends in American culture in Rutherford’s studies than might he 
expected given her claims. Rutherford admits that “knee-jerk,” and sensationalized 
reactions to Skinner’s hooks, baby tenders, teaching machines, and social theories abound 
in the popular press. Yet the analysis in hoth of her recent articles does not thoroughly 
explore the cultural basis of the public mistrust of Skinnerian behavioral technology. As 
with Wiener and other Skinner scholars, Rutherford does not offer a convincing 
explanation as to why Skinner was controversial in the first place, or why he was talked 
about at all. Scathing critiques of the sterilizing effects of science were certainly nothing 
new in Skinner’s time. But Rutherford’s conclusion — that Skinnerian behavioral science 
and social theory clashed with the “common sense” public preference for humanistic 
depictions of human nature — presents no new insight into Skinner or his audiences. In
and technologies. We often use the same terminology to describe various aspeets o f the history o f the 
social sciences and o f Ameriean eultural history. In one partieular instanee, we have both described the 
1960s as the “age o f Aquarius” in relation to Skinner’s publie career in this decade. The title for chapter 
three of the present dissertation is “Human Engineering in the Age o f Aquarius and Beyond,” and this is 
similar to a section title on page 12 o f Rutherford’s 2003 article entitled “Beyond Freedom and Dignity: 
Behavioral Technology in the Age of Aquarius.” This similarity is entirely eoineidental and is most likely 
explained by the general popularity o f this phrase in describing the mid- to late 1960s. Moreover, I am in 
no way claiming priority over any aspect o f Alexandra Rutherford’s work. The historical framework and 
strategy for our respective theses are fundamentally different. I have attempted at various points in the 
following two chapters to show where we agree and also where and how our analyses are different.
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fact, it seems to contradict her initial intimation that Skinner’s “audiences” were just that, 
multiple and with differing agendas.
Rutherford argues, as have I, that Skinnerian social theory and social technologies 
were imbued with the metaphors of efficiency and practicality. They also embodied, as 
she states, the “progressivist values” associated with the history of social melioration, as 
well as the embrace of technology in organizing modem life. I make similar claims in 
the present treatment. The analysis I offer, however, is situated within a more sustained 
historical discussion of the evolution of these ideals and values in American culture. My 
discussion of trends in scientific social management, technocracy, political theory, 
progressivism. Taylorism, the history of American utopianism, and postwar American 
culture is designed to contextualize Skinner’s contributions to debates on the self in the 
broader context of twentieth-century American history.
Rutherford’s depiction of Skinner as a public enigma, dogmatic and unwavering 
in his dedication to radical behaviorism, and utterly bewildered by the outcry over his 
views, is also, I think, problematized by Bjork’s biography.'* It is important to challenge 
the assumption among Skinner scholars that social critics and journalists in the popular 
press both reflected and shaped the whole of public opinion about Skinner and behavioral 
science in toto}^ Without denying the general recognition among historians o f science 
that popular media are important venues in exploring the public reception of science, it is 
also historically pmdent to investigate the audience(s) of critics and journalists
Rutherford, “Radical Behaviorism,” 372-73.
"  Rutherford inexplicably passes over Bjork’s biography by commenting simply that his is “a sympathetic 
yet objective portrait o f one o f psychology’s most famous figures.” See page 391 o f her article.
Rutherford, “Radical Behaviorism,” 372 and Wiener, Benign Anarchist, xi-xiv.
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themselves in greater detail. Many who chose to write negatively about Skinner, for 
example, did so because of strong personal commitments to humanism and liberal 
democratic politics; hence their derision of Skinner. Yet the popular rejection of 
Skinnerian social theory does not explain, for example, the wholesale appeal of, and 
multimillion-dollar commitment to, technologies of teaching and the science of 
programmed instruction by educational and business administrators at the end o f the 
1950s. Nor can this explain why Skinner is still lauded as a founding father of a 
revolution in programmed instruction, an industry that continues to this day.
These considerations, when coupled to broader themes in American urbanization 
and technocracy, indicate that, while most Americans were uncomfortable with the stark 
and baldly mechanistic visions of the self in Skinnerian behaviorism, they were more 
than willing, absent the specter o f Skinner, to take advantage of behavioral techniques to 
increase efficiency and productivity. This was especially the case in corporate and 
educational settings. These examples indicate the multiplicity o f Skinner’s audience as 
well as the complex and contradictory nature of his popular image, which as Rutherford 
concludes, although without explanation, is “uniquely intertwined” with his professed 
theories.'^ I will argue, however, that distinctions between the distrust o f Skinnerian 
behaviorism on the one hand, and the widespread embrace of technocracy in America on 
the other, account for his multifaceted public image only when placed in the proper 
historical context in which humanistic and technocentric inclinations co-existed. While 
publicly decrying Skinner’s direct challenge to human autonomy and dignity, Americans 
in the workplace and on the home front nevertheless employed all sorts o f behavioral
Ibid., 390.
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methods and technologies to manage human activity. They may have done this without 
sustained reflection on the mechanistic implications for human nature that were 
embedded in technologies of social control.''*
How then can we begin to explain the countless articles, book reviews, essays, 
dissertations, and book-length refutations of Skinner that support the claim that Skinner’s 
public audiences were always at least suspicious if not completely outraged by his 
behavioral visions of humanity? The capacity o f Skinner to inflame his many critics did 
not lie simply in his mechanistic depiction of the self. Like Taylorism, Skinnerism 
brought into focus those commitments to technocratic science and society that Americans 
had already made.'^ Skinner, like his audience, understood that his was in many respects 
a description of a world in which Americans already lived. Skinner merely advocated the 
refinement o f social controls already extant in society, and this forced his critics and 
readers to confront the advent of a systematized, ordered, and controlled existence.
Some embraced Skinner’s vision of the self in the hope o f maximizing human 
potential in business, education and government and streamlining their individual and 
collective production. Other critics protested and condemned it. Most, however, found 
ways of doing both at the same time — of holding mechanistic and holistic images of 
humanity together in a tentative embrace and learning to live with the fundamental 
tension between both visions of the self.
Ibid ., 3 8 9 . R u therford’s o w n  citation  o f  a 195 9  statistic , in d ica tin g  that fifty  percent o f  su rveyed  
Americans thought that science would advance the understanding o f human behavior, might perhaps 
support a claim that some recognition and/or choice occurred, but she inexplicably dismisses the percentage 
(half the survey pool) as insignificant.
Laurence Smith has noted this similarity between Skinner and Taylor, and it is my aim here to expand on 
his observation. See comments by Smith, in “Situating B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American 
Culture,” in Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture, 294-315, 
especially page 298.
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In the examination here and in the next ehapter, an analysis o f Skinner’s eareer as 
a behavioral technologist and advocate of societal engineering is presented as an 
exploration of modem images of human nature, contextualized as they were by both 
laboratory science and American culture. Such an analysis will reveal important links 
between scientific depictions o f human nature and the dynamic o f their popular 
appropriation in the public and private sector.
With his introduction of ‘baby tender’ technology in the late 1940s Skinner 
achieved a level o f public notoriety that was rare for social scientists. An examination of 
his emerging status as a scientific social “expert” in the area of child rearing gives special 
insight into how social scientists crafted their wares to fit social needs. Further, by 
describing Skinner’s explorations o f contemporary social issues through the medium of 
utopian fiction, my analysis addresses the tension between scientific aspirations toward 
human engineering and the public resistance to mechanistic conceptions of the self. In 
his utopian novel, Walden Two (1946),’  ^Skinner took on such pressing emergent social 
problems as the reorganization of American families and communities, the advent of 
technocracy, and the new social roles of the sexes. By the 1950s Skinner had developed 
these emergent theories on human behavior into a fully articulated philosophy of 
humanity and society in his ‘sequel’ to Walden Two, a formal text on the subject entitled 
Science and Human Behavior that was first published in 1953. In these and other 
publications he used the language of human adaptive potential, evolution, and the
B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1946).
B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1953).
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‘laboratory’ image of experimental utopias to explain and illuminate the new 
environmental ‘contingencies’ of American postwar social transition.
Skinnerian Experiments with Social Technology
As historian Nils Wiklander has effectively argued, Skinner channeled his 
embrace o f science as a pathway to social reform into a research program in behavioral 
science in the 1 9 3 0 s . T h e  social collapse that attended the Great Depression spurred 
many social scientists into organizing university-based institutes dedicated to research in 
social planning. As Wiklander contends, however, Skinner eschewed reform politics and 
collaborative research projects for the solitary mastery o f behavior in the laboratory. He 
combined a search for the laws of behavior in animals with readings in science, 
philosophy, and literary criticism that sparked his imagination about how science could 
bring order to society.'^ As early as 1932, these investigations coalesced in an essay on 
behavioral interpretations of epistemology where Skinner explored the human 
implications of his behaviorism. In 1934 Skinner also produced a paper for a Rockefeller 
foundation work group (headed by Carl Murcheson and Warren Weaver) that explored 
the use o f human verbal behavior in examining human will and emotion.^^
While holding faculty positions at the University o f Minnesota and Indiana 
University in the mid to late 1930s Skinner published The Behavior o f  Organisms (1938).
Nils Wicklander, “From Hamilton College to Walden Two: An Inquiry into B. F. Skinner’s Early Social 
Philosophy,” in Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism, 83-108.
Ibid., 86-87.
Ibid., 92-93.
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He also privately addressed the disturbing events in Russia and Germany in 
correspondence with colleagues. Social scientists at large answered the need for research 
into totalitarianism and fascism by creating consortiums like the American Association of 
Applied Psychology (AAA?) and the Society for the Psychological Study o f Social 
Issues (SPSSI). Skinner, however, stayed clear of such projects, but he did note that the 
scourge of Nazism indicated the need for a social scientific meritocracy. The rule of 
experts, he thought, would prevent such corrupt leadership and extremist nationalism.^'
Thus, even in the experimental research phase o f his career in the 1930s, there are 
indications that Skinner had begun to think about the social reform implications of 
operant behaviorism. His passing comments on political events are prescient o f his full 
disquisition on the comparative efficacy of political systems in Walden Two later on. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, Skinner was neither a political post-progressive in the 
1920s nor a scientist-activist in the 1930s. His vision of social scientific management 
and technocracy, however, would carry over into his next career as a public intellectual in 
the 1950s and 60s. The Second World War, as historian of psychology, James Capshew 
has argued, saw Skinner’s transformation from a devotee of pure experimental research 
into an “inventor” and promoter of technologies of human engineering and control.
Project Pigeon in the 1940s marked Skinner’s professional transition. A 
maverick, Skinner did not involve himself in any of the collaborative and 
interdisciplinary wartime efforts among social scientists to marshal useful research into 
human behavior for the war effort. Instead he worked alone on his pigeon missile
Ibid., 96-97.
James H. Capshew, “Engineering Behavior; Project Pigeon, World War II, and the Conditioning o f B. F. 
Skinner,” in Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism, 128-50.
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technology. During a period when professional soeial science expanded dramatically 
through military and government sponsorship, Skinner attempted to market useful 
techniques and technologies, battling a wartime prejudice against psychology as an 
inaccurate s c i ence . S k i nne r  reinvented his presentation of behavioral science later on 
by using the popular imagery o f convenience technology and the political rhetoric o f his 
utopian writing in appealing to a broader audience in the postwar and Cold War eras. 
Skinner became a social analyst and critic in order to sell the virtues o f operant 
behaviorism to a nation facing new challenges.
Skinner’s status as a purveyor of behavioral teehnology during the war, embodied 
first in his work for the American military on experimental missile guidance systems, and 
later in the technology of child rearing devices, are reflections o f Skinner’s aspirations 
toward a science of comprehensive social engineering.^'* The Second World War 
provided Skinner with some initial opportunities to try his hand at marketing social 
technologies to a broader public audience.
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 Skinner began to explore applications 
o f behavioral science to the war effort, specifically the production o f warfare technology. 
The unusual technique of using kamikaze pilots in flying weapons had proven effective 
in the Pacific theatre and in Europe. Another particularly unorthodox ordinance delivery 
method involved the behavioral conditioning of dogs by the Russian army to serve as 
walking mines, engineered to crawl under enemy tanks and debilitate them with
"  Ibid., 128-30.
Capshew's argument appears to counter claims by Nils Wiklander (in the same volume) that Skinner’s 
ideas about social engineering began well before the war. I am inclined toward W iklander’s claim that 
Skinner began to explore the social implications of his work, at least intellectually, before the war, but that 
Project Pigeon was key in helping him begin to imagine future technologies o f social reform.
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explosive c h a r g e s . Skinner became interested in producing similar technologies to help 
the American military gain an advantage over the Germans in designing missile guidance 
systems.
While observing the acrobatic movements of pigeons one afternoon from his back 
yard window in Minneapolis, Skinner hit upon an idea. “Suddenly I saw them as 
‘devices’ with excellent vision and extraordinary maneuverability. Could they not guide 
a missile?,” Skinner wondered.^® With the help o f two graduate students, Skinner went to 
work on designing a mechanism for guiding air-to-ground missiles using pigeons 
mounted in the nose cone of a warhead. Skinner produced a device that utilized three 
pigeons rigorously conditioned to peck at plates showing the projected images o f the 
target and correct for directional changes when the image moved from one part of the 
plate to another. With behavioral modification Skinner produced pigeons that could peck 
with accuracy and consistency under a wide range of adverse environmental conditions 
inside a missile cone.
Skinner confidently approached several military and industrial organizations in 
order to solicit financial support for the development of what he himself regarded as an 
important military secret. Through his connections at the University o f Minnesota, 
Skinner first approached the National Defense Research Committee in 1941 but failed to 
get funding.^’ He had better luck convincing a private commercial company, the General
B. F. Skinner, Shaping o f a Behaviorist: Part Two o f  an Autobiography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1979), 255.
“ Ibid., 241.
At one point, Skinner considered forcing the project on the NDRC by taking the invention public in a 
major magazine such as Life or The Saturday Evening Post, but later thought better o f it, given what he
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Mills Corporation, that such gadgeteering was possible using behavioral methods.
Putting the weight of corporate endorsement behind Skinner’s researeh, General Mills 
convinced the newly formed Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) to 
support a contract to develop a technology that government engineers thought was 
feasible. Eventually a total of $75,000 was tunneled into what became knows as ‘Project 
P i g e o n . D e s p i t e  a successful demonstration of the guidance system, the project was 
dropped by the OSRD in April 1943.
Skinner blamed the demise of the project on what he concluded was a general 
lack of faith among OSRD committee members and other projeet scientists in the 
reliability and accuracy of behaviorally modified pigeons. They clearly had not bought 
into Skinner’s mechanistic concepts whereby organisms could be behaviorally designed 
into accurate machine devices, and this proved instructive to Skinner in subsequent 
attempts to showcase his technologies. James Capshew has argued that Skinner’s 
fortunes reflect those of the discipline in general in failing to convince government 
officials and engineers that psychology could produce reliable technological 
applications.^^
Despite the OSRD committee’s skepticism of pigeon technology. Project Pigeon 
served to open up new and exciting possibilities for Skinner in behavioral research. His 
work with pigeons had suggested that complex behaviors could be brought under precise
believed to be its military importance. See his discussion of the negotiations in Skinner, Shaping o f  a 
Behaviorist, 255-56.
I take my cues for this part of the narrative from James H. Capshew's informative essay, “Engineering 
Behavior: Project Pigeon, World War II, and the Conditioning o f B. F. Skinner,” in Smith and Woodward, 
B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture, 128-50.
Capshew, “Engineering Behavior,” 128-30.
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control. The research had also illustrated the inverse — that the construction of highly 
complex behaviors was possible.^*’ With improvements in behavioral technique during 
these experiments the behavioral modifications had also been done at an accelerated 
pace, far beyond what had been accomplished previously with rats.^' The pigeons in the 
missile projeet had been conditioned to function in environments that were entirely 
different from their ‘natural’ environment. They could, as Skinner predicted, be built into 
‘devices.’ Project Pigeon provided inspiration for Skinner’s subsequent experiments with 
the behavioral technologies of child rearing. The device metaphor for the pigeon had 
been no aecident. In the late 1940s Skinner aetively promoted the scientifie links 
between human and animal behavior in the public eye, alluding with each new marvel of 
experimental eonditioning to the possibilities for soeial engineering.
By 1950 the word out of the Harvard Psyehologieal Laboratories was that Skinner 
was using animal experiments to explore human nature. In a set o f artieles that appeared 
in Time and Popular Science about Skinner, this juxtaposition was developed more 
fully.^^ The articles stressed the value of pigeons as ideal subjects for the exploration of 
human charaeteristies, noting in partieular the similarity of reaction times, color vision, 
and penchant for superstitious behavior. An article for Time in 1950 deseribed
Skinner, Shaping o f  a Behaviorist, 267.
Ibid., 268. This acceleration had more to do with improved experimental technique rather than 
differences in rat and pigeon intelligence. Skinner believed that intelligence was ultimately reducible to 
behavioral contingencies. Skinner and his assistants had taught pigeons to perform very complex activities 
such as playing notes on a piano in sequence and playing ping-pong, the latter being an object o f public 
fascination. Skinner claimed to have achieved this behavior in a matter o f  minutes, quickly re-enforcing 
the pigeons so that they would continuously peck at the ball and bounce it back and forth. All this, Skinner 
exclaimed, was done “by hand” and without mechanical devices. “1 remember the day as one o f great 
illumination,” Skinner later recalled.
“Harvard Trains Pigeons to Work for a Living,” Popular Science 157 (July, 1950); 116-18; “Pigeons and 
People,” Time 55 (June 19, 1950): 72-73.
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experiments with pigeons conditioned to play ping-pong matches to their mutual benefit, 
i.e., the procurement of food. The implication of the experiment was that similar 
techniques for engineering such key character traits as cooperation might also work for 
solving human problems. ‘Cooperation’ and ‘competition,’ as discussed in an article for 
Science News Letter, were merely matters, Skinner argued, o f molding behavioral 
contingencies to any given setting. Any ‘pigeon,’ Skinner claimed, could be taught 
complicated behaviors, whether wild or domesticated.^^ Perhaps such factors as cultural 
background, level of education, and intelligence might also be transcended in the case of 
humans. Skinner would later assert as much in his work on education.
Similar messages were embedded in the marketing campaign for what was 
perhaps Skinner’s most famous novelty, the baby tender. Skinner first thought of 
creating a device to simplify the care o f infants after observing the intense anxiety his 
wife Yvonne endured with their first child in the late 1930s. '^* Like many women o f her 
generation, as Dan Bjork observes, she had little familiarity with child rearing 
responsibilities. When their second child Deborah was bom in 1944, Skinner became 
determined to design an enclosed environment for her that would simplify parental 
rearing duties and provide a safe and unrestrictive, healthy environment for the child. 
Skinner constructed a crib-size box that was temperature-controlled, with a glass front 
panel. Freeing the infant from restrictive clothing and linens, Skinner installed a canvass 
floor that could be rolled through the crib, replacing soiled sections as needed. The box, 
Skinner argued, met the needs o f busy mothers and active infants.
“Pigeons Play Ping-Pong,” Science News Letter 57 (June 17, 1950): 371-72. 
Bjork, Skinner, 130-31.
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Skinner’s goal in designing the tender was to simplify the basic maintenance 
activities in infant care for mothers who were under increasing pressure to both manage 
the domestic environment and move out into the job market. In addition, his critique of 
child rearing techniques, and of child psychology in general, centered on the observation 
that modem methods lacked any scientific scmtiny. Skinner translated the language of 
operant conditioning into that of ‘reinforcement,’ the same terminology used by the child 
psychologist Benjamin Spock. By gaining control o f baby’s environment, Skinner 
attempted to introduce scientific management into this particular aspect of daily life. The 
tender would shorten the time spent on child rearing duties and enhance the mental and 
physical health of children using an unrestrictive environment.^^ Unlike other 
psychologists, Skinner, the radical behaviorist and reductionist, claimed that an infant’s 
mood, temperament, and general emotional development depended primarily on its 
physical comfort. For Skinner’s potential audience this perspective reduced the alleged 
psychological complexities of child development to straightforward practical 
considerations. From a commercial and consumer standpoint, this was undoubtedly also 
meant to enhance the Air Crib’s image as a technology of convenience designed to 
replace obsolete and inefficient parenting practices. In a fast-paced modem world, 
Skinner would argue, the tender provided children with more of the essential comfort and 
mobility they needed for emotional and mental health. This, in turn, increased their
B. F. Skinner, “Baby in a Box,” in Readings in Developmental Psychology, ed. Judith K. Gardner 
(Boston; Little, Brown, & Co., 1978).
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opportunities to explore the kind of ‘creative’ behaviors that would later be necessary in 
contending with future environmental/social adaptation/^
As with pigeons and missiles, close control of an infant’s immediate 
environmental contingencies was the key innovation o f the baby tender. By symbolically 
relegating the psychological complexities o f child development to the realm of a simple, 
controlled space, Skinner felt that he could offer the parents of the baby boom generation 
an alternative to the advice ‘industry’ in childcare.^^ By emphasizing the tender’s 
appliance-like qualities, Skinner attempted to appeal to a growing consumer market that 
had embraced the mantra of ‘better living through science.’ Much like the contemporary 
spectacle o f Walt Disney’s “Tomorrowland,” with its futuristic emphasis on modernity
It is interesting to note here that Skinner may have emphasized these advantages o f the baby tender in 
light o f other relatively well-known studies that correlated restrictive swaddling techniques with subsequent 
patterns in destructive temperament. One o f the most famous o f these studies was conducted by Ruth 
Benedict, a close colleague of Margaret Mead, who researched the parenting strategies in Russian culture 
as part o f the culture/personality and national character rubric in anthropology during the 1930s. See her 
study, “Child Rearing in Certain European Countries,” American Journal o f  Orthopsychiatry 19, no. 2 
(April, 1949): 342-50.
The Cold War affected many aspects o f the postwar American experience, including the rearing of 
children. Parents relied on the authority o f experts in medicine and psychology for guidance in childcare. 
Beginning in the war years anxious parents were inundated with books, magazines, pamphlets, and texts 
designed to help them succeed on the home front and help keep the nation strong. Much o f this literature 
stressed the need for tight controls on the immediate physical and social environment o f  babies. Good 
interpersonal relationships, now the primary goal o f the nuclear family, and proper hygiene were vital to 
the normal development o f children. Any deviation, it was suggested, could result in the social, emotional, 
or intellectual maladjustment o f children. Examples o f this literature abound. For an example of 
contemporary manuals emphasizing control o f the environment, see Gertrude E. Chittenden, Living With 
Children (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945). Many o f these guides addressed the everyday aspects of 
caring for babies and children. Perhaps the most popular and influential o f these was Dr. Benjamin 
Spock’s The Common Sense Book o f  Baby and Child Care (New York: Sloan, and Pearce, 1946) which 
encouraged parents to feel confident and trust their own instincts. Other examples o f practical manuals 
include Helen F. Dunbar, M. D., Your Child's Mind and Body: A Practical Guide fo r  Parents (New York: 
Random House, 1949) and Dorothy E. Bradbury, Learning to Care fo r Children (New York: D. Appleton 
Century Co., 1946). Organizations such as the Child Study Association o f America also produced books 
and pamphlets for new parents. See their publication Parents Questions (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1947). Other texts explored the sociological and developmental consequences o f child rearing, examining 
developmental stages and the problems of social adjustment. For examples see Arnold Gesell, Child 
Development: An Introduction to the Study o f  Human Growth (New York: Harper, 1949); Erik H. Erikson, 
Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950); Henry H. Goddard, Our Children in the Atomic Age 
(Mellot, IN: Hopkins Syndicate, 1948).
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and convenience technology, Skinner promoted the baby tender as yet another labor-
saving device 38
The Aircrib has many advantages for both child and parents. For the child 
it offers greater comfort, safety, freedom of movement, and an opportunity 
for the earliest possible development of motor and perceptual skill. For 
the parent it saves labor and gives a sense of security about the baby’s well 
being.^ ^
Beyond its convenience the tender would rid parenting of inefficient and damaging 
practices and provide control over the first years of a baby’s life, years that ‘experts’ like 
Dr. Benjamin Spock"*® had convinced Americans were crucial to the emotional 
development o f children. Skinner’s device would place the power o f technology directly 
in the hands o f average citizens instead of pediatricians and ‘experts.’
For new parents who had been told that the first years of life were the most 
formative, the baby tender ostensibly provided a practical solution to seemingly complex 
problems. The controlled environment o f the tender cultivated desirable traits.
See also Alexandra Rutherford’s very informative discussion o f these trends in consumer culture in “B.
F. Skinner’s Technology o f Behavior in American life,” 2-6.
See Skinner, “Baby in a Box,” 101.
The popular iconography o f the postwar era and its emphasis on futurism fueled a new 
consumerism that embraced science and technology as the key to modem living. Advertisers and the media 
fed the American desire for convenience and for ergonomic, efficient design in cars, home designs, 
appliances, and other household items. A future-minded public was also treated to the spectacle o f 
technological transcendence in such displays as Walt Disney’s ‘future world’ exhibits that featured a look 
at modem urban and suburban life in the next century. Skinner hoped that such technologies as the baby 
tender would also be embraced in this new culture o f convenience. For more on the iconography and 
consumer culture o f the 1950s consult Thomas Hine, Populuxe (New York: Knopf, 1986). For discussions 
o f how the new medium o f television promoted eonsumer eulture see Karal A. Marling, As Seen on TV:
The Visual Culture o f  Everyday Life in the 1950s (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1994).
Spock’s book. The Common Sense Book o f  Baby and Child Care (New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce,
1946), was wildly popular in the 1940s and 50s as a guidepost for new parents. Dr. Spock became 
something o f  a public expert and celebrity as a result, and he was highly regarded throughout the postwar 
decades as a founder o f  modem parenting theory. See the recent biography on Spock by Thomas Maier,
Dr. Spock: An American Life (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1998), and Spock’s own account o f his celebrity 
and influence in Benjamin Spock & Mary Morgan, Spock on Spock: A Memoir o f  Growing Up With the 
Century (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).
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empowering parents with the ability to introduce behavioral contingencies that ensured
well balanced, calm, tolerant, and creative children. Indeed, Skinner saw the tender as
the perfect laboratory for “building happy and healthy babies,” and discovering the
optimal conditions for molding character and personality.'*'
If, as many people have claimed, the first year is extraordinarily important 
in the determination of character and personality, then by all means let us 
control the conditions o f that year as far as possible in order to discover 
the important variables.'*^
Not unexpectedly, Skinner’s methods left many in the public uneasy. The tender was met
with mixed reviews. After convincing the editors of Ladies Home Journal to publish an
article on Skinner’s own success in using the baby tender for his daughter, he received a
flurry o f inquiries from interested parents.'*^ There were also reports in several
mainstream magazines such as Time and the New Yorker that carried favorable reviews of
the tender. Touted by one reporter as a device “counted on to revolutionize the rearing of
children and enormously diminish parental strain,” Skinner could boast that forty families
had used the Box with great success.^ Time ran a 1954 article about twin boys, Roy and
Ray Hope, who were raised in a Skinner Box for their first eighteen months. The
endorsement from the mother seemed to leave no doubt about its basic practicality —
Skinner, Shaping o f  a Behaviorist, 290.
Ibid.
B. F. Skinner, “Baby in a Box,” Ladies//owe/owrM a/(October, 1945): 30-31, 135-36, 138. In the years 
following its introduction other magazines provided accounts o f its successful use. See “Baby Box,” New 
Yorker (July 19, 1947): 19-20; “Box Reared Babies,” Time 63 (February 22, 1954): 66.
“Baby Box,” New Yorker (July 19, 1947): 19-20.
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“Mrs. Hope’s verdict: the box is a boon to mothers because it cuts down on laundry and 
bathing.”"*^
But the tender also inspired debate and occasionally harsh criticism of parental
techniques that reduced babies to lab rats. Although Skinner received many letters from
interested parents, be also got letters from physicians cautioning him not to market the
device without further testing. Professional endorsements from psychiatrists and
physicians were few and c a u t i o u s . O t he r  letter writers were firmly opposed to the
tender, seeing it as a cage that would be used by neglectful parents. One respondent
singled out Skinner, the amoral academic scientist who subjected his own child to
experimental analysis, for some particularly vitriolic remarks.
This professor who thinks he can rear his little child by depriving her of 
social life, sun and fresh air [xic]. Can’t you people of the law do 
something about this? These crack-pot scientists.. .[cjaging this baby up 
like an animal just to relieve the mother o f a little more work
Those few commercial and governmental agencies that expressed interest in
manufacturing the tender were concerned about its negative image as a sterile and
isolating environment."^* Commercial patrons associated the baby tender with the cold
instrumentation of the laboratory."^^
“Box-Reared Babies,” Time 84, no. 1 (February 22, 1964): 66.
^  Skinner, Shaping o f  a Behaviorist, 305-06.
Ibid., 305.
'*** Skinner, “Baby in a Box,” 103; Skinner, Shaping o f a Behaviorist, 291.
49 See the detailed appraisal o f the Air Crib’s commercial history by Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr., and Elizabeth 
Nielsen-Gammon, “B. F. Skinner and Psychotechnology: The Case o f the Heir Conditioner,” Review o f  
General Psychology 3, no. 3 (1999): 155-67. Benjamin and Nielsen-Gammon note three surveys that were 
conducted by Skinner and the manufacturers o f the Aircrib in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. The surveys 
indicated that the majority o f those who actually used the Crib were very satisfied with it. Benjamin and 
Nielsen-Gammon disagree, as do I, with Daniel Bjork in and his contention that the commercial failure of 
the Air Crib was due to limited research. A more likely explanation, they claim, is that the Crib was seen
99
In the emerging suburban landscape o f the postwar period, the subject of 
parenting was associated with anxiety and controversy about bow best to raise children 
and prepare them for adulthood. The ambiguous role of science in mediating these 
concerns is clearly represented in the mixed reception o f the Baby Box. Although many 
nominally welcomed the role that science might play in family planning, others resisted 
the intrusion o f scientific ‘expertise’ into parenting. The laboratory and the experimental 
aesthetic o f the Box did little to accentuate its intended function as a benign tool of 
convenience and efficiency. Despite Skinner’s assurances to the contrary, many critics 
worried that the tender would stunt emotional development.^*^ While the tender was 
meant to fit the new consumer ideal of individual fulfillment and family harmony through 
domestic technology, a labor saving device for parenting apparently stretched the proper 
limit of science in the eyes o f most Americans.^’ The experimental connotation of the 
“box” in the title of the Ladies Home Journal article, Skinner later recalled, had been a 
mistake and was partly to blame for the misrepresentation of the tender.
With the bomb guidance project Skinner had trouble convincing his military 
patrons that his behavioral techniques could be used in producing precise organic
by most as a dehumanizing technology o f “displacement” that undermined the normal relationship between 
parents and children. I agree with this assessment, but it is clear that Benjamin and Nielsen-Gammon are 
highly biased in their supportive portrayal o f Skinnerian technology. They make clear their belief that the 
Air Crib is still today a viable technology, and that Skinner was the victim o f an “appallingly bad” public 
understanding o f science. I would also disagree with those historians such as Alexandra Rutherford, who 
claim a positive reception for the Air Crib in the 1950s and 60s. Skinner’s tender was indeed marketed to 
fit consumer desire for convenience technology, but it was nevertheless a commercial failure. Despite 
Rutherford’s claim, Skinner did not understand American culture as well as he thought he did in the early 
1950s. See Rutherford’s comments in “B. F. Skinner’s Technology o f Behavior,” 4, 6.
Rutherford associates this attitude about the tender with the rise o f psychoanalytic child psychology and 
changing social roles for women in the 1950s. See Rutherford, “B. F. Skinner’s Technology o f Behavior,” 
6-7.
Skinner, “Baby in a B ox ,” 101.
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“devices” sueh as pigeons. The social import o f his child rearing technologies was lost as 
well on many who associated the technology of the Baby Box with the abuses of social 
science reminiscent o f Huxley’s Brave New World (1932). The trouble lay in convincing 
consumers that the tender employed benign and non-aversive methods that did not isolate 
children from the outside world. It was not meant as a substitute for parenting.
For Skinner, the tender was simply an extension of the parenting techniques that 
he and his wife Yvonne had used on their own children. Ironically, as psychologist 
Elizabeth Jordan has argued, the Skinners took a remarkably permissive attitude toward 
discipline and control of the environment, one for which Benjamin Spock would have 
approved.^^ Indeed, a popular focus on permissiveness, on allowing children the freedom 
to explore their world without restrictions or harsh punishment, overshadowed Spock’s 
equally strong emphasis on parental authority and leadership. Spock encouraged parents 
to present children with the illusion of freedom by allowing them some independence. 
Bad behavior was re-directed through positive reinforcement. Spock’s strategy, Jordan 
argues, actually paralleled Skinner’s behavioral philosophy o f parenting. By passively 
controlling the child’s environment, the Skinners could create the illusion o f freedom for 
their children and help them learn creativity and independence while still retaining 
parental authority. The Skinners did not believe in harsh punishment. They claimed to 
use reasoned explanations and positive reinforcement, much as Spock had recommended.
Anxiety over totalitarian science and dehumanization was also associated with 
Skinner’s utopian musings. His novel Walden Two, first published in 1946, was received 
poorly by a public whose fear of communism, economic instability, threat o f war, and
Elizabeth A. Jordan, “Freedom and the Control of Children: The Skinners’ Approach to Parenting,” in 
Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism, 199-214. See pages 207-11.
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social change left little room for scientifically inspired social experimentation on a grand 
scale. Yet, as I will show in the next chapter, a rise in popularity o f Walden Two in 
subsequent decades would see Skinner’s public image modified by a new readership 
whose collective memory of the Depression and world war figured less in their vision of 
future America. With what one reviewer termed his ‘society tender’ Skinner would again 
attempt to transform the experimental language of operant behaviorism into the rhetoric 
of social reform, addressing the question of human freedom while at the same time 
invoking classic individualism and America’s agrarian past.^^ As with baby tenders, the 
illusion o f freedom could be applied to individuals in a small community where their full 
creative potential could be realized through passive environmental controls. Skinner 
addressed the persistent dilemma of how to accommodate the individual in a 
predominantly bureaucratic society. Freedom in all human settings was an illusion, he 
thought, but one that could be utilized scientifically to help rebuild a decaying 
metropolis. As Skinner’s protagonist T. E. Frazier would argue in Walden Two, human 
behavior was already under systematic controls. The controls needed refinement so as to 
liberate human potential.
“Box Reared Babies: Skinner Baby Box,” a review o f Walden Two, by B. F. Skinner, Time 63 (February 
22. 1954): 66.
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Utopian Dreams: Experiments in Social Engineering
ADAMS AND EVES, NINETEEN FIFTY -  ?
They stood upon the eerie, rubbled waste 
Left by the atom-bombs -  a stunned, hurt youth 
And girl, half-blind, and in their mouths the taste 
O f ashes from the seattered eorpse of truth.
The days dragged. They were joined by other pairs 
Merged in the primitive, grim fight for life,
Wrenehed from grey aftermaths o f hate and strife.
At first they stumbled on with dark, strained breath.
But gradually they were touched by dawn.
The complicated avarice, senseless death,
Sly, vicious oratory -  all were gone.
Now stripped and timid, they could once more plan 
A small but actual brotherhood o f man.
Maxwell Bodenheim^'*
On the heels of his experimental successes with behavioral technology in the mid- 
1940s Skinner began thinking about opportunities for social experimentation that the 
war’s end might provide. Americans might be open to social experimentation, he 
thought, after a period of social mobilization that had radically altered public and private 
life. Having been instilled with the “crusading” spirit o f the war effort, America’s return 
to traditional patterns of life, work, and family seemed unlikely to Skinner.^^ Skinner 
recalled a dinner conversation with friends in Minnesota in the spring of 1945 where the 
subject o f returning sons and daughters came up. In such an atmosphere, Skinner 
wondered aloud, why not continue with social experimentation? “[Tjhey should
A signed and unpublished poem sold to B. F. Skinner by Maxwell Bodenheim dated 1947. Papers o f B. 
F. Skinner, Reactions to Skinner’s Work, ea. 1948-1976. Box 1, 1948-1951. [HUGFP 60.15]. Harvard 
University Archives, Cambridge, MA. Items from these folders are hereafter referred to as HUGFP 60.15. 
A note written by Skinner at the bottom o f the page reads, “Eve and I bought this from Bodenheim in 
Greenwich Village. He was bleary -, bloodshot-eyed
Skinner, Shaping o f  a Behaviorist, 292.
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experiment,” he asserted, “they should explore new ways of living, as people had done in 
the communities o f the nineteenth century.”^^
Given the collapse of the economy in the early 1930s and the social and 
philosophical morass that it had produced, it seemed to Skinner that a return to traditional 
living patterns made little sense. The Second World War, more than any other event in 
American history, Skinner believed, held the potential for creating viable alternatives to a 
conventional lifestyle. Shortly after this conversation Skinner began writing an 
exposition that would become the utopian classic, Walden Two, a novel that he started in 
June 1945 and finished in just under 14 weeks. The ‘poetic license’ of this novel allowed 
him to explore the implications of operant behaviorism for human engineering to the 
fullest extent without the constraints of a professional forum.^^
As historian Ellen Herman has observed, the institutional expansion of social 
science during the war created a postwar enthusiasm for producing techniques and 
technologies that had practical application to social management.^* Fresh from the war 
experience, and the lessons of Project Pigeon, Skinner came to believe that behaviorism 
writ large rendered traditional theories o f political economy obsolete. Short of wholesale 
revolution, he surmised, social reform could be achieved through the improvement o f the 
individual’s developmental environment. By improving family and educational
Ibid.
B. F. Skinner, “Walden Two Revisited,” preface from the 1976 edition o f Walden Two (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1948).
Ellen Herman, The Romance o f  American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age o f  Experts, 1940- 
1970 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1995). See especially the relevant chapters, “The Career of 
Cold War Psychology,” 124-52 and “The Growth Industry,” 238-75.
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environments for children, a new generation of Americans could eventually perfect 
society.
Both Skinner and Margaret Mead channeled their respective technocratic and 
meliorative reform agendas in the 1950s into critiques o f the family and the school. 
Skinner used behavioral psychology to develop technologies of social adjustment and 
reform. He also concluded, as I will demonstrate, that democracy as a system of social 
management was flawed. A reading of Walden Two clearly indicates, in fact, that 
Skinner was well versed in postwar debates among political scientists on the utility of 
democracy as a system of governance.
As psychologist and disciplinary historian Jill Morawski has observed, Skinner’s 
forays into utopian writing about the role o f experimental psychology in the cause of 
social reform was part of a tradition in utopian thought among his immediate 
predecessors in psychology.^^ Other prominent psychologists like G. Stanley Hall, Hugo 
Münsterberg, William MeDougall, and John B. Watson had written similar utopian 
essays about scientifically inspired societies in the 1910s and 20s. Each of them reflected 
a desire among psychologists to have professional psychology play a role in creating 
systems of social management that would be run by highly trained scientific “specialists.”
For progressive era psychologists, professional success mandated that they 
participate in introducing scientific efficiency to social administration. Such aspirations 
were in turn bolstered by what Morawski describes as a general public fascination in the 
1920s and 30s with mental testing, psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and the promise of
Jill G. Morawski, “Assessing Psychology’s Moral Heritage Through Our Neglected Utopias,” American 
f  jycWogMt 37 (1982): 1082-93.
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better living through science.®*  ^Psychologists would “provide expert leadership and 
implement scientific measures of social control.”^' Experimental psychologists were just 
as keen as clinicians in the first half of the twentieth century to make psychology socially 
relevant.
Viewing psychologists’ utopian writings as expressions o f a desire for social 
relevance obviates less charitable views among historians of psychology such as John 
Mills. Mills has masterfully chronicled the theoretical evolution o f behavioral 
psychology from its beginnings in nineteenth-century New Realism and pragmatic 
positivism.®^ Mills’ unhistorical and dismissive appraisal o f Skinner, as a failed 
philosopher and polemicist incapable of addressing the disparity between his social 
philosophy and its basis in animal experimentation, however, adds little to our 
understanding o f Walden Two's significance as a cultural artifact. Mills believes that the 
logical and metaphysical inconsistencies in Skinner’s philosophy o f mind (or, rather, ‘no 
mind’), and his penchant for avoiding the criticism of his contemporaries, renders Walden 
Two an exercise in wishful thinking that is unsubstantiated by authentic behavioral 
science. From a cultural historical perspective, however, I contend that such 
inconsistencies are beside the point. In the present discussion I am interested in the soeial 
and political dimensions of Walden Two as a critique o f modem society, a utopian 
polemic with a history that goes beyond its author’s status as a behaviorist. As Morawski 
states, “utopias comprise entertaining pronouncements on psychology’s ultimate
“ Ibid., 1091. 
Ibid., 1092.
John Mills, “The Behaviorist as Philosopher: B. F. Skinner,” in Control: A History o f  Behavioral 
Psychology (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 123-51. For comments on the origins of 
behaviorism, see M ills’ first chapter, “The Birth o f Psychological Behaviorism,” 23-54.
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contribution to a better society and the techniques that should be implemented by 
psychological e x p e r t s . I n d e e d ,  they served as vehicles through which psychologists 
could articulate the relevance of science to social reality, advocating as they often did the 
consolidation of disparate branches of professional psychology in response to social
• 64crises.
Skinner o f course faced a similar set o f circumstances in the postwar atmosphere 
o f the 1940s. The social transformations entailed in world war and the Cold War 
presented Skinner with what he and other scientists and intellectuals believed was the 
best opportunity yet to propose plans for social adjustment. Unlike his predecessors, 
however, Skinner created real-world technologies that he believed would make the 
manipulation of social environments possible. For him, utopian communities could be 
actual experiments in social engineering, just as they had been for other groups of 
Americans in the nineteenth century who faced similar ehallenges o f adjustment and 
adaptation in the face of urban expansion and industrialization.
Skinner’s utopian vision was inspired by Henry David Thoreau’s original 
nineteenth-century autobiographical recollection, Walden (1854).^^ As a young man 
Skinner, like Thoreau, became enchanted with Walden Pond, and he immersed himself in 
Walden and the collected works and notes of Thoreau.^® Skinner seemed particularly 
attracted to what he saw in the novel as a life made efficient through a simplified
Morawski, “Assessing Psychology’s Moral Heritage,” 1092.
^  Ibid., 1083.
Henry David Thoreau, Walden, or, Life in the Woods (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2002, c l 854).
66 Skinner, Shaping o f  a Behaviorist, 296-97.
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environment. Skinner was also impressed with Thoreau’s dedication to self-reinvention 
and divergence from a traditional lifestyle, and his almost scientifie approach to a new 
design for living through cloistered self-examination.^^
In his own novel Skinner envisioned a rural commune where members of a small 
collective would work, raise families, and organize living spaces around the principles of 
experimental behaviorism. The task of the Walden Two projeet would be to create an 
environment that would sustain a high degree o f soeial integration while also providing 
for the essential physical and emotional needs of the individual through the use o f soeial 
technology. One of the ultimate goals o f this experimental environment would be 
selectively to engineer out all ‘undesirable’ (i. e., inefficient or cumbersome) character 
traits by modifying environmental contingencies in the community setting. Such 
alterations were left to ‘planners’ who were trained in behavioral science and teehnology.
Skinner was well aware that Walden Two fell into an established genre of utopian 
literature and soeial thought stemming back to Plato’s Republic. Undoubtedly, he would 
have put himself in the company of Francis Bacon and Edward Bellamy as one o f the 
great utopian thinkers.®* Like these philosophers, Skinner wrestled with the question of
David Shi, The Simple Life: Plain Living and High Thinking in American Culture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). See especially Shi’s chapter on the transcendentalists, “Transcendental 
Simplicity,” 125-153 for a description of Thoreau’s life on Walden Pond.
The philosopher and reformer Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is best known for his views on empirical 
methods in science and science’s utility. One o f  the most well known utopian writers. Bacon envisioned a 
utopian community in his novel. New Atlantis (1627). See Sir Francis Bacon, New Atlantis and the Great 
Instauration, trans. Jerry Weinberger (Arlington Heights, IL: H. Davidson, 1989). Bacon envisioned a 
community o f natural philosophers living together in the monastic setting o f Salomon’s house and 
practicing the study o f nature as a form o f religious devotion. As an exploration o f socialism and a tract on 
social reform and industrial reorganization, Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward, 2000-1887 (New York: 
The Modem Library, 1951, c l 887), was one o f the most widely read and popular novels o f its time. 
Enthusiasm for his social reforms was intense, and something o f a political party was formed around 
discussion o f his book. Over a hundred Nationalist Clubs were formed in the 1890s to discuss his ideas, 
and a reform party called the Peoples’ Party was formed in 1891 and became a central part o f the 
Nationalist movement. For more on the social and literary impact o f Bellamy’s novel, see the collected
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how to organize society such that the greater good of the community was better served. 
His hypothetical system of government was not unlike Plato’s meritocracy in which a 
class of educated leaders, specially selected for a life of statesmanship, was trained to 
manage society. Bacon had proposed a similar strategy in his utopian classic, New  
Atlantis (1627).
Exploring the societal problems generated by industrialization and urbanization 
put Skinner in good company with nineteenth-century utopian theorists such as Edward 
Bellamy and Herbert Morris, both o f whom addressed the rise o f mass society and the 
concomitant disjuncture of individuals from nature and a sense o f community. Thoreau 
looked to nature to recapture a sense of community and personal identity. Others such as 
Bellamy addressed the destructive forces of industrial expansion and mechanization, 
arguing that they needed to be reshaped to serve the interests o f humanity rather than 
m ach in es .F o llo w in g  their lead, Skinner sought to combine the best o f both
essays in Looking Backward, 1988-1888, ed. Daphne Fatal (Amherst: The University o f  Massachusetts 
Press, 1988). For an appraisal o f Bellamy’s influence on the reform movement in the 1890s see Robert 
Shor, “The Ideological Matrix o f Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America: Reading Bellamy’s Looking 
Backward,” 3-26 in Francis Robert Shor, Utopianism and Radicalism in a Reforming America, 1888-1918 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997).
^  Edward Bellamy’s utopian social theories were representative o f the late nineteenth-century secular 
utopian writers who dealt primarily with theories o f economic and social planning. The Utopians o f this 
period strove to understand and improve on emerging institutions o f mass management. Some chose to 
retreat from these new trends, but progressives like Bellamy embraced them. The central problem for 
progressive Utopians lay in how to design social institutions so as not to compromise cultural traditions and 
individual autonomy entirely. Dystopian writing o f this period addressed the loss o f these traditions in an 
industrialized urban society.
Bellamy proposed to subject humanity to the rigors o f industrial efficiency and military 
organization where the individual worker served the greater whole. This would result, Bellamy believed, in 
social and moral edification. For a survey of Bellamy’s theories and those o f other nineteenth-century 
utopian writers, see The Quest fo r  Utopia: An Anthology o f  Imaginary Societies, ed. Glenn R. Negley and J. 
Max Patrick (New York: Flenry Schuman, 1952).
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philosophies in the social technology of operant behaviorism. What earlier soeial
experiments had lacked, he claimed, was a sound scientific basis.™
Most of the story o f Walden Two takes the form of a Socratic dialogue between
the community’s creator, psychologist T. E. Frazier, and a group o f guests from a nearby
urban university. Two of the guests are professors o f psychology and philosophy
respectively, and these characters serve as critical foils in the articulation o f Skinnerian
social theory, delineated through the character of Frazier. Professor Castle, a humanist
philosopher, remains vehemently opposed throughout the visit to what he considers
Frazier’s affront to human dignity. Professor Burris (similar to ‘Burrhus,’ Skinner’s own
first name), an academic psychologist, is eventually won over by Frazier’s arguments.
Also accompanying the academicians are two college-age couples fresh from the war.
They mull over the debate about the merits and drawbacks of the Walden Two
community. By the end of the novel, one couple is convinced enough to move into the
colony, but the other pair returns to urban life. For Burris, the potential o f such
experimental communities culminates at the end of Walden Two in his own epiphany and
conversion (similar, no doubt, to Skinner’s own).
I felt a warm blood coursing through my veins. This was what I had really 
wanted. I was on my own at last, and ahead of me lay a future o f my own 
making. ...I pulled out the copy of Walden and turned to the last 
page.. .Its apparent mysticism and its obscurity were unlike the rest o f the 
book and quite un-Thoreauvian. But now I knew that I would understand 
every word o f it, ... “The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Robert S. Fogarty has recently argued against the traditional chronology associated with the rise and fall 
o f communitarianism in nineteenth-century America. Earlier interpretations placed the height o f success of 
the religiously oriented communal experiments in the 1840s, followed by a steady decline after the Civil 
War. Fogarty asserts that there continued to be a strong utopian literary tradition in the latter part o f the 
century, as well as real-world projects that continued the tradition o f industrial, social, and political reform 
through experimental living. See Fogarty, All Things New: American Communes and Utopian Movements 
1860-1914 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1990).
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Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn.
The sun is but a morning star.” [from Walden]
Just as Thoreau had remade himself through social isolation and a communion with 
natural rhythms, so would Burris and the rest o f mankind remake themselves through the 
new light of experimental social behaviorism. Walden Two was a revelation about the 
potential for social technology to remake humanity, and it marked for Skinner the first 
incarnation of what would later become his mature social theory in the 1950s and 60s.
For Frazier, and Skinner, the Walden Two enterprise represented a microcosm of 
what a better society could look like when properly engineered. A return to kinship 
would, however, require the removal of social and economic hierarchies as well as 
competition between groups. This could be achieved with a form of government that 
utilized a managerial hierarchy of behavioral engineers and scientists who would be 
subject to regular peer reviews, thus rotating managerial responsibility and holding 
everyone accountable for their actions. Everyone would be involved in eommunity 
maintenance using a credit system that rewarded all types of labor. No special 
recognition would be given to individuals in a society that celebrated collective 
achievement. Technologies could be designed to minimize the time and amount o f work 
done in community maintenance, and the increased efficiency o f work and workspaces 
would allow community members more time to pursue artistic and intellectual projects. 
And, finally, by simplifying and integrating all aspects o f living — from language, dress, 
and patterns o f  consumption, to the dynamics o f  work, play, socialization, and child 
rearing — the integrity of social networks would be maintained.
B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 315.
I l l
Thoreau had proclaimed in Walden that the individual was in charge of his own 
destiny and that self-examination, away from the distractions o f society, was the key to 
remaking life. Such an endeavor required isolation, experimentation, and the 
simplification o f needs.^^ Skinner invoked similar sentiments in his plan for an isolated 
community in which human nature could he reinvented. In conjunction with Thoreau’s 
philosophy, Skinner prescribed additional social goals:
1- Build a lifestyle based on cooperation rather than competition.
2- Maintain it with “gentle but pervasive ethical sanctions” rather than force or 
punishment.
3- Perpetuate the community with sophisticated methods o f childcare and 
education.
4- Foster conditions which facilitate enjoyment of work.
5- Experiment with all social institutions; adapt freely to new conditions; accept 
change.
Inherent in these new principles was Skinner’s conviction that modem society had failed
to progress through conventional means. As Frazier explained.
As we use the term these days, government means power — mainly the 
power to compel obedience, ..., [gjovemments which use force are based 
upon had principles of human engineering. Nor are they able to improve 
upon these principles, or discover their inadequacy, because they aren’t 
able to accumulate any body of knowledge approaehing a science... It’s 
never possible to plan and carry out experiments to investigate the better 
use of power or how to dispense with it altogether.^"^
Capitalist competition and nationalist aggression had not procured social harmony.
Traditional moral and ethical sanctions had not functioned adequately.
Recent sociological investigations of the history of utopian experiments in
America indicate patterns o f  growth and decline that conform to long-range industrial
Skinner, Shaping o f a Behaviorist, 346.
Ibid.
B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (1948).
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cycles in the economy. In addition to assessing the political activity associated with these 
patterns, sociologist Brian Berry has amassed statistical data on the aetivities, inventories, 
and movements o f communal societies. His analysis has revealed a strong relationship 
between economic depression and the subsequent rise in social experimentation in 
America over the course of the last two eenturies.^^
During periods of economic downturn, poverty, and general social disruption, 
interest in alternatives to capitalist-based, industrialized soeiety went up. Along with 
other colleagues. Berry has identified four distinct phases of communal utopian activity 
that are linked to the industrial revolutions o f the 1840s and 1890s, the Depression of the 
1930s, and the counterculture movement of the 1 9 6 0 s . D u r i n g  each period, 
disillusionment over the evils of capitalism and mass urban culture evolved for some into 
attempts to return to traditional rural values among a small but highly distinct minority.
In each case these movements spawned collectives and isolationist sects that actively 
disconneeted themselves from mainstream culture in order to seek out communal 
solidarity in small-scale rural communities of their own design. Whether religious, 
secular, or political in orientation, these groups shared a common set o f concerns and 
ideals. Throughout American history, urban expansion, technological and industrial
Brian J. Berry, America's Utopian Experiments: Communal Havens from Long Wave Crisis (Hanover: 
University Press o f New England, 1992).
Berry notes in the introduction to his most recent book that his research was inspired by the findings of 
another study on communal societies written by Michael Barkun. See his article, “Communal Societies as 
Cyclical Phenomena,” Communal Societies 4 (1984): 35-48. Also see the full-length study o f economic 
trends in Berry’s previous book, Long Wave Rhythms in Economic Development and Political Behavior 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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innovation, and geographic migration have disrupted family and community life/^ The 
desire for a more integrated and harmonious existence, coupled with the need of 
individuals to feel emotionally connected to a community of fellow travelers, was a 
strong motivating factor in the retreat from mass society/* This return to nature, culture, 
and the land also characterized the pioneer spirit in America.
Unlike other modem utopian novelists, Skinner chose to mix social 
experimentation, set in the present day (rather than the distant future), with the traditional 
imagery of nineteenth-century ‘pioneerism.’ The icon of the pioneer celebrated the 
virtues of the mgged individual, virtuous and thrifty, imbued with religious devotion and 
plain guts, forging a life in the wilderness. Prompting the reader with allusions to these
This seems to be a conclusion shared among historians o f utopianism and utopian communities. For an 
overview o f common themes in the history o f experimental communities in the United States, consult the 
introductory comments in David Shi, In Search o f  the Simple Life (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1986). 
As Shi asserts, the history o f experimental communities in America is part o f a broader search for 
simplicity in American culture. As a concept, simplicity is deeply engrained in our cultural heritage, and it 
has its roots in the ideals o f the early Puritan settlers. The desire to strip away the trappings o f society in 
order to search for a morally centered existence was a theme o f radical religious communal experiments of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century as well as the experiences o f transcendentalists, progressives, and 
counterculture activists later on. For a detailed historical treatment o f these themes consult Shi’s 
companion work, The Simple Life: Plain Living and High Thinking in American Culture (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985). Other surveys o f American utopianism include Michael Fellman, The 
Unbound Frame: Freedom and Community in Nineteenth Century Utopianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press Inc., 1973). The scholarship on utopianism is considerable and has seen a resurgence in the last 
several years. For a survey o f the most recent scholarship see the collected essays by noted utopian 
scholars in America’s Communal Utopias, ed. Donald E. Pitzer (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1997). See also Timothy Miller, The Quest fo r  Utopia in Twentieth Century America (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1998). For a recent treatment o f utopianism among the transcendentalists, 
consult Richard Francis, Transcendental Utopias: Individual and Community at Brook Farm, Fruitlands, 
and Walden (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
Other scholars o f American utopianism have observed that a common influence in experimental 
communities is an attraction to the ethos o f the American frontier. Many groups that experimented with 
communal living, regardless o f their political or religious beliefs, thought that salvation and social harmony 
were possible by embarking on a journey into a new land and remaking the self and the environment. As 
with other social movements, American Utopians put their faith in the redemptive potential o f  the land. 
Many of the late nineteenth-century experiments in socialist utopianism in fact blended industrialization 
with the Jeffersonian ideal o f a return to the land. Communal life in the late nineteenth century also held the 
promise o f moral and spiritual regeneration. Many groups attempted to rework Christian principles or 
incorporate entirely new religious systems from both the West and the East. These communes appealed to 
workers, tradesman, and others from the cities who sought economic, communal, and spiritual security. 
Communalism attempted to capture the energy o f new social forces and reshape them to serve humanity.
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traditional images of American individualism, Skinner transformed the Thoreauvian 
principle o f self-actualization outlined in Walden into a set of hypothetical guidelines for 
engineering small-scale ‘experimental’ communities. His was a vision o f collective 
social harmony that accommodated the physical and emotional needs o f the individual.
In this sense, Skinner addressed the same dilemma faced by previous communitarians, 
bureaucrats, progressives, philosophers, politicians, and activists — how to manage 
complex social spaces while preserving the illusion of individual autonomy.
The parallels between the goals o f the early real-world communities and those 
proposed in Walden Two are striking. What must certainly have been attractive to 
Skinner about communalism, especially the experience of the Shakers and the Oneida 
group, was their willingness to address aspects of individual and community life from a 
quasi-scientific, experimental viewpoint, modifying different rules and techniques of 
community life in strengthening the social system as a whole. Although vastly different 
in terms o f their respective social techniques and religious beliefs, both the Shakers and 
the Oneida group set out to reshape those mores and institutions that seemed most vital 
for social harmony and spiritual salvation. Significant changes were made to marital 
traditions, the education and rearing of children, the organization of work, the distribution 
o f goods and wealth, community government, communication, and the relationship 
between the sexes. To modem social theorists who had been imbued with the cult of 
efficiency and the philosophy of scientific control, such experimentation in social 
engineering was prescient and instmctive. Many of the same social institutions brought 
forth for scrutiny by the Shakers and the leaders of the Oneida communities, as I have 
shown, are also addressed in Walden Two.
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Skinner and his utopian predecessors responded to the recurring problems of mass 
society and urban living in America. Political Utopians sought to empower workers in 
industry and manufacturing who endured the dehumanizing and often deplorable 
conditions of factory labor. Religious Utopians sought to recapture the sense of spiritual 
community that had been lost in the industrial revolution. Individual identity, work, and 
community — these were the common themes of utopian fantasy and experiments. To 
Skinner, such themes were no less relevant for the postwar age a century later. Despite 
what many critics saw as his dehumanizing social theories, Skinner’s intent in Walden 
Two was to speculate on how the destructive effects of industrialization and urban 
expansion on humanity might be alleviated through proper social engineering.
Channeling his speculations through his protagonist, Frazier, Skinner unleashed 
the first full articulation of his philosophy of science and his social theories. As he 
recalled, “[0]nce I had put down the whole pattern of his thinking, I saw the connections 
among its parts, and I became, a year or two after I finished the book, a thoroughgoing 
Frazierian.”^^  Indeed, Skinner likened writing the novel to a kind o f self-psychoanalysis, 
a process of discovery in which latent ideas about the potential of behavioral science 
were brought forth through imagination.*® What had started as a long, drawn out 
exposition on an imaginary utopian society became for Skinner the first attempt at 
integrating his experiments in animal behavior with careful consideration of the human
Skinner, “W ald en  T w o  R e v is ited ,” 1.
Editors who reviewed the first few drafts of Walden Two (originally entitled “The Sun is but A Morning 
Star,” after a line from the last page o f Thoreau’s Walden) suggested that Skinner concentrate less on the 
presentation o f behavioral theory and more on the inner conflict o f  the main character, Frazier, who 
answers the critics o f behavioral engineering throughout the story. See editorial notes on “The Sun is but A 
Morning Star,” an unpublished manuscript dated 1947. [HUGFP 60.10]. Box 1. Papers o f B. F. Skinner. 
Correspondence 1928-1958. Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA. Items from these folders are 
hereafter referred to as HUGFP 60.10.
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condition.^' For Skinner, the essence of all science was gaining control o f phenomena 
and generating data. And as Skinner later recalled, “Control was no doubt at the heart of 
Frazier’s behavioral engineering.’’*^  The ‘working out’ o f Frazier’s character, his defense 
and clarification of the community in Walden Two, became the forum for Skinner’s 
emergent theory of scientific social management.
Skinner and the Crisis of American Democracy
The rise of fascism in the 1920s and 30s sparked debate among American 
editorialists, intellectuals, and scientists over the very questions that Skinner and Mead 
raised in their research in the 1930s and 40s. What was the nature o f humanity, and was it 
inherently constructive or destructive, cooperative or competitive? And what was the 
future of democracy in the modem world?
As historian Edward Purcell observed, discussion about the causes o f fascism and 
totalitarianism in Europe during the 1930s centered in part on the rise o f scientific 
naturalism in philosophy, legal theory, and the social sciences.** As early as the 1890s, 
intellectuals such as William James, John Dewey, and Lester Frank Ward had sought an 
alternative to the detemiinism of evolutionary naturalism inherent in Darwinian theory.
A general scientific naturalism, they argued, would support human uniqueness and
' Skinner, “Walden Two Revisited,” 1.
Skinner, “Shaping o f a Behaviorist,” 345.
Edward A. Purcell, The Crisis o f  Democratic Theory: Scientific Nationalism and the Problem o f Value 
(Lexington: University Press o f Kentucky, 1973).
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agency through pragmatism and instrumentalism.^'' In a dehate that spanned 25 years 
between 1910 and 1935, contextualized hy the First World War, economic boom and 
bust, and the Depression, the logical outcomes of scientific naturalism were confronted. 
Scientific naturalism appeared to threaten the legitimacy of classical democracy, 
undeimining any rational explanation for its moral tenets. The added fact that individuals 
did not participate directly in governance also seemed to challenge classical democracy. 
Most of the real power in government was wielded hy political and industrial elites.
Given these realizations, traditional demoeratic theory looked to he in crisis by the 1930s. 
Political developments in America and Europe had exacerbated the problem.*^ Moreover, 
scientific naturalism also called into question the rationality of human behavior in 
general.
Most social scientists did not, however, succumb to the implications o f extreme 
moral and philosophical relativism embedded in scientific naturalism. The political 
scientists Harold Lasswell and Charles Merriam, for example, continued to believe in a 
genuine ethical basis for democracy. Scientific objectivism in the social sciences also did 
not degenerate into “value n e u t r a l i t y . A s  Purcell stated, the shift toward a relativist 
view of humanity and society was a matter of “tone and emphasis.”*’ The discovery of 
the multifarious nature of humanity and culture had not marked a departure from 
democracy as a political philosophy. Nevertheless, the question of how to define 
morality and values in a rational way drove much of the professional disagreement over
^ Ibid., 9-10.
Ibid., 11-15.
“  Ibid., 189-93.
Ibid., 191.
118
appropriate criteria. Social scientists, to be sure, were dedicated to the political cause 
against totalitarianism, but they could identify no clear scientific, legal, or moral 
justification for democracy. In the end, a strictly logical and rational explanation for the 
validity of American democracy was not possible on epistemological grounds. The tenor 
o f the debate shifted in the late 1930s instead toward political explanations, supported by 
social scientific research, about the immorality of authoritarian and absolutist regimes.** 
Ironically, the defense of democracy as a bastion o f rationality and morality in the 
war and postwar years, at least among those like Dewey and Jacques Barzun, became an 
endorsement of the status quo in America. Many intellectuals, imbued with renewed 
nationalism after the Second World War, placed science and technology at the heart of 
modem democracy.*^ The true dilemma in countering political absolutism had to do with 
issues already familiar from the present study. What was the proper balance between 
cultural diversity and the need for consensus in government? What level o f economic 
competition could effectively coexist with institutions o f social cooperation and systems 
of social management?
As we have seen in scientists like Skinner and Mead, these questions engendered 
a ehoice between meehanistic and holistic visions of the self. Assent to the status quo 
was also tied to professional expansion and the desire for social authority among social 
scientists in the postwar years. The New Deal, the Cold War, and McCarthyism pushed 
intellectuals toward this status quo.^° This fact will become especially important in later
Ibid., 200-05.
Ibid., 216, 235-37.
Ibid., 239-40.
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chapters of the present treatment where Margaret M ead’s nationalism and her awareness 
o f these debates over democracy will be addressed. As we shall see presently, however, 
Skinner’s rejection of democracy did not stem merely from the dictates o f behavioral 
science. It is clear from Walden Two that he was also cognizant of debates on democracy 
among Marxist political scientists in the immediate postwar years.
Many had seconded Julian Huxley’s proclamation in Man Stands Alone (1941), 
that, while neither inherently good nor bad, a “general aggressive tendency” was present 
in human nature.^' It also seemed that humankind was “obsolete,” having built a 
civilization that outstripped the pace of its biological and psychological evolution.
Despite having the greatest reserves o f natural and human resources in the world, Walter 
Lippmann also observed, America in the late 1930s and early 40s was gripped by a fear 
o f failure. Americans seemed alarmingly pessimistic about the future of the nation. This 
left American democracy susceptible to decay.^^
This view from Julian Huxley’s popular book o f the time, Man Stands Alone (New York: Harper and 
Bothers, 1941), was mentioned in a 1945 editorial piece for the Saturday Review o f  Literature by an 
anonymous contributor who voiced what had clearly become a common view o f human nature. Similar 
opinions were explored in the pages o f such mainstream publications as Time, Newsweek, and Life, 
indicating an active public discussion. See the article by Norman Cousins, “Modem Man is Obsolete: An 
Editorial,” Saturday Review o f  Literature 28 (August 18, 1945): 5-9. See also an editorial, “Untragic 
America: Our Democratic Faith Needs Correcting If  We Are To Produce Great Tragic Drama,” L ife2 \ 
(December 2, 1946): 32.
^  Representative examples o f this very large body o f literature include Stanley High, “Where There Is No 
Vision-,” The R eader’s Digest 49 (July, 1946): 57-61; Thomas H. Briggs, “The Enemy Within,” School 
and Society 51 (January 27, 1940): 97-109; Upton Sinclair, “America’s False Democracy,” The American 
Mercury 44 (June, 1938): 208-11; Eleanor Roosevelt, “Keepers o f Democracy,” The Virginia Quarterly 
Review  15, no. I (Winter, 1939): 1-5; Edmund E. Day, “What Really Threatens American Democracy?,” 
Vital Speeches 5 (Febmary 22, 1939): 371-73; Henry Morgenthau Jr., “The Road Ahead: The Generation 
Which Found Itself,” Vital Speeches 4 (June 6, 1938): 597-99. It is also worth citing a special edition of 
Survey Graphic in 1939 entitled “Calling America.” The entire issue was dedicated to a discussion of 
democracy and its future in America, given the unfolding events in Europe. It included over thirty essays 
with such luminaries as Bertrand Russell and Thomas Mann as contributors. See “Calling America: A 
Special Number o f Survey Graphic on the Challenge to Demoeraey,” Survey Graphic 21, no. 2 (February, 
1939): 54-170.
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Ironically, an apologetic editorial entitled “Untragic America” in the squarely 
nationalistic Life magazine in 1946 warned that Americans seemed to have lost their 
sense o f “human greatness,” in the decade before the Second World War. Moreover, in 
the aftermath o f the war, Americans, Lippmann claimed, “now believe[d] in nothing in 
p a r t i c u l a r . S u c h  critiques masked a politieal agenda among liberal-demoeratic 
scientists and journalists such as Lippmann and Margaret Mead, however, who used anti­
isolationist rhetorie to spur Americans into readiness for war. The same tactics were 
employed during the economic crisis of 1945-1946 to rekindle American confidence. 
Mead had talked also o f the failure of American national character in her book And Keep 
Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America in 1942.^ "* Demoeraey had, after 
all, been seriously challenged by fascism and communism on the world stage. In this 
“war of ideologies,” Americans could reflect on how each political system (democratic, 
communist, fascist) handled the problems o f economic reconstruction. At times, it 
seemed that demoeraey and free-market capitalism on the home front was failing.^^ And 
as the famous intellectual historian Carl Becker noted in a 1941 artiele for The Virginia 
Quarterly Review, frustration with the efficacy of democracy and capitalism had led to 
outright revolution in Italy and Germany. Given America’s struggles during the
From an editorial in Life Magazine 21 (December 2, 1946): 32. See Carl Becker’s comments in “The 
Dilemma o f Modem Democracy,” The Virginia Quarterly Review 17, no. 1 (January, 1941): 11-17.
^  Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist looks at America (New York: Morrow, 
1942).
Briggs, “The Enemy Within,” 97.
121
Depression, Becker asked, might the same thing happen in America if  things got any
worse?^^
The problem may be otherwise stated: Can the flagrant inequality of 
possessions and of opportunity now existing in democratic societies be 
corrected by the democratic method? If  it cannot be corrected by the 
democratic method, the resulting discontent and confusion will be certain, 
sooner or later, to issue in some form of revolutionary or military 
dictatorship. This then is the dilemma which confronts democratic 
societies: to solve their economic problems by the democratic method or 
to cease to be democratic societies.
Whereas communists and fascists seemed to have clarity of purpose and a vision for the
future of their states, Americans, as Upton Sinclair proclaimed, had lost their “crusading
spirit.”^^  The result, as Eleanor Roosevelt put it, was that “people have reached a point
where [...] if  Fascism or Nazi-ism promises more security than our own democracy we
may even turn to them.” *^
Yet, prominent liberal-Democratic intellectuals and commentators such as
Lippmann also noted that comparative anthropology (specifically Mead’s work) had
revealed that self-destruction was not inevitable. Change in human nature, perhaps even
within a generation, was still possible. But it entailed radical alterations in our
geopolitical, economic, and educational philosophies.^^ In an international political
^  Carl Becker, “Dilemma o f Democracy,” 11. Becker’s sentiments were well founded, if  reports from 
Washington in the late 1930s were any indication. Government officials were indeed beginning to worry 
that what was transpiring in Europe might also happen in the United States. See the editorial, “Can 
Democracy Survive,” The Commonweal 27 (December 17, 1937): 199-200. See similar reports o f such 
fears in Edmund E. Day, “What Really Threatens American Democracy?,” Vital Speeches 5 (February 22, 
1939); 371-73.
Sinclair, “America’s False Democracy,” 208. Also refer to comments by Stanley High, “No Vision,” 60- 
61.
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Eleanor Roosevelt, “Keepers o f Democracy,” 2.
Lippmann wrote extensively on these and other issues regarding the fate o f the Unites States and 
American democracy. See for example, “M an’s Image o f Man: An Address to the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association,” The Commonweal 35 (February 13, 1942): 406-9; “Education vs. Western
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environment, our social institutions would need to reflect the cultivation of “world man” 
and “world conscience,” as one commentator for the Saturday Review o f  Literature 
o b s e r v e d . T h i s  emphasis on human modification with educational methods and a 
global perspective on human society commanded the particular attention of Skinner and 
Mead in the opening decades o f the postwar era.
By the end of the Depression and the start of the Second World War many public 
intellectuals felt that a revolution in the organization of societal affairs was needed.
Most, like Roosevelt, Lippmann, Morgenthau, Sinclair, and Mead, agreed that modifying 
democracy to function in a modem world was imperative. Skinner however did not 
believe that modifications to any conventional political system would be sufficient.
Future society would require both a complete break with present systems and the 
construction o f a scientifically trained managerial elite. Indeed in many ways, he argued, 
this had already happened. To the extent that Walden Two was a forum for the fleshing 
out of Skinner’s social theories, it was also a response to postwar debates concerning the 
future o f American democracy. Skinner began his career as a social philosopher in the 
1940s believing that the experiences of the Depression and the New Deal, international 
politics, and the upheaval of war would encourage Americans to explore new avenues of 
social economy. The task of rebuilding a nation in an international context, he and others 
like Mead had thought, could foster a more experimental and scientifically informed 
approach to the re-design of American life.
Civilization,” American Scholar 10, no. 2 (April, 1941): 184-93; “The American Destiny,” (condensed 
from Life Magazine) The Reader’s Digest 35, no. 238 (August, 1942): 1-5.
Cousins, “Man-Obsolete,” 7-8.
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Skinner echoed fellow psychologist, Henry A. Murray (1893-1988), who 
contended that it was the American penchant for practicality where “questions ... are 
approached with an empirical, experimentalist attitude that focuses on contingencies of 
fact,” that, ironically, had prevented a true understanding of the totalitarian menace of 
C o m m u n i s m . A s  Skinner opined, “the Wilsonian era o f diplomacy with its 
exaggerated trust in world assemblies and in spectacular international conferences,” had 
in fact encouraged “a mood of general, if  not unbroken, goodwill toward Russia ... 
almost p a t h o l o g i c a l . I t  seemed to Skinner that there was still a lingering intellectual 
curiosity about, and perhaps sympathy for, the Soviets and their attempts to redress the 
destructive forces of despotism and unbridled capitalism in the nineteenth century. This 
convinced Skinner and others that the time was ripe for social experimentation in postwar 
America.
Alternatives to classical demoeraey were explored by Marxist historians and 
political scientists during the 1940s. The political scientist Joseph Schumpeter argued in 
his 1942 classic treatise Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, for example, for a 
revised democracy that would combine the economic momentum of capitalism with the 
bureaucratic controls o f a socialist managerial s t a t e . I t  would be headed by political 
leaders elected on the basis of professional merit. On its own, Shumpeter argued.
Ibid. Skinner noted that Henry Murray went on to conclude that the McCarthy communist hunts o f the 
early 1950s had been a good thing for Americans, having exposed them to the true aims o f Communist 
cultural subversion.
B. F. Skinner, “Notes on Fund for the Republic lecture, 1958-1960.” From an undated collection of 
Skinner’s private notes on a lecture given to the Fund for the Republic. Lecture Notes and Manuscripts, n. 
d. [HUGFP 60.50]. Box 1, Folder 1. Papers o f B. F. Skinner. Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, 
MA. Items from these folders are hereafter referred to as HUGFP 60.50.
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unbridled laissez-faire capitalism and corporatism eroded the fabric o f family and 
community life, destroying its own framework. Agrarian popular democracy and the will 
o f the majority also failed, since it was in essence an illusion, incompatible with a 
complex urban and industrial culture. The electorate, as Shumpeter noted, no longer 
controlled its leaders directly, except in elections.
Citing the exemplar of the British parliamentary system, Shumpeter argued that a 
revised democracy could tame the destructive effects o f capitalism through a combination 
o f competitive political leadership and a well-trained bureaucracy of civic-minded 
scientific managers. These managers would independently run public works, social 
agencies, and municipalities at the local city level. Invoking the language of work and 
waste reminiscent o f nineteenth-century machine metaphors in physical science and 
social theory, Schumpeter argued that the inefficiencies o f democratic “engines of 
government” could be resolved through a new hierarchy of l eade r sh ip .El ec t ions  
would decide professional leadership. The electorate would not subject all aspects of 
economic and civic maintenance, however, to popular vote. Leaders and bureaucratic 
agencies would be free to govern and manage without the inefficiency o f placating 
popular opinion. The populace in turn would put faith in the leadership, as well as the 
system of promotion and advancement that placed responsible, well-trained people in 
charge o f society. Shumpeter’s model also reflected a common understanding among 
political scientists that freedom was, in fact, relative in any political s y s t e m . T h e  task
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942). It should be 
noted that reprints appeared in 1947 and 1950. Also important to note is that Mead seemed particularly 
fond of the British social welfare system as well. This is explored further in Chapter 5 o f the present study.
104 Ibid., 286-88.
Ibid., 302.
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in running the urban complex was always to strike a balance between appropriate
individual freedoms and the institutional controls of collective social management.
A careful reading of Walden Two makes clear Skinner’s awareness o f these kinds
of models. Skinner provided a behaviorist’s interpretation of what Frazier described in
the novel as a democracy perfected through the careful planning o f trained and
conscientious social e n g i n e e r s . H i s  protagonist mouthpiece, T. E. Frazier, also
described popular democracy as an illusion, “the spawn of despotism,” that eventually
left power elites in charge of a vast, unwieldy s y s t e m . L i k e w i s e ,  as Frazier observed,
popular “democracy,”
[Fjails to take account of the fact that in the long run man is determined by 
the state. A  laissez-faire philosophy which trusts to the inherent goodness 
and wisdom of the common man is incompatible with the observed fact 
that men are made good or bad and wise or foolish by the environment in 
which they grow.'^
Communism was also no alternative. Although bom of humanitarian intentions and 
social experimentation, it had been undermined by the Russian reliance on propaganda, 
hero worship, and consolidation o f power, things that resulted in totalitarian rule.'°^
Skinner, of course, argued that his system would avoid both the inefficiency of 
popular democracy and the devastation of economic/political despotism."*^ Through 
proper environmental engineering, community planners would rise through the
Skinner, Walden Two, 269.
Ibid., 268.
' “ ibid., 273.
Ibid., 274-76.
""Ibid., 274.
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managerial hierarchy in similar fashion to Schumpeter’s competitive meritocracy ideal. 
Governance in Skinner’s system, however, would lie squarely with expert scientific 
managers, even though anyone theoretically could rise to their ranks. Using the language 
o f work and waste, Skinner hailed labor efficiency as a central characteristic o f his vision. 
The embrace of technology, Frazier claimed, would streamline labor and industiy^ so that 
a valuable “surplus” of human energy intended for leisure and individual creative pursuits 
would not be wasted. ' ' ' Individuals would enjoy the illusion of freedom without 
enduring its collective e v i l s . I n  Skinner’s case, then, the implications of scientific 
naturalism were taken to their logical extreme. The only rationale for a society’s 
structure and ethic, Frazier argued, was the survival imperative inherent in adaptive 
behavior itself.” ^
Skinner’s technocracy still struck most readers as authoritarian, despite Frazier’s 
arguments to the contrary. Social conservatism, xenophobia and insecurity had taken 
hold of a nation enduring McCarthyism, and the paranoia over national security worked 
against radical social change. Fear of the communist ‘other,’ embodied in McCarthyism, 
masked Americans’ fear of themselves.
Postwar cultural entrenchment in America did not, however, deter Skinner and 
Mead from the exploration of human nature and society in their effort to examine.
Ibid., 75.
"M bid., 84. 
Ibid., 174.
114 The fear o f cultural subversion, as Richard Fried notes, took many forms during the Cold War. Music, 
art, academia, styles o f dress, and political ideology, for example, were all subject to close scrutiny amidst 
the fear o f social degeneration. See Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era Perspective 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and Steven Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold War 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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critique, and influence postwar American social life. In the pages o f Walden Two and 
numerous academic seminars and public speeches in the 1940s and 1950s, Skinner 
challenged political economic theory and struck at the heart of American democratic 
institutions. Both in Science and Human Behavior and in his numerous articles and 
speeches, Skinner described the soeial controls that he insisted were embedded in all the 
groups, organizations, and agencies familiar to citizens in a supposedly open democracy.
In one instance Skinner summarized the relationships between controllers and the 
controlled with an illustrative graphic entitled “Areas o f Control by Special Groups or 
‘Agencies’” that accompanied his public lectures. In the extract below we see that 
Skinner classified each group or agency (governments, religious organizations, economic
entities, educational institutions) according to its systems of behavioral manipulation. 115
Government Religion Education
Controllers: Rulers, etc. Priests, etc. Teachers, Deans 
Etc.
Controllees: Citizens Communicants Students
Power Police and Military 
(power to punish); 
Wealth (power to 
reinforce)
Ability to mediate or 
specify ultimate 
contingencies of 
reinforcement and 
punishment
Personal reinforcers, 
grades, release from 
threat o f failure.
Processes and 
Techniques
Punishment, 
conditioning o f stimuli 
associated with 
punishment
Release from threat or 
punishment, 
conditioning o f positive 
and negative reinforcers
Presenting materials, 
reinforcing responses
Resulting Effects on 
Behavior
Suppression o f illegal 
behavior
Suppression o f sinful, 
strengthening o f pious 
behavior
Production of
intelligent.
Learned,
Skillful
behavior
Countercontrol Revolution, escape Apostacy Truancy,
vandalism
M a x im ized  E ntities or 
Principles
Justice
Security
Freedom
P iety
Salvation
K n o w le d g e
Skill
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Skinner believed that the same types o f social controls explored in Walden Two had their 
real-world behavioral counterparts, to one degree or another, in every real system of 
social organization. Such engineering was ubiquitous, he contended, in every advanced 
civilization.
With such a formulation one could compare such disparate opposing entities as 
secular Soviet Russia and the Catholic Church and discover similar objectives and power 
structures in each that were designed to shape behavior to particular ends. In one set of 
private notes, Skinner outlined such similarities. Like the communists, the Catholic 
Church considered conversion and expansion one of its central functions. A set of well 
defined doctrines and worldviews made up the central tenets o f the Communist state, just 
as it did in the Church. These in turn helped define procedures o f social control. 
Throughout history, Skinner surmised, each system had used military conquest, political 
coercion, centralized administration, and economic exploitation to maintain control.
Each had relied on propaganda to solidify allegiance among its followers. And all of it 
was ultimately designed to save mankind from the “Promethean West,” in the case of the 
Communists, and in the Catholic Church, “to rescue humanity from atheistic 
communism.”"®
Skinner thus invited his audience to consider how it was possible for two 
diametrically opposed groups such as the Soviets and members o f the Church, two central 
rivals o f the Cold War, to share such fundamental similarities in their social hierarchy
B. F. Skinner, “Areas o f Control by Special Groups or ‘Agencies’.” An undated chart constructed by 
Skinner. Lecture Notes N 8114. n. d. [HUGFP 60.50]. Box 1. Papers of B. F. Skinner. Harvard University 
Archives, Cambridge, MA.
1 1 6 B. F. Skinner. From a chart written by or for Skinner comparing the history o f the Soviet Union and the
Catholic Church, n. d., HUGFP 60.50, Box 1.
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and methods of social control. Skinner contended that it made little difference in the end 
whether or not the professed worldviews, philosophies, or doctrines o f a group 
acknowledged or opposed the necessity of behavioral controls. O f greater importance in 
the examination of cultures and groups was an evaluation of the actual processes of 
control and administration that existed from the outset.
How effectively, Skinner asked, did these mechanisms o f control contribute to 
social efficiency, and who controlled these mechanisms? What, for example, was the 
true effect of the election process in American democracy? Did such political 
participation result in any real social change? According to Skinner, the answer from the 
behavioral standpoint with regard to “an industrialized democracy,” was ‘no.’ To Skinner 
the American election process, as a mechanism of democratic social control, was a myth. 
“The political process is almost invisible in America. The elaborate mechanisms of 
interaction among the branches of government, public opinion, popular morality and 
elected officials is [s'/e] mysterious,” Skinner asserted.”  ^ Despite the fact that the 
government seemed to be “orderly” and “seldom tyrannical,” Skinner felt that it was a 
mistake to assume that any efficiency in government resulted from the participation of 
the general population. “One of the most potent beliefs,” Skinner claimed, “is that 
citizens run the government. Everybody knows the facts are otherwise, but everybody 
talks as if  the belief were substantiated. ...So it is with the American myths about 
political participation.”” *
B. F. Skinner. From an outlined address to the Burdick-FIoffman League[?]. 15 April 1958, FIUGFP 
60.50, Box 1.
"*Ibid.
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A vote is primarily a poll o f satisfaction with the status quo -  or, rarely, of 
approval of a program. ... The present ballot [system] does not offer the 
voter an opportunity to act in any useful capacity. ... Some schedule for 
the eventual reduction of offices might be easier to put across, e.g. all 
county offices taken over by state or city by 1969?
Skinner believed that systems of demoeratic soeial management worked more 
efficiently on a smaller scale (as in Shumpeter’s city management model), since the 
processes o f control could more easily be supervised and administered. And rather than 
encourage the uneducated and uninformed to vote, the responsibility for selecting leaders 
should be left to “the best and wisest who are responsive to and responsible to all.””  ^
Skinner advocated a kind of scientific meritocracy where “loyalty to experts, to 
administrative superiors, [and] to articulate constituency” was properly b a l a n c e d . I n  
one instance Skinner went so far as to venture a behavioral interpretation o f the system of 
controls he felt were embedded in the constitutional Bill of Rights. “The New Bill,” 
Skinner postulated, “concerns techniques which are still available to all” :
A New Bill of Rights
1. Government shall not use positive reinforcement
2. Government shall not use emotional appeals.
3. Government shall not manipulate levels of deprivation and satiation
4. Government shall not put tranquilizers in water supply [!]’^ '
In these talks and exercises, and in the pages of Walden Two, then, is an 
indictment of the American political system, a behaviorally inspired rejection o f the ideal 
of democracy. Skinner seemed to be asking many of the same questions that his 
intellectual contemporaries such as Shumpeter had. Had past experience indicated that
B. F. Skinner. From a miscellaneous collection of Skinner’s handwritten notes for a talk given to the 
Fund for the Republic. 28 April 1959, HUGFP, Box 1, Folder 1.
''"Ibid.
Ibid.
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democracy really worked? Did it fulfill its promise o f a truly representative government?
Classical democracy assumed that the public controlled the processes o f leadership and
management. Yet what seemed clear to Skinner and others was that the American public
had very little control.
Such sentiments were confirmed by studies of voting patterns by Bernard R.
Berelson and others political scientists in the 1940s and 50s who eontended that
managerial hierarchies had effectively removed the need for average citizens to
participate in the political p r o c e s s . S o c i e t y  was not, however, managed by properly
trained leaders, and Berelson et al. suggested that democracy could be revised through
the scientific scrutiny of empirical sociology.
Another reason that Amerieans could not yet graduate to a scientifically perfected
democracy was that concepts of freedom, liberty, and dignity kept us from making the
democratic process effective and efficient. The threat of diminished human dignity had
prevented us from addressing human behavior seientifically and incorporating this
knowledge into our system of government. Was the traditional concept o f freedom a
liability in producing a better society? If so, why were Amerieans not experimenting
with something else? Was freedom really necessary?
Freedom is not something the human speeies needs, as it needs food and 
water. The species has survived and flourished even though only a small 
fraction of its members have known any substantial degree o f political 
freedom. ... When governments resort to non-coercive techniques which 
do not make men act “against their wills,” the only distinction is between
122 Voting: A Study o f  Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, ed. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld, and William E. McPhee (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1954). See especially the 
comments on 305-22. It is also worth noting that Shumpeter's study is also cited here.
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aversive and non-aversive control. Traditional political philosophy is ill-
123prepared to consider [this].
In what was later referred to as the ‘sequel’ to Walden Two, Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity, Skinner made the clearest and most comprehensive statement o f his theory of 
mechanical man and society. Utopian visions o f the twentieth century, Skinner observed, 
had been decidedly behavioristic in scope. They had acknowledged the failure of 
political theory, law, religion, and economics by way o f Plato, More, Rousseau, and 
others to allay social ills.'^^ In appealing to the scientific expediency o f behaviorism, 
modem Utopians had simplified social design considerably by confining experimentation 
to the rigors of the small-scale community, removing the need for complex social 
philosophies and replacing them with the factual, real-world exigencies of human 
behavior.
Skinner’s Utopia and the Plight of the Postwar American Family
While Walden Two served as a behavioral interpretation o f the American body 
politic, it also provided Skinner, as has been stated, a forum through which to critique 
trends in postwar American culture. In reflecting on the strueture of communal life, 
Skinner’s protagonist, Frazier, found ample cause to disparage outmoded social customs 
in a rapidly changing social landscape. There were indeed many social and economic
B. F. Skinner, “The Coneept o f  Freedom from the Point o f View o f a Science o f Human Behavior,” 16 
July 1958, HUGFP 60.50, Box 1, Folder 2. From a private address by Skinner to the Fund for the 
Republic.
B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam, 1971).
125 Ibid., 146.
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trends in the immediate postwar period that had an impact on the f a m i l y . A m e r i c a  in 
the late 1940s was unstable economically, and living standards were initially much lower 
than is most often assumed. In addition to labor unrest and periodic recessions, families 
also endured housing shortages. Education, health, and child-care facilities were in short 
s u p p l y . T h e  lack of such support networks played a direct role in increasing the 
psychological strain on postwar families.
Not surprisingly, sociological and popular commentaries on the fate o f the family 
began to proliferate. Skinner joined the growing ranks of commentators and scientists 
who pointed to certain trends in family life that suggested its eventual dissolution as a 
fundamental unit of American c u l t u r e . I n  Frazier’s words.
Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg, Domestic Revolutions: A Social History o f  American Family Life 
(New York: Free Press, 1988).
Ibid., 152.
There was a large body o f sociologieal studies and commentaries on the fate o f the American family 
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The family is the frailest of modem institutions. Its weakness is evident to 
everyone. Will it survive as the culture changes? We watch it with all the 
panic that besets a mother as her backward child steps to the platform and 
begins to speak a piece. Well, a great deal happens to the family in 
Walden Two, Mr. Castle, I can tell you that.'
It was clear to Skinner and other ‘social experts’ that many of the older functions 
of the extended family, an entity that had integrated work, child rearing, socialization, the 
production of goods and materials, and social welfare, had been gradually undermined by 
large scale bureaucracy in American culture by the 1940s. The compact and efficient 
‘nuclear’ family model became heavily scmtinized as a preserver o f American social and 
cultural values. Interpersonal relationships and emotional fulfillment became the primary 
function o f marriage and child rearing. Families also became smaller and more mobile.
The model o f the small, efficient, well-adjusted family was an ideal that many 
new parents and spouses, however, felt ill prepared to take on. The stress of making a 
quick transition to postwar domestic life was difficult for Americans who could no longer 
rely on an extended family network for support. Such profound changes had given way, 
it seemed, to a new set of adverse social consequences. The waning stigma o f divorce, 
for example, paralleled a sharp rise in the number of failed marriages in the late 1940s 
and early 50s. Increased rates of crime, juvenile delinquency, and psychological 
trauma were some of the major social ills that scientific experts linked to the degenerative 
state of the family and the loss of American values.'^' The future of the family, as
' Skinner, Walden Two, 137.
The rise in the divorce rate beginning in the mid-1940s has been well documented. At one point these 
rates took on alarming proportions with a sharp rise to 1 in 4 by 1946. For more on the rise o f divorce rates 
after the war consult Mintz and Kellogg, Domestic Revolutions.
There is a vast literature on the culture o f the Cold War during the 1950s. The mass anxiety o f Cold 
War culture over the threat o f foreign aggression was in many ways linked to the intense desire for political 
and social stabilization on the domestic front. For examples o f historical appraisals o f  the links between
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Skinner noted in Walden Two, had become the focal point for many of the most pressing
issues of the modem age.
The significant history of our tim es.. .is the story of the growing weakness 
o f the family. The decline of the home as a medium for perpetuating 
culture, the stmggle for equality for women, including their right to select 
professions other than housewife or nursemaid, the extraordinary 
consequences o f birth control and the practical separation o f sex and 
parenthood, the social recognition of divorce, the critical issue of blood 
relationship or race -  all these are parts of the same field. And you can 
hardly call it quiescent.
The decline of the family was indeed a flash point for postwar social commentators both
in the academic and popular press. At a meeting of the American Hygiene Association in
1947, the Harvard sociology professor, Dr. Carl Zimmerman, proclaimed, for example,
that the family as a social unit would most probably break up by the end of the century.
The phenomena associated with family breakups such as alcoholism, spousal conflict,
juvenile delinquency, and psychological problems all suggested to Zimmerman that the
American family had reached its “maximum demoralization.” There also seemed to be
no alternative system to replace it.
This sentiment was later echoed in 1953 with John Sirjamaki’s seminal synthesis
of contemporary scientific opinion on the future of the family. The American Family in
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the 2Cf' Century (1953).'^“* The family, Sirjamaki contended, had been radically altered 
since the turn o f the century, and now consisted of a small number o f socially isolated 
individuals. Marriage and family relations, once a matter of community sanction and 
maintenance, had become thoroughly private affairs that were excluded from outside 
influence. Nuclear families were expected to maintain their independence and integrity 
without the need of external social m e c h a n i s m s . T h e  new family in its compact form, 
it seemed, was often short-lived, not lasting much beyond one generation, since children 
were encouraged to migrate and start new families.
The tendency toward the independence of the individual and the family thus 
produced what the prominent sociologist, Talcott Parsons, had referred to in the 1950s as 
the ‘structural isolation’ o f the family in modem suburban culture. The lack o f solidarity 
among members of the extended family group was now a central characteristic of the 
American kinship system in general and the source. Parsons believed, o f many of the 
problems associated with postwar family life.'^^ Parents were left without the support 
mechanisms previously used to aid the transition to family life.'^* Yet the family’s 
ability to adapt quickly to social and economic conditions and prepare children for the 
challenges o f a highly mobile and ever-changing culture became o f utmost importance.
134 John Sirjamaki, The American Family in the 20''' Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).
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Skinner addressed these and other issues of postwar social adjustment in Walden 
Two. With his description of a small scale and integrated community that combined the 
collective activities of work, community maintenance, child rearing, money, and 
intellectual and emotional fulfillment, Skinner proposed a psychological and behavioral 
alternative to a highly complex socioeconomic and cultural conundrum in America. As 
Frazier quipped, “[n]o one can seriously doubt that a well managed community will get 
along successfully as an economic unit. A child could prove it. The real problems are 
psychological.” '^^
Many contemporary critics, in fact, had called upon the government to design
more effective social policies and community programs that would replace older family
support networks. Such infrastructure would include new community service centers,
churches, family welfare offices, hospitals, and schools, all o f which had been neglected
by national policy makers.'""' In Walden Two all of the essential functions o f a
community, Skinner argued, could be studied and maintained by well-trained scientific
specialists, the utopian analogues of real-world civil servants. As Frazier explained, in a
manner reminiscent of Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis,
Our only government is a Board of Planners, .. .There are Managers of 
Food, Health, Play, Arts, Dentistry, Dairy, various industries. Supply,
Labor, Nursery School, Advanced Education and dozens of others. They 
requisition labor according to their needs, and their job is the managerial 
function which survives after they’ve assigned as much as possible to 
others. They’re the hardest workers among us...[a  manager] must have 
ability and real concern for the welfare of the community.
139 Skinner, Walden Two, 80.
Hill, Families Under Stress, 345.
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There were two key differences between this hypothetical system and bureaucratic social 
management. Managers in Walden Two were scientists and experimentalists first and 
foremost, and they were much more intimately connected to the communities that they 
studied and served. Thus, not only was the study of society a problem of psychology, but 
it was also, in Skinner’s estimation, one of scale. Small experimental communities, or 
laboratories of culture, he argued, would help us discover the laws o f social engineering, 
just as the laws of child rearing and pigeon training had been delineated through small 
scale experimental control and manipulation. The laboratory as a metaphor that was used 
to command social authority has had a long history in nineteenth and twentieth-century 
science. As I contend in chapter five, both Mead and Skinner used the imagery o f the 
laboratory to market visions of society and culture as a wellspring of human potentiality, 
and as a machine device, respectively.
Such an approach might also reform the old-style patriarchal structure o f domestic 
life where gender roles were clearly defined. These distinctions had been propagandized 
in postwar American culture as the formula for true happiness in the home, just as it had 
in the Victorian era. Americans were inundated in the 1940s and 50s with media images 
o f the “good life,” depicted in popular magazines (especially women’s magazines) and 
television, where the family dynamic was carefully presented to reflect traditional gender 
roles and relationships. The story lines of many family-based popular television 
programs often portrayed males, for example, as distant and emotionally unsophisticated 
breadwinners, while wives/mothers were the keepers o f family harmony, psychological 
well being, and preservers o f good relations between parents and children. Any deviance 
from these roles, especially among women, it was suggested, exposed the nuclear family
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to instability and a host of social problems chronicled daily in news columns and popular 
magazines.
“Feelings of insecurity!” Frazier continued with increasing warmth. “The 
marriage system trades on them! What does the ordinary middle class 
marriage amount to? ... To make matters worse, we educate our women as 
if  they were equal, and promise them equality. Is it any wonder they are 
soon disillusioned?
The social and psychological consequences of marital stress were o f special concern,
since stable marriages, like families, were seen as barometers o f cultural health. The toll
on women was especially great as their roles began to change from mothers and
housewives to active participants in the workforce, having access to new educational and
employment opportunities. Yet any number of psychological and developmental
maladies in children including delinquency, poor learning skills, psyehological neurosis,
behavioral and development difficulties were publicly associated with a lack o f parental
care and attention, especially from absent m o t h e r s . I n  Walden Two, Skinner spent
much of the text pondering these concerns. Frazier’s experimental community had of
course alleviated these problems through proper environmental engineering.
The community [in Walden Two], as a revised family has changed the 
place of women more radically than that of men. [Tjheir new position is 
more dignified, more enjoyable, and more healthful, and the whole 
question of security eventually vanishes. In a world of complete economic 
equality, you get and keep the affections you deserve. You can’t buy love 
with gifts or favors, you can’t hold love by raising an inadequate child, 
and you can’t be secure in love by serving as a good scrub woman or a 
good provider.
But as w e have seen, Skinner had trouble eonvineing those other than his small 
community of faithful followers (made up of intellectuals, scientists, and some
Ibid., 146-47.
143 Ibid., 162.
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laypersons) that his technological and literary marvels were anything more than the 
fanciful, albeit intriguing, dreams of a scientist cum social theorist. Skinner’s progressive 
views on gender, community development, racial equality, family planning, and social 
democracy were lost, for the most part, on a generation o f postwar Americans in the 
1940s and 50s. While Americans hoped for a departure from the social and economic 
failures o f the inter-war period, they nevertheless hearkened to the aesthetic o f older 
models o f family and community for reassurance in the face o f an unknown future.
The many associations that people had already drawn in previous decades between social 
science and various forms o f communism, socialism, and fascism, made Walden Two 
look like a scientifically inspired totalitarian nightmare.
The extent o f American fears about social transition was palpable in reviews of 
Walden Two, where the novel was not simply panned but openly ridiculed as a perversion 
of science. One commentator from Time magazine described the book in the mid-1950s 
as “a depressingly serious prescription for communal regimentation, as though the author 
had read Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and missed the point.” ’"*^ Huxley’s work 
had, of course, been a satire on psyehological behaviorism (of the Pavlovian variety) and 
the perceived potential for its social and industrial abuses. Another reviewer from Life 
magazine blasted Skinner for the “egregious liberty he has taken with the title of Henry 
David Thoreau’s original Walden,"' and the apparent removal o f self-definition and 
personal freedom from humanity that seemed central to Thoreau’s vision o f what might
For more on the use o f pioneer and Victorian iconography in the consumer culture o f the 1950s consult 
Thomas Hine, Populuxe (New York: Knopf, 1986).
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be called a ‘utopia for one.’ Skinner’s “society tender,” as the reviewer called it, was 
thoroughly anti-utopian in this regard, and its menacing imagery was as well reminiscent 
o f Huxleyan thraldom. Skinner’s Walden seemed to be a place where scientific managers 
had a stranglehold on individual autonomy.
With the cold and sterile imagery o f the Baby Box fresh in the minds o f his 
readers, much the same reductionism of humanity was read into Skinner’s vision of an 
experimental community. In these early public offerings he had thoroughly 
underestimated the extent to which postwar social transition would solidify traditional 
patterns and values and undermine radical social reform. This is not to say that social 
rebellion and challenge to social norms did not exist among feminists, the beats, and 
among the young in the 1950s. Comprehensive and radical social experimentation 
however was incompatible with mainstream sensibilities on the whole. The postwar era 
had clearly shaped Skinner’s scientific endeavors as a technologist and social theorist, but 
he had been a decade too early with ideas that would later strike chords with the “baby 
boom” generation during the social upheavals o f the 1960s. Only then would younger 
minds entertain what for Skinner had become by the early 1950s a radically new 
interpretation of individuality, human nature, and the self.
Humanity as Machine — The Self Dissolved
From his ruminations on the challenges faced by Americans in the postwar era 
Skinner moved in the early 1950s to the fullest articulation of his model of human nature 
in the academic setting while also cultivating his public career as a social theorist and
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technologist. This image of humanity is explored most fully in Skinner’s textbook 
treatment of human behavior, Science and Human Behavior (1953), a book that he had 
hoped would be a best selling “potboiler” of a psychology text on college campuses.
The approach to human society outlined in the text would define Skinner’s career as a 
social theorist and polemicist.
In order to fulfill his publishing contract with Macmillan, Skinner had promised 
to follow up Walden Two with a textbook in psychology. The book that emerged seven 
years after the first edition of Walden Two, Science and Human Behavior, was in fact a 
full exposition o f Skinner’s thoughts on bringing operant behaviorism to bear upon the 
human condition. The principles o f behavioral control that he had outlined in Behavior 
o f  Organisms using animal experimentation were now applied to the examination o f the 
human organism. Skinner’s social philosophy and his agenda for social reform were 
given their most thorough treatment in a text intended to reach a college audience.
Skinner’s text was designed around two main objectives. The first was to provide 
a summary of the principles of operant behavior and describe the techniques involved in 
the analysis and control of behavior in organisms. Skinner’s description o f the operant 
and of conditioned reflexes, the analysis o f environmental contingencies, his behavioral 
interpretation o f emotion, avoidance, anxiety, and other traits in organisms, and the 
complexities o f causal factors in behavior were all adapted directly from The Behavior o f  
Organisms: An Experimental Analysis (1938).’'^ ’ Skinner’s claims for direct application 
o f his principles to human research were not, however, supported by actual experimental
146 B. F. Skinner, A Matter o f  Consequences (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 229.
B. F. Skinner, The Behavior o f  Organisms: An Experimental Analysis (New York: Appleton Century 
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evidence or sustained formal research into human behavior. Skinner nonetheless moved 
freely between human and animal examples, reflecting the hehaviorist assumption that 
operant principles were universal. In his courses at Harvard in the late 1940s his 
“interpretation” (something that he claimed was a “common scientific practice”) of 
human behavior was derived primarily from data collected on pigeons, following his 
peculiar assumption that, “[tjhey were pretty much alike genetically, and we could give 
them fairly similar individual histories.”
The second major aim of the text was to apply Skinnerian behavioral science to a 
description of the successive spheres of control that determined the character o f the 
individual in society. This approach entailed an analysis o f the internal controls posited 
in the traditional concept o f the self, and the examination of group behavior both on the 
small and large scales. Group analysis in turn gave way to Skinner’s critical appraisal of 
modem society and its inefficiencies. What, Skinner asked, were the sources of 
diminished effectiveness of traditional social sanctions in government, law, religion, the 
economy, and education? How could these systems be reworked by a science of 
behavioral engineering to increase the pace of human adaptation to changing social and 
environmental conditions in a new global existence? Science and Human Behavior was 
thus an outline for the construction of a true science of cultural engineering.
In Walden Two Skinner had explored the idea of using a small community as a 
social laboratory, a contrived environment with which to design a system of social 
engineering. In Science and Human Behavior^^^ Skinner extended the laboratory concept
Ibid., 26-27 .
Hereafter referred to as SMB.
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to encompass an entire culture, a highly complex social environment. Like the individual 
subject, culture was malleable and capable of being studied, molded and controlled on a 
grand s c a l e . W h y ,  Skinner asked, should we leave social management to the accidents 
of conventional religious and legal sanctions that had proven woefully inefficient in 
optimizing human b e h a v i o r ? W h y  not place the haphazard experimentation already 
taking place in education, politics, and industry on a sound scientific footing?
At the heart of SHE was a view of the self at odds with the traditional image of 
the individual in Western culture as an independent entity possessing mind, will, and 
agency. Many were loath to relinquish those unique characteristics that set humans apart 
from the a n i m a l s . A n d  yet, Skinner observed, even as modem humanity had come to 
recognize the controls of the many spheres of bureaucracy and technocracy, people 
tended nevertheless to embrace the illusion o f autonomy. Humanity seemed still to be 
wrestling with contrasting images of the mechanistic and holistic self. As Skinner 
observed.
All of this suggests that we are in transition. We have not wholly 
abandoned the traditional philosophy of human nature; at the same 
time we are far from adopting a scientific point o f view without 
reservation. We have accepted the assumption of determinism in 
part; yet we allow our sympathies, our first allegiances, and our 
personal aspirations to rise to the defense o f the traditional view.’^ ^
150 Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, 312,418.
Ibid., 427.
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In Skinner’s arguments we find the self dissolved. Operant behaviorism called
for the complete eradieation o f inner states encompassed in ‘mind’ or ‘personality’ that,
not being experimentally discernible, had no demonstrable reality. Skinner left no room
in his epistemology for an inner self.
Psychologists like James and Freud observed events within their own 
bodies called feelings or states of mind which often occurred at just the 
right time to seem like initiating causes. That kind of misleading 
information was lacking in the psychophysies of rats and pigeons.
The only model o f human nature that allowed for scientific description and
control was one where the ‘se lf was addressed as a unified system of responses, or as a
‘common mode of action.’ Studying variations in such systems allows for much
greater control than if personified in a cultural context. Thus it was the cultural ideal of
the self, denoting free will, responsibility, creativity and agency, Skinner felt, that needed
overhauling if modems were ever to put human progress on a sound scientific footing.
A third aim for SHB was thus the réévaluation of traditional notions o f the self in the
study of human behavior. As one reviewer described it,
Skinner’s treatment of the self is based on his general scheme o f analysis, 
completely divorced from any previous theories, such as those of Mead,
Cooley, Dewey, Sullivan, and others. According to him, the “self is 
simply a device for representing a functionally unified system of 
responses.
Skinner, A Matter o f  Consequences, 279. 
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Samuel M. Strong, review of Science and Human Behavior, by B. F. Skinner, American Journal o f  
Sociology 60 (1954-55): 323.
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This then was the revelation of a behavioral science o f social engineering.
Skinner claimed to have found a way to bring ‘social forces’ under experimental,
laboratory control. Harry Prosch in the journal Ethics described the text as “a splendid
example of the truly vast extent to which a behavioristic approach to human behavior and
action can deal with the subject, [.. W. J. H. Sprott, writing for the Sociological
Review, extolled the book’s scientific merits as “a work o f major importance to the
psychologist.” '^  ^And with regard to its extreme view o f human nature, other critics noted
its value as a forum for productive debate on the status o f the self in modem society. In
the American Journal o f  Sociology, Samuel Strong put it best;
This is an important hook, exceptionally well written, and logically 
consistent with the basic premise of the unitary nature o f science. Many 
students of society and culture would take violent issue with most o f the 
things that Skinner has to say, but even those who disagree most will find 
his a stimulating book.'^"
Many indeed took issue with Skinner’s depiction of human nature and the self. 
Charges o f anti-humanism were leveled against Skinner’s vision and the general rise of 
technocracy in American culture during the 1950s, a trend that encouraged “groupthink” 
approaches to business, education, industrial engineering, and human work efficiency. 
Much like the programs o f reinforcement outlined in SHB, the psychology of groupthink 
asserted that the moral, ethical, and intellectual norms o f culture and community should 
he oriented around the needs of the collective. Some critics feared that such emphasis 
would detract from the uniqueness, creativity, and spirituality o f human nature and
Ibid.
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culture.’ '^ These concerns typified the humanist countermovement against behavioral 
depictions of the individual.
The widely read humanist philosopher and social gadfly, Joseph W. Krutch, for 
example, was one of the earliest and most outspoken opponents of Skinner and 
technocratic management. Krutch spent a good portion o f his career as poet, 
musicologist, and philosopher lambasting Skinnerian behaviorism, championing the 
cause of democracy and individual freedom. His attitude toward behavioral science was 
much like that of the fictitious philosopher, Castle, in Walden Two, who argued for the 
traditional Western view of humanity — rational, autonomous, and intuitive — existing in 
many respects apart from the trappings of the immediate environment. Like Castle, 
Krutch rebuffed what he saw as the “fascism” of the Skinnerian self and its denial of 
human individual integrity.’®^
Krutch's The Measure o f  Man (1953), which contained an extended criticism of 
Walden Two, spoke for many who lamented an age in which man’s “ingenuity had outrun 
his intelligence.” '®^ For Krutch, modem society had amplified both humanity’s 
potentiality and fallibility to a degree that left it increasingly incapable o f managing its 
own complexities. The advent of global culture, social change, and institutionalized 
science and technology left humankind struggling to keep control over society to the 
detriment of basic communal, artistic, and spiritual needs of human beings.'®"' Krutch
William H. Whyte Jr., “The Social Engineers,” Fortune 46 (1952): 88-91, 108; “Groupthink,” Fortune 
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firmly believed that human beings ultimately preferred a less ‘successful’ and socially 
mobile existence and would ultimately place more value on free will than the ‘good life’ 
promise o f an automated society, embodied in the dreams of the behavioral social
165engineers.
Such rhetoric was echoed in subsequent evaluations of the rise o f social 
technocracy in the latter part of the 1950s. The famous sociologist and radical 
intellectual C. Wright Mills argued in his classic, The Sociological Imagination (1959), 
for example, that scientific expertise had been used to legitimate a view of humankind 
that emphasized now familiar images of mechanism, control, and manipulation. The 
religion of scientific method, so much a part o f contemporary human relations research, 
had systematically dehumanized many sectors of human c u l t u r e . L e a d e r s  o f the 1960s 
counterculture such as Theodore Roszak reiterated this appraisal o f the American social 
experience a decade later in his classic. The Making o f  a Counter Culture (1968), stating 
that technocracy had invaded the American consciousness, finding converts in politics, 
education, entertainment, and urban planning.'®’
Such sentiments were also shared by a new cadre of social scientists who oversaw 
the rise of psychotherapy in professional psychology in the 1950s. As part o f the “third 
force” in psychology, humanist psychologists such as Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow 
also challenged Skinner and argued that behaviorism did not help the cause of democracy
Joseph Krutch, “Men, Apes, and Termites,” Saturday Review 58 (September 21, 1963): 22-25. See page 
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or social p r o g r e s s . A  new theory of human personality was in order. Rogers, Maslow,
and others worked to forge alternative theories that emphasized the virtues of human
reason and their power over the strictures o f environment.
[RJesponsible personal choice, which is the most essential element in 
being a person, which is the core experience in psychotherapy, which exist 
prior to any scientific endeavor, is an equally prominent fact in our lives.
To deny the experience of responsible choice is, to me, as restricted a view 
as to deny the possibility of behavioral s c i e n c e . — Carl Rogers
Rogers employed concepts of democracy in his definition of mental health, asserting that
the individual was capable of self-actualization in the journey o f personal growth and the
perpetuation o f healthy social traditions. As Rogers put it in his 1956 symposium with
Skinner before the American Psychological Association,
It is in the direction of the “open society,” as that term has been defined by 
[Karl] Popper, where individuals carry responsibility for personal 
decisions. It is at the opposite pole from his concept of the closed society, 
o f which Walden Two would be an example.'™
It was this kind of personality theory, of which both Rogers and Margaret Mead 
were adherents, that became the backdrop for some of the key professional debates 
among behaviorist and humanist psychologists in the 1950s and 60s. In the early fifties, 
an emerging community of academic psychologists began to challenge the dominance of 
behavioral science and push an introspective approach to the subconscious mind in 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy.'^' Behavioral approaches were viewed as inadequate
Ellen Herman provides an excellent discussion of the disciplinary diversification in postwar psychology 
in her book, The Romance o f  American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age o f  Experts (Berkeley: 
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in explaining and treating complex emotional pathologies. The study o f emotional 
development began to take on a prominent place in such areas as child psychology.
With Rogers as one of the central figures, the study of emotional development moved 
away from the analysis of environmental dynamics and the group and toward individual 
subjective investigations. Rogers argued that as the study of emotion and motivation 
became more sophisticated, new plans for social programs would supplant the aspirations 
of the behaviorists.
An account of the exchange between Skinner and Rogers was documented in the 
pages o f Science magazine in 1956, and it set the tone for the clashes between humanist 
and behaviorist thinkers in psychology.'’  ^Rogers railed against Skinner’s uncritical faith 
in the ability of experimental scientific inquiry to inform us about the end-goal o f human 
society. The practice o f social science, as one among many forms o f social interaction, 
involved subjective personal choice at every step. Rogers warned against the implication 
in Skinnerian social theory that a science o f social control was the next logical, and 
inevitable, step in human social evolution. Short of arguing for a science o f social 
control, Skinner rebutted Rogers by pressing the value o f behavioral perspectives to help 
analyze, predict, and recommend social practices that preserved the whole culture, as 
well as the individual. Behavioral science, Skinner claimed, got us beyond the 
inaccuracies of ill-defined human caprice. After all, the goal of behavioral science was to
172 Ibid., 43.
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gain some measure o f eontrol over social and individual destiny. His methods were more 
efficient, Skinner claimed, and were not inherently contrary to liberal democratic values.
Conclusion
In many respects Skinner’s career in the postwar decades is the story o f American 
urbanization and social diversification. His utopian thought experiments remind us o f the 
search in American culture for balance between the demands of social progress and the 
need for the preservation of cultural traditions that define American values, especially 
those identified with our frontier traditions. Such need to return to nature and simplicity, 
to a practice of social harmony that aspires to social perfection, is reflected in the social 
theory of Skinnerian behaviorism.
While Walden Two looked to the past to capture the essence of American utopian 
heritage in social experimentation, it also reflected the aims o f social reform that were 
part of the inheritance of the progressive era in modem America, an age that defined 
American social science through the confluence of professional growth and the rise of 
technocratic, urban culture. The system of the factory came to shape the lives of 
Americans in the manufacturing cults of Fordism and Taylorism, creating a high demand 
for efficiency and scientific authority in the design of modem mass culture. The 
scientific philosophy and social aims of progressive social science were carried over into 
the development of a new behaviorism in the late thirties by members o f the second 
generation of behaviorists, Skinner being among its most prominent representatives.
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As Skinner translated his behaviorism into a seienee of humans and social 
management, he sought to influence public opinion during a period of intense social 
change in the postwar years. The legacies o f social efficiency, scientism, and traditional 
American culture were very well represented in a postwar culture struggling to come to 
grips with new architectures for family, gender, work, community, and the many 
demands that such an existence made on individuals. True to form, Americans embraced 
the promise of technology in the search for tools and techniques o f social adjustment, but 
rejected Skinner’s vision of community harmony.
The process of technological appropriation by Americans, nevertheless, 
engendered a new vision of the self that left human nature beholden to the controls of 
ever changing and diversifying social environments. Little wonder that some social 
scientists like Skinner chose to embrace and market a mechanical view of humanity in 
getting a handle on human destiny. As demonstrated in the next chapter, the events o f the 
postwar era caused many to wonder whether Skinner’s view o f the self might not be 
preferable to the images o f a capricious, despotic, and wasteful humanity that many in the 
1960s and early 70s thought spelled the end of human civilization.
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CHAPTER THREE 
HUMAN ENGINEERING IN THE AGE OF AQUARIUS AND BEYOND
I  knew, as all teachers know, that education was inadequately supported. That 
was perhaps not its own fault, but its outmoded techniques certainly were.
Furthermore, education was completely bewildered as to its place in the world 
o f  the future.
...Now, fresh from my experience at Walden Two, I  saw that this could 
not go on. But I  also saw that educators themselves could not save the situation.
The causes were too deep, too remote. They involved the whole structure o f  
society. What was needed was a new conception o f man, compatible with our 
scientific knowledge, which would lead to a philosophy o f  education bearing 
some relation to educational practices. But to achieve this, education would 
have to abandon the technical limitations which it had imposed upon itself and 
step forth into a broader sphere o f  human engineering. Nothing short o f  the 
complete revision o f  a culture would suffice.
T. E. Frazier, in Skinner, Walden Two (1948)'
[I]t could maximize the genetic endowment o f  each student; it could make him 
as skillful, competent, and informed as possible; it could build the greatest 
diversity o f  interests; it could lead him to make the greatest possible 
contribution to the survival and development o f  his culture.
B. F. Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching { \ 9 6 i f
B. F. Skinner, the public scientist, enjoyed considerable notoriety from his 
technological and literary promotion of social efficiency in the 1940s and 50s, especially 
with regard to teaching and education reform in later years. His initial suggestions for 
large-scale social experimentation, however, met with little support among intellectual 
and popular audiences. Skinner was demonized in the press by several humanist 
scientists and philosophers. This was the kind of megalomania and perverted science, 
they argued, that had contributed to the rise of the Nazi and Communist regimes. The 
potential of his social inventions had been lost, Skinner concluded, on Americans who 
focused on the sterile, dehumanizing connotations of the Baby Box and Walden Two.
' B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York; Macmillan Publishing Co, 1948), 312.
 ^B. F. Skinner, The Technology o f  Teaching (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 91.
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What Skinner characterized as straightforward failures in marketing his ideas and 
technologies is, however, more readily explained by the effects o f the Second World War 
and the Cold War on the confidence of Americans in their national identity. While 
accepting increased technology and systemization into the home and the workplace, 
postwar Americans were not open to the level o f social regimentation imagined in a 
Skinnerian technocratic utopia. The late 1940s and early 1950s in America were 
characterized by a political emphasis on containment and security, and a cultural closing 
of the ranks driven by the fear of renewed economic and social instability. Conservative 
and standardized portrayals of family and community life proliferated in the media during 
the opening decade of the Cold War. Although these images o f the ‘good life’ did not 
accurately reflect the lives o f most Americans, suspicions about unconventional and 
radical social views were nonetheless part of the phenomena of McCarthyism and the 
outward standardization of suburban culture.
In the early 1960s, younger Americans especially became increasingly dissatisfied 
with the trappings o f modem mass culture, as well as the injustices o f sexual and racial 
discrimination. Protest movements among a new generation of social critics fueled high- 
profile debates about the future o f America and the fate o f humanity. These critics saw 
an America that had yet to address institutionalized racism, pollution, poverty, war, urban 
strife, and dehumanizing bureaucracy. This period of protest and debate bred open 
discussion of social reform among politicians, public intellectuals, counterculture 
activists and scientists.
Beginning in the late 1950s and early 60s, Skinner’s technologies and social 
theories, and his image of the future self, were again hotly debated. In the present
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chapter I will examine this third period of Skinner’s career when he enjoyed greater 
success at promoting technologies of behavioral modification, and stirring up controversy 
about his social theories in the late 1960s and early 70s. Skinner modified his 
presentation of educational technology and utopian theory in the 1960s to appeal to 
Americans concerned about such issues as the Vietnam War and environmental pollution, 
and who were calling for reforms in education and civil rights legislation. Many were 
also enthusiastic about exploring societal alternatives.
Like other well-known radicals who had publicly challenged the status quo, 
Skinner again offered up Walden Two as a plausible vision of what humanity and 
community could become with proper engineering. He promoted the potential of 
experimental communities in helping Americans to learn how to reinvent society.
Without question, Skinner’s description of the Walden Two community, with its attention 
to behavior modification and human efficiency, evoked for many the calculated 
dehumanization of technocracy and laboratory science. Curiously, however, many of 
Skinner’s young communitarian readers of Walden Two in the 1960s selectively 
appropriated its experimental themes and translated them into a general, non-technocratic 
call for the exploration of social alternatives. Its setting, after all, evoked many of the 
ideals o f community cohesion, simplicity, personal discovery, and smallness o f living 
that were part of the counterculture mandate to get humankind physically and spiritually 
‘back to the garden. ’ In the 1960s Walden Two thus served as an important propaganda 
tool for Skinner in recasting behaviorism as a humanistic science o f social exploration, 
one that de-emphasized burgeoning technocracy and instead upheld a return to simplicity 
and humanity.
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Most significant for Skinner’s public career in the 1960s, however, was his rising 
fame as the acknowledged leader of a revolution in teaching technology and learning 
theory. This aspect of his career merits special examination, since it is the clearest 
example o f the public appropriation of Skinnerian behavioral technology. Skinner 
believed that, short of starting experimental communities for research, the best hope for 
the design of better human ‘natures’ was the laboratory of the classroom. An 
examination o f how Skinner translated the utopian ideals in Walden Two into a strategy 
for restructuring education theory will show the considerable influence o f Skinner’s 
behavioral perspective on American education. It will also illustrate how a vision of the 
programmable self was appropriated by administrators and industrialists involved in 
American public education. If  Skinner’s techniques of behavioral modification could be 
applied, as he claimed, to virtually any aspect of human learning, intellect, or mode of 
creativity, then adaptation to social change could be quickened and enhanced. American 
schools could use teaching technology, Skinner would claim, to respond quickly to an 
alleged education “crisis” in the late 1950s. Public debates on the efficiency of American 
education intensified during this period following the launch of the Russian satellite. 
Sputnik.
Daniel Bjork, E. A. Vargas, and Julie S. Vargas have discussed Skinner’s 
attempts to bring teaching technology to the public as a venue of social reform.^ His 
aspirations ultimately were thwarted, Bjork explains, by what Skinner believed was his 
own persistent inability to control the commercial designs on his inventions. Skinner 
eventually concluded that business interests had gained too much control over the
 ^ See Daniel B jork's chapter on Skinnerian educational technology in B. F. Skinner: A Life (New York: 
Basic Books, 1993), 167-90.
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‘experimental’ space of the classroom and were bent on exploiting teaching machines as 
an educational commodity/ Bjork also notes Skinner’s general dislike o f education 
professionals who seemed more interested in perpetuating traditional administrative 
policies than exploring innovations from science/ A teaching machine revolution in 
education did not materialize, and Skinner’s own methods were never extensively used in 
subsequent projects of programmed instruction.
There is ample evidence to suggest, however, that a revolution in programmed 
instruction, inspired directly by Skinner’s innovations, did occur in the 1960s and 70s, 
and that it continues to exert influence even today.^ In order to frame this revolution 
historically, I will again invoke the American cultural themes of scientific management 
and efficiency and their transformation of American industrial management. The 
philosophy of Scientific Management, as I have argued, transcended Taylor the 
individual in the decades after 1915. In much the same way, Skinner’s basic 
management approach to the processes of learning has been applied subsequently to 
innumerable settings in schools, government and military institutions, and corporate
" Ibid., 182.
 ^ In particular, Bjork recounts Skinner’s interaction with James B. Conant, former president o f Harvard 
(where Skinner was a faculty member), who was well known for his highly publicized report on American 
education. The American High School Today: A First Report to Interested Citizens (New York; McGraw 
Hill, 1959), published just after the launch of Sputnik. Skinner found Conant to be a typical policy maker, 
an official who preferred to reconstitute existing systems o f administration instead o f experimenting with 
radical change.
® While Daniel Bjork acknowledges Skinner’s influence in programmed instruction, he does not elaborate 
on this point. A behaviorologist and educational psychologist, respectively, E. A. Vargas and Julie S. 
Vargas are themselves enthusiasts of programmed instruction and have made a case for Skinner’s 
revolutionary status. They contend that Skinner’s theories o f education have yet to be fully tapped. These 
claims seem to me to be historically uncritical. See their article, “B. F. Skinner and the Origins of 
Programmed Instruction,” in B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture, ed. Laurence Smith and 
William R. Woodward (London: Associated University Presses, 1996), 237-53, especially page 251.
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training programs since the 1960s. Breaking down information into manageable parts 
that can then be quickly and efficiently re-programmed into human machines, is a 
strategy that has been developed extensively. The ability to program humans for any 
industrial, social, or military contingency has been a powerful idea among industrialists 
long since indoctrinated into the principles of Scientific Management.
As cultural historian Martha Banta has observed in her studies o f language and 
iconography in literary journals and magazines, Taylor-style system building as a cultural 
template was well established in the national culture in the early twentieth-century.^ 
Americans in the twentieth century, Banta argues, became obsessed with organization 
and systematization. This made Taylor’s rise to public notoriety predictable. Taylor, like 
Skinner in the postwar era, promised simple methods for solving social problems, a 
promise that Americans have always found especially appealing. This love of system 
building and controlling human behavior played no small role in establishing behavioral 
perspectives on humanity in the social sciences at the turn of the century. System theory, 
as Banta noted, also came to exert considerable influence on social discourse about 
everyday living. The desire for systems has remained a foundational component not 
only of social administration theory but also of the very image of modem humanity. The 
self as a lawful system of behavioral matrices open to environmental manipulation was 
an image, as Skinner understood, that had already made inroads into many areas of 
American cultural life. Skinner’s rise to fame is understandable in light o f the American 
obsession with order and system, and it helps explain why Americans found his 
technologies and depictions of the self so fascinating.
 ^ Martha Banta, Taylored Lives: Narrative Productions in the Age o f  Taylor, Veblen, and Ford (Chicago; 
University o f Chicago Press, 1993).
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In my analysis of Walden Two, technologies of teaching, and Skinner’s social 
manifesto, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, published in 1971,1 demonstrate how Skinner 
capitalized on public awareness of the global nature of social and environmental 
problems associated with urban living in the 1960s and 70s.* In Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity, Skinner declared that a failure to rework traditional ideals o f human 
individuality and community would spell the end of civilization. Social engineering was 
now a matter o f human survival. A comparison of the objections to Skinnerian social 
theory during the 1950s Cold War and the era of the counterculture in the 1960s and 70s 
also reveals why it was such a controversial subject. It tapped into some of the core 
dilemmas of American national identity in postwar America about the place and face of 
the self. These controversies solidified Skinner’s public reputation by the early 1970s, 
however, as one of the most influential scientific minds o f the twentieth century, and the 
author of what a reviewer for Psychology Today called the most “controversial and 
terrifying book” of 1971.^
Indeed, as Daniel Bjork also has argued, Skinner’s book was controversial 
because of its timeliness and its challenge to democratic and individualist values. The 
proper balance between individual autonomy and social management, Bjork observed, 
was debated among American “traditionalists” and “liberators” in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.'*’ Those in the traditionalist camp believed that individual caprice 
needed to be controlled by the institutions of church and government, while liberators felt
* Both of these books are hereafter referred to as WT and BFD where appropriate.
 ^Riehard Rubenstein, review o f Beyond Freedom and Dignity, by B. F. Skinner, Psychology Today 6 
(1971): 30-31, 95-97. See page 30.
160
that unrestrained individual freedom was essential to moral and social harmony. This 
debate has since played out in a number o f different political arenas.
While I agree with Bjork that the philosophical virtues o f freedom and human 
dignity remained strong despite Skinner’s challenge, I interpret the strong negative 
reaction to Beyond Freedom and Dignity in a slightly different, but not incompatible, 
way. The humanist intellectuals and scientists who lambasted Skinner undoubtedly saw 
his book as a variation on nineteenth-century traditionalism, one that needed to be 
quashed. But the national phenomenon that was BFD cannot adequately be characterized 
as an intellectual debate that reflected broad American opinion. To be sure, many 
Americans saw the same basic threat to freedom and democracy in BFD as the 
academics. I think it productive, however, to analyze reactions to BFD in light o f other 
trends in American culture that are only partly addressed in Bjork’s discussion. My 
treatment examines how Americans learned to live with the tension between mechanistic 
and holistic visions o f the self. This moves us beyond Bjork’s straightforward 
pronouncement of victory for liberators over the forces of technocracy. "  As a 
description of American cultural and political ideology it rings true. But it does not 
entirely account for the embrace o f technocracy in postwar America that, as Bjork 
acknowledges, Skinner tapped into.'^
Both mechanistic and holistic images of the self continued to be invoked by 
Americans in different social and industrial contexts. My presentation of the practical
Bjork, Skinner, 206-08.
Ibid., 207.
Ibid., 212-13.
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realities of these attempts to eombine demoeracy and technocraey, while by no means 
comprehensive, is intended nevertheless to add to Bjork's discussion o f Skinner’s 
audiences and critics. In contrasting these images o f the self and their cultural sources I 
will also provide further explanation of what Alexandra Rutherford has described as 
Skinner’s many public images ranging, as she says, from “educational revolutionary, to 
utopian, to scientific despot and totalitarian.” '  ^ In what she has termed the “complex and 
historically unique” era of 1960s America, some saw Skinner as a humanist progressive 
while others vehemently dismissed his theories as the stuff of Orwellian nightmares. In 
invoking the tension between the humanistic desire for individual dignity and the 
technocratic aim of harmonious social organization that persisted throughout twentieth- 
century political thought and public culture, I will delineate Skinner’s appropriation by 
public constituencies that each held different agendas for the self. This will, I believe, 
elucidate Rutherford’s characterization of Skinnerian social philosophy as “at once 
unbearably tantalizing and devastatingly empty.” ’^
In chronicling the third phase of Skinner’s public career as a social critic and 
purveyor of behavioral technology, I shall begin by discussing the rise in popularity of 
Walden Two during the late 1950s and early 60s. It will again be explored as a foil for 
discussing contemporary social issues in postwar America. In the 1960s the novel was 
being read by a new generation o f young adults who interpreted its message differently 
than those who encountered it in the immediate postwar years. Rejecting mass society
Alexandra Rutherford, “B. F. Skinner’s Technology o f Behavior in American Life: From Consumer 
Culture to Counterculture,” Journal o f  the History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 39, no. 1 (Winter, 2003): 1- 
23. See page 19.
14 Ibid., 18.
Ibid.
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and consumer culture, a new generation of readers saw a humanistic vision o f society that 
combined the idea o f engineered human potential with the individualist virtues of 
simplicity and a connection to nature that were reminiscent of earlier nineteenth-century 
experiments in utopian social harmony.'^ In some cases the novel served as guide for 
real-world experiments in alternative living.
Recasting Skinnerian Social Technology in the 1960s
Back in 1948 when Skinner first published Walden Two, he had high hopes that 
would be received favorably. His reputation as a scientist and budding philosopher 
already had attracted attention the previous year from Time Incorporated which offered 
him a recurring column in a new magazine on contemporary art, literature, philosophy, 
theology, and science, called the “Philosopher’s Notebook.” The magazine would be
Skinner, I argue, recognized the appeal and fascination that Walden Two, with its call to the simple life 
and small-scale community living, would have for a new generation o f  Americans who had begun to reject 
mass culture and become more aware of social and environmental problems. In this sense, many 
appropriated Skinner’s utopian vision as a critique o f modem life similar to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), and E. F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful: Economics As if  People 
Mattered (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). Walden Two also served as a manual o f sorts for those 
seeking what C. Wright Mills had called a return to ‘membership’ in society, and a reinvigoration o f basic 
community functions. Skinner’s model seemed to provide for a form o f democratic social control where 
group activity was mediated by the leadership o f social planners. For more on the use o f these types of 
techniques by humanist and liberal democratic social scientists, see William Graebner, The Engineering o f  
Consent: Democracy and Authority in Twentieth Century America (Madison: University o f Wisconsin 
Press, 1987).
Skinner’s social theory thus found a place in the eounterculture among communalists and 
‘diggers’ in the 1960s and 70s who set off in search o f alternatives to modem living. The Twin Oaks farm 
which was established in 1970 outside Louisa, Virginia, for example, initially used Skinner’s novel as the 
model. For more on the history o f the commune movements in the 1960s and 70s, see Keith Melville’s 
Communes in the Counterculture (New York: Morrow, 1972). For an in depth look at the Twin Oaks 
experiment, see Ingrid Komar’s Living the Dream: A Documentary Study o f  the Twin Oaks Community, 
Communal Societies and Utopian Studies Book Series, vol. 1 (Norwood: Norwood Editions, 1983) and 
Kathleen Kinkade’s A Walden Two Experiment: The First Five Years o f  Twin Oaks Community (New 
York: William Morrow & Co., 1973).
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dedicated to discussions on “the problems of our time,” and the first of Skinner’s
columns was to be on the topic of free w ill.'’ This was undoubtedly an encouraging sign
of public interest to Skinner as he began to piece together Walden Two. Indeed, Skinner
and his editors felt that the novel might fit in well with other controversial books on the
economic, political and social conditions that had led to the Second World War.'* As one
editor observed in a review o f the manuscript for Walden Two, “the average utopian
novel [usually] fails to sell because of the burden o f ideas.” And yet.
By and large, however, successful utopian novels appeal to a strong 
dissatisfaction with the present and encourage a hope for the future. Both 
LOOKING BACKWARD and NEWS FROM NOWHERE came at a time 
when certain shortcomings of monopoly capitalism were becoming 
apparent to large numbers o f people. ... Many social scientists have 
argued that our knowledge of human behavior is now adequate to serve as 
a basis for the good life, but Skinner, so far as I know, is the first person to 
try to imagine what would happen. His arguments, it almost goes without 
saying, are not perfectly convincing, but he makes a good enough case to 
be interesting.'
Publishers at Macmillan predicted that Walden Two would be a provocative best
seller.^" It did see support among a small number of enthusiasts like the young Yale
Papers o f  B. F. Skinner. Correspondence ca. 1928-1979. Executive offices o f Time Incorporated to 
Skinner. 10 October 1947, Box 1, Folder 4. [HUGFP 60.10]. Harvard University Archives. Cambridge, 
MA. Item from these folders are hereafter referred to as HUGFP 60.10.
Some o f the more important works that fall into this category are by prominent intellectuals and social 
scientists o f the day such as Charles Wright Mills, Peter Drucker and Erich Fromm, all o f whom explored 
the problems o f the postwar economic and social environment. See for example M ills’ The New Men o f  
Power: Am erica’s Labor Leaders (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948) for a discussion o f  labor issues and 
industry. See also the classic by Peter Drucker, The New Society: The Anatomy o f  the Industrial Order 
(New York: Harper, 1949). For criticism o f American society, consult Erich Fromm’s Man For Himself: 
An Inquiry Into the Psychology o f  Ethics (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications Inc., 1947).
Editorial comments on Skinner’s manuscript, “The Sun Is But a Morning Star,’’ 3-4. Papers o f B. F. 
Skinner. Correspondence ca. 1928-1979. n. d. [HUGFP 60.10]. Box 1. Folder 1. Harvard University 
Archives. Cambridge, MA. Items in these folders hereafter referred to as HUGFP 60.10.
There were early indications from the initial reviews in the New York Times that Walden Two would be 
regarded as an important book, since, as Macmillan editors noted, it received early recognition by the 
media and was proving controversial. Papers o f B. F. Skinner. Correspondence and Documents, ca. 1948- 
1979. Macmillan to Skinner, 11 June 1948, Box 1. [HUGFP 60.15]. Harvard University Archives.
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student, and future social psychologist, Arthur Gladstone, who attempted to organize
communities based on Skinner’s ideas. On the whole, however, the novel did not gamer
a wide initial readership. It inspired vimlent responses from humanists and philosophers
because of its rejection of classic human virtues. As one of Skinner’s old classmates
from Hamilton College, the artist A lf Evers, observed, the novel challenged fundamental
tenets o f individual identity and nationalist politics with such bald directness that it would
certainly be vilified.
I can see fiery crosses burning on the outskirts [5 /c] of Walden Two. I can 
see Mr. Hearst turning on the thunder from San Simeon, and the 
Legionnaires and other respectable groups turning out to picket and 
harass, until the younger set feels impelled to indulge in arson and murder.
Pulpits would be pounded, Mr. Kaltenbom and Fulton Lewis would get to 
work. If the attorney general couldn’t find the proper statute, Congress 
would eagerly provide one. Behavioural engineering would be turned 
against Walden Two on a nation wide scale. The existence of the colony 
would be too great a threat to the powers that be, to be ignored, and all the 
techniques of influencing behaviour would be at their command.^’
Decades later, however, Walden Two would be recognized as one of the most
influential literary explorations o f modem social and technological utopianism. In the
decades after its initial publication it slowly developed a following among younger
readers and communalists. Because o f its timeliness for the 1960s, the book served as a
sounding board for discussions among prominent humanist intellectuals, scientists,
psychologists, and the occasional politician, about social technology and the
philosophical implications o f a behavioristic approach to the self.^^ In his 1976 survey of
Cambridge, MA. Items in these folders hereafter referred to as HUGFP 60.15. Skinner’s early assessment 
o f the book’s readership potential as a best seller comes from his own account in the third volume o f his 
autobiography, A Matter o f  Consequences (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 44.
A lf Evers to Skinner, 26 June 1948, HUGFP 60.15, Box 1, 1948-1950.
Harold Berger made this claim for Walden Two in his 1976 literary study. Science Fiction and the New 
Dark Age (Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1976), 53, 55. Other surveys of
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postwar dystopian science fiction, where world war, environmental devastation, and 
overpopulation were often central topics, Harold Berger described WT in the most telling 
terms as “more nearly a sociological dialogue with connecting narration than a work of 
fiction.”^^  To a certain extent this was true of all dystopian science fiction in the 
twentieth century according to Berger. George Orwell, Aidons Huxley, Frederick Pohl, 
Anthony Burgess and others had simply put contemporary trends in technocracy to work 
in foretelling the future. “They are the fellows who had written about this [social 
breakdown], who had said this could happen, this -  dystopia — declared Berger, “and 
they were right.” '^^  Skinner’s was a straightforward appraisal of real social trends, albeit 
with no significant literary merit. Still, Berger acknowledged the tremendous influence 
o f Walden Two.
The impact of Skinner’s book is now history. No modem utopist vision 
has stimulated a greater reaction than Skinner’s, and that reaction has been 
largely and heatedly negative. Macmillan’s 1966 paperback printing 
acknowledges on its hack cover that Skinner’s “modem utopia has been a 
center o f raging controversy ever since its publication in 1948.”^^
Skinner had written a novel that he believed would appeal to the educated
layman.^^ It was initially critiqued, however, by intellectuals with ties to academia. The
novel also piqued the interest o f fellow public intellectuals who acknowledged Skinner’s
newfound celebrity. It was clear to them that Skinner was not engaging in literary flights
utopian literature from this period make similar claims for the influence o f Walden Two. See Charles J. 
Erasmus, Utopian Experiments Past and Future (New York: Free Press, 1977); Peyton E. Richter, ed., 
f/topia/Dys'topia (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1975).
Berger, Science Fiction and the New Dark Age, 52.
Ibid., xi.
25 Ibid., 53.
Skinner, Consequences, 44.
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of fancy or cultural satire. Walden Two was Skinner’s first (but not last) social scientific
m a n i f e s t o . I n  his article for the Philosophical Review in 1949 entitled, “The Scientist as
Philosopher King,” for example, the philosopher Donald C. Williams observed that social
scientists such as Skinner had recently laid claim to long-sought public authority.
We have often been told of late that man will end himself unless the social 
scientists bring our understanding of human nature abreast o f the widely 
careering physical sciences and lays hands on the reins o f history. In 
Walden Two, Professor Burrhus Frederick Skinner, an illustrious 
psychologist and man of parts, speculative and humane, accepts the 
challenge and gives in the dress o f utopian fietion a sanguine aecount of 
the brave new world whieh his profession can provide. The scientific 
samurai could not put their case in the hands of a more able and winning 
advocate, and if he loses it, it is lost indeed.^*
What plans indeed did such “scientific samurai” (a phrase borrowed by Williams from H.
G. Wells) like Skinner have in mind for soeial progress and human survival, and what
could this mean for the modem understanding of human nature? The novel sparked a
mixture o f fascination and revulsion among Williams’s intellectual contemporaries.
Skinner’s audienee, as described in the previous chapter, was captivated by the
promise of social harmony but also anxious about scientifically engineered social
reform.^^ One o f the most damning and widely read responses to Walden Two came from
See Donald C. W illiams’ discussion o f Walden Two and Skinner’s social philosophy in his extended 
article for the Philosophical Review entitled, “The Social Scientist As Philosopher and King,’’ 58 (1949): 
345-59.
Ibid., 345.
Most o f the more studied commentaries and reviews by American liberal and humanist intellectuals were 
highly dubious o f behavioral engineering and warned o f its totalitarian and even fascist characteristics. For 
a mainstream popular review, see the scathing opinions in the Life magazine article, “The Newest Utopia Is 
A Slander on Some Old Notions o f the Good Life,” 24 (June 28, 1948): 24, 38. Reviews in intellectually 
oriented journals expressed similar sentiment. See John K. Jessup, “Utopian Bulletin,” Fortune 44 (1948): 
191-195; G. Negley and J. M. Patrick, The Quest fo r  Utopia: An Anthology o f  Imaginary Societies (New 
York: Henry Schuman, 1952); Joseph W. Krutch, The Measure o f  Man (New York: The Bobbs-Merril Co. 
Inc., 1953); Andrew Hacker, “Dostoevsky’s Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory,” Journal o f  
Politics 17 (1955): 590-608.
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a reviewer for Life magazine who branded Skinner’s protagonist a tyrant and an advocate
o f the kind of dystopian nightmare satirized in Aidons Huxley’s Brave New World
(1932), with its images of screaming babies, electrocuted and terrorized, conditioned to
effect desired behavior/^
[T]he menace of the mechanical baby tender is as nothing compared to the 
menace o f books like Walden Two. For Dr. Skinner’s utopia is a triumph 
o f “cultural engineering” and “behavioral engineering” where the 
conditioned reflex is king.. .Once they are trained, the inhabitants of 
Walden Two have “freedom.” But it is the freedom of those Pavlovian 
dogs which are free to foam at the mouth whenever the “dinner” bell 
invites them to a nonforthcoming meal. The very possibility of random 
personal choice has been eliminated from Dr. Skinner’s world by a 
hierarchy which alone has the right to experiment.^'
The image o f the self as presented by Frazier struck many scientists and intellectuals as a
gross oversimplification o f human nature.^^ Most disturbing of all was the fact that this
utopia had been offered up by a prominent Harvard psychologist as a reasonable prospect
and possible alternative to modem industrialized society. As one contemporary survey of
utopian literature observed in 1952,
[WJhile it was to be expected that sooner or later the principle of 
psychological conditioning would be made the basis o f a serious 
construction of utopia .. .not even the effective satire o f Huxley is 
adequate preparation for the shocking horror o f the idea when positively 
presented. O f all the dictatorships espoused by utopists, this is the most 
profound, and incipient dictators might well find in this utopia a 
guidebook of political practice.^^
Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1932).
Part o f Huxley’s intent in this dystopian tale o f the future, grounded in the prineiples o f behavioral 
control in human society, was to illustrate the arrogance o f social scientists in presuming to prescribe social 
ethics and values on the basis o f professional expertise and scientific philosophy/methodology. The result 
o f such arrogance, as his readers later saw at the end o f the 1930s, was totalitarian oppression.
“Newest Utopia,” Life, 38.
This was the general sentiment o f the review in Life magazine. Also see the comments o f Donald C. 
Williams in note 24 above.
Negley, Quest, 589.
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Many critics were also disturbed by what seemed to be Skinner’s almost
obsessive fascination with control. How was this any different from the dehumanizing
techniques of psychological conditioning that Aldous Huxley had warned against?
Skinner was often at pains to make clear the erucial distinetions between the classical
conditioning techniques in Pavlovian and Watsonian behaviorism, viciously satirized by
Huxley, and what was in Skinner’s view a fundamentally different, non-aversive
approach to shaping behavior/'^
[T]he difference between Brave New World and Walden Two, aside from 
the fact that the former is a satire, was the difference between a concern 
for feelings and a concern for action. Huxley was fascinated by 
feelings.. ..Perhaps the current lack of interest [in exploring a Walden 
Two] is explained by the fact that people who are devoted to feelings 
avoid hearing feelings ridiculed.^^
Operant conditioning, Skinner stressed, emphasized positive reinforcement. Speaking in
the voiee of Frazier years later at Columbia University about renewed interest in Walden
Two in the 1960s, Skinner made further distinctions,
Frazier — “In Brave New World, published in the early 30s, you find a 
commitment to a few selected techniques of behavioral eontrol. ... The 
behavioral techniques are reducible mainly to the Pavlovian eonditioning 
of attitudes and to the allaying of all needs and desires through massive 
gratification.. .Fordian productivity was to make most of it possible and 
the rest could be achieved by a reversal of sexual conventions which 
Huxley borrowed from the Marquis de Sade. ... [yet] [h]e is still talking 
about the engineering of attitudes (with subliminal perceptions added as a
Robert Epstein, ed., Notebooks, B. F. Skinner (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Ine., 1980), 64. See also B. F. 
Skinner, “Walden Two Revisited.” MSS and Near Print Items, Lecture Notes and Manuseripts. 4 January 
1960. HUGFP 60.50. Box 1. Folder 1. B. F. Skinner papers. Harvard University Archives. Cambridge, 
MA. Items in these folders hereafter referred to as HUGFP 60.50. From a leeture given at Teacher’s 
College, Columbia University in 1960.
Epstein, Notebooks, 64.
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new threat) and other techniques o f inculcating acceptance on the part of 
the ruthlessly govemed.”^^
The backlash that attended Walden Two's publication in the late 1940s, as I have 
argued, had little to do with the theoretical and technical nuances of behavioral 
psychology. Rather, the problem lay with what appeared to be Skinner’s wholesale 
indictment o f traditional American cultural virtues. Particularly insidious was his method 
o f engineering consent through an ostensibly participatory system of community 
government in the Walden Two community. Skinner might have removed the need for 
punishment and coercion in the conditioning of behavior, but his plan still required the 
sacrifice of personal autonomy.
The novel struck at the very core of what the political scientist Andrew Hacker 
characterized in a 1955 essay for the Journal o f  Politics as a new period of anxiety about 
the erosion of the religious, philosophical, and political underpinnings o f human 
autonomy. “In these days of ‘interdisciplinary’ study,” Hacker observed, “it is often 
difficult to remember that liberal theory is a political theory.” Indeed, the social sciences 
— psychology, sociology, and anthropology — had made plain the realization that 
fundamentally, “the individual’s behavior may be governed by the fact he is reared in a 
culture which is based on the kula ritual; or because he lives in matrilineal consangual 
groups; or by reason of his l i b id o .S o c ia l  science, it seemed, had laid bare the fallacy 
o f the autonomous individual with overwhelming evidence. Skinner’s utopia, Hacker 
observed, confirmed a new soeial reality. In a world o f  myriad system s, “the individual
“  Skinner, “WT Revisited,” 2.
Hacker, “Dostoyevski’s Disciples,” 593.
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is forever being buffeted about by external pressures -  pressures which originate
elsewhere than from within himself.”
Skinner had simply written about what the liberal cognoscenti, those like Joseph
Wood Krutch, David Riesman, and Erich Fromm, had feared might be true — that this
“selection mechanism,” the inviolate human capacity to make educated choices among
myriad influences and pressures, was in the end an illusion.^^ Modem social science,
Hacker thought, had precipitated a new political reality, one where society was divided
between managers and the profligate masses in need of conditioning. If  autonomy lay
anywhere, it was with the political and scientific elite, those who controlled the society
and the place of the individual in it.
Conceptions such as “consent,” “obedience,” “obligation,” “leadership,”
“public opinion,” “representative government,” “majority rule,” and even 
“freedom” must take on new meanings. The traditional definitions which 
spring from liberal theory may perhaps still hold true for those who plan 
the conditioning of others. But they are grossly malapropos for those 
whose minds are on the receiving end. And this latter group contains the 
vast majority of us.^^
This message from Skinner about the death of autonomous man was not new. 
Dostoyevsky’s “Grand Inquisitor” character in The Brothers Karamazov (1912) and 
Huxley’s “World Controllers” in Brave New World (1932) had said the same thing about 
the fate of the individual in the modem age. What emerged from reading Skinner’s 
utopian novel, however, was a recognition that at least a portion of social authority and 
control in designing cultures, was now in the hands of scientific experts. For Huxley, this
Ibid., 591-92.
”  Ibid., 613.
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had been a vision o f things to come. In the 1950s Skinner heralded the arrival of this
political reality. As Hacker observed,
A discussion in terms of a realistic political theory should grant that there 
are important differences between a consciously manipulative 
conditioning process and one that is left to the whims of cultural 
development and impersonal forces."*^[...] Dostoyevski, Huxley, and 
Skinner have presented us with fictional fantasies. It ought well to be 
asked how they can help us in understanding our own world. ... [W]hat 
must concern political scientists is the efforts at conditioning which exist 
in our own society."^'
Hacker suggested that Americans study the techniques employed by the Soviet 
Union, the Nazis, communist China, and Korean prison camps to remind themselves of 
the dangers of abusive conditioning. The decay of social, religious, and political 
institutions often had been associated with a scientific deconstruction and secularization 
of culture.'*^ Secular humanism, social experimentation, and oppressive bureaucracy 
were closely associated with totalitarian communist, socialist, and fascist experiments. A 
closer look at our own systems of conditioning at the national and local level was thus in 
order. What could we learn from a so-called “company town” where local politics and 
public opinion were geared toward corporate interests?'^^ As 1 have shown previously, 
Skinner had done such analyses in his behavioral interpretations o f political, social, and 
religious institutions. His conclusions about the shortcomings o f democracy, and the
Ibid., 608.
Ibid., 609.
One o f  the best explorations o f these themes is contained in the Science o f  Culture series published under 
the supervision o f the sociologist, Ruth N. Anshen, in the late 1940s. For a discussion o f scientific 
secularization in modem America see volume four, Our Emergent Civilization (New York; Harper and 
Brothers, 1947).
Hacker, “Dostoyevski’s Disciples,” 610.
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need for scientific management, were reflections o f larger trends in American 
bureaucracy and technocracy.
Skinner, of course, had always understood the difference between the conditioned 
matrices bom of “cultural development” and the concerted effort to scientifically 
engineer efficient cultural spaces. His aims in the second half o f his career were in line 
with what Hacker and many others seemed to be asking for. He tried to make good on 
his promise to provide guidance.
Walden Two appeared at a time when, as the American cultural historian Warren 
Susman has explained, world events fueled a growing sense of bewilderment and anxiety 
among Americans about the fate of modem civilization, as well as a palpable cynicism 
with regard to human nature."^ "^  The magnitude of human violence perpetuated by 
military and industrial technology, the social excesses that had brought about a global 
economic depression, the political extremism that had produced fascism, and the horrors 
o f world war and nuclear devastation had all contributed to a new set o f fears, especially 
among young Americans, about the fate o f humanity in the modem age. Gallup polls in 
the 1950s reflected these sentiments. In 1948, 56% of Americans ranked the Cold War, 
Russian insurgency, and the threat of another war as the top policy issues. A 1955 poll 
indicated that 64% of Americans believed that a major war with Russia was likely. 
Another in 1958 noted that 54% of Americans felt that direct govemment action would
Susman argues for a distinct postwar culture in his article, “Did Success Spoil the United States?: Dual 
Representations in Postwar America,” in the seminal collection o f essays on postwar American culture. 
Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age o f  Cold War, ed. Lary May (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 19-37.
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be needed to stabilize the economy. And a 1960 poll showed that 50% of Americans 
believed that war with Russia was inevitable.'^^
Skinner was encouraged by the intellectual furor that his novel had created in 
light of what clearly were heightened public fears about the potential for another world 
conflict and about the fate of humanity. In his 1960 address to the Fund for the Republic, 
Skinner recalled that his ruminations about the book, and its acute relevance to current 
social dilemmas, in the first two years after it was published had converted him into “a 
thoroughgoing Frazierian.”"*^ He also found the marginal but growing public interest in 
experimental communities inspiring. Skinner was confident that, given such cultural 
anxieties, the seeds of discontent within a mass technocratic society would persist and 
eventually come to a head. He need only wait for the revolution. As he was fond of 
saying years later, a new vision o f the self and the desire for a science of culture, both of 
which were embodied in Walden Two, was a science ‘fantasy’ that, bit by bit, slowly 
made its way into reality."^^
With the encouragement of friends and the occasional letter from excited readers, 
Skinner continued to draw up plans for the construction of experimental communities in 
the 1950s and 60s. He collected ideas for another utopian novel about the practical 
aspects o f maintaining such a community."^* Although it never materialized, Skinner
Statistics taken from the colleeted abstracts in George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1955- 
1971, vol. 1-3 (New York: Random House, 1972). From polls taken on April 19, 1948, February 12, 1955, 
April 20, 1958, and June 19, 1960.
46 B. F. Skinner, “Walden Two Revisited.” A Lecture for the Fund for the Republic, 1 April 1960, HUGFP
60.50, Folder B7c. 
Epstein, Notebooks, 94. 
Ibid., 77-78.
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continued to engage in personal experiments with behaviorally designed living. While on 
sabbatical leave in 1955 Skinner worked on daily personal schedules of reinforcement 
that helped him make more efficient use o f his work and leisure time, aspects of 
communal life that he discussed in Walden Two.
Skinner doggedly promoted his vision of programmable humanity, and his 
behavioral technologies, in mainstream culture through his articles and public lectures, 
thereby advancing his social vision. In 1953 he fulfilled his agreement with the 
Macmillan publishing company to produce a textbook in psychology. Science and 
Human Behavior, which was in many ways an extension o f his utopian musings in 
Walden Two. Science and Human Behavior became one o f Skinner’s best selling books, 
receiving enthusiastic reviews and breaking sales records in the textbook division at 
Macmillan. One of the most important aspects of his comprehensive plan for social 
reform covered in the book was the reform of education. In 1959 alone Skinner recalled 
giving over fifty public lectures on programmed instruction.'*^ Technologies o f teaching 
became central to the practical implementation o f Skinner’s social vision.
The Behavioral Revolution in American Education
Skinner’s rise to full prominence as a public intellectual and scientific expert 
came with his endorsement o f education reform in the early 1960s. The spread of 
programmed learning concepts and technologies, more than either the baby tender or the 
Pigeon Project, was a clear testament to the social potential of behavioral science. In no
Skinner, Consequences, 206.
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other area of Skinner’s work was the symbol of programmable humanity more explieit 
than in his teaching technology of the late 1950s and early 60s.
For Skinner, teaching was a matter of programming the human machine to 
maximize its learning potential. In many ways teaching technology and programmed 
instruction were the culmination of his research on how organisms — rats, pigeons, and 
people — were fundamentally shaped by their environment. As recounted in a 1960 
Fortune magazine article entitled “Can Pigeons Be Taught like People?,” “a basic tenet 
o f behaviorism [namely] that behavior patterns, such as learning, are essentially the same 
for all intelligent species. So,” as was said of Skinner’s early work at Harvard, “Skinner 
adapted his pigeon-training techniques to his own students.. .Skinner’s boys and girls 
proved easier to condition than pigeons. Evidently most human beings set great store on 
being right and are willing to work for a pat on the back.” °^
Skinner’s research had convinced him that human nature, like that of all animals, 
had been fundamentally shaped by environmental contingencies in the evolutionary 
process. Each activity of the organism emerged as a consequence o f the topography of 
environmental reinforcement. This perspective, Skinner argued, also applied to the 
behavior (including thinking, acting, and communicating) of learning. For Skinner it was 
pointless to attempt unscientific education programs that typically were based on the 
analysis of current institutional practices. The study of human behavior in the classroom, 
he argued, would provide more than enough information about the learning potential of 
students and how best to optimize it.^'
George A. W. Boehm, “Can People Be Taught Like Pigeons?,” Fortune 62 (October, 1960): 176-179, 
265-266. Seepage 178.
Skinner, “Why We Need Teaching Machines,” 37.
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The fact remains that more than half a century o f the self-conscious 
examination o f instructional processes had worked only moderate changes 
in educational practices. The laboratory study of learning provided the 
confidence, if  not all the knowledge, needed for a successful instrumental 
attack on the status quo. Traditional views may not have been actually 
wrong, but they were vague and were not entertained with sufficient 
commitment to work substantial technological changes.
Indeed, Skinner’s theories of behavior found exceptionally fertile ground in the
late fifties and early sixties when national anxieties about education efficiency were
heightened by the launch of Sputnik in 1957. This challenge to American technological
and military prowess at the height o f the Cold War galvanized ongoing debates over how
to re-forge American educational institutions that failed to meet the high demand for
engineers and scientists. Scrutinizing American education became a call to arms for
politicians clamoring to have education involved in national preparedness against foreign
aggression. Demands for higher standards and an expanded curriculum (with special
emphasis on mathematics and science) resulted in the granting o f federal aid for several
legislative initiatives that were designed to improve schools and hire more te a c h e r s .I n
the drive to increase the productivity o f American education and solve the dual problems
of “brain drain” and teacher shortages, many American educators began to consider the
Ibid.
In terms o f  its implications for American technological and scientific readiness, the launching o f Sputnik 
has been likened to the bombing o f Pearl Harbor. For many, Sputnik illustrated the weaknesses o f an 
educational system in the United States that had failed to produce the brainpower necessary to beat the 
Soviets in the space race. Confidence about American education had was linked to the Cold War, and the 
reform o f education became a central priority. In response to this emergency, govemment aid for 
educational programs on a national scale was quickly initiated. For a discussion o f the connections 
between postwar debates on education and the subsequent reform initiatives o f the late 1950s and early 60s 
see Barbara B. Clowse, Brainpower fo r  the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense Education 
Act o f 1958 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981). For a definitive contemporary appraisal o f the public 
debates among journalists, academicians, and education experts over the shortcomings o f  education in the 
1950s, consult the collected essays in The Great Debate: Our Schools in Crisis, ed. C. Winfield Seott, 
Clyde M. Hill, and Hobert W. Bumes (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959).
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new technologies o f programmed learning and teaching machines as possible panaceas 
for this ‘education crisis.
As historian of science Scott Montgomery has observed, the Sputnik launch 
accelerated an ongoing shift toward a team research model for secondary science 
education during the 1 9 5 0 s .C o ld  War concerns among academics and legislators over 
what appeared to be the more efficient production system of Russian science education 
and technology fueled calls for more research on American education by the National 
Science Foundation starting in 1950, projects that later were funded through the National 
Education Defense Act of 1958. Scientific expertise and a group-research model for 
learning were embraced as a way to help speed up secondary education, particularly in 
math and science, the keys to American technological p ro w e ss .D o ro th y  Nelkin noted 
that this science-centered curriculum model eventually succumbed to a decrease in the 
demand for scientists in the late 1960s and a return to formal methods. Popular concerns 
about the damaging effects of research science on humanity and the environment during 
this period were on the rise.^^ During its heyday in the early 1960s, however, the 
research production model was widely embraced by educational officials like J. B. 
Conant, with whom Skinner had conferred on education reform.^* Skinner’s teaching
Boehm, “Can People Be Taught Like Pigeons?,” 176-79, especially page 37; Gay G. Luce, “Can 
Machines Replace Teachers?,” The Saturday Evening Post 233 (September 24, 1960), 33-37. For a 
discussion o f the ‘education crisis’ see Scott, Hill, and Bumes (eds.) above.
Scott L. Montgomery, Minds fo r  the Making: The Role o f  Science in American Education, 1950-1990 
(New York: The Guilford Press, 1994), 199, 208.
“  Ibid., 208,212.
Montgomery cites Dorothy Nelkin’s study. Science Textbook Controversy and the Politics o f  Equal Time 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), 214.
For more on Conant, see page 156, note 3 in the present ehapter.
178
technology had been designed to meet the high demand for accelerated learning during
this time, especially in math education.
Skinner took full advantage of the situation in the early 1960s to promote his
behavioral technology. In his public talks and interviews during this period he took
advantage of Cold War fears, linking his achievements in the field o f education directly
to the preservation o f American national integrity. In an article for the Teachers College
Record in 1963 he declared.
Competition between the various cultures of the world, warlike or 
friendly, is now an accepted fact, and the role played by education in 
strengthening and perpetuating a given way of life is clear. No field is in 
greater need of our most powerful intellectual resources. An effective 
educational technology based upon an experimental analysis will bring it 
support commensurate with its importance in the world today.^^
The rapid proliferation of teaching devices and experimental programs, both academic
and corporate, during the early sixties supported Skinner’s intuition about the growing
demand for new and expedient strategies of educational reform. The craze over teaching
machines sparked widespread fervor in educational and public circles about the potential
of such technologies to revolutionize the classroom. Although Skinnerian teaching
machines themselves eventually fell out o f vogue (due often to their expense), the
programmed instruction (in textbook format and later with computer-based interactive
programs) movement went on to exert considerable influence on education theory and
instructional design in the remaining decades of the twentieth century.^®
B. F. Skinner, “Reflections On a Decade o f Teaching Machines,” Teachers College Record 65, no. 2 
(1963): 183-92. Reprint obtained from the Harvard University Archives, HUGFP 60.50, Box 1, Folder 2.
“  Programmed instruction continues to influence education design up to the present day. It is taught in 
many graduate education programs and is implemented for a variety o f uses in the public and private sector 
in training programs. For background on this history consult Classic Writings in Instructional Technology, 
ed. Donald P. Ely and Tjeerd Plomp (Englewood, CO.: Libraries Unlimited, 1996). I should also mention 
here my disagreement with Alexandra Rutherford on the causes o f the failure o f Skinnerian teaching
179
According to Skinner, the education psychologist, Sydney L. Pressey, had been 
the first scientist to develop a teaching machine in the 1920s for classroom use. Pressey 
eonstrueted a machine that was primarily intended to help the student practice and learn 
rudimentary information and ease the burden of teachers who normally supervised such 
exercises.^’ The real innovation of the machine, however, was that it engaged the student 
in active learning using positive reinforcement, a technique familiar from Skinnerian 
behaviorism. Pressey’s machine not only tallied correct scores on tests but also prompted
machines to catch on. Although Rutherford rules out cost, it is cited as a contributing factor in numerous 
studies o f the use o f educational technology in the classroom during this period. See the references on the 
following pages. While I agree that the imagery o f teaching machines in the popular press certainly 
contributed to concerns about its dehumanizing effects, it is also clear that, if  not for the projected high cost 
o f large-scale implementation in public schools, teaching machines would have witnessed much greater 
use. Again, evidence from contemporary educational studies clearly suggests that many school 
administrators, the professional managers of education, were very enthused about the potential o f teaching 
machines to accelerate production in institutionalized education at the primary and secondary level. 
Bureaucratic inertia and cost concerns, however, prevented further implementation. Conversely, I would 
also argue that the rejection o f Skinnerian teaching technology was only indirectly related to anti- 
teehnoeratic political rhetoric. Theodore Roszak and other humanist critics o f such technologies, writing 
with their own agendas in the popular press, represented a different constituency than that o f educational 
administrators and policy makers. It also helps to explain their accusations as to the “social alienation,” 
“conformity in thinking,” the compromise o f “creativity [and] imagination” and a general restriction of 
“freedom” in teaching technology that Rutherford mentions. These connotations did indeed exist, but there 
is also evidence in the popular press for public support o f teaching technology, as it meshed well with what 
Rutherford and I agree is an American love o f efficient technology, a phenomenon that persisted in the 
1960s despite the political exhortations o f the left. Too often, critics and historians alike have allowed the 
radical politics o f reform and protest to dominate our historical understanding o f the 1960s and its varied 
publics. It also seems to me that Rutherford’s explanation for the “national concerns” that drove the 
marketing o f Skinner’s teaching machines are in need of further clarification. As I explain above, the 
initial impetus came from political debates over what in the late 1950s was thought to be a national 
education crisis. Demands for increased production efficiency in American education in order to compete 
with the Russians intensified. See Rutherford’s comments on teaching technology in Rutherford, “B. F. 
Skinner’s Technology of Behavior in American Life: From Consumer Culture to Counterculture,” Journal 
o f  History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 39, no. 1 (Winter, 2003): 1-23. See pages 7-12.
For a fuller description o f the design and aim o f these machines see Sydney L. Pressey, “A Simple 
Apparatus Which Gives Tests and Scores -  And Teaches,” School and Society 23 (1926): 373-76, and “A 
Machine for Automatic Teaching o f Drill Material,” School and Society 25 (1927): 549-52. For a historical 
account o f Pressey in relation to Skinner’s work, as well as an account of his machine experiments at 
Harvard between 1956 and 1958 see E. A. Vargas and Julie A. Vargas, “B. F. Skinner and the Origins of 
Programmed Instruction,” in Smith and Woodward, B. F. Skinner and Behaviorism in American Culture, 
237-53.
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the user for the correct answer to questions before advancing to the next step.^^ Self­
pacing allowed the student to proceed according to individual ability.^^
Pressey’s design was inspired by the behavioral theories o f another education 
psychologist and central pioneer of programmed learning, Edward L. Thorndike. Pressey 
employed Thorndike’s laws of learning to increase the efficiency o f machine-aided 
instruction. These laws of effect, recency, and exercise correlated the consequences of 
responses with the frequency and repetition of questions asked by the m a ch in e .P ressey  
had been the first to realize the potential of such behavioral methods for actual 
technologies o f education. In the early 1960s Skinner reaffirmed Pressey’s original 
complaint that such innovation seemed lost on the community o f education psychologists 
who were preoccupied with quantifying memory and intelligence.^^ As he recalled, other 
psychologists such as E. L. Thorndike had overlooked the possibilities for teaching 
machines.
Thorndike never realized the potentialities of his early work on learning 
because he turned to the measurement o f mental abilities and to matched- 
group comparisons of teaching practices. He pioneered in a kind of
B. F. Skinner, The Technology o f  Teaching (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 31.
Like Skinner, Pressey had high hopes for a science and technology of education, speculating that it 
would precipitate a new revolution in teaching efficiency. See Sidney L. Pressey, “A Third and Fourth 
Contribution Toward the Coming ‘Industrial Revolution’ In Education,” School and Society 36 (1932): 
668-72. Skinner would later speak in very similar terms about a revolution that seemed to him to be 
underway in the 1960s.
For an outline o f Thorndike’s laws of learning and philosophy of education consult his seminal work on 
the subject. Education: A First Book (New York: Macmillan, 1912).
^  Reflecting on these events Skinner expressed disappointment that the revolution had not transpired with 
Pressey and Thorndike in the 1920s. Thorndike had been the first to suggest the possibility o f such 
machines in his book o f 1912 on education, and yet, according to Skinner, he had failed to pursue their 
potential by turning his attention from programmed instruction to intelligence testing later in his career. 
There are several possible explanations for why such technologies failed to catch on, the Depression being 
one. The power o f such technology must be wed to public demand, he contended, and the conditions were 
only now becoming ripe for a revolution. See Skinner, “Reflections On A Decade o f Teaching Machines,” 
190.
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research whieh, with the encouragement offered by promising new 
statistical techniques, was to dominate educational psychology for 
decades. It led to serious negleet o f the process of instruction.^^
The need for aceelerated education in the early 1960s, however, provided an ideal
opportunity to join Skinnerian concepts of learning with modem industry and mass
production. In arguing the need for mechanization in the classroom, Skinner again linked
the efficiency and practicality o f teaching machines to other devices in the ‘culture of
convenience’ that had revolutionized the domestic sphere in the 1950s. How eould a
nation that had invested so much of its identity in the efficiency of machines, from
automobiles to kitchen appliances, Skinner asked, not give similar consideration to
devices that optimized the learning environment?^^
By Skinner’s own aeeount, nothing of significanee had surfaced in learning theory
since the turn of the century and the introduction of the principles o f progressive
education by John Dewey.^*
Progressive edueation tried to replace the bireh rod, and at the same time 
avoid the artificiality o f grades and prizes, by bringing the reinforeers of 
everyday life into the school. ... But a school is only a small part o f the 
student’s world, and no matter how real it may seem, it eannot provide
66 Skinner, “Reflections on a Decade o f Teaching Machines.’"
B. F. Skinner, “The Science o f Learning and the Art o f Teaching,” Harvard Educational Review 24 
(1954): 86-97.
^  Dewey’s philosophy o f edueation exerted considerable influence over education reforms in the 1930s, 
40s, and especially the 50s. Urbanization and immigration were two o f the primary factors in the initial 
shift o f American education away from a traditional emphasis on intellectualism and standard subjects and 
toward social amelioration and adjustment. Progressive educators faced the task o f creating curricula that 
would accommodate new cultural and socio-economic perspectives and help indoctrinate American rural 
and international immigrants into the major urban centers o f the country. Dewey advocated a departure 
from pedagogic standardization that treated the student as a passive receptacle o f information. Instead her 
argued for a student-centered environment, one that emphasized active learning. Central to Dewey’s 
approach was the link between the student’s experience in and outside of the classroom. Dewey believed 
that educational technique should be based on the learning experiences of children both as individuals and 
as members o f a community who must adjust to a constantly changing environment. For a full delineation 
o f  Dewey’s proposals see The School and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899) and 
Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books, 1938).
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natural reinforcing consequences for all the kinds o f behavior which 
education is to set up. The goals of progressive education were shifted to 
conform to this limitation, and many worthwhile assignments were simply 
abandoned.^^
While calls for reform in the 1950s had addressed the general need for better 
schools, more teachers, and better learning materials, Skinner pointed to a paucity of 
genuinely scientific studies on the process o f learning itself.^® Reams o f statistical studies 
in education psychology had addressed the information retention and memory curves of 
subjects, but very little had been accomplished in examining the psychology o f learning 
and the methodology of teaching. The craft of teaching, as Skinner often observed, was 
not so much taught as it was thrust upon initiates, especially at the secondary and college 
levels. Bad practices were perpetuated with each generation o f teachers.^' In an 
unpublished address to the New England Board of Higher Edueation, Skinner stressed the 
importance o f examining education methods experimentally in order to evaluate their 
effectiveness.
[I]t is argued that we need bigger and better schools, financial 
inducements to attract better teachers, changed emphases on subject 
matter, and so on. The methods of education are seldom examined. Yet 
no enterprise can really hope to improve itself without a close look at its 
own technology. ...[a] new and effective scientific analysis o f behavior has 
much to offer here.
The first task in reorienting educational techniques, Skinner argued, was to do 
away with concepts and language traditionally used to explain the learning process. 
Skinner thus began his critiques of educational methodology in the early 1950s by
® Skinner, “Why We Need Teaching Machines,” 37.
™ Skinner, “Reflections on a Decade of Teaching Machines,” 185. 
Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching, 93-95.
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addressing these terms and the processes involved in explaining the elusive concepts of 
cognition, association, and m e m o r y A s  with many branches of psychology, learning 
theory seemed to suffer from the same experimental inaccessibility to human nature. 
Whether one spoke o f the active ‘acquisition,’ or the passive ‘reception,’ o f information, 
such terms said little about the actual processes involved in the construction of 
knowledge. In the methodology of Skinnerian behaviorism, there was no need for 
concepts of knowledge or inner mental states. They were merely linguistic inventions that 
failed to create any useful experimental toehold on the control and quantification of 
leaming.^^
Skinnerian learning theory dealt directly with the behavioral variables (verbal, 
physical, or auditory) that were linked to the acquisition and use o f information. By 
doing away with the concept of the inner mind and situating learning behavior in the 
environment of the organism, Skinner was able to recast learning theory in terms of 
relationships between organism and world.^'^ This recasting opened the problem of 
learning up to direct manipulation. Because the basic laws of operant behavior applied 
universally, regardless of environment or species, Skinner simply translated the 
conventional language and theory of education into the principles of operant behavior in 
the experimental environment of the classroom, where, he argued, reinforcement 
architecture was in bad need of r e p a i r . ‘Teaching’ was the task of mapping the
B. F. Skinner, “Are Learning Theories Necessary?,” Psychological Review 57 (1950); 193-216. 
Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching, 1-2.
Ibid., 3, 32-33.
Ibid., 13-15.
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contingencies of reinforcement already present in the classroom, streamlining them in 
order to elicit behaviors consistent with knowledge acquisition/^
In striking similarity to F. W. Taylor’s approach to the production of 
manufactured goods, Skinner believed that efficiency in learning could be increased by 
breaking down information in any subject into small and simple parts. Skinner called 
these informational components ‘frames.’ Desired behaviors o f learning were produced 
by the slow, gradual construction of links between informational fragments in arithmetic 
or English grammar, for example. In presenting the components of a mathematical 
equation or a sentence and having students select answers from a set of choices, or filling 
in blank spaces on a paper recorder, teaching machines used didactic questioning to elicit 
correct responses from the student. Information frames were kept simple enough so that 
students almost always met with correct answers to questions, receiving in turn a steady 
diet of positive reinforcement. These techniques were first implemented for primary and 
secondary education, but they were later used at the collegiate level, especially for 
language proficiency training. The high level o f experimental success with these 
methods made it clear to Skinner that programmed learning revealed much more about 
the actual processes o f knowledge acquisition than any abstract learning theory.^’
Such a learning philosophy was also in line with those prominent contemporary 
educational theorists such as Jerome Bruner, a colleague of Skinner’s at Harvard, who 
lobbied for production models of science education. In his classic tome The Process o f  
Education (I960), Bruner had stressed the need for an educational revolution in math and
Ibid., 160-70. See also Skinner, “The Science o f Learning and the Art o f Teaching,” 86-97. 
Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching, 47-50.
185
science to combat what he characterized as the national security crisis o f domestic brain 
drain and foreign communist insurrection/^ Bruner advocated a new learning theory that 
looked to mathematics and computer architecture for models o f cognition/^ This type of 
learning theory was similar to the kind of program metaphors in Skinnerian learning 
theory. And just as Skinner believed that behavioral learning theory was universal in all 
organisms, Bruner had concluded that the math/machine model also universalized 
learning theory for all subjects. Like Skinner, he believed that the differences in 
architecture between different subjects were o f “degree not kind.” °^ Bruner, like Skinner, 
advocated the use of teaching technology that employed a “sequential program” similar 
to Skinner’s linear progressions of informational frames in teaching machines. Bruner 
also placed a high priority on all forms of programmed instruction that utilized these 
math/machine models of learning in order to speed up the learning process and chum out 
science graduates as fast as possible.^' The demand for technological resources was also 
reflected in the National Science Foundation sponsorship of curricular reforms in the 
1950s and 60s. These initiatives stressed the introduction of technology and multimedia 
in the science classroom.
Jerome S. Bruner, The Process o f  Education (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1961, c l 960), 2-10. 
™ Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching, 12-14.
Ibid., 14.
Bruner, The Process o f  Education, 81-82. Daniel Bjork notes, however, that Bruner came out against 
teaching machines in public schools, since he felt that many o f the machine designs in the early 1960s 
seemed crude and unsophisticated. See Bjork, Skinner, 188, especially note 85, for an account o f  one of 
their exchanges on this subject.
For an example see the National Science Foundation report. Course Curriculum Improvement Projects -  
Mathematics, Science, Engineering (Washington D. C.: U. S. Govemment Printing Office, 1966).
186
As much as it was inspired by industrial models o f efficieney, Skinnerian learning 
theory also embraced the philosophy of progressive education.*^ John Dewey’s aim had 
been to replace standardization with praetieal, real-world learning programs that made 
edueation more relevant to the cultural experiences o f students.*"^ Viewed in terms of 
behavioral contingencies, modem educational methods eontinued to plaee heavy 
dependence on what Skinner deseribed as ‘aversive controls.’ Desired learning behavior 
was often aceomplished by the threat of disapproval or punishment. The format of 
lessons and tests themselves reflected a traditional dependence on trial and error learning, 
competition, and negative consequences for poor performanee.
Sueh teehniques forced rather than encouraged desired behaviors from students.
It was these conditions, Skinner elaimed, that led to the usual behavioral “by-products” of
Progressive education is actually comprised o f several schools o f thought, the main lines o f which 
emerged in the 1920s and 30s. Arthur Zilversmit has outlined the themes around which most o f these 
competing schools revolved in his book, Changing Schools: Progressive Education Theory and Practice, 
1930-1960 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1993). Some progressives emphasized the need to 
provide both cultural indoctrination and vocational training, while others looked to the models of 
efficiency, bureaucratic centralization, and organizational eontrol in business to solve the inefficiencies of 
public school systems. The first o f these groups identified with Dewey while the other embraced the 
testing and standardization strategies o f Thorndike. For more on the respective histories o f these lines of 
development in American education consult the chapters on education in William Graebner's The 
Engineering o f  Consent: Democracy and Authority in Twentieth-Century America (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987) and Douglas J. Simpson and Michael J. B. Jackson, Educational Reform: A 
Deweyan Perspective (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997). The relationship between business 
models o f administration and the drive to increase efficiency in education has also been skillfully explored 
in Raymond E. Callahan’s Education and the Cult o f  Efficiency (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1962). For a more comprehensive overview o f the history o f education theory in America see the recent 
study by Dickson A. Mungazi, The Evolution o f  Educational Theory in the United States (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1999).
In discussing the possibilities for teaching technology, Skinner recognized the merits o f both 
Deweyan developmentalism and the experimentalism o f Thorndike. Skinner saw that Thorndike had been 
right to embrace the mechanical view of the learning process and concentrate on manipulating the 
environmental conditions in which learning took place, but he was also sensitive to Dewey’s concern for 
addressing the experiences o f the individual and incorporating this into the classroom setting. Skinner 
viewed his technology as a marriage o f the two perspectives.
^  B. F. Skinner, “Why We Need Teaching Machines,” Harvard Educational Review  31 (1961): 35-55. See 
page 37. Reprint obtained from the Harvard University Archives, HUGFP 60.50, Box 1, Folder 2.
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the classroom environment: truancy, counter-aggression, and worst o f all, apathy.*^ The 
advantage of operant behavioral techniques was that they provided a steady diet of 
positive reinforcement that kept students interested in learning. Programmed learning 
was immediate and tangible; it encouraged students through rewarding gradual progress 
rather than placing the rewards of education (grades, diploma, careers) at a distance. This 
made the process of learning much more efficient.*^ In a 1964 talk at Wayne State 
University entitled, “By the Year 2000,” Skinner made assurances that, “[a]s the 
experimental analysis [of teaching] progresses [in the] next 25 or 30 years we will, I am 
sure, greatly increase the efficiency of education. With the same time and effort, our 
young people will be able to learn a great deal more than they do now.”*^
The advent of the teaching machine and programmed learning in the early sixties, 
it seemed to Skinner, marked a clear departure from traditional education theories. 
Teaching machines brought the progressive education concept of Teaming by doing’ to 
the forefront. Students played an active role in building behavioral repertoires through 
self-pacing and frequent reinforcement.** Teaching machines built upon the study 
techniques that students normally used to learn assigned materials, and they made the 
process o f active learning more efficient.*^
B. F. Skinner, “The Theory Behind Teaching Machines.” From an address to the ASTD 17* Annual 
Conference. 2 May 1961, HUGFP 60.50, Box 1, Folder 2.
Skinner, “Why We Need Teaching Machines,” 36.
B. F. Skinner, “By the Year 2000.” From a talk at Wayne State University. 1964, HUG 60.50, Box 1, 
Folder 1.
*** Skinner, “Why We Need Teaching Machines,” 45-46.
Ibid., 47.
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This strategy and philosophy of programmed teaehing was not lost on 
entrepreneurs and administrators who recognized that the production efficiency of 
institutionalized education could be increased through what I will term the 
‘Taylorization’ of classrooms and textbooks. The process of breaking down information 
into manageable parts and then reconstructing it in the behavior o f the student through a 
schedule o f reinforcement was not unlike that of product assembly in the factory, as one 
commentator in Time magazine observed.^*^ As with Taylorism in the factory, the aura of 
efficiency proved to be an important tool in convincing potential consumers of the virtues 
of programmed instruction. As one researcher from the New York Institute of 
Technology remarked in 1959, “Education alone among all ‘industries’ in this country, 
has not increased productivity since 1900.” '^
Indeed, popular accounts showcased incredible feats o f learning efficiency with 
automated self-instruction. Among them were astounding reports o f junior high students 
learning a semester’s worth of mathematics in two weeks and three-year-olds learning to 
read with machines in a matter of hours. According to some pilot studies in public 
schools, machines were helping students learn material in half the time they would have 
spent using conventional texts and classroom instruction.^^ Such feats not only promised 
a quick turn-around time and an increase in the volume of information students might
“The Teaching Machines,” Time 76 (November 7, 1960): 91-92. Teaching machines received a great 
deal o f exposure in the popular press and in professional education magazines. The mainstream news 
literature from the early sixties is quite extensive. The following references therefore represent a selection 
from a much larger collection.
“For Brighter Students?,” Newsweek 54 (August 17, 1959): 94-95. See page 95.
Skinner, “Why We Need Teaching Machines,” 44.
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learn, but they also challenged the very structure o f traditional grade-scaled, age-based 
education.^^
Teaching machines also seemed to provide the kind of interactive learning and 
self-pacing that students of varying skill levels needed to maximize their performance. 
Unlike normal class exercises, lessons on machines encouraged students as they moved 
through information frames, and the machines allowed them to go at their own pace. 
Providing reinforcement at each step, it was claimed, induced a lasting enthusiasm for 
learning. Studies at UCLA comparing teacher- and machine-taught students indicated 
that such methods could potentially double the math test scores o f fifth graders.^"* Other 
studies claimed a tenfold increase in the mastery of foreign languages by high school 
students.^^ One of the most publicized programs was initiated in 1960 in Roanoke, 
Virginia, where pilot studies indicated that junior high students could finish courses in 
higher mathematics in half the time normally required. Standardized tests administered 
to eighth graders saw 41% finish with the highest scores for the ninth grade level.
By 1964 it looked as if Skinner’s hopes for teaching technology had been 
realized. The initial promise that teaching machines held for streamlining instruction and 
revolutionizing education theory attracted considerable attention from companies eager to 
cash in on new markets for such technologies. Corporate sponsors followed Skinner’s 
lead in touting their potential. By some accounts, education technology was poised to 
change what one writer for Fortune magazine called the “whole social structure of
Margaret B. Kreig, “What About Teaching Machines?,’’ Parent’s Magazine 36 (February, 1961): 44-45. 
“For Brighter Students?,’’ Newsweek 54 (August 17, 1959): 94-95.
Luce, “Can Machines Replace Teachers,’’ 102.
^  “Children Like Rats,” Newsweek 56 (December 26, 1960): 56.
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American youth. The market for technologies of teaching, coupled with the pressing 
need for administrative and curricular solutions, also created a boon for publishers and 
research firms who invested large amounts of capital in the development o f programmed 
instruction and machine design. The number of companies involved in teaching machine 
research and development surpassed 100 in the early sixties, and speculators projected 
a 100 million-dollar in d u s try .N o t only were well known publishing firms such as 
Macmillan, Doubleday, McGraw Hill, and Prentice-Hall lining up pilot studies and 
planning programmed texts, but an entirely new set o f companies emerged around the 
market for teaching machines and programmed materials for use in public schools and 
corporate training p ro g ram s.In te rn a tio n a l Business Machines (IBM) and the National 
Educational Association also launched a joint project (the Project on the Educational 
Implications of Automation, or EIA) to promote awareness of automated learning among 
teachers, administrators, and the public and to serve as an advisory wing for educational 
agencies nationwide."^' By 1964 the use of education technologies in public schools had
Boehm, “Can People Be Taught Like Pigeons?,” 176.
Ted Morello, “Which Is It?, New World o f Teaching Machines or Brave New Teaching Machines?,” 
UNESCO Courier 18 (1965): 10-16.
^  Boehm, “Can People Be Taught Like Pigeons?,” 177.
Ibid.
A. S. Fleming, “Automation and Education: Report on NBA Project,” National Education Association 
Journal 51 (1963): 33. Consult the study published by the EIA (Educational Implications o f Automation), 
National Education Association, Symposium on the Educational Implications o f Automation (Washington, 
D. C„ 1963).
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been firmly established with 15% aetively using some form of programmed instruction, 
and 60% of American institutions providing training with these techniques.
Compared with other countries that were experimenting with educational 
technology, however, the United States was relatively slow in incorporating programmed 
learning into its school systems. Great Britain, Germany and especially Japan, had 
moved much more rapidly into research and application o f these technologies. The 
Soviet Union officially recognized programmed learning as a weapon of the Cold War.'*^  ^
Its use in developing countries was also explored by international organizations such as 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that 
sponsored programs and workshops in programmed instruction, especially in math, 
English, and science, to local educational agencies in the third world. This spirit of 
‘reform through retraining’ was also strong in urban American schools where 
programmed instruction was used to teach both basic and specialized work skills to those 
who lacked a formal education.
The effieieney of learning machines was enough to win over many educators at 
both the secondary and the college level. Programmed instruction and machines, they 
claimed, were nothing more than efficient ‘textbooks’ that served as aids to, rather than 
replacements for, real te ach e rs .T ech n o lo g ie s  o f teaehing were also attractive because 
they seemed able to cross the barriers of age, culture, language, intelligence, and class.
David Sohn, “P. I. -  Out of the Clouds and Into the Classroom,” Senior Scholastic 84 (March 13, 1964) 
16T, 9T-15T, especially page 13T.
Ibid,
Ibid., I4T.
Ibid., 12T; Eugene Galanter, “The Mechanization o f Learning,” National Education Association Journal 
Symposium on Teaching Machines and Programmed Learning 50 (November, 1961): 15-30.
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The public demand for faster and more effective education was intense, and this
drove technological innovation, just as it had in other areas of science and industry.
Skinner had made a convincing case for the scientific analysis o f teaching. He believed
that it could be made as precise as physics or e n g i n e e r i n g . As  he remarked in his book.
The Technology o f  Teaching, first published in 1968,
These techniques made it possible to explore the complexities o f the 
individual organism and to analyze some of the serial or coordinate 
behaviors involved in attention, problem solving, various types o f self 
control, and the subsidiary systems of responses within a single organism 
called personalities}^'’
Yet despite the fact that the public enthusiasm for machines and programmed education
remained strong, they were met with a mixed and cautious reception among many
educators and social c r i t i c s . T h e  specter of Orwell and burgeoning technocracy proved
again to hamper the cause for Skinnerian behavioral technology and cast doubt on its
social benefits. Teaching machines, some charged, threatened to dehumanize the
classroom and relegate the role o f the student to that o f a laboratory animal.
Skinner had been critical o f an education establishment that, in response to poor
student performance, merely had stressed the need for better schools and teachers. In
their present form, Skinner believed that schools were exceptionally poor environments
for cultivating educational excellence. Skinner argued that the conventional classroom
was just as thoroughly structured and controlled an environment as anything his
Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching, 59-61.
Ibid., 12. Italics mine.
David Sohn, “P. I. Out o f the Clouds and Into the Classroom,” 12T.
Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching, 26-27.
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detractors were alleging about teaching technology. Traditional classrooms were far 
more oppressive and contrived than what was being proposed by educational 
technologists. The educational engineer aimed merely to subject the classroom setting to 
scientific scrutiny and replace aversive controls on behavior with schedules o f positive 
reinforcement. Only through experimental analysis, Skinner asserted, could the 
inefficiencies o f education be addressed. Advocates of teaching machines maintained 
that the technology merely streamlined and optimized the behavioral mechanisms used to 
teach reading, writing, arithmetic, and spelling.
For some, teaching machines also threatened to take expertise out of the hands of 
educators and put it into those of machine programmers. The fate of human teachers thus 
also heeame the subject of considerable debate in academic circles. Designing effective 
programs required an intimate knowledge of behavioral concepts and reinforcement 
schedules, rather than of traditional teaching methods. As proponents assured, however, 
teaching machines would merely reduce the amount of time spent on rote memorization 
and basic exercises. Echoing Pressey’s original claim, Skinner and his corporate backers 
argued that teaehing machines would help instill the basic elements o f a subject and leave 
teachers free to put students to work on more creative endeavors.
Skinner was able successfully to market the more liberating aspects of 
programmed learning, touting it as a technology that would free students from an 
arbitrary and tightly regimented cu rricu lu m .’ From reports in the mainstream press, it 
appeared that technologies of teaching had the appeal of tailoring lessons and exercises to
Skinner, “Reflections On A Decade of Teaching Machines,” 183. 
Skinner, Technology o f  Teaching, 238.
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each student’s individual abilities and paee. As Skinner noted in his book, The
Technology o f  Teaching in 1968,
These techniques made it possible to explore the eomplexities o f the 
individual organism and to analyze some of the serial or coordinate 
behaviors involved in attention, problem solving, various types o f self 
control, and the subsidiary systems of responses within a single organism 
called personalities.'*^
It was the teaching machine’s role as a supremely patient tutor, speeially designed to
cater to individual styles o f learning that might not be compatible with traditional group
methods, that made Skinner’s inventions that much more attractive. Teaching machines,
it was argued, would ameliorate one of the biggest flaws in the present educational
system, namely, the failure to recognize individuality in learning."^ Although some
schools employed a “multi-track” system for groups with various aptitudes,
standardization still proved to be a problem for many. Teaching technologies, Skinner
claimed, were able to accommodate a wide variety o f learning styles and aptitudes.
Perhaps the most compelling element of Skinner’s campaign for programmed
learning was his claim that intellectual and creative abilities were not predetermined, but
were in fact dependent on the environment. Skinner made the revolutionary claim that
such human characteristics could be behaviorally enhanced. Rather than view creativity
or genius as human qualities defined by inheritance, Skinner proposed that they were
better conceived of as behaviors to be cultivated."'*
Ibid., 12.
113 Ibid., 241-43.
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As with his social theories in Walden Two, Skinner’s educational philosophy, 
fully explained and implemented, challenged the traditional stereotypes surrounding 
behavioral psychology. Skinner had set out to dispel the notion that behavioral 
technology curtailed the diversity o f human potential. Certainly it was true that, from an 
experimental perspective, the coneept of behavioral determinism was valuable in opening 
the door on human nature in the search for causes."^ As products o f both environmental 
and genetic conditioning, however, the diversity and eapriee of humanity were not in 
question. In his drive to sell the liberating power of the machine for individual students, 
Skinner east himself again in the unlikely role of antiestablishment humanist scientist, a 
role befitting the social critic of the 1960s. By his own reckoning, the “laboratory study 
of learning” was the only real path for what he termed the “successful instrumental attack 
on the status quo'” in institutionalized education."^ The proliferation of programmed 
instruction during the 1960s was justification enough for Skinner to regard his role in this 
booming ‘industry’ as that of antiestablishment revolutionary.
Although Skinner’s dream of future humanity was not realized through 
educational reform during the 1960s, the widespread use o f programmed instruction in 
business is an enduring testament to a public desire to maximize efficiency. Indeed, the 
present-day industry in instructional technology continues to reflect a mechanistic 
approach to the self. In selling educators on the usefulness of conceptualizing human 
beings as collections of learned behaviors in the 1960s, Skinner contributed significantly
115 Ibid., 170-72.
Skinner, “Why We Need Teaching Machines,” 55.
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to the reification o f the programmable, mechanistic self in modem methods of 
programmed instruction.
Contemporary literature bears this out with a number of significant statistics. A 
survey among secondary school principals conducted by the National Education 
Association in 1960-61 indicated that 13% of schools were using some form of 
programmed instruction. Its projected use in schools by 1965-66 was estimated at 65%, 
indicating a high degree o f administrative enthusiasm for the managerial potential of 
programmed instruction (PI).''^ Most of the successful applications o f PI in schools were 
in language (reading, English, foreign languages, verbal skills) and mathematics. 
Mathematics in particular saw the widest application, comprising 64% of all 
applications.”  ^ In her exhaustive survey of the use of teaching machines and PI in 
primary and secondary education during the 1960s, however, Martha Casas has argued 
that their implementation was limited within schools that reported using them. 
Programmed textbooks, she contends, saw much wider use than teaching machines. In
The survey was cited in Peter H. Rossi and Bruce J. Biddle, The New Media and Education: The Impact 
on Society (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), 226. A sample o f the considerable literature that 
was devoted to assessing programmed instruction in the 1960s would include Nancy S. Anderson, 
Automatic Teaching: The State o f  the Art (New York; Wiley, 1959) and Programmed Learning and 
Computer Based Instruction: Proceedings o f  the Conference On the Application o f  Digital Computers to 
Automated Instruction, Washington, D. C., 1961 (New York: Wiley, 1962). For a survey o f four particular 
case studies in public schools see. Fund for the Advancement o f Education (sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation), Four Case Studies o f  Programmed Instruction (New York, 1964). See also Stuart Margulies 
and Lewis D. Eigem, Applied Programmed Instruction (New York: Wiley, 1962). For commentary on the 
use PI at the end o f the decade, consult Allen D. Calvin, ed.. Programmed Instruction: Bold New Venture 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969). For contemporary studies o f computer assisted learning 
see Computer Assisted Instruction, Testing, and Guidance, ed. Wayne H. Holtzman (New York: Flarper & 
Row, 1970) and Computer Assisted Instruction: A Book o f  Readings, ed. Atkinson and Wilson (New York: 
Academic Press, 1969).
Lincoln F. Hanson and P. Kenneth Komoski, "School Use o f Programmed Instruction,” in A Sourcebook 
fo r  the Use o f  Teaching Machines and Programmed Instruction, 2 vols., ed. Julian I. Taber, Robert Glaser 
and Halmuth H Schaefer (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1965), 648.
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the end, it appears, these technologies were, at the time, no more or less effective than 
traditional methods."^
Programmed instruction became more established in the corporate sector, 
however, where it was used in designing training programs for computer programming, 
business writing, data entry, billing procedures, banking, and a host of technical 
activities. Between 1960 and 1963 the use o f PI in industry rose 33%.’^ ° The effieieney 
potential of PI was also strong among government and military agencies that used it to 
standardize training programs. Both corporate and government use o f PI illustrated its 
advantages in standardizing procedures and ensuring quality control.'^’ A survey of 
recent literature on instructional technology in secondary education and occupational 
training in industry also yields ample evidence of P i’s continued legacy in education. By 
one estimate the use of computer-based instructional technology at the college level for 
remedial learning (reading, writing, and mathematics) averaged 35 to 40% in 2000.'^^
Martha Casas, “The History Surrounding the Use of Skinnerian Teaching Machines and Programmed 
Instruction (1960-1970)” (Ph.D. Ed. diss., Harvard University, 1997). It should be noted that Casas 
centers much o f her argument on the influence of Skinner and the phenomenon o f programmed instruction. 
She argues that, while inspiring its popularization, Skinner himself had little to do with its 
commercialization. Casas also argues that the negative reception o f PI and teaching machines in the 
popular press would have occurred regardless o f Skinner’s association with it. As he was in fact strongly 
associated with it, Casas contends that the negative press that he received in the 1950s over the baby tender 
factored into his public image with regard to teaching machines in the 1960s.
H. A.. Shoemaker and H. O Holt, “The Use o f Programmed Instruction in Industry,” in Teaching 
Machines and Programmed Learning: A Reader, 2 vols., ed. Robert Glaser and A. A. Lumsdaine 
(Washington, D. C.; National Education Association, Department o f Audiovisual Instruction, 1960-65), 
685-742, especially pages 691-96.
Glenn L. Bryan and John A. Nagay, “Use of Programmed Instruction Materials in Federal Government 
Agencies,” in Robert Glaser, Teaching Machines and Programmed Learning, 743-70. See page 751.
These statistics apply to “Title IV degree-granting institutions” that offer on-campus remedial 
coursework for these subjects and indicate a level o f frequent use by students. See Basmati Parsad and 
Laurie Lewis, “Remedial Education at Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions in Fall 2000,” United 
States Department o f  Education, Statistical Analysis Report fo r the National Center fo r  Education 
Statistics, November 28, 2003, Publication Number: NCES 2004-010, 33.
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Skinner is still regularly invoked as the founder of the movement. In professional 
journals and manuals, training specialists often discuss the process o f designing new 
systems of skill acquisition in the workplace, and they use terminology that connotes the 
mechanistic view o f human nature. Designers write of “up-skilling” and “de-skilling,” 
loading and unloading workers with task sequences according to the changing demands 
of the factory and the office. In the area o f secondary education there is the example of 
Instructional Computer Technology (ICT) where depictions of the student as an 
engineered product a b o u n d . T h e  growing sophistication of computers, designers 
claim, makes it possible to construct ITS (Intelligent Tutoring Systems). ITS combines 
interactive media with computer programs that are designed to diagnose, or ‘model,’ the 
student according to various criteria that include cognitive style, modes o f language 
acquisition, and memory architecture.’^  ^ Designers continue to make the same claims for 
these computer applications as Skinner made for mechanical teaching machines in the 
1960s. As had Skinner, ITS engineers stress the advantages o f machine-based instruction 
over human teaching in adjusting to the learning styles of individual students. Some 
speculate that the coming developments in artificial intelligence will enhance this 
capability considerably. Echoing Skinner, designers also claim that such technology will
Roger Penn and Michael Rose, Skill and Occupational Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994).
For an example o f collected papers and essays on the development of ITS strategies and systems see the 
conference proceedings in Intelligent Tutoring Systems: 5''' International Conference, ITS 2000, Montreal, 
Canada, June 19-23, 2000, ed. Claude Frasson and Kurt Van Lehn (New York: Springer, 2000). For a 
historical overview o f ITS and examples o f recent design developments see Mark Elson-Cook, Guided 
Discovery Tutoring: A Framevmrkfor ICAIResearch (London: Paul Chapman Publishing, 1990).
Marilyn Leask and Norbert Pachler, Learning to Teach Using ICT in the Secondary School (London: 
Routledge, 1999). See also William R. Murray, An Endorsement-Based Approach to Student Modeling for  
Planner-Controlled Intelligent Tutoring Systems (Brooks Air Force Base, TX: Armstrong Laboratory, Air 
Force Systems Command, 1991).
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reduce the failure rate in the classroom and encourage students to think more critically.
And, of course, this will all save money and time in the schools.
Clearly then, in the current industry of instructional technology in education and
business, there is continuing fascination with the idea o f engineered humanity, the kind
that Skinner promoted in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Even in the most recent textbooks in
programmed instruction, like Learning to Teach Using IC T in the Secondary School,
there seems to be an invocation o f a Skinnerian legacy. In terms o f education theory, for
example, it is said that,
[ICT is] in the behavioral tradition [and it,] explains learning in terms of 
operant conditioning where the student responds to a stimulus in a 
particular way. [L]earning is broken down into a sequential series of 
small steps, each covering a piece of the subject domain or particular skill.
The computer program models the role of the tutor.
Skinner’s legacy continued to influence late twentieth-century mechanistic conceptions
of the self among industrialists and corporate managers whose systems o f production
demanded the efficient use o f human resources. Americans have been willing partners in
this evolution.
A Return to Community in an Age of Technocracy
During the early 1960s when young radicals in the counterculture were rebelling 
against the ‘establishment’ and rediscovering the graces of the land, Skinner’s utopian
For more on contemporary ITS and ICT programs in American schools see Hugh Bums and James W. 
Parlett, Intelligent Tutoring Systems: Evolutions in Design (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1991); Martha C. 
Poison and J. Jeffrey Richardson, Foundations o f  Intelligent Tutoring Systems (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum 
Associates, 1988); Karen Littleton and Paul Light, Learning With Computers: Analyzing Productive 
Interaction (New York: Routledge, 1999); W. Michael Reed and John K. Burton, Multimedia and 
Megachange: New Roles fo r  Educational Computing (New York: Haworth Press, 1994).
Leask and Pachler, Learning to Teach Using ICT, 8. Italics mine.
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fantasy was read along with accounts of Walden, Brook Farm, the Shakers, the Oneida
Community, and other experimental environments. With an updated introduction,
Skinner re-deployed Walden Two in the early 1960s. In this incarnation it was a work of
social analysis that played to the traditional longings o f utopian dreamers but also added
contemporary twists. It offered Skinnerian social technology as a solution to
contemporary social ills.
The Cold War had taken a psychological toll on those who had worked hard to
live up to the ideals o f the ‘good life’ and the strong nuclear family, conspicuous
consumerism, and corporate-inspired models of community, work, and values. In the
early 1960s social critics like William H. Whyte Jr., C. Wright Mills, and others like
Rachel Carson began to point out the dangers of organizing culture too much around the
technologies and bureaucracies o f commerce and industry. In his famous treatise on the
deleterious effects o f large corporate organizations on young technocrats. The
Organization Man (1956), Whyte warned that the social matrix o f the corporation was
undermining the evolution of people-centered social ethics.
No generation has been so well equipped, psychologically as well as 
technically, to cope with the intricacies of vast organizations; none has 
been so well equipped to lead a meaningful community life; and none 
probably will be so adaptable to the constant shifts in environment that 
organization life is so increasingly demanding of them. .. .They are all, as 
they say, in the same boat.
But where is the boat going? No one seems to have the faintest 
idea; nor, for that matter, do they see much point in even raising the 
question. Once people liked to think, as least, that they were in control of 
their destinies, but few of the younger organization people cherish such 
notions. Most see themselves as objects more acted upon than acting -  
and their future, therefore, determined as much by the system as by 
themselves.’ *^
’ William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), 437.
201
Humanist social scientists such as C. Wright Mills in The Sociological Imagination
(1959) warned that the social ethics of scientific experts, those who managed and
controlled the matrices of human organization, would also be compromised by vast
bureaucracies where allegiance to the system would determine moral choices about how
people should live.
Whatever else [the society of the United States] is, surely this is evident; it 
is a society in which functionally rational bureaucracies are increasingly 
used in human affairs and in history-making decisions. Not all periods are 
alike in the degree to which historical changes within them are 
independent o f willful control, go on behind all men’s backs. Ours seems 
to he a period in which key decisions or their lack by bureaucratically 
instituted elites are increasingly sources of historical change. Moreover, it 
is a period and a society in which the enlargement and the centralization of 
the means o f control, o f power, now include quite widely the use of social 
science for whatever ends those in control of these means may assign to it.
To talk of ‘prediction and control’ without confronting the questions such 
developments raise is to abandon such moral and political autonomy as 
one may have.'^^
These and other high profile critiques of American society in the late 1950s and early 
1960s called into question the very institutions and systems of social management that 
had brought America to the height of world economic and political power. What were 
the cultural costs of this campaign on the social environment? Moreover, what was the 
cost to the natural environment?
New revelations from scientists such as Rachel Carson about the environmental 
effects of industrial expansion called the authority of science and government even 
further into question. In one of the most controversial books of the early 1960s, Silent 
Spring (1962), Carson presented the conflict between scientific expertise and public 
awareness on the issue environmental devastation.
' C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 115-16.
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This is an era of specialists, each of whom sees his own problem and is 
unaware of or intolerant of the larger frame into which it fits. It is also an 
era dominated by industry, in which the right to make a dollar at whatever 
cost is seldom challenged. When the public protests, confronted with 
some obvious evidence of damaging results o f pesticide applications, it is 
fed little tranquilizing pills o f half truth. We urgently need an end to these 
false assurances, the sugar coating of unpalatable facts. It is the public 
that is being asked to assume the risks that the insect controllers calculate.
The public must decide whether to continue on the present road, and it can 
do so only when in full possession of the facts. In the words o f Jean 
Rostand, “The obligation to endure gives us the right to know.” '^°
The open questioning of authority and convention gained momentum in the early
1960s, and Skinner’s social message, curiously enough, found a new audience among the
disillusioned. His ideas attracted the baby boom generation, now reaching their twenties
and searching for alternatives to the urban life and the corporate complex. It seemed to
many o f them that technological and industrial advancement had done little to alleviate
social ills. If anything, the expansion of technocracy had done just the opposite. A good
many in this growing counterculture sought a return to a more humane and simple
existence.
Through the sixties and early seventies the sales o f Walden Two grew 
dramatically. Between 1948 and 1960 the novel sold only 9000 copies. By the end of 
1961, it had sold 8000 more and sales doubled for the next three years. By the early 
1970s circulation had topped a million.’^' The novel carried less of the stigma of 
scientific sterilization, socialism, communism, or anti-humanism than it had in the era of 
McCarthy and the Red scare. Instead, new readers were drawn to the same idea of simple 
living that had first attracted Skinner to Thoreau and Walden. WT was a place away
Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), 13.
B. F. Skinner, A Matter o f  Consequences (New York: Knopf, 1983), 358-59.
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from urban chaos, a return to the land, to old ways of living, but with a new technology to 
make it work.
In the early 1960s Skinner shifted the focus of his public lectures from teaching 
technology to experimental living and the possibilities o f setting up communities for 
r e s e a r c h . G r o u p s  of students across the country such as the D. C. Walden I I  Committee 
began to hold regular meetings and discuss plans for trying out what Skinner had 
proposed in the novel. The book was increasingly discussed in college courses, and it 
went into paperback for easier distribution.'^^ Predictably, commentaries on Skinnerian 
theory again proliferated among social critics such as George Kateb, Anthony Burgess, 
Arthur Koestler, Margaret Mead, Karl Popper, and Carl Rogers.'^"' Such counterculture 
celebrities as Timothy Leary and Henry S. Huntington made inquiries to Skinner about 
such communities.
Ibid.
Ibid., 178.
George Kateb was a well-known utopian scholar and critic o f  Skinner’s vision. See his book of 
collected essays on utopian theory that includes commentary by both Skinner and Margaret Mead in 
Kateb’s Utopia (New York: Atherton Press, 1971) and his extended discussions on the idea o f utopia in 
Utopia and Its Enemies (New York: Schocken Books, 1963). The literary scholar and social critic, 
Anthony Burgess, wrote his famous novel, A Clockwork Orange (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), as part 
o f  his direct challenge to Skinner and broader trends in what he saw as the dehumanizing technologies of 
behaviorism. See also an essay attacking Skinner’s utopian fantasies by Burgess, “A Fable for Social 
Scientists,” Horizon 15, no. 6 (Winter, 1973): 12-15. The renowned philosopher o f science, Karl Popper, 
who was also a highly regarded social and political critic, wrote a scathing critique o f Skinner’s book. 
Technology o f  Teaching, in 1968 dismissing Skinner’s theory o f learning as untenable. Popper also argued 
against the implications for scientific totalitarianism in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, c l947). The humanist psychologist Carl Rogers, like 
Margaret Mead, was also an outspoken critic of Skinner’s views o f humanity and psychology. He invoked 
Popper’s idea o f the “open society” to argue that Skinner’s was an anti-human image o f humankind and 
that it would lead to a repressive culture if  embraced. See Rogers’ debate with Skinner on these and other 
points in Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, “Some Issues Concerning the Control o f Human Behavior,” 
Science 124 (1956): 1057-1066, especially page 1064. Margaret Mead spoke against Skinner’s brand of 
behavioral social theory on different occasions. See Margaret Mead, “Behavioral Science,” Bulletin o f  
Atomic Scientists 25 (December, 1969): 8-10; Continuities in Cultural Evolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1964), 237-239.
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The excitement over Walden Two was also apparent from Skinner’s personal 
reaction to his renewed celehrity. He again considered a run at a community experiment 
and the chance to play the role of Frazier for real. He recalled devoting most of his 
personal notes to the details o f planning and constructing an experimental community, 
and taking his new novel up again. Skinner gave careful thought to each aspect of the 
community, from the architecture of the buildings to the distribution o f goods and 
s e r v i c e s . H e  also kept informed about other projects in communal living such as the 
Kibbutz movement in Israel. He recalled analyzing the rules and practices of religious 
monastic orders and utopian communities from history by reading the Rule o f  St. 
Benedict^^^ and the Rules o f  the Society o f  Jesus, e v a l u a t i n g  their utility for a Walden 
Two community. He studied the history of communes set up by noted Utopians such as 
Étienne Cabet in T e x a s . S k i n n e r  also had plans to produce a pamphlet for interested 
groups on how to set up a commune. He corresponded with philosophers, architects, and 
interested financiers in the late 1960s.
At one point Skinner even entertained offers from the Central Intelligence Agency 
which sought to provide him with information and funding for a community based on 
reports of communal experiments in Russia know as “microrayons.” Microrayons were
B. F. Skinner, A Matter o f  Consequences, 84-85.
St. Benedict established this standard for the structure and purpose of the Benedictine monastic 
community in this work. It was written approximately between 535 and 540 A.D. and has been published 
in numerous translations. Consult Saint Benedict, Abbot of Monte Cassino (ca. 535-540 A.D.), The Rule o f  
St. Benedict, trans. Leonard Doyle (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2001).
This document was the representative work of the Counter-Reformation and provided the articulation of 
a new religious order in the Jesuits. It was written by St. Ignatius o f  Loyola beginning in 1539. Consult 
Saint Ignatius o f Loyola (1539), Rules o f  the Society o f  Jesus: A New Translation from the Latin, trans. 
Jesuit Order (Woodstock, MD: Woodstock College Press, 1956).
138 Skinner, Consequences, 289-90.
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apparently situated within urban centers and were self-contained, with their own housing, 
factories, hospitals, schools and stores. Skinner was asked to set up a similar complex, 
but he declined over reservations about the behavioral techniques allegedly being used in 
such installations. Skinner did, however, come very close to striking a deal with one of 
several financiers he queried about funds for a community. The Arthur D. Little 
Company, a business management consulting firm, offered to bankroll the project, but as 
with the CIA, Skinner declined to have outside controls placed on his d e s i g n s . I n  1967 
the Johnson Foundation, an organization dedicated to the promotion of sustainable 
community development, provided Skinner with money for what turned out to be a large 
conference dedicated to the design of experimental communities. He also received 
offers from several movie studios to buy the rights to Walden Two.
Although Skinner never found the right combination of conditions to make 
Walden Two into a reality, he continued to promote the technologies that such a 
community would utilize, and that contemporary society might use as vehicles o f social 
reform. By the late 1960s, Skinner had found both an academic and public audience for 
his theories. He saw himself as someone who had challenged the ‘status quo,’ as he put 
it, and who had garnered something o f a cult following in the counterculture. Although 
Skinner disavowed any such association, he seemed willing to acknowledge a role for 
Walden Two as a significant catalyst in the movement.’"^ ' By 1965 Skinner was known 
and talked about in academic circles. Professional and university audiences for his
Ibid., 264.
Ibid., 290. 
Ibid., 307.
206
numerous public lectures, he felt, were now conversant with the basic principles of 
Skinnerian behaviorism. Skinner found himself needing less time to explain key 
principles and theories. He could devote more effort to presenting the technical details of 
his technologies to groups of educators and physicians interested in applying them in the 
workplace.
As many of his detractors had pointed out in the past, however, Skinner failed to 
address the possibility of totalitarianism in a society managed by scientists and engineers. 
It might work on a small scale, but certainly the example o f the Soviet State indicated the 
compromise in human values and dignity that a larger enterprise entailed. Skinner 
nevertheless believed that his novel had served a role in galvanizing the counterculture 
movement. And indeed it had, among some.
A Walden Two Experiment*'*^
As David Shi observed in his study of communal life and utopianism in American 
history, communitarian aims spanned a wide range of political, religious, and social 
perspectives. The search for simplicity, however, was common to all o f them. Further, 
this quest in the American context has been particularly unique, since the ideal of 
simplicity has always had a strong connection to American cultural ideals and heritage 
stemming back to colonial times.*'*'* It was from this transcendentalist literary and
Ibid., 271.
The title for this section is taken from Kathleen Kinkade, A Walden Two Experiment: The First Five 
Years o f  Twin Oaks Community (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1973).
See David Shi, In Search o f  the Simple Life (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1986).
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experimental tradition that Skinner derived much of his personal inspiration for Walden 
Two. Like Thoreau, Skinner had spent time in quiet contemplation in the 1950s, 
designing and testing new techniques to optimize his own time and work, creating a 
personal regimen in order to put his intellectual creativity on a sound scientific footing. 
Skinner also worked out an ethic for the individual in community. Walden Two 
combined a return to simplicity with the classically American themes of pietism, 
republicanism, and transcendentalism.
Many in the 1960s sought what C. Wright Mills had referred to in The 
Sociological Imagination (1959)'"^^ as a ‘return to membership’ in social life. The control 
of basic community and family functions, those aspects of collective living that fostered a 
sense of belonging for each member, had to be reclaimed and begun anew. For the new 
generation o f communalists wanting to return to the land and the life o f the ‘tribe’ in the 
late 1960s and early 70s, Skinner’s appeal to individual sacrifice for the sake o f the 
collective, and his emphasis on simplification and small-scale living, struck a chord. The 
pro-active approach to alternative living in America prompted a generation o f radicals 
like the ‘diggers’ to move ahead with organized experiments in communal living.'"*^ For 
a small minority of readers, Walden Two literally served as a blueprint. The most lasting 
and famous example of these communities was the Twin Oaks farm project in Louisa, 
Virginia, which began in 1970 with two-dozen members and continued in operation for 
over ten years.
Charles Wright Mills, Tke Sociological Imagination (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).
For an overview o f this counterculture phenomenon, consult R. Roberts, The New Communes: Coming 
Together in America (New Jersey; Prentice Hall, 1971) and Keith Melville, Communes and the 
Counterculture (New York: Morrow, 1972).
208
Like most other communes of the period many of its members were seeking to 
escape from unfulfilling home or work l i v e s . U n l i k e  many others however, the Twin 
Oaks commune was not merely a site for escapism and retreat. Its professed goal was to 
recast community maintenance using Skinnerian behavioral principles.''** With the proper 
methods and techniques, social bonding could be made more efficient. In reality, 
however, much of Skinner’s methodology was modified or discarded as the colony 
developed and learned about what did and did not work. Nevertheless, the basic 
approach to living remained the same. Community property and care o f children were 
held in common and a willingness to experiment with human behavior in order to mold 
better living spaces, and better people, was a goal that remained part of Twin Oaks.
Skinner again took full advantage of the opportunity to promote his social theories 
by associating himself with these communal experiments. These communities were 
willing to reject social convention in favor o f exploration. In his introduction to Kathleen 
Kinkade’s book about the Twin Oaks experiments, Skinner took credit for have presaged 
the revolt against traditional culture, and for facilitating his own small rebellion in the 
counterculture. At the end of the 1960s, when American society seemed to be headed for 
disaster, however, the publication of Skinner’s magnum opus. Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity (1971), would permanently solidify his status as a scientific icon.
Roberts, The New Communes, 93.
For a full description o f the history and initial aims o f the Twin Oaks community see the documentary 
account in Kathleen Kinkade's A Walden Two Experiment: The First Five Years o f  Twin Oaks Community 
(New York: William Morrow and Co., 1973). See also Ingrid Komar’s Living the Dream: A Documentary 
Study o f the Twin Oaks Community, Communal Societies and Utopian Studies Book Series, vol. 1 
(Norwood: Norwood Editions, 1983).
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Social Collapse and Skinnerian Solutions after the 1960s
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971)*'*  ^(BFD) was the culmination of Skinner’s
career-long drive to promote his behavioral social theories and explain their relevance in
culture that had undergone massive transformations since the turn of the century. Fears
of nuclear and conventional war, economic recession, environmental devastation, and an
energy crisis loomed large at the end of the 1960s. Skinner, as always, deftly exploited
the mood of the country to present his indictment of modem humanity and society in this
his most controversial work. BFD laid out the sacrifices that humankind would have to
make in order to survive as a species. It required no less than a new vision of the self,
and a new ethic for managing social systems.
As an evolutionary social theorist, Skinner believed that the first step in
constmcting an ethic for social management was to eliminate the self as it had been
constmcted in Western culture. The ideal of “autonomous man,” in Western literature
and philosophy, possessed of ultimately unknowable inner qualities — spirit, rationality,
feelings — was a myth that human society could no longer afford to sustain. If  humans
were to survive their own civilization, their relationship to the collective required the
sacrifice o f individual choice.
The history of an idea which has kept essentially the same for two 
thousand years is a history of failure. The more eminent the names 
subscribed to the idea the more ignominious its record. What can be said 
for the conception of a “natural freedom of self-determination” where 
forty four men o f  genius (from Anselm  to Whitehead, in alphabetical 
order) have never been able to make it “march”? Should we not conclude 
either that the problem of freedom is insoluble or that this is not the way to 
solve it? .. .Any serious consideration o f the problem of freedom must
149 B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1971). It is worth noting
that this work went through nine printings in the first six months after its initial publication.
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[now] face not only the growing list of achievements o f a science of 
human behavior but the conception of man which emerges from it.'^ *^
As Skinner observed, however, the use of science and technology to solve social
problems had only been partially successful in advancing social progress. The haphazard
use of technology in such areas as reproductive science, agrieulture, industry, and
medicine had resulted in the overall degradation of the natural environment. This was, of
course, a message familiar to the readers of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. It was not
enough for scientists and social critics, Skinner argued, to make appeals for humanized
technology: “[sjuch expressions imply that where human behavior begins, technology
stops, and that we must carry on, as we have in the past...” A design had to come from
the social sciences, Skinner declared. “[Wjhat we need is a technology of human
behavior.” '^ *
Skinner contended that getting a proper hold on bureaucracy and technocracy was 
a matter of controlling entire populations. This could only occur with a shift from the 
socially constructed morality and ethics that celebrated the dignity of the ‘inner man,’ to 
a focus on the conditions of the surrounding environment, both local and g l o b a l . R u l e s  
and values in society were nothing more than factual contingencies to be analyzed and 
a l t e r ed . Re lo ca t i n g  the source of human behavior in the environment also removed 
much of the blame from the individual who failed to meet an unrealistic moral
B. F. Skinner. From a collection of Skinner’s private notes on a seminar conducted in the summer of 
1958 at the Center for the Study o f Democratic Institutions where he was responding to comments by 
Alfred Adler. HUGFP 60.50, Box 1, Folder 1.
Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, 3.
Ibid., 18-19.
Ibid., 108.
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imperative. Properly constructed technologies of behavior instead could determine ‘good 
and bad’ on the basis of efficiency and survivability. In this sense, Skinner’s Darwinian 
view of a culture was like that of a species, subject to the pressures o f the environment, 
constantly adapting to preserve itself.
Skinner believed that humans were best understood as physical systems. He 
observed, however, that people react instinctively to any form of control, whether 
harmful or beneficial, as an infringement on human a u t o n o m y . W e  praise those who 
demonstrate independence, Skinner said, and dignity is bound to freedom as the 
expression of a u t o n o m y . O u r  ability to weather adverse conditions — to engage in 
unnecessary behavior in order to illustrate our triumph over adversity — is taken as a 
hallmark of human uniqueness. The ‘state of mind’ that inclines us toward personal 
autonomy as an ideal, however, as Skinner argued, was an illusion. The science of 
behaviorism illustrated that all organisms were subject to some set o f environmental 
contingencies. Freedom was more properly characterized as the sense of agency one has 
in the perceived escape from c o n t r o l . O u r  experience of freedom and dignity thus was 
merely a consequence of positive behavioral reinforcement.'^^
A realistic conception of the individual in society, Skinner thought, should be 
based on our scientific understanding of its biological and social contingencies.'^* If, 
Skinner asked, constructive social behavior, namely that which promotes individual
Ibid., 38. 
Ibid., 51-52. 
Ibid., 36. 
Ibid., 41.
Ibid.
212
happiness, cohesion in the community, and the survival o f social systems as a whole, is 
the ultimate goal of modem society , what was the proper course o f action in constmcting 
social policy and infrastmcture? The classic American tradition o f an open democracy 
had emphasized individual responsibility for behaving appropriately and doing good 
works (such as avoiding vice, not committing crime, being a productive citizen, and 
voting in elections). In the highly engineered matrix of modem urbanized culture, 
however, systems of aversive control were regularly used at every stage of individual 
development and in every environment of social activity in order to coerce desired 
behavior and deter destmctive activity. Our focus in social engineering, Skinner 
believed, should therefore be on constmcting behavioral contingencies that prevent 
objectionable behavior, promote the moral and physical welfare of individuals, and 
ensure the survival of the collective society. The task should be to replace punitive, or 
what Skinner called “aversive,” measures of control already in use with reinforcements 
that were scientifically engineered to induce constmctive social behavior.
Skinner often likened the process of social evolution to that o f Darwinian 
biological evolution. In Darwinian evolution, the ultimate value of any variation in 
behavior was its potential to add to the survivability o f the species. The same was tme of 
cultural evolution.
The simple fact is that a culture which fo r  any reason induces its members 
to work for its survival, or for the survival of some of its practices, is more 
likely to survive. Survival is the only value according to which a culture 
is eventually to be judged, and any practice that furthers survival has 
survival value by definition.
159 Ibid., 130.
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But as in biological evolution, it is not always initially clear which individual variations 
will contribute to the overall survival of society. Skinner believed that cultural 
engineers, those who would design social infrastructure, could learn to accelerate social 
evolution and increase the survivability of the species. As with animal husbandry in 
Darwin’s time, artificial control of the ‘natural,’ or in this case, traditional culture, could 
be mastered. The need to understand the collective effects of individual behavior thus 
became even more vital. Hence, as Skinner concluded, “[t]he task of the cultural 
designer is to accelerate the development of practices which bring the remote 
consequences of behavior into play.” '®° By improving conditions for the individual, 
collective social evolution would eventually be optimized. This basic message was 
disseminated to the public by other social commentators such as Margaret Mead.
By the time Skinner came to write Beyond Freedom and Dignity, his school of 
thought on social reform had been firmly established. What made his evaluation of 
modem civilization and his critique of the self in this, his master stroke, so poignant in 
the early 1970s as opposed to the early 1950s, was that it appeared at a time when 
generational conflict and open protest against American technocracy was in full swing. 
The thoroughly public nature of the American political and social crisis of the early 
1970s afforded Skinner a much broader audience for his ideas. Skinner deployed his 
opinions skillfully just when he perceived that Americans might be most receptive to 
Skinnerian social panaceas.
The growing realization among Americans that modem technocracy and the death 
of the self might already have come to pass is indicated in the sheer panic that the book
' “ Ibid., 137.
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elicited among Skinner’s familiar detractors. Skinner seemed to have argued quite 
convincingly that the new programmable self had to be embraced if society was to 
survive. In considering the inroads that behaviorism made into the cultures of work, 
home, and community, in the postwar decades, it seemed to many social critics that 
Americans had already accepted such a view of the self, although perhaps grudgingly.
A Firestorm of Controversy
We can no longer afford freedom, says B. F. Skinner, the most influential and 
controversial psychologist o f  our time; we must design our culture to shape the behavior 
needed for survival. Here is Skinner’s masterwork — a brilliant analysis o f  today’s most 
pressing problems and a stunning, detailed plan fo r  change that challenges many o f  
Western man's most sacred ideals and personal freedoms. Considered “one o f  the most 
important happenings in 20"'-century psychology, ” this book has already stirred 
nationwide debate through the force and shock o f  its ideas.
-Caption on back jacket o f the 1972 edition o f  BFD
The national controversy over Beyond Freedom and Dignity’ following its first 
printing in September o f 1971 far exceeded the success of Skinner’s previous forays into 
public debates about modem society. BFD became “the year’s most controversial 
bestseller,” a multi-million-copy-selling phenomenon that reached number four on the 
New York Times best seller list and went on to enjoy a fourteen week mn in this 
position.'^' It was serialized in both Psychology Today and the New York Post.
With the publication of BFD the firestorm of debate surrounding Skinner’s 
assertions about human nature and society, and the urgency with which critics rushed to 
discredit his theories, increased in the early 1970s. There were endless book reviews and 
extended discussions in numerous mainstream magazines, intellectual journals, and 
newsletters. Countless philosophers, theologians, scientists, social scientists, journalists.
161 Quotes are from the jacket o f the 1972 paperback edition o f BFD (New York: Bantam/Vintage, 1971).
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and fellow psychologists weighed in on Skinner’s propositions, and Skinner found 
himself accepting guest spots on many of the major television talk shows and discussion 
panels o f the time.
In a series of articles on BFD for Psychology Today, Skinner was described as 
“one of America’s most distinguished psychologists.” '^  ^He had been voted the 
psychologist most recognized in faculties of psychology at American universities, and 
also as one o f the ten most influential psychologists o f all time.'^^ The buzz surrounding 
BFD ultimately earned Skinner a portrait on the cover of Time and the lead story for the 
week of September 20*, 1971 in a year marked by Richard Nixon’s price and wage 
freeze programs (intended to counter an economic downturn, to no avail), intensified 
fighting in Pakistan and Southeast Asia, and the overall retreat o f the counterculture 
movement.'^'' Social decay seemed in these times to be just around the comer.
In the coming years after the first edition, BFD spawned book-length explanations 
o f Skinnerian social philosophy from such prominent philosophers as Tibor Machan and 
Finley C a r p e n t e r . S k i n n e r ’s views were the subject o f numerous academic symposia 
and conferences around the country and abroad. The book became a bona fide cultural
Richard Rubenstein, “Beyond Freedom and Dignity,” review o f Beyond Freedom and Dignity, by B. F. 
Skinner, Psychology Today 6 (September, 1971): 30-31, 95-97.
T. George Harris, “All the W orld’s a Box,” introduction to BFD, Psychology Today 5 (August, 1971): 
33-35. Similar claims were made by other reviewers. Another reviewer for the New York Times Book 
Review noted that Skinner’s peers had judged him the most influential psychologist in America. See the 
edition for October 24, 1971.
164 Utopia, Panacea, or Path to Hell?,” review o f BFD, by B. F. Skinner, Time 98 (September
20, 1971): 47-53.
Tibor R. Machan, The Pseudo-Science o f  B. F. Skinner (New Rochelle, NY : Arlington House 
Publishers, 1974); Finley Carpenter, The Skinner Primer: Behind Freedom and Dignity (New York: Free 
Press, 1974).
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event. With this, his crowning social manifesto, Skinner tapped directly into the heart of 
contemporary debates in the early 1970s about how American society seemed utterly to 
have failed in curbing the rising tide of war, poverty, overpopulation, environmental 
devastation, and racial tension, even within its own borders. The state o f society and the 
environment during this period, the perception of social decay, brought many to consider 
more drastic social measures. Skinner’s audience was thus primed for his message in a 
way that their parents had not been in the late 1940s.
Recognized for years as the inventor of the “Skinner box” and the father of 
programmed instruction, Skinner was now being portrayed as the often embattled but 
ever compelling expert on human behavior, held in awe by an admiring but wary 
r e a d e r s h i p . T h e  sheer volume of his credentials, publications, and accomplishments as 
a “Harvard psychologist,” as he was often described, was repeatedly mentioned in articles 
and reviews of BFD as having added to his reputation as one of America’s foremost 
experts on human behavior. In his publicly acknowledged capacity as a scientific expert, 
educational revolutionary, and emerging futurist prophet/sage, Skinner came to be 
regarded by the early 1970s, not merely as the curious inventor o f interesting behavioral 
technology, but as one of the most influential minds of the twentieth century.
His added reputation as one of the most important figures in education helped 
secure a good portion o f Skinner’s audience. William Fischer noted in the magazine 
Intellect that the notoriety o f Skinner’s books had earned him a fellowship at one o f the 
nation’s leading think tanks. The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in
“Brave New Behaviorism,” review o f BFD, by B. F. Skinner, Newsweek 78 (September, 20, 1971): 95.
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Santa Barbara, CA in 1973.'^^ Fischer recounted Skinner’s curious intellectual 
collaborations at the Center with Robert M. Hutchins, a prominent figure in education 
policy debates and author of the landmark study. The Higher Learning in America 
(1936). An advocate o f liberal education, Hutchins was an outspoken critic of Skinner’s 
education theory, which he thought had its origins in pragmatism, love of technology, and 
Deweyan education theory. Such an alliance of opposites, Fischer noted, said something 
very significant, however, about Skinner’s cultural influence and the apparent willingness 
o f his contemporaries to entertain his methods in light o f desperation over America’s 
growing social plight.
By painting a picture of impending disaster for society unless cultural engineers 
stepped in, the press indulged Skinner’s self-promotion. He portrayed himself in public 
lectures as the kind of scientific advisor now needed by governments to help society gain 
control of itself. Old systems of reinforcement (i. e., traditional social standards and 
values), Skinner claimed, had been discarded in a period when standards o f work, 
community, government, and individual behavior had all been severely challenged. This 
change explained the contemporary descent into the “immediate gratifiers,” of drugs and 
sex.'^* Skinner posed the question that many reviewers and readers of BFD seemed 
already to chorus at the time. As echoed in one reviewer’s quote o f Skinner, “Are we 
free to have a future or are we so committed to the immediate gratifiers that we will never
William Fischer, “Shaping a Better World,” Intellect 102 (October 19, 1973): 7- 
Fischer, “Shaping a Better World,” 7-8.
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allow the redesign of our culture in such a way as to bring the future into account and 
make it effective?”
Nevertheless, reactions against Skinner and his sterile plan for social 
regimentation were unsurprisingly numerous. Not much had changed since the 
publication o f Walden Two and Science and Human Behavior for most o f his well-known 
humanist critics. While most people were willing to acknowledge his scientific 
accomplishments and status as an expert on human behavior, they found his views too 
extreme, dogmatic, and dangerous. Many reviewers cited Skinner’s overdrawn 
enthusiasm and faith in science as a panacea for social ills. Skinner presumed, perhaps 
like other social scientists, that his methodology was the “one best way” '^° to solve soeial 
problems. Skinner’s seeming tendency toward megalomania was associated with Hitler 
and the fascist s t a t e . H o w  would Skinner or any other seientific expert presume to 
decide for the populace the good and bad of culture in terms of an evolutionary ethic of 
survival?
Skinner links his technology to the prospect of “maximiz[ing] the 
achievements of which the human organism is capable,” but he nowhere 
tells us how these may be determined. .. .Man is a culturally emergent 
being whose habits and skills are relatively remote adjustments of the 
physical dispositions of a certain gifted animal.
How was he to deal with cultural diversity, given what in Walden Two looked like a
fairly rigid social order? Would this be desirable for democraey in social flux? Modem
Ibid., 8.
I refer here to the book title by Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the 
Enigma o f  Efficiency (New York; Viking Penguin, 1997).
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Rubenstein, “Beyond Freedom,” 95.
J. Margolis, Review essay of BFD, by B. F. Skinner, Society 9 (September, 1972): 80-90. See page 86.
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culture was evolving in an unknown direction, and Skinner could not possibly know what
future would be best.
And what did Skinner really know about human behavior? Many pointed to the
naivete o f his extrapolations from animal experiments and utopian fantasies. As one
reviewer for Book World put it,
From a scientific standpoint, [Skinner] knows almost nothing about human 
beings.. .Thus Skinner’s prescription for the social ills that ail us must be 
evaluated, not as the fruit of a scientific understanding of man but on the 
same basis as Future Shock, The Greening o f  America, or any other piece 
o f schlock sociology.
Indeed, even colleagues attested to the fact that Skinner’s aspirations toward a ‘physics’
of cultural engineering fell far short of what could reasonably be expected from social
science. “He’s just like the rest of us,” one psychologist quipped, “pretty s p o t t y . S t i l l
and all, most reviewers admitted that, in the end, a compromise between human freedoms
and soeial systems of control had to be struck.
What was of greatest concern to Skinner’s contemporaries was BFD’s morbidly
compelling argument. “Given its topic, the success of Skinner’s book — the manner of its
success — is probably more important than the book itself.
[T]he important consideration here is not merely whether Skinner has 
written a good or a bad book,.... if Skinner has written a poor and utterly 
useless book, what are the implications regarding the educated, the 
cultured, the knowledgeable, the informed readership of the trade book 
world?
Robert Clairbom, Review of BFD, by B. F. Skinner, Book World, October 10, 1971, page 6. Reprinted 
in Current 135 (December, 1971); 9-18. Seepages 15-18.
“Brave New Behaviorism,” 95.
Margolis, Review essay, 90.
Ibid., 81.
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It is worth noting a revealing instance in which the popularity of Skinner’s new 
book attracted the attention of a memher o f Congress. Democratic representative 
Cornelius Gallagher of New Jersey entered into the Congressional Record on December 
15, 1971 a multi-page lambasting of Skinner in response to a grant o f close to $300,000 
awarded to Skinner by the National Institute of Mental Health for research into the 
“Behavioral Analysis o f Cultural Practices.
The grant was first awarded in 1964 and had been paid out in installments over 
the course o f eight years. Its purpose was to facilitate further “study [of] the broader 
implications of an experimental analysis of behavior for government, economics, 
psychotherapy, sociology, and anthropology, or the relevance of behavioral processes in 
an analysis of c u l t u r e . T h e  grant helped finance the research for Skinner’s 
Technology o f  Teaching (1968), Contingencies o f  Reinforcement (1969), and Beyond 
Freedom and Dignity (1971).
Gallagher acknowledged that, as one of the most respected and well-known 
experts on psychology, Skinner was a scientist to whom Americans paid close attention. 
“Why should a Member of the Congress rise to discuss one of the most widely read and 
influential books of the fall 1971 literary season?,” Gallaher asked. Because, “[W]hen 
Dr. Skinner speaks millions of our fellow citizens take him very seriously.” '™ In his 
capacity as head of the Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy, Congressman Gallagher
From an article entitled, “Grant K6-MH-21775,” in The Nation 214 (January 10, 1972): 37. See also an 
account o f the debate, “Misplaced Zeal,” The New Republic 166 (January 1, 1972): 14.
Excerpt from minutes o f Cornelius Gallagher’s speech before Congress under the heading, “Federal 
Funds of $283,000 to Flarvard Psychologist B. F. Skinner to write ‘Beyond Freedom and Dignity,” ’ 
Proceedings and Debates o f the 92"'* Congress, 1st sess.. Congressional Record o f  the United States 117, pt. 
36 (December 13, 1971 to December 17, 1971): 47185-47195. See page 47187.
179 Ibid., 47186 .
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had for seven years investigated the federal appropriation o f funds for social scientific
research projects in psychology and sociology. In his estimation these projects reflected
very similar attitudes toward human nature and freedom as those expressed in Skinner’s
BFD. Gallagher highlighted some proposed projects o f social control that included
among other things psychological tests for all children to determine future criminality,
clandestine microphone surveillance in federal housing projects to examine the habits of
low-income lifestyles, and mandated psychological testing for all political leaders.
[Wjhat I question is whether he [Skinner] should be subsidized by the 
Federal Government especially since, in my judgement, he is advancing 
ideas which threaten the future of our system of government by 
denigrating the American traditions of individualism, human dignity, and 
self-reliance.
Gallagher, like many of Skinner’s opponents, drew associations between opinions in 
BFD and what some saw as the general arrogance of social scientists in using invasive 
and manipulative research techniques, and then presuming to dictate social adjustment 
and human values according to their own scientific standards.
For the most part, Gallagher believed that social scientists held traditional ideas of 
human dignity in contempt. Significantly, Gallagher associated Skinner with the overall 
prevalence of social engineering technology in modem society. The ubiquity of 
computer information systems and the use of chemicals and drugs to control human 
behavior (not something that Skinner advocated) came in for particular criticism by 
Gallagher. Skinner was a symbol of scientism in social administration, of technologies
180 Ibid., 47186 .
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that would destroy humanity in the end and bring about an Orwellian dystopia. Similar 
sentiments were directed at Skinner hy then Vice President Spiro Agnew.'*'
The reaction among “the old Skinner watchers” like Joseph Krutch and Anthony 
Burgess who had followed Skinner’s rise since the 1940s was similar and predictable.'*^ 
What was new, however, were the critiques offered by a younger generation of 
intellectuals, humanists, and soeial critics who had come to Skinnerian soeial theory for 
the first time in the 1960s. The turbulent and experimental atmosphere of the age 
undoubtedly contributed to the panicked reaction o f humanists who, to be sure, feared the 
appeal o f Skinner’s theories to a younger generation less familiar with fascism, socialism, 
and the horrors of war from the 1930s and 40s. Many of these young people had read 
Walden Two in college and seen its humanistic potential.'*^ Skinner had also forged a 
scientific school of thought in behavioral engineering and programmed learning that 
boasted ardent supporters in academia and industry. This was hard to ignore, especially 
for those like Gallagher and the humanists who saw that behaviorism in one form or
See comments on Agnew’s pronouncements in W. Joseph Wyatt, “Behavioral Science in the Crosshairs: 
The FBI File on B. F. Skinner,” Behavior and Social Issues 10 (2000); 101-109, especially page 108. See 
also Skinner’s original comments, as Wyatt indicates, in A Matter o f  Consequences, page 323.
Walter Arnold, Review o f BFD, by B. F. Skinner, Saturday Review 54 (October 9, 1971): 47-48. See 
also the comments in Alexandra Rutherford, “B. F. Skinner’s Technology o f Behavior,” page 12, where 
Rutherford claims a broad “societal shift toward humanism” in the 1960s by citing the views o f Abraham 
Maslow, Carl Rogers, Howard Zinn, and Theodore Roszak in characterizing the whole o f American 
culture. These authors had unmistakable political agendas in their characterizations o f American culture in 
the 1960s. Rutherford, however, seems to imply that their polemics represent American society as a whole. 
I suspect that many American historians would disagree with this assessment.
James E. Royce, “The Psychology and Politics o f Freedom and Dignity,” review o f BFD, by B. F. 
Skinner, America 125 (October 23, 1971): 323-24.
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another had infiltrated all aspects of organized social a c t i v i t y . T h e y  had failed in the
end to squelch the continued interest in Skinnerian social theory and social science.
Indeed despite vehement criticism, or perhaps because o f it, Skinner’s vision
received public endorsement, if  not approval, as a plausible depiction o f the present and
future, one that very much needed to be addressed seriously. One reviewer noted that,
while BFD might not contain the best solution to social problems, it nevertheless needed
thorough consideration at the very least, because o f its timely warnings about the danger
of continuing on the current societal path. As such,
[ejvery social studies teacher should not only read the book, but 
study it, fight through it, try to understand what Skinner is saying.
As [Skinner] points out, a science of behavior is more advanced 
than many of its critics realize. It is impossible to deny that our 
culture is in danger o f self-destruction. We must face the fact that 
our efforts to date have not worked.’*^
As I have argued, this tension and anxiety about the implications o f BFD 
stemmed from what was in the late 1960s and early 1970s a real and growing pessimism 
about humanity, one that emphasized its cold, brutal, and inherently malevolent 
tendencies. Nuclear weapons proliferation, environmental devastation, prolonged 
warfare, overpopulation and other social ills had reached global proportions.'*^ The 
failure of social programs to counteract the deleterious effects o f mass culture had fallen 
short in the immediate postwar period.
Harris, Psychology Today, 33; George Kateb, “Toward a Worldless World,” Atlantic Monthly 228 
(October, 1971): 122-25.
Jack L. Nelson, “On B. F. Skinner,” review o f BFD, by B. F. Skinner, Social Education 36 (March, 
1972): 314-15.
David C. Anderson, “Man and His Environment,” review of BFD, by B. F. Skinner, Current 135 
(December, 1971): 9-18.
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In the end, as many had surmised, the unsettling import of Skinner’s manifesto 
was his undeniable acknowledgement of social and technocratic trends in American 
culture that substantiated his claims for this pessimistic view of self and society. As 
Lewis Mumford, among many others, noted in his book. The Pentagon o f  Power {\96A), 
large-scale technocratic culture already utilized intricate systems of social control. This 
had given rise to a new species of human, William H. Whyte Jr.’s “Organization Man,’’ 
an individual who oriented his personal and professional life around the corporate and 
bureaucratic organizations that systematized every aspect of l i f e . ' M u m f o r d  also drew a 
direct link between the emergence of this individual and the advent of Skinnerian-style 
technologies.
Organization Man, then, can be defined briefly as that part o f the human 
personality whose further potentialities for life and growth have been 
suppressed for the purpose of controlling those fractional energies that are 
left, and feeding them into a mechanically ordered collective system.[...]
Consider B. F. Skinner’s learning machine. Such programmed pseudo­
education is in fact the perfect instrument for political absolutism, and the 
general acceptance o f this system would be fatal to the exercise of 
independent judgement, critical dissent, or critical thought. [...] Our 
contemporaries are already so conditioned to accept technological 
‘progress’ as absolute and irresistible, however painful, ugly, mentally 
cramping, or physiologically damaging its results, that they accept the 
latest technical offering, whether a supersonic plane or a ‘learning cell,’ 
with smiling consent, particularly if the equipment is accompanied by a 
‘scientific’ explanation and seems technologically an ‘advanced’ type.
The old view of autonomous humanity, it seemed, had long since been outmoded by the
realities o f a technocratic existence. For many observers, science and technology had
Whyte, The Organization Man.
' Lewis Mumford, The Pentagon o f  Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964), 277, 285, 286.
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redefined, as William Whyte and C. Wright Mills would later observe, the culture and the 
self.'^ ^
Americans had already absorbed the basic methodology o f neo-behaviorism in
social practice by emphasizing the role o f environment in all aspects o f life. It had been
upheld as well in the biological and social sciences, absorbing technologies like the
teaching machine and the computer as templates of human b e h a v i o r . A s  one
commentator for Life magazine put it in a review entitled, “How to Make People
Behave,” BFD was regarded as “a book of extraordinary intellectual power that attacks a
whole herd of sacred cows. Skinner is on to something of great importance. We are
what we do. We become as we behave.”’^' Further,
In his compacted way Skinner tells us where we seem to be going 
and why. W e’ve obviously started: teaching machines and Head 
Start, managed economy and social welfare. Ahead are regulated 
birth rates (which mean genetic control) and more sophisticated 
forms o f operant conditioning in schools.
Skinner had simply outlined a plan for social engineering whose architecture and
epistemology was already in place. He argued that it was high time to put sound
scientific management to work. His was the response of America’s most prominent
psychologist o f the early 1970s to the terrible predicament of humanity.
Skinner says nothing new about the danger. W e’re exhausting our food 
and fuel supplies, reproducing at a suicidal rate, poisoning the atmosphere.
Rubenstein, Psychology Today, 30.
William H. Fischer, “Strange Bedfellows; Hutchins and Skinner,” Intellect 101 (1973): 243-44. See 
page 243.
Wehster Schott, “How to Make People Behave,” Life 71 (October 22, 1971): 18.
192 Ibid.
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turning the land into a graveyard. Nuelear holoeaust is available if all else
fails. Or we can smoke, drink, or drug ourselves to death.
Skinner put the challenge to his readers to face up to the stark realities of their modem 
existence. Humanity either had to relinquish traditional views of individual freedom and 
human dignity and confront human nature head-on, or face extinction. In this sentiment 
Skinner echoed many other social experts of his generation. Skinner’s solution, at least 
to some, “sound[ed] likely because we’ve thought o f nothing more solid.” '^ "^
Conclusion
In the end many o f his critics believed that in history Skinner would share 
company with the great minds of Western science who had fundamentally reoriented 
humanity’s sense of place in nature and society. “After Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud,’’ 
one commentator for the New Catholic World asserted, “Skinner’s aim is to deal the final 
blow to the narcissistic anthropomorphism of man, .. Skinner’s influence as a 
psychologist was regularly compared to that of Sigmund Freud. Just as Freud had 
asserted that human nature is defined both by hereditary/evolutionary endowment and by 
environment, Skinner’s behaviorist manifesto in BFD conveyed a similar message to a 
generation living in a technocratic s o c i e t y . “After Freud came Skinner. After Skinner, 
...? ”, queried one reviewer for Life magazine.'^’
193 Ibid.
Ibid.
James E. Loder, “Secularized Calvinism; B. F. Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity,'" Review feature 
in New Catholic World 215 (January, 1972): 11, 36-37. See page 11.
Willard Gaylin, “Skinner Redux: The Seductive Attempt to Engineer a Better Man,” H arper’s Magazine 
247 (Deeember, 1973): 48-56. See page 54.
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The neo-behaviorist, B. F. Skinner, is unquestionably one of the most 
influential individuals in the circles of American education. Some would 
go so far as to say that be is actually one of the most powerful persons in 
American society. Surely with the emphasis today upon various kinds of 
“game plans and contingencies,” upon “input and feedback,” and upon all 
of the lexicon which has been borrowed from the computer specialists, 
there may be little doubt that, in its various manifestations, neo- 
bebaviorism virtually has taken over our society. Whether this is largely 
the work of Skinner, or whether be simply symbolizes a trend, is relatively
unimportant. The reality of our situation -  for good or for ill — is what
10 0
matters.
This statement is perhaps one of the best contemporary appraisals of Skinner’s career as a 
scientific social expert in the postwar decades. His models of human behavior bad been 
drawn from those deterministic and mechanistic conceptions o f humanity and society that 
reflected broader trends in modem urbanization and technocratic expansion. With bis 
depictions of behavioral humanity, the reviewer observed, Skinner bad worked to reify 
scientifically the machine image of human nature already familiar to modems. In a 
technocratic world, behaviorism and scientism, it appeared to many, bad become the rule 
of order, and Skinner served as advocate and spokesman.
The sales of BFD did not therefore represent a popular embrace of Skinnerian 
social theory by any means. The controversy among the Skinner watchers and those who 
eventually read the book was over whether or not Skinner’s was the only altemative to 
social collapse. The flood of criticism surrounding BFD represents Skinner’s 
exacerbation of anxieties about what to do with the self at a time in the early 1970s when 
it seemed as if human social institutions were in decline.
Webster Schott, “How to Make People Behave,” 18.
William H. Fischer, “Strange Bedfellows; Hutchins and Skinner,” Intellect 101 (January, 1973): 243-44. 
See page 243. Italics mine.
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In a new era defined by the issues o f poverty, urban strife, technocracy, political 
protest, environmentalism, and war, a new generation of young Americans absorbed 
Skinnerian ideology with an eye toward radical solutions to human problems. Skinner’s 
intellectual critics continued to portray Skinner in the 1960s and 70s as a dyed-in-the- 
wool Orwellian, prognosticating the inevitability of scientific meritocracy. But younger 
readers o f Walden Two discovered, or at least thought they saw, a eurious Skinnerian 
style of humanism and an attention to traditional values o f community, self-fulfillment, 
stewardship of the environment, and the value of what some clearly saw as a ‘technology 
of counterculture.’
Yet as with Taylor at the turn of the century, there were just as many others who 
felt a sense o f urgency in downplaying Skinner’s social theories in a culture lured by 
similar visions of technocratic salvation. It is little wonder then, given this, and given the 
central role that the social sciences came to play in debates about future society in the 
postwar era, that social scientists like Skinner were recognized as important participants 
in the public debate about how to build the ‘Great Society,’ to use Lyndon Johnson’s 
terminology. Americans, however, had never lived in a fully Taylorized/Skinnerized 
environment, bound body and soul to the thralldom of the system. Human behavioral 
technology occupied many cultural spaces, but it was never fully embraced in the manner 
of the fictional Walden Two community. As in Taylor’s time, mechanistic approaches to 
the self were counterbalanced by the desire among many scientists, philosophers, and 
members of the public at large to retain an image of the self that was not devoid of 
autonomy, mentality, or individual uniqueness. Indeed, there were many humanists in 
the ranks of the social sciences, such as Margaret Mead, who offered a different vision of
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social engineering and reform during the postwar decades, and who utilized an entirely 
different set of scientific assumptions ahout human nature and potential. They too 
participated in the national debates ahout the future of humankind, and it is to one of the 
most famous of that number that we turn next.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXPANDING POTENTIALITIES: CULTURE, PERSONALITY, AND MEADIAN 
THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL REFORM
I f  w e once grasp  the m eaning o f  foreign cultures in this manner, we shall also  
be able to see  how many o f  our lines o f  behavior that w e believe to be foun ded  
deep in human nature are  actually expressions o f  our culture and subject to 
modification with changing culture. N ot all our standards are categorically  
determ ined by our quality as human beings, but m ay change with changing  
circumstances. It is our task to discover among all the varieties o f  human 
behavior those that are common to a ll humanity. By a study o f  the universality  
and variety o f  cultures anthropology may help us to shape the fu ture course o f  
mankind.
Franz Boas, The Aims o f  Anthropological Research (1932)'
So w e may say that p o w er d irected  towards persons, ... given by the knowledge  
o f  the springs o f  human conduct, can f i t  a man only f o r  control within a fa sc ist 
state. ... On the basis o f  a scientific knowledge o f  culture and human behavior 
we can sa y  that the p o w er to control individual human behavior and the 
exercise o f  such p o w er are incompatible with human freedom . By recognizing  
that circumstance, by voluntarily trying our own hand and laying a  solemn  
injunction upon our ardent imaginations, w e becom e able to use the control 
that science has given us to se t fu ture generations free.
Margaret Mead, A nd K eep Your P ow der D ry (1942)^
Regardless of academic controversy in recent decades over the original studies of 
Samoan culture that brought Margaret Mead to fame in the 1930s, her contributions to 
American anthropology have profoundly influenced generations o f anthropologists.^ In
' From Franz Boas, “The Aims of Anthropological Research,” in Race, Language, and Culture (New York: 
The Free Press, 1940), 243-59. See page 259. This article is a transcript o f Boas’s presidential address to 
American Association for the Advancement o f Science, Atlantic City, December, 1932. See this address in 
C., 76 (1932): 605-13.
 ^Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America (New York: Morrow, 
1 9 4 2 ), 192.
 ^There are many indications in the professional literature in anthropology that M ead’s influence among 
cultural anthropologists remains strong. For a retrospective o f her accomplishments in anthropology, see 
the series o f  articles in a commemorative edition o f American Anthropologist 82 (1980), especially articles 
by Rhoda Metraux, “The Study o f Culture at a Distance: A Prototype,” 362-72; “Margaret Mead: A 
Biographical Sketch,” 262-69. Other articles on Mead in the same volume include: Francis L. K. Hsu, 
“Margaret Mead and Psychological Anthropology,” 349-55; Peggy R. Sanday, “Margaret M ead’s View of 
Sex Roles in Her Own and Other Societies,” 340-48; Mary C. Bateson, “Continuities in Insight and 
Innovation: Toward a Biography of Margaret Mead,” 270-77. Also see the biographical perspectives by
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part because o f her tremendous success in bringing cultural anthropology into the public 
eye, anthropologists today continue to evaluate her legaey and debate her place in the 
profession.'* Mead used her pioneering approach to culture studies not only to challenge 
traditional American concepts of personality and individual psychology but also to 
critique the discipline of anthropology itself. She believed that anthropology often had 
failed to address the psychological and social aspects of cultural analysis, particularly 
with regard to how the researcher and the subject each contributed to depictions of 
culture as a whole. In her career as a scientist and public intellectual in the postwar 
decades. Mead promoted the “science o f culture” as the key to soeial reform in American 
society.
Like Skinner, Mead achieved a level of popular recognition that few social 
scientists ever enjoyed. Mead’s public persona as the “grandmother” to the postwar 
generation was felt more deeply among Americans, especially younger Amerieans, who 
were exploring cultural alternatives actively in the 1960s.^ Mead’s invocation of social
friends and colleagues published in a special memorial issue o f American Anthropologist entitled “In 
Memoriam: Margaret Mead {\9 0 \-\9 1 % )” American Anthropologist 82 (1980); 261-373. On the long­
standing controversy surrounding her work in Samoa see the original criticisms by Derek Freeman in his 
book, Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking o f  an Anthropological Myth (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). For an overview o f the debates see Lowell Holmes, Quest fo r the 
Real Samoa: The Mead/Freeman Controversy and Beyond (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, Pub., 
1987). More recent publications on Mead/Freeman debate include Derek Freeman, The Fateful Hoaxing o f  
Margaret Mead: A Historical Analysis o f  Her Samoan Research (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); 
Martin Orans, Not Even Wrong: Margaret Mead, Derek, Freeman, and the Samoans (Novato, CA:
Chandler & Sharp, 1996); Paul Shankman, “The History of Samoan Sexual Conduct and the Mead- 
Freeman Controversy,” American Anthropologist 98 (1996): 555-67.
 ^Lenora Foerstel, “Margaret Mead: From A Cultural-Historical Perspective,” Central Issues in 
Anthropology 8 (1988): 25-35. Also see the essays in Confronting the Margaret Mead Legacy:
Scholarship, Empire, and the South Pacific, ed. Lenora Foerstel and Angela Gilliam (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1992).
 ^This characterization of Mead in the early 1970s was not uncommon. A particular instance was in a poem 
composed for Mead as part o f a tribute ceremony at the New York Metropolitan Museum o f Art. See 
Vivien Leone, “Margaret Mead: Coming o f Age at the Met,” Manhattan Tribune 2, no. 37 (August 8,
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scientific expertise to address the everyday problems of living, working, and raising 
families in light of broad transformations in American culture, was similar to Skinner’s. 
But her decidedly humanistic approach to society and the individual, and her steadfast 
support o f American democracy, stood in contrast to Skinner’s perspective. By the early 
1970s Mead was also better known than Skinner.
Unlike Skinner’s dehumanizing, neo-behavioral view of the self and society. 
M ead’s perspeetive upheld the epistemology of “progressive functionalism,” a novel 
approach to cultural analysis in the 1920s advocated by anthropologists Franz Boas and 
Ruth Benedict, among others.® Whereas earlier anthropological analysis had entailed the 
historical reconstruction of cultures using ‘armchair’ theories of soeial evolution. Boas 
and Benedict advocated studying culture directly through the lens of the individual. This 
methodology eschewed established typologies and classifications and focused on the 
dynamic interaction between individuals and groups. Mead also preferred an
1970): 5. Other instances include an obituary published upon her death in 1978 that was similarly titled 
“Grandmother to the World,” New York Times (November 16, 1978): A26.
® I borrow this characterization o f  Boasian functionalism from Rosalind Rosenberg. See her chapter on 
Mead, “Beyond Separate Spheres,” in Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots o f  Modern Feminism 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 207-37. As George Stocking has noted, the idea of 
‘culture’ had gradually taken on relativistic connotations by the early decades o f  the twentieth century, 
having earlier been associated with the social evolutionary and Spencerian theories o f the Victorian era. 
Both Bronislaw Malinowski and Franz Boas argued that human personality and mentality were culturally, 
rather than biologically, determined. Boas in particular argued for a new functional approach to cultural 
analysis that combined the study o f social institutions with that o f individuals, as well as the relationships 
between them. Boasian theory in this regard influenced a new generation o f anthropologists in the 
American tradition, including Gregory Bateson, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead. The association of 
specific cultural contexts with the formation of human personality was featured prominently in their work. 
For more on the development o f the ‘culture and personality’ rubric and o f psychological anthropology in 
American anthropology, see Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others: Essays on Culture and Personality, 
History o f  Anthropology Series, vol. 4, ed. George Stocking (Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin Press, 
1986). For more on the development of functionalist theory in anthropology, see Stocking’s own essays in 
Functionalism Historicized: Essays on British Social Anthropology, History o f  Anthropology Series, vol. 2 
(Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1984).
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interdisciplinary approach to research, using psychology to evaluate individual members 
of a culture, sociology to study kinship, and anthropology to study social patterns.
Mead’s training in science had been influeneed by progressivism and the idea of 
scientific social management. Unlike Skinner’s behaviorism, whieh had its roots in 
Taylor-like science and teehnocracy. Mead’s comparative cultural anthropology was bom 
of humanistic approaches to the self. Those strains of progressivism that were people- 
centered instead of factory inspired were part of the liberal demoeratic perspeetive in 
social science that Mead and her colleagues ehampioned. Their coneeptualizations of the 
self stressed the importance o f the individual and his/her potential for growth and ehange 
on emotional, intellectual, and moral levels.^ By human potential Mead meant the 
untapped adaptive capacity of the individual to expand his/her psychological and social 
worldview, and thereby chart new patterns of living.
Out of Mead’s early anthropological research in the 1920s and 30s came her 
conviction that cultures could be redesigned to handle rapid soeial and technologieal 
ehange. Seeking the support of government and military agencies in the 1940s, Mead 
participated in the wartime study of morale and national character, the food habits of 
Americans, and the cultural conditions that produced human aggression.* From these
 ^See John L. Recchiuti, “The Origins of American Progressivism: New York’s Social Science 
Community, 1880-1917” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1992).
* Research by Carleton Mabee has shed light on M ead’s efforts to mobilize anthropology and social 
science for service in the war effort and the concomitant debates over the responsibility o f social scientists 
to the public in the making o f public policy. See Carleton Mabee, “Margaret Mead and Behavioral 
Scientists in World War II: Problems in Responsibility Truth, and Effectiveness,” Journal o f  History o f  the 
Behavioral Sciences 23 (1987): 3-13. Mead and Benedict also contributed to psychological warfare 
operations in the OSS. For an overview o f social scientists and their participation in psychological warfare 
see Eleanor Sparagana, “The Conduct and Consequences o f Psychological Warfare: American 
Psychological Warfare Operations in the War Against Japan, 1941-1945” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 
1990).
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researches came two important works — And Keep Your Powder Dry (1942), a study of 
American national character, and a text edited by Mead and Rhoda Metraux, The Study o f  
Culture At a Distance (1953), which described the skills, methodologies, models, and 
multi-disciplinary resources needed for the study o f “national character.”  ^ Mead 
pioneered the study of national character — the assessment of cultural patterns in relation 
to individual character — and promoted it as an important tool for defense planning and 
for both foreign and domestic policy design in the postwar international environment. 
Mead also advocated both interdisciplinary social science and cross-cultural social 
analysis in order to foster understanding and communication between nations, and to 
study American social patterns."
Unlike Skinner’s technologies of behavioral modification, however, Mead’s 
scientific wares were of a conceptual and methodological variety, exploiting techniques 
from psychology and psychotherapy in evaluating the behavior of individuals in cultures.
 ^ See Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist looks at America (New York: 
Morrow, 1942) and The Study o f  Culture At a Distance, ed. Mead and Rhoda Metraux (Chicago: University 
o f Chicago Press, 1953). The study of national character developed out o f earlier anthropological traditions 
in culture and personality studies. Mead defined it as an attempt to evaluate and understand how individual 
personalities reflect certain regularities and patterns of the larger culture, or in this case, the nation-state. 
More specifically, the study of national character began with, as Mead states, an “attempt to delineate how 
the innate properties o f human beings, the idiosyncratic elements in each human being, and the general and 
individual patterns o f human maturation are integrated within a shared social tradition in such a way that 
certain regularities appear in the behavior of all members o f the culture which can be described as a 
culturally regular character.” For an extended discussion of national character, see Margaret Mead, 
“National Character,” in Anthropology Today: An Encyclopedic Inventory, ed. A. L. Kroeber (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1953). Ruth Benedict also published studies o f national character. See Ruth 
Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns o f  Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1946). Mead and Rhoda Metraux continued their research into national character and cross-cultural 
stu d ies in the late 1 9 4 0 s in their work with the Research in Contemporary Cultures project at Columbia 
University. For an account, see Rhoda Metraux, “The Study o f Culture at a Distance: A Prototype,” 
American Anthropologist 82 (1980): 362-72.
 ^^ Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, “Science, Democracy, and Ethics: Mobilizing Culture and Personality for 
World War II,” in Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict and Others, 184-217.
' ' See Rhoda M etraux's account of Mead’s work in the Columbia University Research in Contemporary 
Cultures research group in her article, “The Study o f Culture at a Distance: A Prototype.”
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Mead had approached the Second World War scientifically, viewing it as a ‘laboratory of 
culture’ ripe with possibilities for research and application. The war presented Mead 
with the opportunity to tailor projects in cultural analysis to military interests and to 
postwar planners in government. Mead’s promotional campaigns, and her status as an 
advisor to various government agencies, saw her participation in numerous wartime 
committees.
Mead came through the war years also having furthered her reputation as a 
scientific expert. As with other aspiring experts such as Benjamin Spock and B. F. 
Skinner, Mead capitalized on a wave of public interest in the social sciences in the 
following decade by promoting her strategies of community, family, and individual 
adjustment to postwar America.’^  Her studies of American culture gave way to an 
extensive series o f publications, commentaries, and symposia that explored changes in 
family life, social roles for men and women, child rearing practices, and public education.
Mead’s tremendously successful and widely read book, Male and Female: A 
Study o f  the Sexes in a Changing World (1949),’^  was one of her most important 
contributions to the postwar dialogue among social scientists, intellectuals and critics 
about changes in American living patterns. Mead argued that, with the steady 
disintegration of the rural American culture model, there came more pressure on the 
“nuclear family” to function without the traditional community networks that had
See, for example, the discussions o f the public interest in social science in Ellen Herman, The Romance 
o f  American Psychology: Political Culture and the Age o f  Experts (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1995) and William Graebner, The Age o f  Doubt: American Thought in the 1940s (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1991).
Margaret Mead, Male and Female: A Study o f  the Sexes in a Changing World (New York: Morrow, 
1949).
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provided for its basic needs. These networks were being replaced by bureaucratic social 
service agencies, institutionalized education, and mass culture.'"^ Changes in traditional 
gender roles also were transforming the American family. Sharing responsibility for 
family maintenance was crucial. Mead argued, for the survival o f the family unit in the 
postwar decades. Children, moreover, whose sense of belonging and individual identity 
was defined by their early experiences in the family, would need to learn more about how 
to adapt to a culture in flux.'^ In a variety of publications that ranged from the American 
Anthropologist to the Ladies Home Journal in the 1950s, Mead made these points 
repeatedly. As with other prominent scientists-tumed-social experts. Mead sought to 
provide direction, encouragement, and hope to an anxious and unsure public, much as 
Benjamin Spock had done for parents with such manuals as The Common Sense Book o f  
Baby and Child Care (1946).'^
Margaret Mead’s career as a public intellectual, however, has not been given its 
fair due in our historical appraisals. Numerous personal and professional biographies of 
Mead attest to her status as a well-known public icon famous for her opinions on
For more on the history o f the family in America, see the following: Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg, 
Domestic Revolutions: A Social History o f  American Family Life (New York: Free Press, 1988); Maxine 
Baca Zinn and D. Stanley Eitzen, Diversity in American Families (New York: Flarper and Row, 1987); 
Michael Gordon, ed.. The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1983); and Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992).
See Margaret Mead, New Lives fo r Old: Cultural Transformation — Manus, 1928-1953 (New York: 
William Morrow & Co., 1956). Mead’s study o f the Manus people of the Admiralty Islands and their 
adaptation to rapid social and technological change within one generation furthered her conviction that 
American culture held great promise for social progress. At least from Mead’s perspective, the ability of 
the Manus to make adjustments to modernization in a nonviolent fashion was evidence that rapid social 
change in a culture need not be a liability. The ability to adapt and change to new conditions was 
characteristic o f American culture. Mead argued, and was one o f our greatest strengths.
Benjamin Spock, The Common Sense Book o f Baby and Child Care (New York: Duell, Sloan, and 
Pearce, 1946).
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American family life, child rearing, education, and g en d er.B io g rap h e r Jane Howard, 
for example, has described Mead as a “eommon sense” social commentator who was 
accessible and personable. Mead’s authority came from her image as a sympathetic, 
hands-on s c ie n tis t.R o b e r t Cassidy has pointed also to Mead’s talent as a social analyst 
in her anticipation of 1960s social unrest. As Cassidy argues, the public saw Mead as a 
scientist who was ‘with the times’ in the 1960s and early 70s. Rosalind Rosenberg has 
gone perhaps the furthest historically in recent years in studying Mead’s professional 
heritage in progressive era reform ideology, going so far as to describe Mead as a 
“progressive social engineer,” who firmly believed in the power o f social science to 
remake society. What we do not have, however, is an extended assessment of Mead’s 
impact on contemporary debates about the self in postwar America. Given her public 
recognition in American culture, there has been a surprising paucity of discussion about 
Mead’s contributions to social reform debates after World War Two. Mead’s daughter 
and biographer, Mary Catherine Bateson, has observed that her participation in social
Jane Howard has contributed perhaps the most comprehensive and useful popular biography thus far on 
M ead’s life and work in her book, Margaret Mead: A Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Other 
biographies of M ead’s early research and her association with husbands and colleagues Reo Fortune and 
Gregory Bateson include Edward Rice, Margaret Mead: A Portrait (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). 
For a more intimate account of M ead’s career as anthropologist and parent, see the biography by her 
daughter, Mary C. Bateson, With A Daughter’s Eye: A Memoir o f  Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson 
(New York: W. Morrow, 1984). For autobiographical accounts, see Margaret Mead, Blackberry Winter: 
My Earlier Years (New York: W. Morrow, 1972) and her self-titled article in History o f  Psychology in 
Autobiography, vol. 6, ed. Gardner Lindzey (New York: Prentice Hall, 1974), 295-326. Robert Cassidy 
has provided an extended overview of Mead’s opinions on the American family, child development, and 
other facets of American culture in his book, Margaret Mead: A Voice fo r the Century (New York: 
Universe Books, 1982). Perhaps the best ehapter-length discussion o f Mead’s academic and public 
activities is provided by Rosalind Rosenberg. See Rosalind Rosenberg, “Beyond Separate Spheres,” in 
Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots o f  Modern Feminism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982), 207-37.
Howard, Margaret Mead, 289.
Rosenberg, Separate Spheres, 237.
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discourse on these and other issues has yet to be addressed adequately. Bateson has 
called for a sociological analysis of Mead’s career in its proper historical context.^'^
Steps toward a cultural history o f Margaret Mead in America have been taken 
recently by the anthropologist and cultural historian, Micaela di Leonardo.^’ Addressing 
the popular reception of American science in the postwar era, Leonardo has argued that 
Mead’s ethnographies and those of other anthropologists o f her generation are 
particularly important scholarly venues for understanding the “commodification” of 
American science in the twentieth century. Leonardo contends that Mead, whom she 
calls the “genus Anthropologicus to the public” in the postwar decades, has “swamped all 
other anthropologists, even most scholars, in public sphere recognition.”^^  Mead was 
foremost among human science experts such as Skinner and Spock who crafted 
marketable perspectives on human nature for popular consumption. Discussion of the 
Mead phenomenon is thus paramount in understanding the American construction of 
what Leonardo calls the postwar American ‘self,’ an idea of the individual that was 
shaped by new social realities.^'* Di Leonardo has stressed the importance of examining a 
scientist’s own personal and professional aspirations, philosophies, political beliefs, and 
attitudes in evaluating their work and their public career. This is paramount, she claims, 
in any true assessment of their cultural impact. Curiously, however, di Leonardo does
Mary Catherine Bateson, With a Daughter’s Eye: A Memoir o f  Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson 
(New York: Morrow, 1984), 198.
Micaela di Leonardo, Exotics at Home: Anthropologies, Others, American Modernity (Chicago: The 
University o f Chicago Press, 1998).
Ihid., 362.
Ibid., 17.
24 Ibid., 9-16.
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not discuss Mead’s thoughts on broader social reforms very extensively. In this and the 
following chapter I will examine Mead’s reform agendas and their appropriation by 
different sectors of the American public.
In the present chapter I will concentrate almost exclusively on the evolution of 
Margaret Mead’s cultural anthropology and social theories both before and during the 
Second World War, and in the decade after it. Her efforts as an advocate of social 
science in service of democracy (in contrast to Skinner’s), and as a proponent of 
interdisciplinary research that celebrated the diversity of human potential, will also be 
examined. Mead’s depictions of primitive peoples, as well as her examination of the 
changing roles of women, the structure of the family, and the importance of proper child 
rearing and education, will be addressed with regard to the experiences o f Americans 
during the late 1940s and early 50s.
In the first part of this discussion I will address Mead’s early explorations into the 
predictive potential of the concept of “national character.” The study of national social 
behavior through the psychology of individuals was a method that Mead tried 
unsuccessfully to promote in military planning and domestic policy circles during the 
Second World War. Similar to Skinner’s attempts at ‘war science’ projects. Mead’s 
research into such things as American and enemy morale, the strategic impact of 
American food consumption habits, and possible methods of psychological warfare 
illustrate her hope that war mobilization would benefit social science as a whole. The full 
delineation of national character studies and a “science of culture,” would come later with 
the publication of her edited volume The Study o f  Culture at a Distance in 1953.^^ This
Skinner published Science and Human Behavior in the same year. It contained his outline for a science 
o f culture as well.
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text summarized the research techniques that Mead and her colleagues used to study the 
national character of several enemy nations during the war.^®
Secondly, I will examine Mead’s evaluation of American national character in her 
book, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America (1942). This 
work demonstrates the centrality of child development studies and educational reform in 
Mead’s (and Skinner’s) postwar social reform agenda/^ Mead’s call for national 
implementation o f community agencies to administer these reforms on the American 
front is indicated, for example, in her endorsement of the British social services system in 
the late 1940s. Mead felt that the British model struck the proper balance between 
scientific administrative oversight and community participation.
With And Keep Your Powder Dry I will argue also that, much as in Skinner’s 
fictional utopia, Walden Two (1946), Mead was intent on building a comprehensive 
theory o f social reform. Her embrace of an open, democratic society as a prerequisite for 
social progress, however, stood in stark contrast to Skinner’s claim that democracy had 
become obsolete as a system of social management. Moreover, just as Skinner’s 
technocratic model of society reflected his mechanistic view o f the self. Mead’s vision of 
professional social science in service of democracy mirrored her faith in the untapped 
potentialities of the holistic, dynamic, culture-bound self. Mead’s widely popular study 
of American middle class culture, families, and the changing dynamics o f gender roles in 
Male and Female: A Study o f  the Sexes in a Changing World in 1949 covered many of 
the issues that were uppermost in the minds of Americans. As in Skinner’s own
Margaret Mead and Rlioda Metraux, The Study o f  Culture at a Distance (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1953).
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appraisals, Mead’s books revealed the aspirations of professional social scientists to build 
their public authority by providing scientific expertise to a public seeking guidance.
Finally, I will end this chapter with an interlude that compares Mead’s and 
Skinner’s use of evolutionary concepts in constructing their respective visions of the self 
and society. The concept o f adaptation in the postwar decades came to dominate not 
only the biological and human sciences but also much o f the popular discourse among 
scientists and social critics about social change. As I argue, this concept and the 
discourses on change influenced how Mead and Skinner each would construct and deploy 
their concepts of human adaptive potential. Whereas Skinner employed a theory of 
human potential that was highly manipulative and deterministic. Mead’s vision of the 
active self left room for the individual to take part in shape his/her adaptive capacities.
‘National Character’ as an Organizing Concept in Cultural Anthropology
Mead’s concept of national character had its roots in American cultural 
anthropology and the theories o f Franz Boas. In contrast to classic nineteenth-century 
physical anthropology, which emphasized the study of artifacts and linguistics, as well as 
Spencerian social evolution, cultural anthropology centered on the study of present-day 
cultural phenomena. Direct contact with primitive societies through fieldwork was 
essential in gaining a true understanding of the social structure, kinship, language, and 
psyehology of a culture. Cultural anthropology thus lent itself to eonnections with other 
soeial seiences such as psychology and sociology because of its foeus on real-time social 
interactions. Indeed, from its inception in the British, American, and European
Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry.
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anthropological traditions in the opening deeades of the twentieth century, the human 
seiences benefited considerably from the disciplinary cross-fertilization that cultural 
anthropology provided.^* In subsequent decades it contributed to the birth o f hybrid 
fields such as culture and personality studies, psychological anthropology, ethno- 
psychology, and most recently, ethno-history. It also contributed to personality 
psychology in the 1930s and 40s/^
Cultural anthropology saw its most important period o f development during the 
interwar period in America and Europe, with Boas drawing inspiration from the British 
functional anthropologists, Bronislaw Malinowski and Augustus Pitt-Rivers.^*^ 
Functionalism, another sehool of eultural anthropology, stressed a comprehensive 
evaluation of each culture’s unique interpersonal dynamics. Functionalism also 
emphasized the special role of individuals -  their behavior, character, psychology, and
For an overview o f the scientific reception o f cultural anthropology in America see George Stocking, 
“The Scientific Reaction Against Cultural Anthropology, 1917-1920,” in Race, Culture, and Evolution: 
Essays in the History o f  Anthropology, ed. George Stocking (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 270-307. 
On the divergence between British and American anthropology in the 1920s see George Stocking, “The 
Ethnographic Sensibility o f the 1920s and the Dualism o f the Anthropological Tradition,” in Romantic 
Motives: Essays on anthropological Sensibility, ed. George Stocking (Madison, WI: University o f Madison 
Press, 1989), 208-76.
For an overview o f the history o f  culture theory see Marvin Harris, The Rise o f  Anthropological Theory: 
A History o f  Theories o f  Culture (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001). For the history o f the 
development o f psychological anthropology see Charles Lindholm, Culture and Identity: The History, 
Theory, and Practice o f  Psychological Anthropology (Boston: MeGraw Hill, 2001); John M. Ingham, 
Psychological Anthropology Reconsidered (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On the 
development o f ethnopsychology see Roy G. D ’Andrade, The Development o f  Cognitive Anthropology 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For an example o f ethnohistorical surveys see Golden 
Ages, Dark Ages: Imagining the Past in Anthropology and History, ed. Jay O ’Brien and William Roseberry 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)
The rival British school o f structuralism was headed by A. Radcliff Brown who was more concerned 
with deciphering the ‘system o f culture’ in order to explain its particulars through the use o f  linguistics and 
complex mathematical models. For more on the influence o f Malinowski on the American anthropological 
tradition see George W. Stoeking, “Anthropology and the Science o f the Irrational: Malinowski’s 
Encounter with Freudian Psychoanalysis,” in Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict and Others, 13-49. 
For more on Augustus H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers and British ethnology see Mark Bowden, Pitt-Rivers: The Life 
and Archeological Work o f  Lieutenant-General Augustus Henry Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers, DCL, FRS, FSA 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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interaction in groups -  in understanding the broader parameters o f social structure. This 
perspeetive broke with the physical anthropology tradition and was inspired by the 
incorporation of Freudian psychology into ethnography, and by its utility in mapping 
kinship systems. Malinowski and Rivers used Freud’s Oedipal and sexuality theories, 
and his theory of repression, in order to understand the influences o f culture on individual 
character. As the historian Jeremy MacClancy has noted, however, because of the 
decidedly empirical bent of British soeial anthropology, the “speculative” psychoanalytic 
aspects o f early British functionalism were later marginalized. American cultural 
anthropologists on the other hand embraced the psychological and sociological elements 
o f cultural anthropology. They became part of the ‘high era’ o f Ameriean culture and 
personality studies and the national character concept in the 1930s.^'
As George Stoeking observed, the rise of the “culture and personality” rubric in 
American anthropology in the late 1920s and early 30s was part o f an attempt by Franz 
Boas, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, Edward Sapir, and the psychologist Abram 
Kardiner at Columbia University to dismantle the racial and psychic determinism of 
nineteenth-century social evolutionary theory.^^ Cultural determinism was the hallmark
Jeremy MacClancy, “Unconventional Character and Disciplinary Convention: John Layard, Jungian and 
Anthropologist,” in George Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others, 50-71. See page 67.
For an overview o f the major conceptual trends leading to the rise o f the culture and personality ruhric in 
the 1930s see the introduction in George Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others, 1-12. See 
also Regna Darnell, “Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, and the Americanist Text Tradition,” Historiographia 
Linguistica 17 (1990); 129-44. For a seminal work by Abram Kardiner, see his book. The Individual and 
His Society: The Psychodynamics o f  Primitive Social Organization (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1939). For modem analysis o f Kardiner see William C. Manson, The Psychodynamics o f  Culture: Abram 
Kardiner and Neo-Freudian Anthropology (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). For primary resources on 
Sapir see The Psychology o f  Culture: A Course o f  Lectures, ed. Judith T. Irvine and Edward Sapir (Berlin: 
de Grayter, 1994). For a modem appraisal see Regna Damell, “Personality and Culture: The Fate of 
Sapirian Altemative,” in Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others, 156-83.
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of Boasian anthropology.^^ Comparative studies of primitive cultures challenged 
traditional Western concepts of gender, family structure, community, and morality.^"^ 
Their researches also gave way to new concepts o f personality and the self. As Stocking 
noted, comparative cultural analysis revealed many possible conceptualizations of the 
individual. A dynamic concept o f personality as an ongoing process, a manner o f “self- 
actualization,” where the unique contexts of the social environment fundamentally 
defined individual identity and personality, undermined Western ideals of the individual 
(Puritanical self-restraint and moral rigidity). The Boasians, particularly Mead and 
Benedict, mixed culture/personality studies with social reform ideology in critiquing 
American attitudes about race and gender/^
It became clear to the Boasians that new perspectives on patterns o f personality 
and culture could replace theories of biological and socio-economic determinism in the 
physical anthropology tradition. Mead had suggested in her highly popular surveys of
Jeremy MacClancy, “Unconventional Character,” 43.
For an extended evaluation o f the Freudian influence on American anthropology see Joan Mark, 
Four Anthropologists: An American Science in its Early Years (New York: Science History Publication, 
1980). For more on the development of the Boasian anthropological tradition in humanistic anthropology, 
and Boas as a psychological anthropologist, see the set o f essays entitled “Boasian Culturalism,” in George 
Stocking, Delimiting Anthropology: Occasional Essays and Reflections (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2001), 1-76 and Stocking, “Anthropology as Kulturkampf...Science and Politics in the 
Career o f  Franz Boas,” in The Ethnographer’s Magic and Other Essays in the History o f  Anthropology, ed. 
Stocking (Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1992), 92-113.
It is important to note here that the Boasians departed from British functionalism in this regard. With its 
emphasis on relativism and the singular uniqueness o f each culture, British functionalism did not invite 
comparisons between primitive cultures.
Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict and Others, 1-12. It should be noted that Ruth Benedict played 
a particularly important role in introducing culture and personality studies to the rest o f the American 
anthropological community with her book Patterns o f  Culture (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1934). 
Benedict’s studies in cultural psychology emphasized the utility o f using Gestalt theory and other 
techniques in psychoanalysis to study culture through the lens o f individual psychology. For a biography 
o f Benedict see Margaret M. Caffrey, Ruth Benedict: Stranger in this Land (Austin: University o f Texas 
Press, 1989). For more on the professional lives and friendship between Mead and Benedict see the recent 
biography, Hilary Lapsley, Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict: The Kinship o f  Women (Amherst: 
University o f Massachusetts Press, 1999).
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primitive culture in the 1930s and 40s that the institution o f the family, for example,
could be modified to counteract destructive cultural traditions that might result
collectively in authoritarian and fascist societies. Mead had learned from her research
that only through a comparative knowledge of how social roles were defined in different
cultures did the anthropologist understand patterns o f culture and individual character.
At the present time [1928] we live in a period of transition. We have 
many standards but we still believe that only one standard can be the right 
one. We present to our children the picture o f a battle-field where each 
group is fully armoured in a conviction o f the righteousness of its cause.
And each of the groups make forays among the next generation. But it is 
unthinkable that a final recognition of the great number o f ways in which 
man, during the course of history and at the present time, is solving the 
problems of life, should not bring with it in turn the downfall of our belief 
in a single standard. And when no one group claims ethical sanction for 
its customs, and each group welcomes to its midst only those who are 
temperamentally fitted for membership, then we shall have realized the 
high point o f individual choice and universal toleration which a 
heterogeneous culture and a heterogeneous culture alone can attain.
Samoa knows but one way o f life and teaches it to her children. Will we, 
who have the knowledge of many ways, leave our children free to choose 
among them?^^
Mead and Benedict firmly believed that research into primitive cultures would reveal a 
pathway to social reform in modem society, and to a form of social engineering, albeit 
not of the Skinnerian variety.^^ What, Mead asked, was the nature o f American culture? 
What determined its propensity for either constructive or destructive behavior? 
Furthermore, how could individual character be shaped to preserve American 
democracy?
Margaret Mead, Coming o f Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study o f  Primitive fo r  Western Civilization 
(New York, Mentor Books, 1949, cl928), 145.
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Part I. Forsins a New Method o f  Comparative Cultural Anthropolosv in the 1930s
As Thomas Haskell, Jill Morawski, and Hunter Crowther-Heyck have observed, 
the interdisciplinary focus of American social science in the 1920s and 30s had its origins 
in the acknowledgement of a causal interdependence between individuals and their urban 
environments at the turn o f the century/^ The shift away from traditional concepts of the 
individual in the ensuing decades had important implications for professional 
organization as social scientists sought to build new techniques in urban management.^^ 
The crisis o f scientific naturalism in the 1920s and 30s in the social sciences in particular 
factored heavily in the search for public authority in the social science disciplines. Not 
only had it undermined classical democracy, it also brought rationality itself into 
question. This forced social scientists to examine the role of subjectivity in theory and 
methodology.'**’ But these events also signaled the possibility for a true science of 
humanity, one that could transcend human history as well as the intangible inner life of 
the individual. Strict attention to standards of investigation, as well as a mathematically 
oriented approach to human behavior and social phenomena, it was thought, could 
counter the threat o f scientific naturalism.'**
”  Richard Handler, “Vigorous Male and Aspiring Female; Poetry, Personality, and Culture in Edward 
Sapir and Ruth Benedict,” in Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others, 127-55. See page 151.
Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence o f  Professional Social Science: The American Social Science 
Association and the 19^ ’' Century Crisis o f  Authority (Urbana, IL: University o f Illinois Press, 1977); Jill G. 
Morawski, “Organizing Knowledge and Behavior at Yale’s Institute o f Human Relations,” Isis 77 (1986): 
219-42; Hunter Crowther-Heyck, Organization Man: The Life and Work o f  Herbert Simon, forthcoming 
(Fall, 2004) from Johns Hopkins Press.
Morawski, “Organizing Knowledge,” 219, 221.
Ibid., 220.
Ibid.
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In recounting the history of the Institute of Human Relations (IHR) at Yale 
University in the 1930s, for example, Jill Morawski argued that such centers of 
interdisciplinary research contributed to the rationalization of social scientific research 
and collaboration. With sponsorship from the Carnegie Foundation and the National 
Research Council the first director, James Angell, invoked a corporate model of 
scientific collaboration for the Institute in 1929. Scientific practice would be eleansed of 
subjectivity and irrationality through centralized planning strategies similar to those in 
industrial production management.'*^ The rationalization of the research environment in 
the search for order and control, as Morawski observed, also entailed a reductionist view 
of human nature. Indeed, the behavioral/mechanical view of humanity appeared to be 
essential to integrating and standardizing research collaboration around ‘production’ 
objectives for scientific output.'*^ This approach to the self also seemed essential in 
linking social science to municipal, government, and military projects in urban 
management.
The emphasis on systemization was most evident in the IHR under the leadership 
o f Clark Hull in the late 1930s. Hull introduced an even more rigorous plan for research 
production through a system of seminar collaboration. Hull demanded that a precise 
decision making system be used in determining when and how experiments would be 
done, and who would do them. The seminar model also purged experiments of social and 
cultural considerations so that research was based solely on theory and method, a
Ibid., 222-25.
Ibid., 227.
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hallmark feature, as Morawski observes, of physical science/'* These “methodological 
mechanics” streamlined the research process in what I would characterize as a very 
Tayloresque manner. Although Morawski does not describe it this way, she notes that 
Hull’s initiatives proved very successful in meeting the goals of collaborative research — 
control, organization, and the promise of social applications. They entailed a mechanical 
approach to the self. This clearly shows how professional ideals shaped the scientific 
approach to human nature in the 1930s.
As Hunter Crowther-Heyck has demonstrated, however, other soeial scientists 
lobbied for an interdisciplinary framework in social science that reflected a liberal- 
managerial approach to soeial management.'*^ The political scientists Harold Lasswell 
and Charles Merriam at the Chicago School o f soeial science argued, for example, that 
bureaucratic and corporate models of social management could accommodate individual 
liberty if they were grounded in democratic values. Democracy in an urbanized America, 
however, demanded both the rationalization of soeial management and the central role of 
a managerial elite in controlling complex soeial forces. Lasswell and Merriam believed 
that the purpose of social science was not to educate the public (whose rationality, they 
felt, could not be trusted) but to train and advise administrators in local, city, and federal 
governments. This aim of social science, as Crowther-Heyck argues, was evident 
especially during the nationwide city-management movement of the 1920s and 30s. The 
drive to put city management on a corporate footing fundamentally shaped what he has
Ibid., 235-39, especially page 238.
Crowther-Heyck, Organization Man, 64-65 (typescript).
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termed the eontrol-govemance philosophy of seience advisorship in the Chieago 
School/^
As with the IHR, Merriam’s efforts to combine scientific research and social 
reform in such agencies as the International City Manager Association and the Public 
Administration Clearing House (both o f which he helped bring to Chicago) indicates the 
common desire among soeial scientists of all persuasions to help rationalize the processes 
of social administration/^ Margaret Mead shared in this vision in the 1930s, but her 
participation in interdisciplinary projects was intended to both educate the public and 
serve in an advisory capacity in government. Her search for order and control, for 
models of culture, and for new analytical criteria, entailed a vision o f humanity that 
celebrated subjectivity, rationality, and limitless potential. Indeed, her aim was to 
demonstrate that collaborative interdisciplinary soeial science could produce techniques 
of social management without embracing a mechanistic approach to the self. Mead and 
her colleagues therefore criticized theoretical and methodological reductionism in the 
soeial sciences in the 1920s and 30s. Although Mead ran in the same academic circles as 
those in the Chieago School and the Yale Institute, her own cohort was firmly dedicated 
to a liberal-democratic vision o f social management, one that upheld the uniqueness and 
dignity o f the individual.
In keeping with the private philanthropic sponsorship o f social science research in 
the 1920s the Social Seience Research Council sponsored a series o f seminars held in 
Hanover, Washington in 1925 that were designed specifically to foster collaboration
Ibid., 66-70.
Ibid., 81.
250
among anthropologists, psychologists, and other social scientists/^ As Mead reealled in 
her introduction to a book that resulted from these seminars, Cooperation and 
Competition Among Primitive Peoples (1937), the idea of an interdisciplinary study of 
individual character in relation to patterns of aggression had its beginnings in these 
Hanover seminars in the early 1930s. These sessions facilitated numerous collaborations 
among social scientists working on culture and personality studies."^^
Other culture and personality seminars were hosted by Mead at Columbia 
University, and by psychologist Abram Kardiner, at both Columbia and the New York 
Psyehoanalytic Institute. Still another was held by Edward Sapir, John Dollard, and the 
psychoanalyst, Harry Stack Sullivan, at Yale in the early 1 9 3 0 s . T h e  aim in having
For more on the history o f the SSRC see Donald Fisher, Fundamental Development o f  the Social 
Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science Research Council (Ann Arbor; 
University o f Michigan Press, 1993); Elbridge Sibley, Social Science Research Council: The First Fifty 
Years (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1974). For more on the Hanover seminars see Regna 
Damell, “Personality and Culture: The Fate o f the Sapirian Altemative,” in Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, 
Benedict, and Others, 156-83. For background on anthropological research in the discipline overall in the 
1930s see George Stocking, “Ideas and Institutions -  Interwar Anthropology in America,” in Stocking, 
Selected Papers in the American Anthropologist, 1921-1945 (Washington, D. C.: American 
Anthropological Association, 1976), 1-44.
Margaret Mead, Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961, 
c l  937), 1.
Gerald Manson, “Abram Kardiner and the Neo-Freudian Altemative in Culture and Personality,” in 
Stocking, Malinowski Rivers, Benedict and Others, 77-79. A student o f both Freud and Boas, Kardiner was 
a psychoanalyst with training in anthropology who was interested in models o f personality based on 
cultural determinants. He participated in the Columbia seminars for ten years and later published a seminal 
work. The Individual and His Society: The Psychodynamics o f  Primitive Social Organization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1939), which served as a model for what Manson calls “culturalist 
psychology,” or the neo-Freudian application o f psychoanalytic techniques to culture and personality.
Along with fellow psychologists and émigrés, Karen Homey and Erich Fromm, Kardiner started his own 
series o f seminars at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute in 1934 that attracted many o f the members of 
the Columbia and Yale groups, including Mead and Abraham Maslow. Out o f these seminars, as Manson 
notes, came several other seminal works that include Ruth Benedict’s Patterns o f  Culture (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1934), Edward Sapir’s article, “The Emergence o f the Concept o f Personality in a Study 
o f  Cultures,” Journal o f  Social Psychology 5 (1934): 400-15 and two works in the cultural psychology vein 
by John Dollard, Criteria fo r  the Life History, With Analysis o f  Six Notable Documents (New Haven: Yale 
Institute o f Human Relations, 1935) and Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New Haven: Yale Institute 
o f Human Relations,1937). It is also worth noting that Homey, Sullivan, and Fromm were part o f a 
movement to promote a neo-Freudian, humanist oriented psychology in the interwar and postwar years.
See Jan Zimmerman, “Transcendent Psychology: Erik H. Erikson, Erich Fromm Karen Homey, Abraham
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interdisciplinary panels for the workshops at these seminars was to bring all the 
theoretical and methodological resources from psychology, sociology, psychiatry, 
biology, and anthropology to bear upon the study of the individual as a representative of 
an entire society. “The culture and personality approach,” furthermore, as Mead 
proclaimed,
demand[ed] that these separate disciplines cease to abstract certain aspects 
o f human life and study them without referenee to the whole individual, 
and to the numbers of whole individuals who make up any group. It 
insists that there is a common meeting ground where the hypotheses of 
each discipline can be tested out and made relevant to a more genuine 
social science.^'
Mead believed that only by bringing the soeial scienees together in a common effort 
could a holistic vision of individuals and societies be drawn.
A subcommittee o f the SSRC commissioned Mead and her colleagues in 1934 to 
survey extant anthropological literature and delineate eooperative and competitive 
patterns among different c u l t u r e s . Th e i r  efforts were to be combined with data from 
various psychological and sociological studies in order to explore such behavior using
H. Maslow, Harry Stack Sullivan and the Quest for a Healthy Humanity” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern 
University, 1982). For an institutional history o f the Freudian schools that they founded, and their fate in 
postwar Freudian psychology, see Neil G. McLaughlin, “Why Do Schools o f Thought Fail? Neo- 
Freudianism as a Case Study in the Sociology o f Knowledge,” Journal o f  History o f  the Behavioral 
Sciences 34 (1998): 113-34. For appraisals o f Sullivan in conjunction with Ruth Benedict’s work see F. 
Barton Evans III, Harry Stack Sullivan: Interpersonal Theory and Psychotherapy (London: Routledge, 
1996); Calvin I. Saxton, “Educating for Worldmindedness: The Theories o f Harry Stack Sullivan, Ruth 
Benedict, and Brock Chisolm” (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1995).
Mead, Cooperation and Competition, 2.
Ibid., 3. May and Doob published a report on these seminars, as did Mead in 1937. See Mark May and 
Leonard Doob, “A Report o f the Subcommittee on Competitive and Cooperative Habits, o f the Committee 
on Personality and Culture, Based on Analysis o f Research Achievement and Opportunity by Members of 
the Subcommittee,” Subcommittee on Competitive and Cooperative Habits, Subcommittee: Gordon 
Allport, Gardner Murphy, Mark May, Chairman (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937). For 
more on the careers o f Murphy and Allport in personality psychology in the 1930s see Katherine Pandora, 
Rebels Within the Ranks: Psychologists ’ Critique o f  Scientific Authority and Democratic Realities in New 
Deal America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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multiple levels of inquiry. For this survey Mead assembled a group of colleagues and 
graduate students at Columbia that included her mentors A. Radcliffe-Brown and Ruth 
Benedict, as well as the psychologist, Erich Fromm, the sociologist, John Dollard, and the 
philosopher, Abraham Edel.^^
Over the course o f the year-long seminar Mead and her colleagues set about 
formulating a research strategy for the comparative study of primitive cultures. Her 
efforts were inspired by a familiarity with other interdisciplinary initiatives, especially 
those o f Edward Sapir, Harry S. Sullivan and the psychologist, Lawrence K. Frank, who 
worked on integrating the sciences o f human relations at Columbia and who also 
participated in Mead’s seminars.^"* The techniques used by Mead’s panel involved 
individual and group assessments of previously collected ethnologies to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of social habits in each culture. This included studies of 
primitive cultures in New Guinea (Arapesh), the Philippines (Samoans), and North 
America (Dakota, Eskimo, Zuni), among many others. The manuscript that eventually 
resulted from the comparative analysis of thirteen different primitive cultures. 
Cooperation and Competition in Primitive Cultures (1937), marked, by Mead’s
On A. Radcliffe-Brown and British structuralism see A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Adam Kuper, The 
Social Anthropology o f  Radcliff-Brown (London: Routledge & Regan Paul, 1977). On M ead’s views of 
Brown’s structuralism and their professional collaboration see George W. Stocking, “Margaret Mead and 
Radcliffe-Brown: Society Social Systems, Cultural Character, and the Idea o f Culture, 1931-1935,” History 
o f  Anthropology Newsletter 20, no. 2 (1993): 3-11. For more on the theories of Erich Fromm see A 
Prophetic Analyst: Erich Fromm’s Contributions to Psychoanalysis, ed. Mauricio Cortina and Michael 
Maccoby (Northvail, NJ: Aronson, 1996); Gerhard P. Knapp, The Art o f  Living: Erich Fromm's Life and 
Works (New York: Lang, 1989). For an overview o f John Bollard’s work and life see Steven Weiland, 
“Life History, Psychoanalysis, and Social Science: The Example o f John Dollard,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly 86 (1987): 269-81.
Mead, Cooperation and Competition, 4. Mead also mentions that her participation in the Hanover 
Seminar o f Human Relations helped her formulate the strategy for this study. Lawrence Frank was one of 
M ead’s close colleagues and shared in her progressive-oriented reform agendas for both social science and 
society. See Stephen J. Cross, “Design For Living: Lawrence K. Frank and the Progressive Legacy in 
American Social Science” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins, 1994).
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reckoning, no less than a new research template for comparative anthropology as the
science o f  culture studies.
The research results, Mead asserted, yielded a basic strategy for assessing
cultures, not from cataloged artifacts or social evolutionary theories, but through the
examination of available ethnographic, sociological, and psychological data. Mead
claimed to have discovered four general areas o f analysis that would yield patterns of
individual personality and group behavior in each culture: material environment,
technology, social structure, and education.^^ The conditions o f the natural environment,
the availability of resources, as well as the technologies devised to exploit them, all had
effects on how people organized their cultures. This in turn contributed to levels of
cooperation and competition found in the social structure, the key factors in determining
what Mead would later call a culture’s overall “national character.”
The dynamics o f social structure, Mead discovered, appeared to be the central
factor in shaping the interrelations between individuals and groups. “The recognition of
this fact,” Mead said,
led us far toward the most basic conclusion which comes out o f this 
research: that competitive and cooperative behavior on the part of 
individual members o f a society is fundamentally eonditioned by the total 
social emphasis of that society, that the goals for which individuals will 
work are culturally determined and are not the response of the organism to 
an external, culturally undefined situation, like a simple scarcity o f food.^^
And just as importantly, this meant that there were no arbitrary or universal criteria for
predicting patterns o f  cooperation and competition in cultures. Cooperative and
Mead, Cooperation and Competition, 14-15.
Ibid., 18.
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competitive behaviors, Mead concluded, were formed according to the traditions of each
culture. This revealed exciting possibilities for social planning in the American context.
Mead’s seminar group, however, ultimately found it necessary to dispense with the
original request of the SSRC subcommittee for a report on universal patterns of human
behavior, since, as they had discovered, none existed. The panel chose instead to
describe character traits in relation to particular social systems, a technique that could still
provide some level of predictive and useful information about different cultures.
Mead thus had found some general research criteria with which to speculate on a
culture’s potential for either competitive or cooperative behavioral patterns. Individual
social status in cooperative cultures, for example, seemed not to undergo much change.
Competitive cultures, however, seemed somewhat more malleable given increased
tensions between different factions and groups. Competition, Mead discovered, made
individual social status more precarious; competitive cultures were organized around the
initiative of the individual.^* There was less of this in highly cooperative cultures,
however, since groups worked together toward common ends. Mead asserted that war
and conflict were more common among highly competitive and individualistic cultures.
We have seen that it is not [for example] the actual supply o f desired 
goods which decreases whether or not the members of a society will 
compete for it or cooperate and share it, it is the way the structure o f the 
society is huilt up that determines whether individual members shall 
cooperate or shall compete with one another.^*^
57 Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 480.
Ibid., 481.
“  Ibid.
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Individual behavior manifested competitiveness or cooperativeness depending on the 
cultural conditions. When the individual ego was closely attuned to status and property 
as measures o f success, competition was the predominant character trait. When 
achievement was judged on the hasis of its value for the entire community, however, a 
more cooperative character structure resulted. Competitive cultures tended to push 
children into adulthood more rapidly, while cooperative cultures encouraged a more 
gradual integration into adult society.®' In terms of individual character formation, it 
appeared to Mead that the criteria o f success, rather than material conditions, ultimately 
determined the intensity of cooperative and competitive traits in a culture.
From a historical standpoint, the reform subtext o f Mead’s cultural analyses in 
these instances was very apparent. Cooperation and Competition was published in the 
midst of an economic depression and an unfolding fascist threat in Europe. The scientific 
explanation of cooperation and competition, and Mead’s opinions about the merits of 
each, were thus manifest in her culture and personality studies in the 1930s. Mead’s 
early research into the character traits of cultures eventually culminated at the end of the 
1940s in Ruth Benedict’s Research in Contemporary Cultures center at Columbia and the 
production o f an interdisciplinary research manual for studying national character in 
1953. Compiled under the editorship of Margaret Mead and her student colleague,
Rhoda Metraux, and with contributions from Geoffrey Gorer, Martha Wolfenstein, 
Gregory Bateson, and others, The Study o f  Culture at a Distance (1953) presented 
techniques for examining national character in cases where no direct contact with the
Ibid., 495.
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culture was possible. In examining Japanese, German, and Russian national character 
during the war, for example, these techniques combined the skills of the historian, who 
might only have access to textual materials, film, and art, with the analytical survey 
methods o f anthropologist.^^ The ability to make assessments o f national character with 
limited resources. Mead and Benedict felt, would be vital for future domestic and foreign 
relations policy design.®^
Culture At A Distance, in fact, represented for Mead the basis of a new “science 
of culture.” It included lessons gleaned from researches into primitive cultures, the 
collaborative study of competition and cooperation, the study o f national character for the 
war effort, and research into contemporary cultures by Mead, Benedict, and their 
colleagues at Yale, Columbia, and New York University. In the early 1950s this 
culminated in an effort to incorporate national character studies into projects in 
international relations and world peace sponsored by organizations such as the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).®'* Professional
Mead and Metraux, The Study o f  Culture at a Distance, 3.
The Research in Contemporary Cultures consortium at Columbia spawned a number o f seminal 
studies in national character during the 1940s by Benedict, Gorer, Metraux, and others. See examples like 
Geoffrey Gorer, The American People: A Study in National Character (New York; Norton, 1948); Ruth 
Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns o f  Japanese Culture (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1946).
63 Mead and Metraux, The Study o f  Culture at a Distance, 6.
^  For background on UNESCO and its projects in the 1950s see Seth Spaulding and Lin Lin, Historical 
Dictionary o f  the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Laham, 
MD: Scarecrow Press, 1997).
The development o f the concept o f national character via the culture and personality studies o f the 
1930s and early 40s, as historian George Stocking and sociologist Alex Inkeles have noted, was fueled by 
the desire among Mead, Benedict, Gorer, and Metraux to make techniques in cultural anthropology 
applicable to domestic and international projects o f  social reform. As a result o f the rush to deploy these 
concepts into the war effort and the internationalism movement that followed, however, a critical 
assessment of national character by anthropologists had not then taken shape. Part o f the problem with 
such synthetic studies o f national character, as historian William Manson points out, was that members of 
different disciplines did not speak each other’s scientific languages, and this made it difficult for all to see 
the value o f combining theories and techniques. The professional criticism in anthropological circles over
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criticism of national character theory as an organizing principle for anthropology began 
to surface in the mid- to late 1950s, however, and this contributed to its subsequent 
downfall among a new generation of cultural anthropologists. As sociologist Alex 
Inkeles has observed, anthropology and personality psychology nevertheless benefited 
tremendously from the cross-fertilization that national character studies precipitated.^^ 
During the war years, Mead and her colleagues had found an effective vehicle in national 
character studies for marketing comparative cultural anthropology and social science to 
military and government agencies. It is to her emergence as a science advisor during the 
war years, and to her critique of American readiness for war and its aftermath, that we 
turn next.
national character that emerged in the early 1950s focused on the unreasonable level o f  personality and 
cultural uniformity that national character was made to assume, as well as the use o f  “Freudian causal 
schemes” in delineating personality formation. One clear example o f this, as Manson mentions, was that of 
infant swaddling in the research of Gorer and Rickman’s study o f Russian national character. Restrictive 
swaddling o f children was used to explain a host o f adult character traits. See William Manson, “Abram 
Kardiner,” in Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others, 88.
Stocking, Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others, 11. As Inkeles notes the period between 1939 and 
1945 saw the most intense activity in the development o f the national character concept. Further theoretical 
elaborations came with Abram Kardiner’s disquisition in Psychological Frontiers o f  Society (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 1945) and Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, ed. Flenry A. Murray 
and Clyde Kluckhohn (New York: Knopf, 1948). Geoffrey Gorer’s work on American and Russian 
national character came in for particular criticism, as did M ead’s Powder where cultural analysis was 
mixed with social criticism, something that many anthropologists felt invalidated her assessment of 
American national character. For more on the history o f the concept o f national character in cultural 
anthropology and its development hy the generation o f anthropologists after Mead in the 1960s and 70s see 
Alex Inkeles, National Character: A Psycho-Social Perspective (New Bmnswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997). For appraisals o f national character in the subsequent generation o f anthropologists, see 
Manson’s references to Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality, ed. F. L. K. 
Hsu (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1961) and M. Singer, “A Survey o f Culture and Personality theory and 
Research in Studying Cross-Culturally,” in Studying Personality Cross-Culturally, ed. Bert Kaplan 
(Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1961), 9-90.
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Part IL Wartime Applications: Marketins National Character to the Government
As the historian Virginia Yans-McLaughlin has noted, the Second World War 
forced many anthropologists to examine the political and social implications of their 
work as their association with government agencies increased. Moreover, after the war, 
as McLaughlin states, no one could avoid what she terms the “politics of anthropology” 
and its relevance to foreign and domestic affairs o f state.^^ Mead’s primary aim during 
the war years and beyond in working with government agencies on special committees, 
as well as in rallying professional social science to the cause, was to promote 
interdisciplinary, collaborative studies in national character and to advocate for the 
improvement and expansion of community services for children and families on the home 
front.
By the early 1940s Mead’s professional reputation, as well as her status as a 
public intellectual, had been established through the popularity o f her famous studies of 
primitive cultures and her successful participation in government policy-making circles. 
Using this reputation to gain access to government circles. Mead became very active in 
involving the social sciences in the war effort. Mead’s growing reputation as a prominent 
government advisor during this period is indicated in her work with the National 
Research Council’s Committee on Food Habits, the Committee for National Morale
^  Yans-McLaughlin, “Science, Democracy, and Ethics,” 185. For a history o f  anthropologists’ 
participation in government during the war and afterward see The Politics o f  Anthropology: From 
Colonialism and Sexism Toward a View From Below, ed. G. Huizier and B. Mannheim (Mouton: The 
Hague, 1979); Margaret Mead, “The Use of Anthropology in World War Two and After,” in The Uses o f  
Anthropology, ed. Walter Goldschmidt (Washington, D. C.: American Anthropological Association,
1979), 145-57. For background on the fate o f social science participation in government policy making see 
Social Science and Policy Making: A Search fo r Relevance in the Twentieth Century, ed. David L. 
Featherman and Maris A. Vinovskis (Ann Arbor, MI; University o f Michigan Press, 2001).
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(organized privately by social scientists), the U. S. Children’s Bureau, the Office of War 
Information, and the Office of Strategic S e rv ic e s .M e a d ’s work with the Committee for 
National Morale (CNM) in particular serves as an example of how Mead and her 
colleagues attempted to craft knowledge products that would have practical applications 
in the war effort.^^ Not being able to offer up physical technologies. Mead and her 
professional cohort endeavored nevertheless to show that concepts such as national 
character could be powerful tools in planning war strategy.
With the pressing need for information about how different nations and cultures, 
allies and enemies alike, might respond to escalating world conflict, Mead and her 
colleagues began converting the techniques for analyzing character traits in primitive 
cultures to those of modem, large-scale societies where direct study was not always 
possible. Research models for evaluating cultures at a distance presented a serious 
challenge. As with the cooperation/competition studies, research conditions demanded 
innovation in analyzing the best available (but often incomplete) data on the culture in 
question. The rapid production of information ‘tools’ for the armed services was 
paramount. In moving from analysis o f the small-scale local community to that o f an 
entire nation or region of the world. Mead, Ruth Benedict and Geoffrey Gorer, promoted
For a history o f the U. S. Children’s Bureau see Kriste A. Lindenmeyer, ‘A Right to Childhood': The U. 
S. Children's Bureau and Child Welfare, 1912-1946 (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1997). For 
historical background on the history o f food studies in the NRG, see Marion Nestle and Donna V. Porter, 
“Evolution o f Federal Dietary Guidance Policy; From Food Adequacy to Chronic Disease Prevention,” 
Caduceus: A Museum Quarterly fo r the Health Sciences 6, no. 2 (1990): 43-67.
^  See comments on M ead’s activities in this committee in Ellen Herman, The Romance o f  American 
Psychology, 48-53.
Mead and Metraux, Study o f  Culture at a Distance, 364.
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the appeal o f national character theory as a way of efficiently encapsulating the key 
cultural characteristics of various nation-states/^
After returning from Bali in 1939 Mead began working with an independent 
group of prominent researchers attempting to organize social scientists for government 
service. The original aim of this group, the Committee for National Morale (CNM), had 
been to address the apparent lack o f resolve among some European nations in confronting 
the menace o f Nazi aggression. The research plan was first to assess the national morale 
among these countries in order to judge their readiness for war, and second, to implement 
a program for increasing American morale. The CNM attracted many of the most 
prominent scholars and scientists of the time. Its membership is testament to the 
considerable support among socially active scientists who wanted to place social science 
in the service o f national defense.^’ Its ranks boasted over one hundred members 
organized into seventeen different subcommittees. These smaller groups would examine 
the psychological, medical social, economic, and historical dimensions o f national morale 
in the United States and Europe and assess their relevance to the design of domestic and 
foreign policy, public opinion and propaganda strategies, the eonstruction of social 
services, and the delineation of educational objectives.’  ^ Prominent participants included
Carleton Mabee, “Margaret Mead and Behavioral Scientists in World War II; Problems in Responsibility, 
Truth, and Effectiveness,” Jowrwa/ o f History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 23 (1987): 3-13.
For an overview of scientific involvement in social issues in the interwar period see Peter J. Kuznick, 
Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists As Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1987). Another important organization responsible for bringing together psychologists interested in 
addressing the implications o f psychology in social reform was the Society for the Psychological Study of 
Social Issues. For an historical appraisal o f SPSSI see the collection o f  articles edited by Benjamin Harris, 
“Fifty Years o f  Psychology and Social Issues,” Journal o f  Social Issues 42 (1986): 1-233; Ian Nicholson, 
“The Politics o f  Scientific Social Reform, 1936-1960: Goodwin Watson and the Society for the 
Psychological Study o f Social Issues,” Journal o f  History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 33 (1997): 39-60.
From a list o f members and subcommittees for the CNM. Papers o f  Margaret Mead, Special Working 
Groups, n. d., Container F I, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. Washington, D. C. For an
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Robert Yerkes, James Angell, Karl Menninger, George Gallup, Max Lemer, Gregory 
Bateson, Leonard Doob, Gifford Pinchot, and Geoffrey Gorer. Their intent was to help 
place a national morale program on a sound scientific footing. Such a program would be 
crucial in getting the country ready for war. Mead thought, especially after a decade of 
economic depression.
The research plan on the home front would be “the study of those factors, 
psychologically and sociologically most vital to morale.”’  ^ Capitalizing on the available 
data from a wealth of sociological studies of communities (such as the famous 
Middletown studies), groups and organizations within these communities (such as unions, 
community service groups, and student youth groups), and individual biographical 
histories, the CNM aspired first to diagnose American attitudes toward war, and 
America’s appropriate role in the global conflict.^'^ The Committee also conducted 
research to discover how knowledge of enemy national character could be exploited to 
gain a strategic advantage. In one instance Mead headed up a subcommittee on German 
national character that addressed strategies for war propaganda. The subcommittee
overview o f CNM aims see Gregory Bateson, “Morale and National Charaeter,” in Civilian Morale, Society 
fo r  the Psychological Study o f  Social Issues, Second Yearbook, ed. Goodwin Watson (Boston; Houghton 
Mifflin, 1942), 71-91.
From a copy o f the original research summary presented by the CNM to the National Research Council, 
Papers o f Margaret Mead, Special Working Groups, n. d., Container F I, Library o f Congress Manuscript
Division. Washington, D. C.
74 The Middletown studies were conducted in 1924-25 in Muneie, Indiana, and were designed to show the 
effects o f commercialism and industrialism on the traditional community structure o f an American town. 
Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd argued that these traditional networks were gradually undermined by 
consumerism. See Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American 
Culture (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929). For further background see Dwight W. Hoover, “Changing 
Views of Community Studies: Middletown as a Case Study,” Journal o f  History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 
25 (1989): 111-24; Richard W. Fox, Epitaph for Middletown: Robert S. Lynd and the Analysis o f  Consumer 
Culture (New York: Pantheon, 1983); John S. Gilkeson, “American Social Scientists and the 
Domestication o f ‘Class’ \929-1955,” Journal o f  History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 31 (1995): 331-46.
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recommended using refugee informants from various economic classes, a technique 
similar to Mead’s use o f native informants in her primitive culture research/^ From these 
and other studies the CNM developed a scientific “treatise” on the principles o f morale, a 
set o f guidelines for building and enhancing it in the American context, as well as 
methods isolating those psychological factors that counteracted it. The manual, they 
claimed, could also be applied to the study o f enemy morale programs.^^
Historian Carleton Mabee has observed that the concept o f the CNM was never 
endorsed fully by the American government. Although it made inroads in successfully 
promoting the role o f social science in the war effort by winning research contracts, the 
CNM was funded only to a limited degree. A separate social science agency, hoped for 
by many of its members, never materialized. Government officials remained skeptical 
about what “academics” could really do for the war effort. Most social scientists 
subsequently were recruited into established military and government agencies for work 
on other research projects.’  ^ Mead herself went on to serve as the secretary for the 
National Research Council’s Committee on Food Habits that looked at American eating 
habits and their potential impact on the war effort.’* Although the Committee for
From an undated copy o f the minutes taken in a subcommittee meeting on cooperative national 
psychology over which Mead presided. 24 March 194[?]. Papers o f Margaret Mead, Special Working 
Groups, n. d., Container F I, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. Washington, D. C.
Ibid. Mead was involved with the Social Sciences subcommittee and the Youth and Child Development 
subcommittee.
Mabee, “Mead and Behavioral Scientists in World War II,” 4.
For an overview o f the Food Committee and its activities see Carl E. Guthe, “History o f the Committee 
on Food Habits,” in The Problem o f  Changing Food Habits, Bulletin o f  the national Research Council, No. 
108, 1-19. See also Margaret Mead, Food Habits Research: Problems o f the 1960s. (Washington, D. C.: 
National Academy o f Sciences-National Research Council, 1964). For more on collaborative research 
funded by the NRC see Glenn E. Hugos, “Managing Cooperative Research and Borderland Science in the 
National Research Council, 1922-1942,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 20 
(1989): 1-32.
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National Morale was short lived, it provided Mead and her cohort with crucial guideposts 
in designing research into national character and contemporary cultures/^
At the end of the 1940s, Ruth Benedict’s Research in Contemporary Cultures 
(RCC) center continued to thrive at Columbia. As Hunter Crowther-Heyck has observed, 
a host o f interdisciplinary social science research centers such as the RCC were launched 
in the decades after the war. They were funded by a diverse collection o f patrons that 
included universities, private philanthropic organizations, and government/military 
agencies.**^ Although most o f these patrons were interested in research that was 
behavioral and technical in orientation, the RCC geared its research toward 
interdisciplinary studies on specific issues in international policy.*'
Crowther-Heyck has noted also the vital role of committee and project work 
during and after the war in coordinating research. Mead’s network o f academic, political, 
and government connections in the 1940s established her as what Crowther-Heyck 
describes as a broker o f interdisciplinary research, a well-connected scientist able to bring 
individuals and groups together.*^ The activities of Mead and other such brokers 
contributed significantly to the institutional growth o f the professions and their 
incorporation into the military industrial complex after the war.*^
79 Ibid.
Hunter Crowther-Heyck, Organization Man, p. 249, 252 (typescript). Such centers, as Crowther-Heyck 
notes, included the Harvard Department and Laboratory of Social Relations, MIT Center for International 
Studies, the RAND Corporation, and the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences 
sponsored by the Ford Foundation.
See Crowther-Heyck on patron expectations for social science research in Organization Man, 253 
(typescript).
Ibid., 255.
Ibid., 274.
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As Mead would argue in And Keep Your Powder Dry, and elsewhere in the 
popular and academic press, American social science and culture needed to change 
together. Mead argued that the future o f society lay in the expansion of human potential 
through comparative cultural analysis of those familial, community, and otherwise social 
contexts in which human creativity, especially in the young, might be enhanced. Social 
change, as both Mead and Skinner «might have agreed, provided Americans with 
opportunities to chart new patterns of culture that would ensure the survival o f American 
society and, as Mead hoped, liberal democracy.
National Character, Nationalism, and a New Model for American Democracy
Mead had aggressively deployed the concept of national character in examining 
American culture during the Second World War in her book. And Keep Your Powder 
Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America, published in 1942. In this, a highly rhetorical 
and anti-isolationist social commentary, she presented her thoughts on the character traits 
that best fostered democracy. By far, the most important factors in molding a culture 
were child rearing and education. Her emphasis on the value of cooperative cultural 
patterns in Powder foreshadowed her commentaries on education reform, liberal 
democracy, and international communication in the postwar decades.
^  Mead, Powder, 14.
Powder was intended as a eall to arms, directed broadly to all Americans, but also in particular to 
American social scientists. Just as physicists and chemists had been enlisted to apply their talents to the 
machinations o f war. Mead argued, anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists needed to put their 
knowledge to work. If the social crisis o f the Depression had failed sufficiently to coax social scientists 
from their academic ‘ivory towers’ en masse, Mead argued, surely a threat to the fate o f the free world 
would.
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If Americans were to preserve a privileged place for the individual and 
encourage each person’s talents and abilities, Mead argued, the virtues of freedom and 
choice had to be affirmed over social conformism. For Mead, such an open society had 
to uphold the ethical and political imperatives necessary for a true science of social 
progress. This vision entailed viewing the self as a dynamic nexus o f creativity and 
uniqueness, not as an automaton. The presence of both of these notions o f the self in 
different parts o f American culture. Mead observed, however, was a reflection of 
conflicting social values in American culture. As Mead asserted in Powder, for 
example, Americans in general faced a particularly confusing set of cultural rules about 
the appropriateness of cooperation and competition in different social situations. There 
were also mixed messages for women about proper gender roles, and for children about 
their roles in adult society.
In Powder Mead brought her comparative anthropological research to bear upon 
these aspects of American national c h a ra c te r .M e a d  wanted to present her readers with 
a historically informed, scientific ‘diagnosis’ of the strengths and weaknesses of a nation 
faced with the task o f preserving democracy in the Western hemisphere. War was 
waged. Mead observed, not just between opposing countries, but also between different 
cultures, each with its own sets of traditions, values, and social practices governing 
everything from socioeconomic policy to education.^^ Preparedness for war required 
scrutiny o f Americans from every walk of life. Americans, Mead cautioned, could not 
afford to presume that commonly held concepts of human nature, individuality, race.
Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry. 
Ibid., 15-20.
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gender roles, and social conventions would be adequate in evaluating their enemies, or
themselves. Mead’s anthropology had already exposed the fallacy of racial and
historical stereotypes.^^ Americans, she asserted, now needed the special insights of
anthropologists in assessing the unique national character of each combatant in order to
predict their response to a world crisis.
According to Mead, the self-image of American children depended in great
measure upon the approval o f their parents. Love and aeeeptanee were based on the
child’s ability to live up to standards of success gleaned from mass culture. Such was the
case for the individual in society who sought validation through the approval of peers.
Success in America, as Mead asserted, was measured by the ability of individuals to
distinguish themselves personally, intellectually, and materially from their peers through
competition. Material wealth and social mobility had become the hallmarks o f the
successful American. This need for recognition and success was most acute. Mead
observed, among the middle classes, the American barometer o f national health. And in
a nation built upon social mobility and progress, the success o f the middle class reflected
that of the nation, just as the success o f the child indicated the health o f the family.**
The story of American children and families, then, mirrored that o f American
character in general. Such analyses gave way to many other generalizations about
Americans. “Their nature,” Mead asserted,
is geared to success and to movement, invigorated by obstacles and 
difficulties, but plunged into guilt and despair by a catastrophic failure or a 
wholesale alteration in the upward and onward pace;.. .a character which 
measures its successes and failures only against near contemporaries and
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 65, 68.
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engages in various quantitative devices for reducing every contemporary 
to its own stature; a character which sees success as the reward of virtue 
and failure as the stigma for not being good enough;.. .a character oriented 
towards an unknown future, ambivalent towards other cultures, which are 
regarded with a sense of inferiority as more coherent than our own.
Yet it was these “catastrophic failures” and “wholesale alterations” in the formula for
progress that most concerned Mead in light o f the war. The demoralizing effects of the
First World War, coupled with the failure of the economy in the late 1920s, and the
Depression in the 30s, she argued, had fostered profound disillusionment and cynicism
among A m e r i c a n s . H o w  could those raised in such an environment serve as an
example to their children? How, Mead wondered, could they ask their children to wage
another war?
As Mead saw it, the parents of the war generation had failed in the Great War to 
finish the job o f bringing democracy to Europe. Instead they left it to the scourge of 
fascism and indulged themselves in a decade o f waste, decadence, and materialism in the 
1920s. The Depression that followed left the country demoralized, and its people 
endured a poverty of both body and spirit.^' Fortunately, as Mead assured, it was 
precisely because Americans were not bound to tradition and their past that they could, 
through the war, create the American dream anew. For Mead, the war ironically 
presented a unique opportunity to set things right.
89 Ibid., 193-94.
^  Mead also feared that such cynicism and a desire to succeed once again as a nation would lead, as it did 
in some cases, to American forms o f fascism. See her comments in Powder, 195-204.
Ibid., 115-25.
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Part of Mead’s goal in Powder, was thus to convince Americans that their 
national character could still be wielded as a weapon both of war and peace.^^ The young 
people who would fight the war needed all the moral and material support that their 
parents’ generation could muster. Mead aspired to place the social sciences, particularly 
comparative anthropology, at the forefront of this effort. By studying the processes of 
American character formation and building upon those traits that could be utilized to 
motivate people, social science could play a vital role in national and international 
reconstruction.
Inasmuch as her anti-isolationist analysis of Ameriean character in Powder was
an exposition on why Americans should embrace war mobilization. Mead’s treatise also
revealed a fully developed agenda for postwar social reform. Predictably, this would
entail the expansion of the social sciences to aid in democratic reconstruction. The
engineering of culture, even while used for war. Mead argued, need not result in the kind
of totalitarian regimes seen in Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. True social
engineering. Mead asserted, would not reduce humanity to the level o f the machine.
While it could not bring forth the social utopia hoped for in these social ‘experiments,’ it
could nevertheless serve the cause of freedom and democracy.^^
It is possible that this type of social science, which is not a mere lifeless 
aping of the mannerisms of the natural sciences but which shapes its
^  Mead claimed that although the expression of human emotion was universal to human beings, the mode 
o f its expression was different in each culture. With regard to aggression, American modes are explained 
by the way we learn as children to use aggression in different confrontational situations. The rules, she 
said, can be complex. The end result, however, was that Americans tended only to fight when provoked 
first by an adversary o f equal strength. See Mead, Powder, chapters 9 and 10, 139-71.
Ibid., 176-78. This form o f social engineering, which Mead said stems from the physicalist view of 
human nature embodied in Pavlovian science, aims to dictate rather than facilitate a desired social structure, 
to oppress rather than liberate. One can imagine similar comments by Mead about Skinner’s vision of 
social utopia as well.
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hypothesis to its materials and includes the repercussions o f a hypothesis 
inside its equations, can give us premises by which we can set men free; 
release in them the energies which can be trusted to develop towards more 
freedom instead of towards a machine model of slavery or Utopian 
totalitarianism.^"^
True to her polities o f applied social science, Mead also believed that a cross-national and
cross-cultural approach was essential to progress, allowing Americans to transcend the
perceptual boundaries o f conventional culture and examine themselves in light of the
‘other.’ But social scientists themselves had to become more applications-oriented to
make this possible. As in her previous work. Mead implored them to start this work now,
before the war was over.
How can we organize a society in which war will have no place? And as 
the scientific question most germane to freedom: What are the conditions 
in a culture, in its system of education, in its system of interpersonal 
relationships, which promote a sense of free will?^^
Reworking classic American virtues, just as Skinner had in Walden Two, Mead hoped
also to put the characteristically American traits of practicality and the puritanical virtues
of inventiveness and industry to work in social experimentation, reinventing the formula
of success for Americans through the study of democratic social pattems.^^ American
flexibility and ability to adapt to new conditions. Mead asserted, would allow for the free
exploration o f new social processes. Yet, as Mead reminded, time was of the essence.
Only by going to each people, now, while they are living their own lives in 
their traditional way, can we find out these accidentally discovered, these 
inarticulate and priceless secrets of how to draw out of each generation of 
children unguessed potentialities...If we use the clues which other great 
cultures give us, and if  w e work with members o f  those cultures in
^  Ibid., 182.
95 Ibid., 183.
Ibid., 209.
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building the world new, we will have ways o f tapping human energies as 
startling, as exciting, and the ways of tapping natural resources which so 
dazzle our eyes today.^’
Mead had subtly mixed together science and reform polities in her previous 
books, but in Powder there was no mistaking her agenda. Powder, as Virginia Yans- 
McLaughlin has noted, reflected the care Mead took to gear her scientific analysis to the 
sensibilities o f the American public. In the case of sex roles, for example, in Powder 
Mead toned down the strict cultural determinism she had argued for in Sex and 
Temperament and played instead to more traditional conceptions of gender roles.
Powder was panned roundly among American anthropologists as an inaccurate misuse of 
anthropological data to make social commentary. But it signaled Mead’s professional 
shift away from field research and toward an expanding career as a social commentator 
and public intellectual in the 1940s. She would concentrate more fully on American 
problems in subsequent publications.^*
British Social Services as a Model for Modern Democracy
Mead participated in many federal and military programs during the decades after 
the war and was one of the key members o f the 1950 Mid-century White House 
Conference on Children and Youth commissioned by President Truman. This committee 
was charged with examining the state of Ameriean social services in light of ongoing 
research into family life, child development, and the socialization of young adults into
97 Ibid., 238.
Yans-McLaughlin, “Science, Democracy, and Ethics,” 205.
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society/^ Mead’s call for the creation of new community-based family and educational 
agencies during the war embodied her convictions about the diversity and flexibility of 
human nature and the place of the individual in Ameriean culture. Her aim as a social 
science expert in this regard was not only to foster further interdisciplinary research on 
families and communities but also to provide recommendations about the problems of 
individual social adjustment to government agencies.
Even in later years the policy recommendations o f the Mid-century White House 
work groups continued to reflect Mead’s influence and her use of comparative 
anthropology techniques to evaluate the social services infrastructure in other countries. 
In one particularly instructive instance Mead drafted a brief description o f British social 
service agencies in a report for the U.S. Office o f War Information and touted it as an 
ideal model for the postwar development of Ameriean social services.’^ ’ This brief 
study, entitled “Reflections on a Short Trip to Britain,” highlighted Mead’s considerable 
admiration for what she believed was the superior effectiveness of the British system of 
implementing programs in education, nutrition, and community development. The 
British system also embodied many of the features of professional social science that 
Mead hoped to foster in the Ameriean context. Her findings in Britain are therefore 
worth brief examination.
^  Mead maintained a career long membership in this committee and served on it during each presidential 
administration until her death in 1978.
Yans-McLaughlin, “Science, Democracy, and Ethics,” 198.
Margaret Mead, “Reflections on a Short Visit to Britain,” Office o f the War Department, 1943-1945. n. 
d. Container E l 54. Papers o f Margaret Mead. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. Washington, D. 
C., 1-18.
Histories o f British social welfare programs and services include British Social Welfare: Past, Present, 
and Future, ed. David Gladstone (London; UCL Press, 1995); J. Dworkin, “Social Workers and National
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The central feature o f the British system, Mead recalled, was the tradition of 
allowing local communities and agencies a substantial measure o f control over 
government funds by encouraging the direct participation of the public in policy 
implementation. The formation of community-based “citizen’s advice bureau[s],” Mead 
observed, produced a healthy balance between bureaucratic administration and the public 
control o f agencies. These committees were collaborative in nature, emphasizing 
flexibility in harmonizing national social policies with the realities o f local community 
conditions. The professional agencies and citizen committees also placed value on 
individual perspectives in what Mead described as a characteristically British, team- 
oriented approach to problem solving.
Those ineffective standards of practice and professional scientific hierarchies that 
were more akin to American social service bureaucracy, it seemed to Mead, were much 
less in play in the British c o n t e x t . I n  the case o f implementing nutritional standards in 
school lunch programs, for example, Mead noted that local British agencies were given 
much more freedom than their American counterparts in adjusting national nutritional 
standards to the availability of local resources and preferences. This institutional 
“flexibility,” which Mead found very appealing, was typical of the overall “preference for 
diversity” in British social welfare a g e n c i e s . O t h e r  features of British culture — public 
participation, flexibility, cooperation, and a celebration of individual and group diversity 
— also contributed to differences in the professional training of British social scientists.
Health Care: Are There Lessons from Great Britain?,” Health and Social Work 22, no. 22 (May, 1997):
117-23; Pat Starkey, “The Medical Officer o f Health, the Social Worker, and the Problem Family, 1943- 
1968: The Case o f Family Services Units,” Social History o f  Medicine 11, no. 3 (December, 1998): 421-41.
Mead, “Reflections on a Short Visit,” 3-6.
Ibid., 8-9.
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The ability of local and national agencies to effectively work together and accommodate 
regional differences reflected the willingness of British professionals to collaborate with 
designated lay representatives in communities rather than rely on established 
methodology to control the entire process. Professional and lay groups in Britain worked 
together to design solutions based on specific social contexts.
Mead concluded that the professional patterns o f practice in British social science 
were a manifestation of the broader tradition of collaboration and camaraderie in the 
culture at large, and that this was a tradition that Americans in the postwar world should 
begin to imitate. The British social science tradition seemed to illustrate the need for 
change in American social science and its obsession with efficiency, professional 
authority, and methodological standardization in implementing policy. American social 
science research overemphasized objectivity and universal methodology, which in turn 
contributed to what historians of science have described as the cult of the ‘expert’ in 
American society.
The question for American social scientists. Mead insisted, was how to begin 
designing a new science o f culture that could study social patterns without compromising 
their complexity with standardized research methods. Further, Mead asked, could social 
scientists begin to experiment with American culture within the framework o f a new 
science of human behavior?*®^ What new cultural traditions in American communities 
and families would be needed in order for social experimentation and reform to take
For subsequent published comments by Mead on the ideal kinds o f social scientific research institutions 
for community maintenance, see her lectures in Margaret Mead, Continuities in Cultural Evolution (New
Haven; Yale University Press, 1964), especially pages 298-306. 
Ibid., 14.
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place? Mead used the British example among others to help Americans answer these 
questions and to understand the dual need for reform in social science as well as in 
society during the postwar years.
As with many in her professional cohort, Mead believed in a “humanistic 
democracy,” based on “faith in the potentialities of human nature,” as revealed by a 
social science rooted in interdisciplinary studies and a commitment to comprehensive and 
holistic approaches to human behavior and personality.'®’ Like John Dewey, Mead 
believed in a philosophical pragmatism that reflected the interdependence o f science and 
democracy. In his own book of the late 1930s, Freedom and Culture (1939), Dewey had 
pointed to the importance o f the social sciences, particularly anthropology, as part of the 
basis of a new ethic o f reform in the modem age. Dewey and Mead both believed that 
science itself possessed a “moral potential.” '®*
Unlike Skinner, Mead understood that social science, being the youngest of all the 
sciences, was largely an historical rather than statistical or technical endeavor, a slow 
accumulation of cultural knowledge. “Man,” Mead asserted, “is made human through his 
culture,” and human nature could not be reduced to experimental measurement, as
Yans-McLaughlin, “Science, Democracy, and Ethics,” 209.
Ibid., 208; Margaret Mead, “The Comparative Study o f Culture and the Purposive Cultivation of 
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Skinner had h o p e d . O n l y  hy the slow accumulation of information could patterns of 
culture be discerned. One could not make a physical science of humanity, since culture 
and human nature were always context driven. Rather than trying to control human 
behavior directly, Mead asserted, the best way to effect change was to use the knowledge 
of specific cultural contexts to maximize the free and spontaneous development o f innate 
human po ten t i a l i t i e s . S uch  a prescriptive reflected both striking similarities and also 
distinct differences between Skinner and Mead in their approach to the self in postwar 
culture, particularly with regard to American families.
The Lessons of Comparative Anthropology for Postwar American Families
Mead’s commentaries on the fate of the American family, gender roles, and 
individuality in the early 1950s drew heavily from the global, rather than merely national, 
context of cultural change in the postwar era. Mead believed that it was important for 
Americans to examine emerging social patterns in light of international social change. 
Mead also argued that comparative studies would help Americans understand how a 
traditional conception o f the American family dynamic might be altered to accommodate, 
for example, changes in the social roles of the sexes. Mead’s intent with Male and 
Female: A Study o f  the Sexes in a Changing World (1949) was to introduce Americans to 
the concept of cultural malleability. Americans in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Mead
See Margaret Mead, “The Modem Study o f Mankind,” in An Outline o f  Man's Knowledge o f  the 
Modern World, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), 323-41. See page 330. It is important 
to note here that this essay seems to have been, in fact. M ead’s counterpoint to behaviorist theory and 
technology, and was specifically aimed at Skinner.
n o Ibid., 337-41.
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observed, were attempting to live the myth of the nuclear family. This had contributed to 
what David Riesman described in his book, The Lonely Crowd (1951), as the ‘other- 
oriented’ personality, enamored of idyllic images of success, the perfect family, and the 
“well-adjusted” child.
Again using her anthropological studies Mead hopes to use Male and Female to 
show Americans that the mass media fixation on the “perfect” middle class family 
actually obscured the considerable variation in family types among the cultures o f the 
world. Citing the Samoan, Manus, Arapesh, Mundugumor, Tchambuli, latmul, and 
Balinese peoples. Mead explained the wide variations that existed among these peoples 
with regard to social roles for the sexes, developmental stages in children, and personality 
types. The diversification of family models and gender roles in the American postwar 
context also showed that no universal or ideal family structure or individual existed."^ 
Indeed, as another famous commentator of this period, Julian Huxley, put it in his review
Ibid., 264. The ideal o f the family was widely discussed and criticized by social scientists and 
intellectuals. For an overview see Fred Matthews, “The Utopia o f Human Relations: The Conflict Free 
Family in American Social Thought, 1930-1960,” Journal o f  History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 24 ( 1988): 
343-62.
“Male and Female,” condensed and edited for publication in the Ladies Home Journal 66 (September, 
1949): 36-37. The articles were presented with the intent o f using M ead’s insights to help American 
women understand how M ead’s experiences as an anthropologist could contribute to the American 
understanding o f how to raise healthy and emotionally well-adjusted children. The articles were also 
designed to help women understand and cope with the changing status of women in American culture and 
provide guidance and encouragement as they began to balance motherhood with new career opportunities.
Mead, New Lives fo r  Old, 248. For more on the proliferation o f children and family studies in the 
postwar era see Margo Horn, Before I t ’s Too Late: The Child Guidance Movement in the United States, 
1922-1945 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Kathleen W. Jones, Taming the Troublesome 
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of Male and Female, Mead had contributed the “valuable reminder that the [cultural]
attitude o f our own society has no special validity just because it is ours.” ” "* Culture he
observed was a matter o f human artifice. Moreover,
[Mead’s] anthropological studies have led her beyond all simple theories 
of economic and social determination to a recognition of the almost 
unbelievable range of cultural possibilities open to man, each in its own 
way a creative work of art — a unitary presentation of how to be human.
And she believes in applied anthropology and in the possibility and in the 
possibility of action, through the building up of a positive cultural pattern 
and ideal with its own stability and its own dynamism."^
An awareness of cultural diversity and malleability. Mead told her readers, was a 
distinct advantage for Americans whose social patterns had yet to take shape. Clearly, 
American patterns o f living were not set in stone; they had developed according to 
specific environmental and social conditions."^ Furthermore, when considering regional 
patterns o f community and culture within America, Mead argued, the concept of a 
universal or natural state of human nature looked even less tenable. Mead suggested to 
her readers that, with the aid of social science, Americans could design new strategies for 
living, i. e., “develop and elaborate this precious system of invention and social practice 
that man alone of all living things has begun.”’ "  The new rule of American culture, it 
seemed, was adaptability. This required the loosening o f traditional social categories and 
mores.
Julian Huxley, “Human Relations,” review o f Male and Female, by Margaret Mead, The Spectator 184 
(February 10, 1950); 184.
“ Mbid,
' Mead, “Male and Female,” Ladies Home Journal, 135.
"M bid., 144
118 Ibid,, 153.
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For Mead, American cultural change was best represented in gender roles. In the 
1950s women were finding their way into higher education and the professional work 
force. Recent scholarship on women activists during the 1950s has dispelled the 
assumption that Cold War social conservatism and containment kept women squarely in 
their domestic roles. Joanne Meyerowitz and other historians of women in the postwar 
era have amassed considerable evidence on women’s advocacy movements in labor and 
the professions during the 1950s that effectively debunks assumptions that some 
historians have accepted without qualification."^ Further, these studies show that the 
drive for representation in the workforce, although not yet politically feminist, 
nevertheless crossed racial and cultural divides to bring women from different ethnic and 
socioeconomic backgrounds together.
Indeed, as labor historian Susan Hartmann has demonstrated, the support for 
women in business and industry was more extensive than previously thought. An 
expanding economy created a need for more personnel. Women’s employment levels 
went back up to their wartime height by the mid-1950s. Organizations such as the 
National Manpower Council, the American Nurses Association, the YWCA, and a 
special Commission on the Education of Women sponsored by the American Council on
See Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960, ed. Joanne Meyerowitz 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994) and Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American 
Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basie Books, 1988).
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Education, among other organizations, lobbied aggressively on issues of women’s
employment and child care, as well as against sex and race-based discrimination.*^'
Still, the conflicting cultural messages that women often encountered about their
place in postwar American society belied the persistent mandate that women guard and
preserve their traditional roles as mothers and caretakers in the nuclear family unit. Wife
and mother vs. independent, educated worker/producer — this. Mead said, was the
conundrum for women in the postwar era. Attempts by women to take on new career
paths often were met with public criticism in the mass media. Like other ‘second class’
Americans, such as youth, minorities, immigrants, and the poor, women faced a postwar
culture where full participation paradoxically was both praised and criticized.
The continued inequities, in contrast to emancipation, faced by women and
minorities in America also reflected a stark contrast in the 1950s between the propaganda
of American democracy, and the reality o f discrimination. Women, Mead observed, were
expeeted to embrace their new roles in the American work force while maintaining their
old status as mothers and domestic caretakers. Similarly, young people, minorities and
immigrants were taught that full social participation and opportunity were theirs for the
taking; yet stereotypes and prejudices often dictated otherwise. *^  ^ The hypocrisy,
xenophobia, and containment tendencies of American society during the Cold War era.
Mead observed, kept Americans from realizing the dream of a true democracy.
The fresh bright dreams of a system based on a belief that all men are 
created equal and with an equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, on which our American democracy is based, have been
Susan M. Hartmann, “Women’s Employment and the Domestic Ideal in the Early Cold War Years,” in 
Meyerowitz, Not June Cleaver, 84-102.
Mead, Male and Female, 445.
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compromised from the beginning by the existence of slavery, a general 
political and snobbish intolerance toward people of other races, creeds, 
and nations, and by a tendency to interpret our political forms and the 
accidents o f our particular way of life as having wider and more universal 
qualities than they have, so that we often insist, with the voice o f the 
cultist preacher, that the rest of the world, of they who would share our 
wealth and our know-how, must adopt our manners and morals.
Such ethnocentrism. Mead continued, also perpetuated what in American anthropology
and social science had been the well-worn assumptions o f universality and
standardization in human personality and potential, or, conversely, those hierarchies of
human potential grounded in theories of race and gender. This scientific chauvinism.
Mead suggested, may have stemmed from cultural resistance to examining the self
through the lens of world cultures.
In Male and Female and the rest of her popular science writing during the 1950s,
Mead lobbied for expanded social roles for women as well as changes in traditional
models o f family, community, and the individual. Not only was the ability to revise
American social mores scientifically demonstrable, it was a social imperative if true
democracy in America was to be realized. As one reviewer for the popular intellectual
magazine. The Survey, paraphrased Mead, the “plea” was to, “let us have fully realized
human beings contributing to society, not manikins typed by inappropriate extensions of
sex differences.”’ "^^ Mead’s message in Male and Female was that the process of social
change itself held the key to expanding human potential. The parents o f the next
generation in the 1950s were very important in this respect. Mead said, since they
seemed.
123 Ibid.
Cora du Bois, “An Anthropologist on Sex,” review o f Male and Female, by Margaret Mead, The Survey 
85 (Oetober, 1949): 554-55. See page 555.
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Primarily ... concerned with their children as persons, as little potential 
bundles of high achievement, who must be given the very best chance, the 
best education, the best habit training, for success in life. Life [for 
postwar Americans] is a race that both boys and girls must run ...
Any plan that resorted to coercion (as with fascism or communism, or hard-line
technocracy) was doomed to repeat the mistakes of the Depression and the World
Wars.'^^ If these pitfalls could be avoided. Mead thought.
Then we [might] have what we may call world religions, world political 
and technological systems, systems with potential universality, whose 
claim to universality is based on a willingness to share what they have 
obtained by revelation or invention with all members o f the human race.
There perhaps could be universality in social science methodology after all, but not o f the
mechanistic variety. Such a methodology would be based on the universal recognition of
diversity of culture and human behavior, and o f the need for a collaborative approach to
their study.
Here again was Mead’s plea for model for a new science of culture — an 
interdisciplinary and international science that celebrated and encouraged the free 
exchange of information about how each culture, each context o f human experience, held 
within it an endless treasure trove of human potentialities that could be tapped to realize 
American democracy. Social science itself would reflect democratic values. Exploring 
the potentiality o f the self was after all for Mead a practice in bringing together objective 
and subjective descriptions o f the evolutionary, biological, physiological, psychological, 
and cultural aspects of human behavior. Interdisciplinarity and diversity o f perspective, 
as envisioned in the original personality and culture seminars at Columbia and Yale in the
Ibid., 283.
Ibid., 455.
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1930s, had always been Mead’s goal for a new social science o f democratic social 
reform.
Human Nature and Adaptive Potential: Postwar Scientific Perspectives
As indicated in this and previous chapters, a predominant theme running through 
debates about human nature and the future of democracy in the postwar era is the concept 
o f adaptation. Despite obvious differences in the way Mead and Skinner each conceived 
of the self, they nevertheless both embraced a basic behavioral orientation to the 
individual in society. Human beings, indeed all organisms, were shaped fundamentally 
by environmental conditions. This had long since been confirmed by urban trends in the 
last century and a half, and by the rise of social evolutionary theory. Skinner and Mead 
both concerned themselves with how humans should adapt to new cultural frameworks, 
social roles for the sexes, and patterns of family, work, and community. Adaptability 
became the central rule for Americans in the postwar era.
Aside from its political and social dimensions bom of war, modernization, and 
economic expansion, the concept of adaptation in social science also had strong 
connections to the Evolutionary Synthesis in biology, to the new sciences of ecosystems 
ecology and cybernetics, and to information theory in cognitive psychology that took 
shape in the postwar decades. By this time social evolutionary theory had moved away 
from the strong environmental determinism implied by social Darwinism in the 
nineteenth-century. The recognition of individual agency and group cooperation in
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processes o f change in nature and culture led to cross-fertilization between the biological 
and social sciences in the opening decades o f the twentieth century.
This was also true for anthropology and psychology. In the area o f cognitive 
science, for example, evolutionary concepts were used by one of its founders, Herbert 
Simon, in modeling human nature on computers and machine systems where 
environmental feedback modified internal decision-making procedures (programs) to 
produce any number of complex and subtle behavioral adjustments.'^* The predominant 
environment for modem humanity, as Hunter Crowther-Heyck has noted, was mass 
society and the bureaucratic complex.
Mead and Skinner represent opposing scientific approaches to the self in social 
science. Both visions of human nature, however, reflected a basic acceptance of the
For background on the Evolutionary Synthesis see Joseph A. Cain, “Common Problems and 
Cooperative Solutions: Organizational Activity in Evolutionary Studies, 1936-1947,” Isis 84 (1993): 1-25; 
John C. Greene, “From Huxley to Huxley: Transformations in the Darwinian Credo,” in Science, Ideology, 
and World View: Essays in the History o f  Evolutionary Ideas (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 
1981); Peter Bowler, “The Evolutionary Synthesis,” in Evolution: The History o f  an Idea (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1988), 307-18; Vassaliki Smocovitis, “Unifying Biology: The Evolutionary 
Synthesis and Evolutionary Biology f  Journal o f  the History o f  Biology 26 (1992): 1-65. For an overview 
o f the connections between evolutionary theory, human ethics, and ecological theory see Gregg Mitman’s 
study of Warder Clyde Allee and ecological theory at the University o f Chicago in The State o f  Nature: 
Ecology, Community, and American Social Thought, 1900-1950 (Chicago: The University o f Chicago 
Press, 1992). For a history on the connections between evolutionary theory and cybernetics, see Donna J. 
Haraway, “The High Cost o f Information in Post-World War II Evolutionary Biology: Ergonomics, 
Semiotics, and the Sociobiology o f Communication Systems,” Philosophical Forum 13 (1981-82): 244-78. 
On ecosystem ecology see Joel B. Hagen “A Rational Field Physiology,” in An Entangled Bank: The 
Origins o f  Ecosystem Ecology (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 15-32; Chunglin 
Kwa, “Radiation Ecology, Systems Ecology, and the Management o f the Environment,” in Science and 
Nature: Essays in the History o f  the Environmental Sciences, ed. Michael Shortland (Oxford: Alden Press, 
1993), 213-50. For the influence o f cybernetics and systems theory on psychology, see Hunter Crowther- 
Heyck's biography of Herbert Simon in his forthcoming hook. Organization Man.
128 Hunter Crowther-Heyck, Organization Man, 538 (typescript).
Ibid., 541-42. The idea o f  individuals and society, machines within machines, stems back to the 
mechanical worldview o f the Enlightenment. In its modem postwar incarnation, the connection between 
individual and society was grounded in analogies from physiology, ecology, and cybernetics, fields that 
were linked closely to one another through the new computer-oriented science o f systems theory. In the 
organic microcosm o f the individual, as well as the physical macrocosm o f the bureaucratic society.
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modem bureaucratie worldview, especially when Mead and Skinner turned to the 
consideration of humanity’s adaptive potential, both individual and collective, and to 
evaluating systems of social management and democracy. Simon, Skinner, and to a 
lesser extent. Mead, also used the concept of Darwinian natural selection to describe how 
human adaptation to the social world took place; behaviors that were advantageous to the 
self in adjusting to family, school, and community were selected out by the environment, 
and also, in Mead perspective, by individuals themselves. Indeed, the key difference 
between Mead’s and Skinner’s conceptualization of adaptive human potential was the 
presence/absence in the individual of independent choice, freedom, and agency. While 
Mead’s holistic vision of the self celebrated these aspects of human nature, Skinner’s 
mechanistic approach dismissed them altogether. To this extent, Skinner’s view o f the 
individual, who is entirely controlled by environment, put certain limitations on the 
adaptive potential o f the self, whereas Mead’s anthropology of self-actualization freed the 
individual to make choices about behavior and about the design o f environments. 
Skinner’s social vision, as I have argued, moreover, was technocratic, while Mead’s was 
democratic.
Both Skinner and Mead referred to the idea of human potential, but they did so 
using very different assumptions about the role of cognition and culture in shaping 
individual behaviors and social roles. What distinguished Mead’s anthropological 
approach was her view that human nature, in all its varied manifestations throughout the 
world, was fundamentally an expression of the complex dimensions o f culture. Although 
Skinner considered the social and historical dimensions of postwar Ameriean culture in
systems worked toward homeostasis and equilibrium through adaptation to new conditions. See Crowther- 
Heyck, Organization Man, 544-45.
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promulgating his vision of a behaviorist-inspired technocracy (by way o f his utopia), he 
removed mind, personality, and cultural history from his experimental view of humanity. 
Skinner felt that the behavioral potential of human organisms, their ability to adapt to 
complex arrays o f environmental contingencies, was limitless. But his view o f humanity 
was very limited in scope, one that did not involve recognition of internal hierarchies of 
consciousness and cognition. Mead’s view of human potential, on the other hand, sprang 
from the complex and multi-layered inner and outer worlds of the self, where cognition, 
experience, mentality, and culture all played a hand in adapting the individual to different 
social and environmental conditions. Mead’s scientific view of the multi-layered self, 
moreover, recognized the agency o f individual human beings in controlling the 
development o f their potentiality, whereas Skinner’s vision of the programmable self did 
not.
Mead counted many psychologists among her cohort of collaborators in her 
culture and personality studies. The theories of humanist psychologists such as 
Lawrence Frank, Erich Fromm, Karen Homey, and Gardner Murphy, for example, 
influenced Mead’s constmction of the holistic self in cultural anthropology. For her ideas 
on adaptation and human potential. Mead drew inspiration from, among other sources, 
the theories o f the personality psychologist, Gardner M u r p h y . M u r p h y  and Mead 
shared similar convictions about the need for interdisciplinary techniques in the study of
As a central pioneer o f the psychology o f perception and personality, and a progressive science 
eompatriot o f M ead’s, Gardner Murphy was best known for theories o f human personality that entailed 
both a biological/evolutionary and social interpretation o f individual mental development. Murphy’s work 
on human perception and personality at the City College o f New York in the 1940s culminated in his 
monumental work o f 1947, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure, which became a 
landmark in the psychology o f personality. See Gardner Murphy, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to 
Origins and Structure (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947).
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human nature, and about the dangers of experimental methodologies that redueed the 
study of humanity, as Skinner had, to statistieal quantifieation.
Mead and Murphy viewed the individual as a work in progress — a eomplex of 
aetivities constantly in evolution — rather than as an entity with a finite and fixed set of 
capacities.'^' Human life had no standard architecture for Mead; it changed and 
transformed over the course o f time. Akin to Mead’s theories o f individual development 
in primitive culture, Gardner Murphy’s trademark ‘field theory’ o f personality 
accommodated the multiple levels of interaction that he felt existed between the nexus of 
inner and outer activity that defined the individual, and the surrounding fields of activity 
in the physical, biological, and social environment.'^^ This interaction, Murphy, and 
Mead, believed, shaped the development of perception and personality for each 
individual, a dimension of the self that Skinner’s view of the adaptive individual did not 
recognize. The concept of the active self as a field of activity interacting with the
Such an approach to personality stood in sharp contrast to traditions in the social sciences during the 
1920s and 30s that favored the study o f aggregate groups and the standardization o f  mental and personal 
traits through statistical analysis. See, for example, Kurt Danziger, “Investigating Persons,” in 
Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins o f  Psychological Research (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 156-78; and Katherine Pandora, “Defying the Law o f Averages: Constructing a 
Science o f Individuality,” in Rebels Within the Ranks: Psychologists ’ Critique o f  Scientific Authority and 
Democratic Realities in New Deal America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 61-89.
See Murphy’s article, “Kurt Lewin and Field Theory,” Bulletin o f  the Menninger Clinic 30 (1966), 358- 
67. As Murphy observed in this retrospective, Kurt Lewin was a leading American proponent o f Gestalt 
psychology in the 1920s and 30s and believed that perception and thought were not brain processes that 
could be explained simply as combinations of individual impressions. Along with German Gestalt theorists 
Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Kohler, Lewin believed that the integration of sueh impressions ereated a new 
level of understanding not reducible to its component parts. Using the concept o f the ‘field’ borrowed from 
physics, Lewin furthered Gestalt theory by applying the mathematics o f topology as well as concepts of 
space to the study o f mental development and perception. Lewin introdueed the idea o f the “life space” as 
a way of coneeptualizing individual psychology and the proeesses o f differentiation and pereeptual 
formation. See Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory o f  Personality (New York: MeGraw Hill, 1935). For more 
on Murphy’s impressions o f Gestalt Psyehology and its ehallenge to older meehanistie and behaviorist 
traditions in psychology, see his article, “The Geometry o f Mind,” Harper's Magazine 163 (1931): 584-93. 
For more on the history o f the German tradition in Gestalt psyehology, see the recent study by Mitchell G. 
Ash, Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the Quest fo r Objectivity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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environment also distinguished Mead’s view of the evolution of the individual as a an 
adaptive process from Skinner’s.
The most pressing task in cultivating human adaptive potential, as both Mead and 
Murphy argued, was to create environments that encouraged people to look beyond their 
individual and social maps of reality and cultivate new cognitive skills and perspectives. 
The cultivation of mental and intellectual creativity was of utmost importance. Whereas 
Skinner’s behavioral theories had stressed precise controls in eliciting useful behaviors, 
Murphy and M ead’s personality theories argued for a science of the self that would free 
human potential by applying cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary approaches to 
educating children in the home and classroom. Whereas Skinner spoke o f changing the 
environmental contingencies in the laboratory through manipulative technology. Mead 
and Murphy advocated experiential diversity for children in learning, which was in their 
view the central meehanism of individual a d a p ta tio n .M o s t research on personality 
during the 1930s was laboratory-based and had not, Murphy felt, addressed its true 
origins. In the works of Ruth Benedict and Mead, however, Murphy saw a means to 
correct this deficiency by demonstrating how cultural context shaped personality. The
Having minored in anthropology at Harvard in 1916, Murphy became familiar early on with the Boasian 
school. Murphy had discussed cross-cultural anthropology with Boas himself in the early 1920s at 
Columbia as a graduate student, and he was deeply influenced by Boas’ perspectives on human nature. 
Murphy later read M ead’s first book, Coming o f  Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study o f  Primitive Youth 
fo r  Western Civilization (New York: Morrow, 1928), and was a strong supporter o f  her comparative 
approach to cultural analysis. He appreciated M ead’s emphasis on the malleability o f human nature and the 
relationship between personality and its cultural milieu. See Lois B Murphy, Lois B. Murphy, Gardner 
Murphy: Integrating, Expanding, and Humanizing Psychology (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1990), 102.
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combination of insights on personality from various sources in social science, moreover, 
Murphy hoped, would help refocus the psychological study of the self in general.'^'*
Given all the multifarious interactions between (and within) the individual and the 
surrounding social and physical environment, the standard view of perception, as simply 
the “mediation” o f the inner and outer world of the self, had never made sense to Murphy 
or Mead. ‘Sensing’ the world, perceiving and understanding reality, was no mere 
function of the sense organs or the brain. The “dynamic personality” — possessed o f a 
myriad o f memories, experiences, tastes, values, needs, and talents — reflected the 
process of “sifting” out a reality that was unique for each person. Perceiving, as William 
James had observed, was not simply unconscious information gathering, but rather a 
process o f  learning, i. e., of integrating, relating and organizing new experiences into the 
fluid matrix o f the holistic self.'^^
As with Mead’s cultural anthropology, Murphy’s Neo-Jamesian and 
interdisciplinary approach to human perception inspired his experimental research on
One o f the prominent facilitators of the Yale seminars in culture and personality during the 1930s, the 
psychologist, Lawrence K. Frank, had brought Murphy and Mead together on many occasions during the 
1940s for discussions about personality. Like Mead, Frank had been an influential proponent o f 
interdisciplinary and cross-cultural research in the social sciences and was well known for his application 
o f  personality research to education theory and human relations studies, and most importantly, child 
development studies. These collaborations deeply influenced Murphy’s thought on personality formation. 
For more Lawrence K. Frank see Fundamental Needs o f  the Child (New York: New York Committee on 
Mental Hygiene o f the State Charities Aid Association, 1938) and Individual Development (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1955).
For more on James and his ideas o f experience and the self, see Eugene Taylor’s William James on 
Exceptional Mental States: The 1896 Lowell Lectures (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982) and 
William James on Consciousness Beyond the Margin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1996). As 
historian Katherine Pandora has demonstrated, Murphy’s perspective on perception had its roots in his 
early exposure to the psychological theories of William James and the philosophy o f radical empiricism. 
Having also spent his career criticizing scientific practices that narrowed psychological inquiry, James was 
a forerunner in lobbying against mechanistic depictions o f the self that hampered consideration o f the rich 
diversity o f human experience. The function o f considering the unconscious mind was for James, and 
Murphy, a means o f uncovering the vast storehouse of hidden ability in human cognition underneath the 
conscious mind. See Katherine Pandora, Rebels Within the Ranks: Psychologists ’ Critique o f  Scientific 
Authority and Democratic Realities in New Deal America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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how manipulating basic human motivations and needs could induce perceptual 
distortions. Such experiments demonstrated that perception was, again, a dynamic 
process of selecting and integrating new impressions and sensations into the matrix o f the 
self. In this sense, Murphy’s perception theory was somewhat similar to Herbert Simon’s 
computer model o f mentality. Perception was an ever-evolving construction of 
individual mental architecture through continual adjustment to changing environmental 
and social conditions. Murphy’s perception theories thus integrated the physiological, 
neurological, mental, cognitive, social, and bio-evolutionary elements of human 
experience in a theory of the se lf as evolutionary process from infancy to adulthood. The 
self was a flu id  entity. In fact, as fully evidenced by Mead’s anthropology, there were at 
least as many selves, natures, personalities, and characters, as there were cultures in the 
world. Their vision of the self also implied individual agency in the process of adapting 
to a changing social environment. As I have argued, however, radical behaviorists such 
as Skinner had abandoned traditional concepts of the autonomous self for something far 
worse — no self at all.
As Skinner, Mead and Murphy might have agreed, there were advantages in 
constructing new models of the self in a era dominated by the concepts of change, social 
adjustment and adaptation, concepts that had fundamentally challenged previous 
scientific assumptions about intelligence, creativity, and overall human potential. As 
Mead and Murphy had argued, however, the processes of personality development 
involved the evolution o f an individual reality for each person, modified in turn by 
cultural experience. As Mead had shown, different cultural values and conceptions of 
individuality, social roles, family, and community all factored in to how the self evolves
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through individual adaptation to the cultural environment. Moreover, Mead had argued 
that a social democracy was the best system of social management in which to cultivate 
human adaptive potential to the fullest.
Conclusion
In the careers of Mead and Skinner we are confronted with contrasting 
perspectives on how best to construct a science o f society, and o f the self. In contrast to 
Skinnerian models of mechanistic humanity. Mead’s depiction o f the individual as a vast 
wellspring of potentialities celebrated human uniqueness and diversity in defiance of the 
standardized self. Clearly in Mead we also see a progressive legacy in her science (but 
not radical politics) o f social planning and reform in service (but not in charge) of 
democracy.
Mead, Skinner, and other social scientists took advantage o f the growing public 
recognition of social science during the early 1940s in marketing scientific wares. Mead 
marketed her vision through committee participation and carefully crafted publications 
that were geared to governmental and public interests. Her interdisciplinary and 
collaborative studies of national character also did much to illustrate the professional 
advantages of re-integrating the specialties and, as in the British social welfare system, 
become a true participant in American culture, a politically and socially relevant force in 
social administration.
Moreover, as she asserted time and again. Mead wanted social science to reflect 
democratic values. In Mead’s view, social science possessed inherent moral and political
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dimensions. Its architecture and purpose, as well as its methodologies and products, did 
not flow from universal templates of humanity or culture, but were shaped themselves by 
the social patterns of the culture that produced them. For Mead, scientific depictions of 
the self and o f human potentiality were intertwined deeply with the cause against gender 
and racial discrimination, with the lessons of war, and with the future evolution of 
democracy. In vying for her vision of a science of culture, and o f cultural engineering. 
Mead understood that scientific depictions of the self would have tremendous 
implications for the future of social administration, and for American society.
Recognition of this fact encouraged those like Mead and Skinner to pursue careers as 
public intellectuals in the postwar decades.
The issue of how Mead and Skinner came to design and market scientific 
knowledge products to a public audience, as 1 have argued, has not been addressed 
adequately. Micaela di Leonardo has made the most productive inroads to date in 
considering this dynamic for Mead. In assessing the “commodification” of the primitive 
“other,” di Leonardo displays the marketing choices that Mead made in catering to 
American political, social, and moral sensibilities. Indeed di Leonardo notes that, despite 
Mead’s present-day reputation as a champion of feminism and the counter-culture. Mead 
thought of herself as a “modernist,” i. e., a pro-govemment advocate of democracy, rather 
than of social radicalism. Her presentation of the primitive self was intended to help 
educate Americans about how they might make their own society better by exploring the 
diversity o f human potential and patterns of culture. Mead was one o f the very first, di 
Leonardo notes, to use ethnography for this purpose, to sell modernity and help
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Americans “rationalize ongoing shifts in American c u l t u r e . M e a d  chose in her early 
work to address issues o f racism, sexual discrimination, and changes in the family 
through the study and presentation of primitive culture, subtly suggesting comparisons 
rather than a direct confrontation with mainstream American values.
In the present thesis the dynamic between science and its public is explored with 
regard to images of individuality and the self. Further consideration o f Mead’s public 
career is necessary in order to illuminate the differences between Mead’s own designs on 
her public image, and the manner in which Americans appropriated and transformed this 
image. These aspects of Mead’s mass marketing of social reform and social engineering 
in the postwar decades need to be more adequately explored than they have been in 
recent scholarship. It is to these considerations that I will turn next.
’ di Leonardo, Exotics at Home, 172-73.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A GENERATION POISED FOR POTENTIAL:
MEAD AND THE CULTIVATION OF THE SELF IN POSTWAR AMERICAN
CULTURE
Unless one is continually assaying the current experience o f  children as they are 
growing up, one gets further and further away from them.... In a prefigurative 
society, the condition o f  the youngest members becomes a necessary component 
o f  learning. The children are our source o f  inspiration today in their fresh 
perception o f  a new world..
~ Margaret Mead, 1970'
Lots o f  old sayings don’t have to be repeated but 
there is one that has got to.
Which is that it is much better to get old than it is 
not to.
And while getting old, to leave off counting
wrinkles and birthdays and bereavements,
And rack up a record o f  solid achievements.
Pick up a ruler. Ye o f  Little Faith,
And Ye shall see that Margaret Mead takes up four 
inches in Who’s Who, while Richard Nixon 
has but one-and-one-eighthl
1970 From a Metropolitan Museum o f Art tribute poem for Mead^
During the 1950s and 60s Margaret Mead employed her wealth o f research and 
her growing public rapport as a scientific expert to discuss the American self. In what for 
Mead became a formidable résumé of books, lectures, articles, reviews, and addresses in 
the postwar decades, she, like Skinner, attempted to show that the social environment 
shaped Americans to a considerable extent. Mead invoked the ‘laboratory of primitive 
society’ to evaluate Western models of gender, race, marriage and the family, and she 
encouraged Americans to confront the tentative nature of their own postwar culture. Like
* David Dempsey, “A Talk With Margaret Mead,” in the article “The Mead and Her Message,” in The New 
York Times Magazine (April 26, 1970): 23, 74-79, 82, 99-103. See page 23.
 ^Vivien Leone, “Margaret Mead: Coming of Age at the Met,” in the Manhattan Tribune 2, no. 37 (August 
8, 1970): 5.
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Skinner, Mead focused on the subjects of child rearing, youth, and institutionalized 
education as forums for her rhetoric on social reform. Mead’s cultural anthropology, 
however, could not offer the practical expediency that was symbolized in Skinner’s 
technologies of behavioral modification. In her own campaign for a science o f social 
reform. Mead instead focused on discussing how to create the interpersonal conditions in 
the family and the community that she felt could enhance individual human potential and 
creativity.
Postwar social scientists had a vested interest in raising public awareness about 
both the reality and the benefits of social change', it worked to their professional 
advantage. As we have seen in the popular writing of Skinner, Mead, and other social 
scientists, the rhetoric of social change and transformation was designed purposely to link 
together the authority of social scientists and the future of the nation. Just as progressive 
social scientists at the turn of the century took the opportunity to align themselves with 
different branches o f political and managerial reform, postwar social scientists positioned 
themselves as indispensable experts to government agencies, industry, and the public.
The public demand for guidance on how to properly raise and educate the postwar 
generation unquestionably created new opportunities for social scientists like Mead.
The conservatism of early 1950s mass culture in America, however, forced Mead 
in certain instances to modify her advice literature in order to accommodate conventional 
values and ideas about the self. Later on, Mead took advantage of new opportunities 
during the social protest movements of the 1960s to market her scientific and theoretical 
wares. With the rising outcry against the Vietnam War, and increased public awareness 
o f environmental pollution, racism, urban decay, and youth rebellion, many Americans
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questioned the soundness of a society that appeared to be on the road to collapse. In 
response, they often turned to public intellectuals like Mead for guidance. Americans in 
the 1960s increasingly were receptive to Mead’s humanistic and liberal-democratic vision 
o f the self. Although Mead had attracted the ire of some activists in the feminist and civil 
rights communities who accused her of pandering to traditional conventions, she 
nevertheless enjoyed widespread appeal in the counterculture and among educators.
With the subsequent publication of her social manifestos in the early 1970s, Mead 
solidified her position in American culture as an icon of anthropology, a “grandmother” 
to the world, and a sage of liberal-progressive counterculture.^
The present chapter has several objectives. In the first part I will examine the 
scientific and popular reaction to Mead’s seminal texts o f the 1930s and 40s. Her more 
prosaic and relaxed style o f science writing for popular audiences in the Growing Up in 
Samoa and Sex and Temperament in the 1930s met with predictable criticism from some 
of Mead’s peers in anthropology. They opposed Mead’s lack o f scientific formalism in 
presenting her research to a popular audience. Moreover, her tendency to mix ethnology 
with highly interpretive analogies to Western culture left many scientists feeling that 
Mead had overstepped the professional bounds of anthropology considerably. Similar 
professional criticism met Mead’s And Keep Your Powder Dry and Male and Female in 
the 1940s and 50s. This criticism of Mead’s books was overshadowed, however, by their 
public popularity. Social scientists sympathetic to Mead’s journey into public discourse 
praised her use o f anthropology to critique Western social patterns. And the public
 ^This characterization was used to describe M ead’s iconic status in an obituary entitled “Grandmother of 
Us All.” See the Margaret Mead Papers, Columbia University Archives. Columbia University, New York, 
NY. See also a similar characterization in “Margaret Mead Today: Mother to the World,” Time 93 (March 
21, 1969): 74.
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enthusiasm for her books helped establish Mead as a seientifie expert in the public 
consciousness.
Secondly, I will examine how Mead’s critique of American social mores, cultural 
categories, and representations of the self in And Keep Your Powder Dry: An 
Anthropologist Looks at American Society (1942), Male and Female: A Study o f  the 
Sexes in a Changing World (1949), and New Lives fo r  Old: Cultural Transformation — 
Manus, 1928-1953 (1952), gave way in the late 1950s and early 1960s to her ‘expert’ 
recommendations for institutionalized education, family studies, and parenting. Mead’s 
anti-isolationist cajoling in Powder about mobilizing American national character, and 
her somewhat mixed messages about child rearing and female potentiality in Male and 
Female, will be considered here with regard to her careful negotiation of the political 
economy of American social conventions. Mead’s emphasis on change, adaptation, and 
social transformation in her portrayal of native peoples in the Admiralty Islands (the 
Manus) will also be addressed as an example o f the kind of strategies that social scientists 
employed to manufacture and/or enhance a public consciousness about social change in 
the American context. In her 1956 book New Lives fo r  Old, Mead presented an 
anthropological account o f primitive utopia in the Manus islands in New Guinea. She 
hoped to convince Americans with this story that rapid social transition in a ready-made 
laboratory of culture was neither counterproductive to democracy, nor an impediment to 
a people thriving in an environment of constant flux. Mead’s vision o f human nature, 
filled with endless possibilities for adaptation, was crafted to fit the public demand for 
increased human potential in the scientific, cultural, military, and economic “races” of the 
Cold War era. A discussion of what Mead felt the individual child — the postwar self —
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would need in order to maximize creative potential will be contrasted with Skinner’s 
prescriptions for the self during the same period.
In the third part of this discussion I will examine Mead’s promotion of real-world 
reforms to contemporary patterns of family, child rearing, community and 
institutionalized education during the 1950s. In Mead’s committee work, lectures, and 
popular writing from this period, the influence of personality psychology and 
psychotherapy on her representations of the holistic self are evident. Increased exposure 
to social change, community participation, and different cultural traditions. Mead 
thought, were vital in fostering the creativity that young people would need to engage the 
emerging social frontiers of postwar America. Public education in particular. Mead 
argued, was in need of innovation. Schools needed to dispense with artificial divisions 
like age and grade, and also have young people participate more fully in their 
communities.
In the fourth part of this treatment I will move to a fuller discussion of how 
M ead’s vision of the self was appropriated and critiqued by those seeking fresh 
perspectives on the individual for personal fulfillment and political ends. In an attempt to 
expand on the historiographic foundations laid by historians Fred Matthews, Micaela di 
Leonardo, and others, I will examine the public reception and appropriation o f Mead’s 
visions of the self among different communities in Ameriean postwar culture. Mead’s 
opinions will be examined with regard to the youth counterculture and the feminist 
community, both of which expanded in the 1960s and early 70s. Examining the feminist 
critique of Mead’s anthropology illustrates how she carefully marketed human 
potentiality to reflect both revolutionary and traditional concepts o f gender. Betty
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Friedan’s criticism of Mead in the early 1960s laid bare some o f the conflicting visions of 
humanity in Mead’s work. Friedan’s attack on Mead also illustrates how scientific 
depictions o f the self were politicized and incorporated into public debate over such 
issues as feminism and civil rights. In the case of youth counterculture, a generation of 
new radicals seeking social alternatives and self-actualization championed Mead’s liberal 
perspectives on marriage, sexuality, community living, and education. I will also address 
these and other examples of appropriation in considering the state o f the self in social 
science and society at the end of the 1970s.
Finally, I will end with a general appraisal o f Mead’s popular currency in the late 
1960s and early 70s. By this time Mead was known worldwide as a scientist and public 
intellectual, as well as an icon of feminism, liberal democracy, and 1960s counterculture. 
Mead’s public image will be compared to her own personal reflections on her place as a 
scientist and public intellectual in postwar era. Mead wrote about the images o f science 
and scientists in the popular media. A comparison of her public image with that o f B. F. 
Skinner illustrates the ways in which personifications of science also affected the popular 
appropriation of the self.
Mead and Pop Anthropology in the 1930s
In her famous books o f the 1920s and 30s, Growing Up in Samoa, Growing Up in 
New Guinea, and Sex and Temperament, Mead used the test cases of adolescence and 
gender in different cultures to critique Western concepts of society and the individual.
As discussed in the previous chapter. Mead wrote these books in a relaxed, prosaic style
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that both professional and lay reviewers recognized as a bold departure from traditional 
science writing. Mead wrote the books specifically for a popular readership, deliberately 
leaving out much of the dry, tedious data analysis and language o f anthropological 
research. These books conveyed important messages about human potential from the 
viewpoint of an expert in the field. In them Mead departed from objective science by 
suggesting that there were moral and social lessons to be learned from social science 
about how Westerners might better raise their children and run their communities. Some 
reviewers unsurprisingly rejected Mead’s unorthodox presentations and warned of the 
risk to her scientific reputation in doing so. Most however were enthusiastic about 
Mead’s attempts to make the human sciences useful and relevant to American life. An 
appraisal o f the professional and popular reception of Mead’s first books in the 1930s in 
the present chapter will be important in considering both the Interwar and postwar 
evolution of Mead’s career as a public intellectual. Surveying the popular response to 
these early works will also be necessary in explaining how Mead modified her scientific 
concepts of self and human potential in these decades to accommodate changes in the 
politics of social reform among her public audiences.
Mead left herself open to the criticism that her studies were “given too much to 
interpretation instead of description,” and lacked the impartiality befitting an 
anthropologist."^ Her attempts to combine the techniques o f anthropology, ethnology, 
sociology, psychology, and psychiatry in writing about individual character and 
temperament in primitive cultures also left some academics skeptical about her
'* Fred Matthews, “The Utopia o f Human Relations,” 347; Joseph Wood Krutch, “Men and Women,” 
review o f Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies, by Margaret Mead, The Nation 140 (May 29, 
1935): 634-35. See page 634.
300
comparisons to Western society/ The soeiologist Robert Redfield, for example, cited 
M ead’s “laboratory exereise” style of ethnography, where a narrow line of inquiry (into 
adolescence in this case) was used selectively to extrapolate “Q.E.D.” conclusions about 
Samoan culture. Mead seemed to be focusing on “problems and cases, not [the whole of] 
human nature.” Mead also seemed intent, as Joseph Wood Krutch quipped, on advancing 
a “thesis” about Western culture and human malleability in studying Samoan culture.® 
Many other social scientists and intellectuals also expressed reservations about 
Mead’s reform-oriented subtexts, her moralizing about American shortcomings, and her 
agenda for social reform. But most non-professional readers appreeiated her “directness 
and lack o f [scientific] convention,” as a welcome departure from “dull” science writing.^ 
Mead was indeed moving beyond the borderlands o f the académie world and into public 
arenas. Her accounts o f the South Seas, primitive cultures, and strange customs read like 
the enchanting tales of eighteenth- and nineteenth-eentury ‘travel’ writers. One reviewer 
likened Mead’s tales to the exotic and fascinating portrayals of “far away native life,” in 
Robert Flaherty’s hugely successful documentary films, Nanook o f  the North and 
M oana} Mead’s descriptions seemed less like anthropological accounts and more akin 
to the fanciful, bizarre, albeit fictional adventures of Lewis Carroll’s, Alice in
 ^Nels Anderson, “In the Light o f Samoa,” review o f Growing Up in Samoa, by Margaret Mead, The 
Survey 6\ (January 15, 1929): 514-15; Joseph W. Krutch, “Men and Women,” 634. See also the extended 
essay on M ead’s methodology in Sex and Temperament by Jessie Bernard, “Observations and 
Generalizations in Cultural Anthropology,” The American Journal o f  Sociology 50 (July, 1944-May, 1945): 
284-91.
Robert Redfield, review o f Coming o f Age in Samoa, by Margaret Mead, The American Journal o f  
Sociology 34 (January, 1939): 728-29; Joseph Wood Krutch, “Men and Women,” 634.
 ^“Primitive Life in New Guinea,” review of Growing Up in New Guinea, by Margaret Mead, The New 
York Times Book Review (November 16, 1930): 22.
* Isidor Schneider, “Manus and Americans,” review of Growing Up in New Guinea, by Margaret Mead,
The New Republic 64 (November 5, 1930): 330.
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Wonderland. Her idyllic tales of social harmony and contentedness among the Samoans 
also were reminiscent o f Samuel Butler’s fictional utopia, Erehwon? Others found 
Mead’s many comparisons of the Manus and Westerners curiously similar to the 
“Puritans of Oceania’’ in Jonathan Swift’s social satire, Gulliver’s Travels.^^ Her 
“impressionistic” presentation of ethnography with lively and engaging descriptions 
prompted one reviewer to ask derisively whether Mead’s appeals to “students of society” 
were meant to be “a contribution to science or art?”"
The consensus among professional social scientists and many mainstream literary 
reviewers was that Mead had, as Robert H. Lowie observed, “deliberately set herself a 
task distinct from that of the traditional ethnographer’s.” Mead had ushered in a new 
vista in ethnographic methodology by “[ijgnoring the conventional descriptive pattern,” 
of the anthropologist and highlighting the dimensions of culture-patterning embodied in 
the 'individual’s reactions to his social setting.”"  With her early focus on specific topics 
such as gender and adolescence, personality molding in children, and the development of 
social roles. Mead’s studies, as many social scientists pointed out, were not merely 
conventional collections of factual data about Samoan, Arapesh, Tcambuli, or Manus life. 
With her use of both projective and personality tests to examine temperament, science
 ^Joseph Wood Krutch, “Men and Women,” 634.
Isidor Schneider, “Manus and Americans,” 330.
' ‘ Nels Andersen, “In the Light of Samoa,” 514.
Italics mine. See Robert H. Lowie, review o f Coming o f Age in Samoa, by Margaret Mead, The 
American Anthropologist 2> \ (July, 1929): 532-34. See page 532. See also the comments to this effect by 
Robert Redfield in his review o f Samoa for The American Journal o f  Sociology 34 (January, 1929): 728-30. 
See pages 728-29. Hortense Powdermaker o f the Yale Institute o f Human Relations also pointed to Mead’s 
liberal use o f psychiatric concepts in Ser and Temperament. See her review in The Annals o f  the American 
Academy o f Political and Social Science 181 (September, 1935): 221-22. See page 221.
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critics recognized that Mead had pioneered the psychological examination o f cultural 
patterns through the lens of representative individuals. Many social scientists hailed this 
as a novel and powerful approach, “bound to find followers and to yield an ever richer 
harvest,” as Lowie commented, o f insight into the diversity of human nature.'^
One reviewer of Sex and Temperament for the Saturday Evening Post observed, 
however, that Mead had not discovered cultural relativity. Hortense Powdermaker of the 
Yale Institute of Human Relations noted that by the mid-1930s this concept had been 
well known already for “at least half a century.” Social scientists understood the 
influence o f culture in shaping social roles in both Western and primitive societies.
“Even the intelligent layman,” she added, had witnessed the “success o f women in 
occupations hitherto closed to them [and this] more or less forced the acceptance o f this 
idea.”'"^  “Modem biology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology [had] converge[d] to 
the point of confirming the basic similarity of the human organism in all races and 
cultures,” a reviewer for the Saturday Review o f  Literature said o f the Samoa study. 
“Differences, then, in patterns of behavior, are differences in conditioning through 
participation in differing cultural situations.” '  ^ Mead’s book, nevertheless, “marks an 
event.. .Anthropology is turning its attention to comparative studies of culture.” '^
Ruth Benedict remarked in her review of Samoa that Mead’s brilliant case studies 
o f adolescence and gender roles were some of the most intriguing demonstrations of
”  Lowie, review o f Coming o f  Age, 534.
''' Hortense Powdermaker, review o f Sex and Temperament, by Margaret Mead, Saturday Review o f  
Literature 12 (June 29, 1935): 16.
Mary Elizabeth Johnson, review o f Coming o f Age in Samoa, by Margaret Mead, The Saturday Review o f  
Literature (March 16, 1929): 778.
Italics mine. See Nels Andersen, review o f Coming o f  Age, 515.
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human nature’s adaptability.’^  Mead presented comparative studies, “more convincing
than any a priori argument as to the plasticity of that which we have been accustomed to
theorize about as human nature.” Malcolm Cowley declared no less than a victory for
social science in this regard in a review o f Sex and Temperament for The New Republic,
proclaiming triumphantly that, “[t]he anthropologists are coming home.” ’* Cowley saw
Mead as the forerunner of a new generation of anthropologists who had spent the
previous thirty years traveling the globe and gathering data. They were returning
triumphantly with many revelations, both fascinating and disturbing, about the
adaptability o f humankind. As Cowley quipped.
This indeed, is the lesson pointed by the studies of almost all the modem 
anthropologists.. .They have to report that nothing is humanly impossible, 
that there is certainly no inferno in which man has not managed somehow 
to live and probably no Utopia toward which he might not rise.’^
“This Margaret Mead is a dangerous person,” would nevertheless also be the reaction of
many readers of Sex and Temperament, one reviewer for The New York Times Book
Review thought. Her books, Florence Finch Kelly observed, were like “a bomb that she
drops into the complacent, fundamental conviction o f the Occidental world, both
scientific and social,”
Ruth Benedict, review o f Coming o f Age in Samoa, by Margaret Mead, Journal o f  Philosophy 26 
(February 14, 1929); 110-11.
Malcolm Cowley, “News From New Guinea,” review o f Sex and Temperament, by Margaret Mead, The 
New Republic 83 (June 5, 1935): 107.
Ibid.
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Her bomb explodes and scatters fragments over all the surrounding area 
and the first thing she knows some indignant voice will be crying out that 
this is an outrage and there ought to be a law—
As Mead hoped, her books became controversial not merely for their challenge to
Western concepts of gender or adolescence. Finch and many other readers recognized
Mead’s “fearlessness” in also confronting scientific and social conventions by using
primitive cultures as “social microcosms” in her bid for the reform of American social
practices and values.^' To meet modem challenges Finch recognized,
Miss Mead would have civilization achieve a richer culture, with many 
contrasting values, by weaving “a less arbitrary social fabric, in which 
each diverse human gift will find a fitting place” and in which no 
individual will be forced by artificial distinctions, such as that o f sex, “into 
an all fitting mold.”^^
Ruth Benedict and other readers had detected the implied ‘moral’ for Americans
in the science o f comparative anthropology. For Mead, Benedict and others of her
cohort, this moral concerned the youth of America, and how Americans might better help
the next generation avoid the mistakes o f their elders. As one reviewer recalled.
This is an era o f experimentation in American schools, most of the 
experiments being directed toward greater freedom and less discipline for 
the growing child. Miss Mead asks the question, and it is one educators 
might well ponder upon. Where is the adult American, the product of 
these schools, to learn the discipline and adjustment that life will demand 
of them?^^
20 Florence Finch Kelly, “A Chilling View of the Sexes: Margaret M ead’s Observations Based on Three 
Primitive Societies Lead Her to Some Iconoclastic Conclusions,” The New York Times Book Review (May 
26, 1935): 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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Mead’s books were “an attempt to draw certain educational conclusions that might bear 
on the problem of rearing children in our own land.” "^^ It was clear to Mead that, in a 
fluid culture, children needed to learn to ‘exercise choice,’ as she often put it, and 
participate more fully in community from an early age, as did Samoan g i r l s . T h e  stress 
and anxiety of assimilation, the Sturm und Drang of adolescence so prevalent in Western 
society but absent in Samoa, for example, might thereby be avoided in the American 
context. This would redress what Mead and Ruth Benedict saw in American society as a 
set o f conflicting values for the young, “set by the ideals we have made for ourselves 
[which come to the forefront in] adolescence.”^^
Marketing Primitive and Modern ‘Laboratories of Culture’ in Postwar America
With these anthropological studies from the 1920s and 30s and the collaborative, 
interdisciplinary study of national character in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, Mead and her 
colleagues moved to address patterns of American culture in the postwar era by studying 
the individual who. Mead argued, “embodie[d], completely, and wholly, the culture, in 
which he or she [was] rea red ...G en e ra liza tio n s  about American national character 
were fruitless, however, if  made without comparison to other cultures. Only in the cross-
Nels Anderson, “Youth on a Tropic Isle,” review o f Growing Up in New Guinea, by Margaret Mead, The 
Survey 65 (November 15, 1930): 228. Italics mine.
Many reviewers o f M ead’s books referred to this emphasis. See Johnson, review o f Coming o f Age, 778; 
Anderson, “Youth on a Tropical Isle,” 228; Krutch, “Men and Women,” 634; Powdermaker, review o f Sex 
and Temperament, 221.
Benedict, review o f Coming o f  Age, 110.
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cultural analysis of many laboratories of culture, could Americans “look at themselves, 
with enough detachment to be able to think,” i. e., productively evaluate, their own social 
reality/^ In accounts of how comprehensive change in other cultures had released human 
adaptive potential. Mead believed, Americans could learn the patterns of personality that 
would lead to American social harmony and progress.
One of the most distinctive American traits Mead discovered was an anxiety 
about broad social transformations in family, work, and society.^^ This was the 
generation that David Riesman had referred to as the “Lonely Crowd,” and that the 
psychologist Erik Erikson described as existing, as Mead recounted, “between rootedness 
and d ep a r t u re .Am er i ca ns ,  Mead argued, needed to cultivate flexibility if  they hoped 
to survive in a rapidly changing society. In the pages of Powder and Male and Female 
was a new ideal of the American character, where “awareness and alertness have taken 
the place of custom and unconscious docility to the ways o f the past.”^’ Mead appealed 
to classic American virtues and past successes while also encouraging a break with old 
folkways. Americans now faced the same kind of dilemma as European immigrants did 
in the early twentieth century. A new ‘frontier’ of culture, and of self, forced them to
Margaret Mead. From an address to a joint session of The American Psychological Association and The 
Society for the Psychological Study o f Social Issues. 6 September 1976. Container Number E49, Folder 2. 
Papers o f Margaret Mead. Library o f Congress Manuscript Division. Washington, D. C., 2.
Ibid., 3.
Margaret Mead, “The Impact of Culture on Personality Development on the United States Today.” 
Excerpts from speech at the Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth. 6 December 
1950. White House Conference on Children and Youth 1949-1963. Container Number E l66. Papers of 
Margaret Mead. Library o f Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D. C., 1.
Ibid., 4-5.
Ibid., 2.
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choose between the folkways of the Old World and emerging patterns in the new. The
path to success, Mead urged, was headlong immersion.
Mead also compared the story of the Western European immigrants to the
mythology of the ‘pioneer spirit’ in the American West.
This heritage, brought to the United States by those who spoke a foreign 
language was added to the heritage of the first pioneers who, as they 
ventured into the new storm ridden, frighteningly vast unsettled country, 
had also to be ready for anything, expectant o f the unexpected. The 
children o f the newer comers have learned from the children o f the earlier 
ones and in turn have taught the children o f the earlier ones their hardly 
learned lessons, how to remain flexible and tentative, ready to settle or 
ready to move on, ready to look at each new situation as if  it were pristine, 
as on a new Day of Creation.
A willingness to adapt, to create possibility from change, to extract potential from social
transformation. Mead said, had seen the pioneers and immigrants through challenging
times. Many fellow academicians, however, were dubious of Mead’s sweeping analogies
and comparisons between different cultures and histories, and her use o f the concept of
culture laboratories in Samoa and New Guinea to illuminate specific problems in modem
social change, in her popular works.
Academic reviews of Male and Female favorably acknowledged Mead’s
revelations about human nature, social mores, and individual identities in primitive
cultures. Harvard anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn observed, nevertheless, that there was
some “disciplinary in-fighting” about Mead’s reputation, especially her career as public
intellectual and social commentator.^^ Mead continued to be something of a
“controversial figure” in anthropological and intellectual circles. She was criticized again
Ibid., 4.
Clyde Kluckhohn, “Anthropology Comes of Age,” review o f Male and Female, by Margaret Mead, The 
American Scholar 19, no. 2 (Spring, 1950): 241-56.
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for using her research to ‘psychoanalyze’ Americans in Male and Female and Powder, 
and for assertions that went well heyond the scope of her scientific work. Mead, they 
felt, followed the “shifting intellectual fads” of the day in tailoring her views to fit other 
characterizations of Americans by well-known social critics such as Riesman and 
Erikson.
The psychiatrist, Franz Alexander, of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, for 
example, noted in his review that the prominent chemist and philosopher of science, 
Wilhelm Ostwald, would have characterized Mead as “an extreme example o f the 
romantic type” of scientist. Mead’s penchant for correlation between scientific fact and 
social, economic, and cultural theory, albeit insightful, nevertheless made for sloppy 
s c i e n c e . H e r  unwieldy commentaries were at times cumbersome and disconnected. 
While praising Mead as a pioneer of interdisciplinary social science, Alexander cautioned 
that such combinations were bound to have most anthropologists crying foul.^^ Mead’s 
“anecdotal” presentation of evidence in Male and Female made her speculations about 
American families, child development, and the sexes seem lacking in seientifie rigor.^’ 
Her colleagues also chafed at Mead’s growing status in the 1950s as the spokesperson for
34 Ibid., 250.
Franz Alexander, review of Male and Female, by Margaret Mead, The American Journal o f  Sociology 
51, no. 1 (July, 1951); 82-85. See page 82.
Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932) was a physical chemist who worked in philosophy o f science late 
in his career. His book. Great Men (Leipzig: Akademische verlagsgesellschaft, 1909), was the source of 
Alexander’s description. The book examined the psychological underpinnings o f scientific endeavors as 
well as prominent figures in the physical sciences such as Humphry Davy and Michael Faraday.
36 Kluckhohn, “Anthropology Comes o f Age,’’ 250.
S. F. Nadel, review o f Male and Female, by Margaret Mead, American Anthropologist 52 (1950): 419- 
20 .
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American anthropology, a scientist who was often “more talked about than read.” *^ Not a 
few of her peers felt that the profession had been misrepresented by her fame and her 
claims for applied anthropology.
Mead, as Kluckhohn noted, was not the only social scientist who had begun to 
promote applied cultural anthropology as the key to solving social problems. The late 
1940s and early 1950s had seen a spate of similarly “messianie” books by anthropologists 
promising scientific panaceas .Kluckhohn  believed, however, that Mead and others had 
promised too mueh in the way of social science solutions. His comments on this 
phenomenon are telling. “Certainly,” Kluekhohn wrote of anthropology in the public eye 
in the 1940s,
[it was] becoming -  rather suddenly -  quite fashionable [but] has its 
dangers to the profession. There are quarters in Washington and even in 
the business world where anthropology is oversold, where in effect it is 
regarded as the newer magic, where we are being asked questions which 
the present generation of anthropologists can never hope to answer.'*^
As the voice o f professional restraint, Kluckhohn cautioned against Mead’s grandiose
pronouncements on the future of modem humanity, the fate of Ameriean society, and
what a tme ‘science of eulture’ could realistically provide.
Many anthropologists had serious reservations about the liberties Mead and her
associates were taking with anthropology. Books on applied anthropology such as Male
38
39
Kluckhohn, “Anthropology Comes o f Age,” 250.
Along with M ead’s Male and Female, Kluckhohn reviewed four other books that made similar claims 
about the importance o f anthropology in consolidating the social sciences and produeing a bona fide 
science o f modern culture. See his comments in “Anthropology Comes of Age,” in Alfred L. Kroeber, 
Anthropology: Race, Language, Culture, Psychology, Prehistory (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 
1948); Melville J. Herscovits, Man and His Works (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); John Gillin, The 
Ways o f  Men (New York: Appleton-Century, 1948); George P. Murdock, Social Structure (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1949).
Kluckhohn, “Anthropology Comes of Age,” 241.
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and Female might erode professional standards and create public backlash over unmet 
expectations, as had happened with sociology in the 1930s.'^' Mead’s free-form mixture 
of anthropological insight, social commentary, and political rhetoric in And Keep Your 
Powder Dry (1942), continued throughout her career as a public figure. Academics, 
intellectuals, and popular critics in turn questioned Mead’s attempts to merge objective 
science with patriotism.
Various intellectual commentators also singled out Mead’s American cultural bias 
in Powder and Male and Female and branded her a propagandist who was using 
Ameriean national mythology to encourage Americans to embrace change. Powder did 
in fact preach the gospel of American greatness, as John Storck noted in The New  
Republic, highlighting a “Puritan impulse as it has been modified by such things as the 
frontier, immigration, population mobility ... and industrialism,” its people “geared to 
success, ... shallow personal relationships, ... patterns of aggression needing to be set in 
motion from the outside.”'*^  Fascists had used race theory to bolster claims o f cultural 
superiority, especially in the case of Nazi Germany, during the inter-war period. Mead’s 
propaganda about American cultural character, although anti-racist and anti-fascist, also 
promoted the superiority o f American democracy. Not unsurprisingly, this 
mythologizing struck some reviewers as an oversimplification. “The details o f these 
pictures,” as Storck noted, “are not facts but palpably [5 /c?] constructions o f the mind.”"^  ^
Whether Mead simply used this mythology purposely as a rhetorical device or believed it
Ibid.
John Storck, “The American Way,” review of And Keep Your Powder Dry, by Margaret Mead, The New
Republic 108 (January 4, 1943); 28.
Ibid.
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personally, her intellectual critics were dubious of such tactics and dubbed them as 
examples of her lack of scientific objectivity.
Mead’s unwavering defense of American ideals and eulture was unmistakable, 
and it certainly appealed to her contemporary lay readers. It proved to be a valuable tool 
in promoting her vision of a liberal democratic society aided by a science o f culture. 
Mead’s message of America’s cultural potential also was conveyed through her 
descriptions of diversity and malleability in other cultures. Some non-academic readers 
in the popular press nevertheless also found Mead’s cultural comparisons somewhat 
tenuous. They seemed to be an admixture of social issues and scientific terminology that 
one New York Times reviewer for Male and Female described as yet “another exercise in 
cultural relativism,’’ with “careless scurrying from the haunts o f the Papuan head-hunter,” 
for example, “to the schoolhouse of Whittier’s poems; the phrases o f the Sunday sermon, 
often dizzying with its repetitiveness; warm, cloudy rhetoric and ecstatic vision.
Mead’s characteristically synthetic arguments, even if somewhat circuitous, did 
not diminish the appeal of her observations about American culture among most of her 
reviewers. The utility of looking at society as artifice, capable o f guided transformation, 
was not lost on prominent social commentators such as the biologist Julian Huxley who 
noted that “[Mead’s] anthropological studies ha[d] led her beyond all simple theories of 
economic and social determination to a recognition of the almost unbelievable range of 
cultural possibilities open to man, each in its own way a creative work of art — a unitary
Bernard Mishkin, “The Sexes in Different Cultures,” review o f Male and Female, hy Margaret Mead,
The New York Times (October 16, 1949): 7, 38. See page 38.
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presentation of how to be human.”"^  ^While many Americans were looking to 
psychologists and sociologists for guidance after the Second World War, Huxley 
observed, Mead was making a strong case for applied anthropology as the central 
organizing discipline around which all other applied social sciences should coalesce. The 
study of family and gender dynamics, the education and upbringing of children -- the 
expansion of potential among these, America’s future ‘selves’ — all hinged on knowing 
the anthropology o f  social change. For his part, Huxley praised Mead’s vision as the 
basis for the new “modem humanism” among scientists and intellectuals at the time with 
its emphasis on expanding human potential in the wake o f the global devastation of world 
war. It was these adjustments in our “human relations,” Huxley concluded, that would 
help cultivate human adaptive potential.
Regardless of the academic and intellectual controversy, Male and Female 
captured a wide readership in the late 1940s and early 50s. It was one of the most talked 
about books o f 1949. The attention in Male and Female to the unique social pressures 
faced by women in ensuring the stability of the home environment and successfully 
rearing children won considerable praise from her female readers, especially mothers.
The Ladies Home Journal gave Mead’s message to women a clear endorsement in 1949 
when extended excerpts were published. Particular emphasis was given to sections o f the 
hook that addressed how the loosening of social mores concerning marriage and gender 
identity pertained to raising children. “Are American boys and girls being educated 
toward — or away from — happier, more successful years as husbands and wives?” asked 
the publishers. Mead encouraged mothers to consider relaxing traditional expectations
Julian Huxley, “Human Relations,” review o f Male and Female, by Margaret Mead, The Spectator 184 
(February 10, 1950); 184.
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for boys and girls. Clearly, the words of such a “renowned anthropologist,” the editors of
the Journal expressly indicated, would play well to their readers. As the editor’s note at
the beginning of the article indicated.
The JOURNAL publishes this illuminating discussion in the belief that, 
while some parts may be unusually frank, mothers will find it valuable 
background knowledge in educating their own children for future happy 
roles as men, as women — as husbands, as wives.
In her 1956 follow-up to Male and Female, New Lives fo r  Old: Cultural
Transformation — Manus, 1928-1953, Mead showcased the accomplishments o f the
South Coast Manus tribes on the Admiralties, a group of islands off the coast o f New
Guinea and part of the Commonwealth of Australia.'**’ The Manus, Mead alleged, had
managed in one generation to make the transition from a primitive subsistence culture to
a Westernized democratic society. As a fellow of the Social Science Research Council,
Mead had visited the Admiralties first in 1928-29 with her second husband, the
anthropologist Reo Fortune. There they conducted field studies that Mead later
incorporated into her books on New Guinea, her studies o f cooperation and competition
in the 1930s, and her gender studies in Male and Female in the 1940s.
When Mead first visited the Manus people in 1928, she encountered a primitive
subsistence culture that had seen virtually no significant exposure to modem civilization.
During the war years, however, the inhabitants of the Manus were introduced to the
technological and material fruits of modem civilization through the American military
occupation o f the islands. The Americans brought an abundance of goods and
machinery, as well as new social customs that together transformed the native culture.
Margaret Mead, New Lives fo r Old: Cultural Transformation — Manus, 1928-1953 (New York; William 
Morris and Company, 1956), xiii.
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Admiration for the power of American technology and culture inspired many Manus 
dwellers to adopt military standards of dress, community organization, and methods of 
trade and commerce. Intense fascination with technology spawned a quasi-religious 
“cargo cult” on the island o f Rambutjon where it was thought that successful 
communication with the spirit world would keep the military cargo ships filled with 
modem goods coming in. By 1946 a political reform movement among the various tribes 
o f the Manus known as the “New Way” took hold, and its leaders successfully 
modernized their villages and unified rival communities. A program of religious 
conversion to Christianity also was introduced.
When Mead returned to the Admiralties for a follow-up visit in 1953 she was 
astounded to find that the Manus had in the seven years after the war seemingly made a 
full transition to the Western democratic/capitalist cultural model. The Manus had traded 
their ‘old lives for new’ in to to. Mead argued in New Lives fo r  Old that these isolated 
examples of cultural transition, these small scale “laboratories” o f culture, were 
indispensable in forging a viable and practical science of social modification. The Manus 
island chain. Mead argued, was the perfect context in which to study human potential. 
Mead also recognized in the Manus a general recipe for the kind o f character and 
personality formation that was suited uniquely to a culture in transition.
The Manus had adopted the army camp as a model for community design. Just as 
American machinery had transformed the landscape of the Manus, to the great 
satisfaction o f its natives, military procedures were used to systematically dismantle old 
social systems and rebuild them anew. Modem technology and militaristic social
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controls were ereating new cultural traditions.'^’ In the ease of the Manus, Mead claimed, 
the breakdown o f older social, moral, religious, and entrepreneurial systems was 
weleomed by the Manus peoples beeause, among other things, it ereated opportunities for 
women and children to participate more fully in eommunity life. Mead encouraged her 
reading audience to make comparisons between the cultural experience of women and 
children in Manus culture, and that of American women and children in the postwar 
years. By studying the example o f the Manus peoples. Mead argued, Americans could 
learn more about the general character traits that made for a successful transition into a 
new culture.
Their delight in mechanical things, their sense of organization, their 
tendency to treat human beings both humanely and mechanically, their 
flexible here-and-now approaeh, their zest and optimism, their coneem for 
children — all these were elements whieh would predispose them to 
appreciate American culture.
The embrace of new technology, a regimented soeial order, a tolerance for new roles for
the sexes, their flexibility, optimism, and eoncem for the future o f their young people —
these were all traits to be eneouraged in Amerieans. The Manus case also demonstrated.
“’ ibid., 164-5, 177, 182, 187.
The Manus people themselves described this period o f social experimentation in the late 1940s as 
the “time without taboos” where the prohibitions o f traditional social conventions were left aside, and an 
atmosphere o f social experimentation developed among the younger Manus natives. More specifically, 
their political transition to democratic administrative rule illustrated for Mead the wholesale abandonment 
o f  mystic leaders as sources o f social authority for new managerial leaders in the communities. Here too, 
the introduction o f Western moral values concerning human equality, brotherly love, and civic 
responsibility also fostered the breakdown o f old social hierarchies and religious superstitions. The sources 
o f evil and illness in Manus culture, for example, were relocated from their old source in the ghost religion 
to the individual person. The enthusiasm among the Manus, Mead recalls, stemmed in part from the unique 
combination o f factors contributing to their exposure to Western civilization during the war. The example 
o f the Manus, she thought, could serve in other instances as a model for how to manage the process of 
modernization in other cultural contexts. Later in the 1960s she would draw similarities between American 
and Manus patterns o f youth-centered social experimentation.
“8 Ibid., 212.
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Mead argued, that it was more effective to fully eradicate old traditions that had no
function in a new social reality than to try and combine the new and old.
[T]he study of the Manus suggests the great importance o f whole patterns, 
that it is easier to shift from being a South Sea Islander to being a New 
Yorker -  as I have seen Samoans do — than to shift from being a perfectly 
adjusted traditional South Sea Islander to a partly civilized, partly 
aeeulturated South Sea Islander, who has been given antiquated versions 
of our philosophy and politics, a few odds and ends of clothing and 
furniture, and bits and pieces of our economies.'*^
Young Americans should thus be free. Mead thought, to east off the soeial mores of their
parents in order to adapt fully to emerging social conditions.
“Twenty-five years ago,” Mead recalled in the introduction to New Lives, “we had
learned, just learned, that we could gain much from the disciplined study o f primitive
people, that here was a priceless laboratory in which we could investigate the possibilities
inherent in human n a t u r e . T h e  lessons learned from the Manus, Mead suggested to her
readers, could help usher in a new era in which social science would be able to exert what
she termed “predictive control over the future.”^’ This was a bold and calculated claim,
one that Mead, as a promoter of liberal-democratic forms o f scientific soeial
management, knew her audience would find appealing.
Many historians of science have noted the physical and conceptual depictions of
the laboratory as especially important venues for constructing the public authority of
science/^ This has been true especially in the human sciences where connotations of
Ibid., 450.
Mead, New Lives fo r  Old, 9.
Ibid., 105.
See for example Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction o f  Scientific 
Facts, 2"'* ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) and Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How 
to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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mathematical precision and control have heen particularly important in facilitating public 
patronage, professional consolidation, and institutional expansion/^ This was certainly 
the ease for psychology and anthropology. Mead’s and Skinner’s emphasis on the 
experimental laboratories o f  culture in deseribing social utopia, both in fiction and 
ethnography, played a key role in matching their scientifie authority with the publie 
demand for a seience and teehnology of modem living.
Skinner stressed the ‘precision controls’ aspect o f laboratory experimentation in 
moving from the manipulation o f pigeons to people to whole cultures. In Mead’s 
ethnography and social reform theory, however, the laboratory metaphors were more akin 
to nineteenth and early twentieth-eentury biological science. Mead was more in the role 
of the field naturalist who studied the effects of environmental ehanges on the evolution 
and behavior o f intereonnected communities in the laboratory o f nature itself. As a field 
anthropologist. Mead took advantage of catastrophic changes in Manus island tribal 
eulture in using different lines o f ‘ experimental ’/analytical inquiry to study kinship, child 
rearing, social organization, and tribal government, to get a sense for the behavior of 
individuals and communities. She did this in the Samoa literature in the 1930s by 
presenting the analytieal variable of adoleseence as a venue for making cultural 
comparisons.
A good example o f this in early twentieth-century psychology is John B. Watson and the popularization 
o f behavioral science. See Kerry Buckley, Mechanical Man: John Broadus Watson and the Beginnings o f  
Behaviorism (New York: Guilford Press, 1989). Henrika Kuklick has explored the laboratory metaphor in 
the history o f British anthropology and the interchange o f cultural themes in the scientific depictions of 
native peoples in British colonies. See Henrika Kuklick, The Savage Within: The Social History o f  British 
Anthropology 1885-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Kuklick, “The Color Blue: From 
Research in the Torres Straight to an Ecology o f Human Behavior,” in Darwin's Laboratory: Evolutionary 
Theory and Natural History in the Pacific, ed. Roy MacLeod and Philip F. Rehbock (Honolulu: University 
o f Hawaii, 1994), 339-70.
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As her colleagues and critics observed, this stretched the limits of cultural 
anthropology. Mead, the public expert, however, understood the marketing power of 
presenting primitive cultures as laboratories where the adaptive patterns o f  social change 
(through analytical variables and individual community members) could be studied. This 
knowledge would in turn enhance the scientific promise of social engineering when 
applied to the American context. Both Mead and Skinner used the metaphor of 
laboratories of culture to construct independent visions o f comprehensive social reform in 
the 1950s. They would later apply the same rhetoric and imagery to ground their reform 
messages in the real world example of education. Here, the laboratory of the classroom 
and the school were presented as key to cultivating adaptive human potential, and 
educating students to live in a culture of change.
Mead had incorporated her theories of culture and human potential, and her calls 
for an organized science of social change, into her two previous books. In New Lives fo r  
Old Mead’s message of hope was set forth powerfully by her use of anthropology in 
helping Americans, as Mead’s psychologist colleague, Lawrence K. Frank, observed, to 
understand the reality of change in their own culture.^"* Although her blatant 
anthropocentrism was considered scientifically suspect by many o f her peers. Mead 
found support for her perspective on the Manus peoples among other prominent social 
scientists cum public intellectuals. Noted anthropologists such as Clyde Kluckhohn and 
Ashley Montagu said o f New Lives fo r  Old, for example, that it effectively illustrated the 
strengths and weaknesses of the American cultural character in a time when humanity
^  Lawrence K. Frank, “Growing Up in New Guinea, 1928-1953 — How a People Decides to Change,” 
review o iN ew  Lives, by Margaret Mead, Herald Tribune Book Review  (July 8, 1956); 3. For similar 
observations see also V. S. Pritchett, “The New World o f the Manus,” review o f New Lives, by Margaret 
Mead, The New Statesman and Nation (September 22, 1956): 347-48.
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itself seemed to be in c ris is .K lu ck h o h n  noted Mead’s revision, however, o f previous 
claims about the proper paee of social change. Mead seemed now to argue that rapid 
social change was better than gradual adjustment. Given the predicament o f Americans 
in the postwar era, transformed in one generation as they were by the Depression and 
world war, this shift in perspective fit nicely with the task before postwar American.
Yet, as with other utopian social scientific visions o f human society, some critics 
o f Mead’s theories wondered, as they had with Skinner’s Walden Two, whether or not 
social science in any form could serve as what one review of Powder called a “culture 
solvent,’’ a panacea for social problems. Could a seience o f social change that Mead 
lobbied for so passionately have the same kind o f effect on American society that the 
military had had on the Manus? Was this simply another seienee-inspired utopian dream, 
some reviewers asked?^'’
As historian Fred Matthews observed, those “Deweyite progressives and émigré 
socialists’’ that included Mead and her colleagues all “shared the utopian inheritance of 
the Enlightenment, the belief in the universal kingdom of harmony realized through
Ashley Montagu, “Return to the Native Drums,” review o f New Lives, by Margaret Mead, The New York 
Times (August 5, 1956): 15; Clyde Kluckhohn, “New Age in New Guinea,” review o iN ew  Lives, by 
Margaret Mead, Saturday Review o f Literature 39 (May 12, 1956): 16.
“  See comments by James G. Leybum, “Changing Societies,” review o f New Lives, by Margaret Mead,
The Yale Review 46 (Autumn, 1956): 140-44 and John Storck, “That American Way,” review o f Powder, 
by Margaret Mead, The New Republic 108 (January 4, 1943): 28.
The historian Fred Matthews has argued that utopianism in the rhetoric o f the “social engineering 
elite” in social science was just as strong among liberal democratic scientists such as Mead. It was, in fact, 
the combination o f M ead’s Boasian anthropology and the Neo-Freudian psychoanalytic tradition o f the 
1930s that together laid the foundation for the therapeutic “helping professions” that proliferated after the 
Second World War. The child psychology o f Benjamin Spock and the new science o f  human relations, for 
example, evolved out o f the behavioral perspective on the self that was rooted in the cultural anthropology 
o f Mead, Benedict, and their cohort o f liberal democratic colleagues in the 1930s and 40s. See Fred 
Matthews, “The Utopia o f Human Relations: The Conflict-Free Family in American Social Thought, 1930- 
1960,” Journal o f  History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 24 (October, 1988): 343-62.
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scientific human engineering.”^^  In both Skinner’s and Mead’s utopias there is as well a 
shared enthusiasm for the potential of scientific social engineering to remake American 
culture, one with roots in progressive reform ideology. Moreover, despite contrasting 
views of the adaptable self in their utopian tales, Skinner’s Walden Two and M ead’s New 
Lives fo r  Old each reflected a desire for the expansion of human potential, and an 
acknowledgment of the importance of applied social science in this transformation.
In both of these laboratories of humanity (real and imagined). Mead and Skinner 
were responding in the 1940s and 50s to the same set o f popular concerns about the 
consequences of human aggression, changing social mores and family structures, class 
diversification, industrial expansion, and child rearing. In addressing these concerns each 
of them proposed a social plan designed to maximize human potential. Recall, for 
example, Skinner’s professed aims in creating an experimental community such as 
Walden Two:
1. To build a lifestyle based on cooperation rather than competition.
2. To maintain it with non-coercive social sanctions.
3. To employ new methods of childcare and education.
4. Create enjoyable work environments.
5. Experiment with all social institutions; adapt freely to new 
conditions; accept change.^^
These were essentially the same reform goals to which Mead aspired in her own utopian
vision. Each of their visions invoked the creation o f a highly integrated society; both
created more opportunities for social innovation and creativity. Both also proposed that
exploring the frontiers o f  human potential should take plaee under the guidanee o f  soeial
Matthews, “The Utopia o f Human Relations,” 358.
Italics mine. See Chapter Two, “Gaining Control,” in the present study and the autobiographical notes of 
B. F. Skinner, The Shaping o f  a Behaviorist: Part Two o f  an Autobiography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1979), 346.
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science. And each of their model societies was intended as an example o f how this might 
take shape in one generation o f Americans.
Skinner, the technocrat, envisioned a scientific meritocracy of planners who 
would implement behavioral modifications to the community directly. Mead, the liberal 
democrat, however, advocated the re-tooling of contemporary social institutions along 
democratic lines under the advice and guidance of social science experts. Each 
laboratory of humanity thus reflected different images o f the self -  one mechanistic, the 
other humanistic. What was the extent and significance o f their reception and 
appropriation by different sectors o f American postwar society? How do we account for 
the exceptional public recognition of Skinner and Mead in the postwar decades given 
their opposing visions of self and future society? These are questions that I will address 
in subsequent sections of the present discussion. It will be important, however, first to 
examine more closely Mead’s model for individual human potential in light o f her 
response to the pressing issue o f child rearing practices in postwar American culture.
The Individual as Potentiai: The Cultivation of Human Potentiality
As argued in the previous chapter, the theme of adaptation became very 
important for the social and biological sciences, and for the scientific rhetoric o f social 
change, after the Second World War. It was a predominant theme in both Walden Two 
and Mead’s reflections on democratic utopia among the tribes o f the Manus islands in 
New Lives fo r  Old. Just as Skinner celebrated the embrace of change and adaptation
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among fictitious members of Walden Two, Mead extolled the wisdom of the Manus 
tribes in dedicating themselves fully to a cooperative transformation o f their eulture.
The idealization of native traditions in Mead’s published studies was nothing 
new; it stemmed both from her admiration for cultural diversity, and from a rhetorieal 
style that invited direct comparisons between primitives and modems. Mead had 
admired the wisdom of Samoan parenting in their gradual introduction o f community 
responsibilities to children from an early age so as to avoid the shock o f a quick transition 
into adulthood. Mead was also clearly impressed with the Manus willingness to bring 
American democracy and technology together in recasting kinship, child rearing, and 
government, and creating new social roles for women and ehildren, thus expanding their 
inherent human potentialities. A new class of wise and semi-educated Manus 
' statesman ’/organizers came together in councils to negotiate tribal treaties and forge a 
new government and a new juridical system.
As students of democracy and technology, these ‘architects’ of the ‘New W ay’ in 
Manus society were for Mead not unlike the interdiseiplinary, committee-oriented social 
science community in America who were attempting to forge a science o f culture in order 
to recast postwar social institutions. The Manus had learned that social adaptation was a 
constant process, requiring adjustment at every turn. Mead described American postwar 
culture the same way.
Amerieans also were learning to adapt to a rapidly evolving social architecture. 
Mead noted that the changes in the Manus tribes had made them less combative, more 
optimistic, and more caring of their children. Mead hoped to adapt the modem self as 
well to cooperativeness, creativity, and openness to alternatives in all situations. This
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view of Americans, inspired by Mead’s idealized native peoples, would be reflected in 
her attitudes about child rearing practices and educational reform in postwar America.
As I will show in the present and following sections, the lessons of the primitive society 
laboratories often had direct application to conceptualizations o f American children, their 
upbringing, and their socialization in the community. Mead’s and Skinner’s agendas for 
comprehensive social reforms (as well as those of many in social science) independently 
coalesced around the issues o f child rearing and education.
Mead had found the focus on children and youth among the Manus in the “New 
Way’’ movement especially compelling for all its similarity to the American context.
How was it, Mead asked, that Manus children were made ready for an unknown future? 
Why had it been easier for them to make the transition to a different model of adulthood 
in the New Way?
[T]here was an even deeper question, and one which is more relevant to 
what has happened to Manus and what is happening all over the world 
today [1956]. How was the experience of childhood — the kind of 
character which children of one society developed as they grew as 
compared with the kind of character with children in a different kind of 
society developed — related to their capacity to change? Because we had 
no adequate theory of character formation [in the 1920s], this question 
reduced itself to the simplicity of asking: Can you change the social 
system by changing the way in which children are reared?^^
The new sciences o f developmental psychology and psychological anthropology
pioneered by Mead and others in her professional cohort such as personality psychologist
Gardner Murphy provided at least a partial answer to this important question. Mead and
Murphy believed that the home and the classroom were the most important arenas of
study in creating new kinds o f people. Connecting optimal conditions in the domestic
’ Mead, New Lives fo r  Old, 139.
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and community environment to a comprehensive plan for education reform would be the 
ultimate goal.
From an environmental and social standpoint, Mead’s cultural anthropology,
Murphy observed, had made the case for human modification quite clear.
If we ask ourselves what kinds of changes in human nature can come 
about very rapidly, we may point to Margaret Mead’s observation of 
[Manus] people passing from Old Stone Age culture through machine 
culture to the atomic and space age in one generation, and reply that we 
should expect two fundamental changes to come in seven-league boots: 1. 
science-technology; and 2. value systems (in art, religion, words and the 
feeling for the ‘good life’).*’”
The malleability of human value systems, cultural traditions, and worldviews, as Mead
had demonstrated, was not simply a matter of meeting basic “visceral needs,” but an
expression of what Murphy described as the uniquely human “craving for thought and
understanding” in all stages of individual human development and culture. Driven to
make sense of the world, humanity had wielded great influence over its social and
biological destiny in the course of modem history.^' But it now needed a ‘science of
human potential’ that was capable of directing this evolution in the right direction.
Linking her own observations on the formation of individual character to the
growing national obsession in the 1940s and 50s with child care. Mead acknowledged
that parenting was associated strongly with the success of America. The developmental
psychologist, Lois B. Murphy (Gardner Murphy’s wife), echoed these sentiments in her
Murphy, “The Nature o f Man,” in Studies in Psychology Presented to Cyril Burt, ed. Charlotte Banks 
and P. L. Groadhurst (London; University o f London, 1965), 91-108. Reprint from the Menninger Clinic 
Archives. Papers o f Gardner Murphy, Volume 19, Article Number 1388. Menninger Foundation. Topeka, 
KS,, 106.
Murphy, “Where Is The Human Race Going?,” in Science and Human Affairs, ed. Richard E. Parson 
(Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books, 1965); 7-17. Reprint from the Menninger Clinic Archives. 
Papers o f Gardner Murphy, Volume 19, Article Number 1393. Menninger Foundation. Topeka, KS, 7.
325
research, noting this shift in attitudes about child care in the postwar era. Citing new 
literature on the connection between culture patterns and child rearing (including Mead 
and Martha Wolfenstein’s, Childhood in Contemporary Culture, 1955),®  ^Murphy 
acknowledged that, “[t]he revolution in child care patterns in the last 15 years testifies to 
the fluidity of our culture, its capacity for change, and the opportunity both provide for 
influeneing the culture if we can be sure of our ground in doing so.”^^  Americans now 
felt compelled to teach their children “awareness and alertness,” and a constant striving 
for new social possibilities, “[wjalking always new roads, with hardly a map before us."^ 
Children needed to be “pioneers” o f culture, immigrants to the new society, and to be 
taught “how to remain flexible and tentative, ready to settle or ready to move on, ready to 
look at each new situation as if  it were pristine, as on a new Day of Creation.”®^ And 
parents were looking increasingly to the “new sciences o f ehild development” in the 
1940s and 50s for help.^^
Popular books such as Benjamin Spock's The Pocket Book o f  Baby and Child 
Care (1945) and its neo-Freudian psychoanalytical emphasis on the emotional 
development o f children was also part of this humanist rubric of the American self and its
“  Childhood in Contemporary Cultures, ed. Margaret Mead and Martha Wolfenstein (Chicago: University 
o f  Chicago Press, 1955). Murphy also mentions two other representative selections. See Mental Health 
and Infant Development, ed. Kenneth Soddy (New York: Basic Books, 1956) and Emotional Problems o f  
Early Childhood, ed. Gerald Caplan (New York: Basic Books, 1955).
“  Lois B. Murphy, “Effects of Child-Rearing Patterns in Mental Health,” Children 3 (1956): 213-18. See 
page 213.
Gardner Murphy, “Where Is The Human Race Going?,” 8.
“  Ibid., 12.
“  Ibid., 8.
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development.^^ This framework had roots in the sociology and educational theory of 
Charles H. Cooley, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, the functional anthropology 
of Franz Boas, and the Frankfurt school of Karen Homey, Erich Fromm, Edward Sapir, 
and Harry Stack Sullivan who were émigré scientists in America.^* All of them were 
colleagues o f Mead. Drawing on their work and her own. Mead’s reform agenda focused
Ibid., 347. See Benjamin Spock, The Pocket Book o f  Baby and Child Care (New York: Pocket Books, 
1945).
^  Fred Matthews, “The Utopia o f Human Relations,” 347.
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on the cultivation of creativity, the skills of social adaptation, personal independence, and 
cooperation between family members and peers, and in the community. Echoing Dr. 
Spock, Mead said that what parents needed most was the ability to provide an 
environment where family relationships remained stable and yet still provided for the 
development o f a strong sense of individuality in the child. Parents needed to be more 
flexible and let children participate more fully in the worlds of community and society. 
New social forces, however, made it difficult for parents to serve as guides for their 
children. Mead highlighted this point in a 1950 White House Conference report on 
children and youth.
The impact o f the culture in which he lives, which often simultaneously,
a. Reassures and extends opportunities for satisfying relations and, at 
the same time,
b. Creates feelings of anxiety and guilt through
1. The continuing emergence of new social goals and values, often 
conflicting with each other and with social practices and 
possibilities
2. The development of social and economic trends which alter 
patterns o f family living and make more difficult the 
achievements of positive.
3. The increasing necessity for choice-making in all areas of 
personal and family living, with ever increasing numbers of 
variable factors and force.
4. The contiguity of cultures in our complex society which are 
essentially different, equally valid from many points o f view, 
and in competition for the benefits o f the American “way of 
life."^°
Fred Matthews, “The Utopia o f  Human Relations,” 347.
Margaret Mead, “Tentative Outline for the Sections on parent Education o f the Fact-Finding Report on 
the 1950 White House Conference on Children and Youth.” Unpublished notes. Central Group o f Experts 
In Domestic Affairs, n. d. Container E l 66, Folder 1. Papers o f Margaret Mead. Library o f Congress 
Manuscript Division. Washington, D. C., 3-4.
Many o f these sentiments in support o f the family environment had been articulated on a national 
level through such federally sponsored projects as the Mid-century White House Conference on Children 
and Youth which was held in 1950 and populated by leading social scientists and social services 
professionals. Mead was one o f the more prominent and long-standing associates o f the conference. Using 
the combined researches o f special project committees and individual social scientists, the work groups in
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The upheaval of the war had been a powerful object lesson for social scientists about 
what peacetime mobilization to a new economy and life-ways would entail for parents 
and children/' As indicated above, the findings o f the work groups in the conference 
aptly reflect professional awareness of the need for emotional support and openness in 
parenting, where stimulation and exploration on the one hand met careful guidanee on the 
other. This would be necessary in order to produce a well-rounded personality in a world 
o f increasing complexity and change. Further, these reports validated Mead’s claim that 
a child’s ability to contribute to the eommunity was crucial for the development o f human 
potential. What also was clear from the White House conference of 1950, however, was 
that postwar America lacked an infrastructure of developed social and community 
services.
Mead’s cultural anthropology, like her reform agenda for soeial services and ehild 
care, revealed the occasional tendency among cultural anthropologists to discuss both 
societies and selves in a holistic way. The technique o f encapsulating a culture or a 
nation in the psychology of the individual in culture and personality studies tended to 
homogenize the anthropologist’s view of a culture. In a national context, this could not 
account for regional and local differences in cultural traditions. Certainly, the rural to 
urban transition, expanding bureaucracy and technocracy, the mobilization for war, and 
consumer culture had occasioned a perceived movement toward unity, or at least
the conference reached the same general conclusion as Mead had independently about the needs o f the 
healthy American family and of youth.
“Findings o f the Work Groups.” Publication o f the Mid-Century White House Conference on Children 
and Youth Mead Papers and Correspondence. 3-7 December 1950. Central Group o f Experts in Domestic 
Affairs. Container E l 66, Folder 1. Papers o f Margaret Mead. Library o f Congress Manuscript Division. 
Washington, D. C., 4.
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standardization, o f American culture in the 1950s. As historians and critics o f Mead have 
often observed, however, she knew far less about American culture and history than she 
claimed. In the context o f adaptations for parents and children, she tended to think, 
perhaps unrealistically, in terms of comprehensive national transitions. In this sense. 
Mead was overly optimistic in drawing direct analogies between the holistic self, holistic 
cultures, and the American national context in arguing for reform. She did however seek 
a compromise when it came to the issue of education. Like Skinner’s, Mead’s reform 
aims emphasized the power of a transformed educational system to gradually remake the 
whole of society.
Mead and American Education: A Venue for Institutional Reform
A decade later in the White House conference report o f 1960, Mead again linked 
the expansion of human potentiality to democratic social reform. In the 1960s when 
modem technocracy was challenged openly. Mead was in a better position than in 1950 
to lobby for her reform measures. The answer for Mead (and Skinner), amidst a well- 
publicized education crisis, was to bring social science to bear on methods of education. 
Any shakeup of institutionalized education would do in the short term. As did Skinner, 
Mead appealed to business leaders to find new ways to improve the environment of the 
classroom.
Amidst the public debate over American primary and secondary education in the 
late 1950s, Mead found audiences in various public and government circles who were 
very interested in learning how to expand human potential. As an advisor to policy
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makers in Washington, Mead framed her ideas for education around the politics of the 
Cold War. Mead, like Skinner, tied human potentiality to the future of American 
democracy in characterizing education reform as a question of how to “get ahead of, or at 
least keep up with, the Russians.”’  ^ Unlike Skinner, however. Mead could not lay claim 
to any behavioral mechanism or technological procedure for tapping this capacity 
directly. Much o f the research on the environment of children in the home, the 
classroom, and the community had yet even to be completed.
As traditional models o f gender, family, and community changed in the postwar
decades, a teaching/learning ‘gap’ (similar to the concept of a “generation gap,” and later
a “missile gap”) also developed between educators and young Americans demanding
training in new skills. “Is not the break between past and present,” Mead queried in a
1958 article for the Harvard Business Review,
and the whole problem of outdating in our educational system related to 
change in the rate of change [itself]? For change has become so rapid that 
adjustment cannot be left to the next generation; adults must, not once, but 
continually, take in, adjust to, use, and make innovations in a steady 
stream of discovery and new conditions.’^
Mead, like Skinner, argued that a reform plan that merely called for more teachers, more
class time, more buildings, and more books was bound to fail. The structure of
institutionalized education had to be assessed on its most basic level. This, in turn, would
require a completely new approach to the individual, one that incorporated all that had
Margaret Mead, “The High School o f the Future,” California Journal o f  Secondary Education 35 
(October, 1960): 360-69. See page 361. This article was prepared by Mead for the annual Cubberly 
Conference on secondary education at Stanford University.
Margaret Mead, “W hy Is Education Obsolete?,” Harvard Business Review 36, no. 6 (November- 
December, 1958): 23-36, 164-170. See page 24.
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been discovered about the environment-specific stages of human development.
Ironically, Skinner would have agreed with Mead’s assessment.
Mead’s cultural anthropology had demonstrated, she claimed, that life skills had 
to be taught and entrusted to the young from an early age. She invoked the progressive 
education initiatives that she and her colleagues had helped forge in the 1930s that 
stressed the “emotional, intellectual, and physical development” o f children, a 
perspective informed by comparative ethnography and psychology.^"* Rather than 
commandeer education with a cadre of professional managers and technologies. Mead 
envisioned an educational “protocracy” of professionals in interdisciplinary social 
science who would put their knowledge of humanity at the schoolteacher’s disposal in a 
cooperative, advisory capacity.^^ American education would also have to change its 
structure from a rigid “ladder” of age-based grade scales and standardized proficiency 
ratings, to a flexible and evolving “lattice,” a lateral matrix of learning opportunities, 
where the free exchange of new, culturally relevant knowledge would cut across age, 
gender, and class lines.^'’ An alternative system, she proposed, might follow the stages of 
growth from developmental psychology and cultural anthropology.
Margaret Mead, “Toward an Educational Protocracy,” New York University Education Quarterly 6, no. 3 
(1975); 2-7. See page 2. Mead mentions the Hanover Seminar on Human Relations in 1934, out o f which 
the theory o f national character developed, as particularly important. Among her colleagues were John 
Dewey, Lawrence K. Frank, and Caroline Zachry, all o f whom were members o f the Progressive Education 
Association dedicated to social scientific research into learning.
Ibid. See similar remarks about the need for anthropologists and psychologists to interact with educators 
more closely in M ead’s article “The Contemporary Challenge to Education,” in the set o f collected essays 
edited by W. R. Niblett, Education —The Lost Dimension (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1955), 
105-12. See also M ead’s Foreword to this volume, pages vii-x, as well as her summary o f the essays, pages 
271-78.
Mead, “High School o f the Future,” 361.
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The first “phase” of education might emphasize the facilitation o f interpersonal 
bonds with one teacher or parent figure. The next phase might then concentrate on group 
bonding among older children. This group-leaming stage could be scientifically studied 
to find those behavioral techniques that streamlined the educational process, a notion 
somewhat akin to Skinner’s idea of teaching efficiency.’’ In analyzing the physical and 
emotional maturity of students, subsequent learning phases would accommodate both 
students who needed special attention in participating in the community, and also those 
students who were ready for full participation.
Mead envisioned this developmental approach to learning stages with the idea of 
moving institutional education away from the ‘homogenization’ of students. In her 
model o f education planning, the teacher would work closely with a resident social 
scientist in interpreting information about students in each community (e. g., 
demographics, immigrant and minority status, gender, economic status). This knowledge 
could then be applied to curriculum design. This strategy is reminiscent o f the British 
social services model that she praised highly in the early 1950s. The “school o f the 
future” Mead felt, should be thought o f more as a “community center where all 
adolescents are given a focus and some sort o f protection, ” and where the transition from 
home to community life could be facilitated more effectively.’*
“No one,” Mead stressed in an article written for the National Education 
Association Journal in 1959, “will live all his life in the world into which he was bom, 
and no one will die in the world in which he worked in his maturity.” The school
Ibid. 362-66.
Ibid., 367, 368.
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curriculum had to incorporate regular re-tooling in helping student fulfill a “rapid and 
self-conscious adaptation to a changing world,” bringing in new knowledge and skills at a 
rate that kept paee with the surrounding eulture/^ Since new skills would be in constant 
demand in an evolving eulture, education centers would also have to accommodate 
people o f all ages returning occasionally for re-training. Public education would also 
have to accommodate students with different aptitudes and styles o f learning.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, children were at the heart of Mead’s popular 
and professional writing in the 1940s and 50s. The core themes o f these articles and 
lectures can be summarized in the following set of prescriptive statements:
1. Children must be taught to live in a culture o f constant change, to adjust 
as they go.
2. Imagination and creativity must be engaged at all stages of 
development with diverse and stimulating experienees that expose 
children to multiple soeial environments, cultural traditions, and living 
contexts.
3. Children must be challenged and pushed to exeel with non-coercive 
methods of education and parenting in order to function independently.
4. Children must not be sheltered from the world o f adults and the 
responsibilities o f living in the community outside their home 
environment.
5. Children must learn to thrive in an inereasingly mechanized world of 
new technologies such that they harness the powers of adaptation to 
their global environment.**^
Herein is Mead’s well-worn message that the self must be patterned for adaptation
through immersion in an international environment o f change. Skinner, of course,
presented similar themes for education and child rearing during the 1960s.
Margaret Mead, “A Redefinition o f Edueation,” Journal o f  the National Education Association 48 
(October, 1959): 15-17. Seepage 16.
^  Taken from an article by Mead in a 1957 special edition o f Parent’s Magazine devoted to “Preparing 
Today’s Children for Tomorrow’s World.” See Margaret M ead’s article in this document entitled “Raising 
Children W ho’ll Reach for the Moon,” Parent’s Magazine 33, no. 10 (October, 1957): 44-46.
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A postwar obsession with emotional well being in the helping professions
(represented in Dr. Spock and progressive education theory), Mead cautioned, would
prevent sufficient experience with new worlds.*' Parental fear o f emotional trauma could
keep children from transcending conventions and perceived limitations. As Mead had
observed in her 1955 research survey. Childhood in Contemporary Cultures,
The comparative study of cultures has played a significant role in 
introducing this sort of balance into our enthusiastic attempts to revise our 
methods of ehild eare.*^... Only gradually have we come to recognize the 
complexity o f such applications of insight to changed social procedures, 
the extent to which the whole culture and the whole society must be taken 
into account, the limitations on innovation given by the extent to which 
the innovating adults are genuine members of their own culture, able to 
reinterpret and reorganize the more drastic recommendations. We have 
slowly come to realize also that insights which are based on trauma, 
failure, casualties o f all sorts are at best only half the story; that we can 
make no complete plans [for child rearing] without a second set o f insights 
based on blessing, gift, success, upon a study o f those happy combinations 
which produce something more than mere “adjustment”; and that from 
experience the growing child gains not only wounds and vulnerabilities b)' 
also extra strengths and blessings.*^
Mead sounded this same admonition throughout the 1950s and 60s in articles and 
lectures aimed at parents and educators. She argued that, as in many cultures around the 
world, children should start transitioning into the adult world much earlier in life. One of 
the drawbacks o f a secluded home environment and educational system. Mead asserted.
Margaret Mead, “Different Cultural Patterns and Technological Change,” in Mental Health and Infant 
Development: Proceedings o f  the International Seminar held by the World Federation fo r  Mental Health at 
Chichester, England, 2 vols., ed. Kenneth Soddy (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), 161-185.
Mead and Wolfenstein, Childhood in Contemporary Cultures, 452.
“  Ibid., 451.
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was that American children did not get enough exposure early on to community life and 
to the stimulation of multiple learning environments.*"*
O f utmost importance in re-designing American education in order to compete 
with the Russians, Mead argued, was the willingness to break free of past traditions by 
taking an experimental approach to school design. As with Skinner, Mead argued that it 
would be the “fear of experimentation, our unwillingness to carry experimentation fa r  
enough, our fixation on the kind of competition that in the end [would be] certain to give 
one the defects if  not the virtues of one’s competitor — as we become made more and 
more in our rival’s image,” that would be the downfall o f American education.*^
Among the most striking aspects of Mead’s appeals for education reform was her 
opinion about where the source of innovation and change might be found. Ironically, she 
appealed not to the government or the schools themselves, but to the very same corporate 
sector that Skinner had courted in promoting his teaching technologies. “Industry,” she 
said, “has the peculiar advantage of understanding the major evil from which our whole 
educational system is suffering — obsolescence.'" Industrialists, as Mead pointed out in a 
speech to business leaders, had made the study of obsolescence and innovation an 
essential tool o f their trade. What better resource, Mead thought, than the business 
community for insight on how to increase the effectiveness of schools. As she observed,
^  Margaret Mead, “Children in American Culture,” National Elementary Principal 36, no. 6 (April, 1957): 
16-19. See also her comments on similar changes to maternity practices in “Families and Maternity Care 
Around the World,” Bulletin o f  the American College o f  Nurse-Midwifery 8, no. 1 (Spring, 1963): 2-7, and 
to mental health professionals such as in her 1957 presidential address, “Growing Up in Different 
Cultures,” to the World Federation for Mental Flealth. See this speech in Growing Up in a Changing 
World: Papers Presented at the Tenth Annual Meeting o f  the World Federation fo r  Mental Health, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, August, 1957 (London: World Federation for Mental Health, 1958), 7-14.
Mead, “High School of the Future,” 369. The italics are M ead’s. See similar comments in M ead’s 
article “Questions That Need Asking,” Teachers College Record 63, no. 2 (November, 1961): 89-93.
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Industry has already taken the lead — within its own walls — in developing 
a new type of education that includes all levels of competence and training 
and that freely faces the need for education at the senior levels of 
management.*®
In their individual quests for a better scientific understanding of the self, both 
Skinner and Mead drew special inspiration from the idea of using the experimental 
laboratories o f culture, symbolized in Skinner’s baby tender and his imagined utopian 
society of Walden Two and in Mead’s study of the Manus tribes in the midst of social 
transition. Skinner and Mead both supported the notion that a science o f education was a 
real possibility. They believed that institutional education, as well as human natures 
themselves, could be modified to meet the needs of a rapidly evolving society. The 
efficiency and productive capacity of educational institutions, Skinner and Mead asserted, 
could not be addressed apart from this pressing need for a new approach to human nature. 
The key to social progress, Skinner and Mead would have agreed, was the preservation of 
the adaptive, experimental perspective on the classroom and the school.
“The Mead and Her Message”: Mead’s Audiences in the Age of Aquarius*’
The 1960s proved to be the most important decade for Mead in promoting her 
vision of the self and her soeial reform agenda. The political and social volatility of these 
years fueled popular debate about civil rights, the Vietnam War, poverty, pollution, 
feminism, the fate o f  the family, and the counterculture movement. Indeed, both Mead
^  Margaret Mead, “Why Is Education Obsolete?,” 23.
The phrase in quotations is taken from the title o f a 1970 article about Mead and her career as a public 
intellectual. See the reference to this article below.
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and her growing audience saw that cultural anthropology and the gospel of expanded
human potential were tailor-made for the reassessment of American society that had
begun in the late 1950s. Mead’s growing celebrity, the “Mead phenomenon,” as it came
to be known in the popular press, marked her international reputation as an expert on
human nature, an anthropologist who successfully brought the comparative study of
cultures into the public domain.
As many commentators noted of her steady rise to fame in the 1950s and 60s, the
phenomenon of Mead, as icon and solicitor of applied anthropology, was linked firmly to
intense public anxiety over living in an “accelerated” culture. As one commentator
observed in a 1970 retrospective of Mead’s career for the New York Times, drastic social
changes on all fronts in the years after the Second World War “ha[d] produced a whole
new ballgame for the human race.”
People are understandably anxious about a game in which the rules have 
been suddenly and drastically revised; and since anthropology is 
essentially a study of cultural adaptation. Mead the anthropologist has 
become a social umpire, calling the plays as they happen. At the same 
time. Mead the popularizer is an effective commentator (or “color 
announcer”) who gives her audiences access to the new, esoteric rules in a 
language they can understand.**
As Skinner had done in his own promotional campaigns of the 1960s, Mead tapped into
emerging constituencies that enthusiastically appropriated her vision o f the self and
helped bring it to the public eye. This phenomenon established Mead as a well-known
social commentator among a group of high-profile public intellectuals who debated the
David Dempsey, "Ttie Mead and Her Message,” 75.
This was perhaps the best and most representative retrospective o f M ead’s career in the press at 
the time. It contains an in-depth analysis o f M ead’s rise to public prominence in the 1950s and 60s and 
does an excellent job o f surveying her place among social commentators o f this period. It also includes 
several discussions o f M ead’s image as public scientist as characterized by fellow academics, politicians, 
and the general public.
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fate of humanity in the media during the 1960s. Among counterculture activists, 
feminists, civil rights organizers, politicians, educators, and parents, Mead found 
audiences who embraced her as an authority figure. Anti-establishment activists who 
employed concepts of cultural diversity as tools of protest also accepted Mead as a sage. 
She was a science ‘expert’ attuned to the political movements o f the day, a guide to the 
American experience who was more personable and accessible to the average American 
than other public intellectuals.
Mead worked tirelessly during these years to solidify this public image. Mead 
attempted, as always, in her characteristically steady stream of articles, lectures, 
discussions, and books, to relate her theories of social change and humanity to a myriad 
o f contemporary issues and problems. Like Skinner, Mead marketed her social theories 
in the popular press as panaceas. World hunger and overpopulation, environmental 
devastation, failed education, warfare, racial tension, feminism, recreational drug use, 
child development, community planning, urban poverty and violence — these were 
among the many issues that Mead addressed as the so-called “social umpire” and “color 
announcer” of American life in the 1960s. “Mead,” the Times writer observed, “is simply 
an anthropologist with a mission, which the new rules of the game have made more 
urgent than ever.”*^
Indeed, Mead’s efforts to raise public awareness about the social utility o f cultural 
anthropology helped to redefine its popular image by this time as an applied science, a 
“study of cultural adaptation, r a t h e r  than simply a survey of primitive cultures. This
Ibid.
90 Ibid. Italics mine.
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development, I argue, ean be interpreted historically as one among many indications of 
the popular appropriation of Mead as an icon of anthropology in the 1960s and 70s. Her 
place in public debates about the future of humanity, the social relevance of 
anthropology, and the popular appropriation of scientific images o f the self in the postwar 
decades was solidified during this time.
The upsurge of highly vocal and aggressive challenges to American society by 
feminists, environmentalists, civil-rights activists, and the youth counterculture in the 
1960s saw a more thoroughgoing evaluation and appropriation o f Mead’s perspectives on 
the self. These political constituencies — women, minorities, and the young — that were 
involved in social protest and rebellion, had a vested interest in the political implications 
of theories of human potentiality and a personal quest for the self. Further, because 
Mead brought with her the legacy of progressivism and the rhetoric o f liberal democracy, 
these groups found some (but not all) of her perspectives on humanity particularly 
amenable to their protest movements. As one commentator observed, “Mead’s partisans 
[could] trace her professional lineage to such scholar-activists as Jane Addams, who used 
her learning to revolutionize social work in this country.”^' So, similarly, had Mead used 
her anthropology of social reform in the 1960s. To a much greater degree than Skinner, 
Mead was appropriated as a leader in the counterculture movement. Her holistic and 
humanistic vision of the self was part and parcel o f their cause.
Mead did not, however, accept all of the protest politics o f these groups, nor did 
they themselves always agree with her depictions of the self. Without question, Mead 
had been a lifelong supporter of civil-rights and women’s liberation. But she avoided
Ibid.
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allying herself closely with any political camp. Mead often presented her opinions with 
more professional detachment, invoking her authoritative status as a social science 
expert, in advocating the universal challenge for all Americans, — to liberate themselves 
from the individual psychology and broad cultural conventions that perpetuated human 
limitation. The political and reform aims of each of these groups, she would argue, could 
be boiled down to this basic task.
M ead’s opinions on social reform in this respect serve as a productive analytical 
backdrop for the historical appraisal of the reciprocal exchange dynamic between Mead 
and her newfound audiences. This dynamic can be explored using appraisals by 
representatives of these audiences and the mass media coverage that Mead received in the 
1960s and 70s. The aim in the present discussion is to juxtapose the unique and 
sometimes contradictory ways in which Mead chose to address feminism, the civil rights 
movement, and the counterculture. Their interpretations of Mead’s vision for the self 
illustrate the complex manner in which it was critiqued and transformed.
With respect to the feminist critique of Mead’s ethnologies and their impact on 
the politics o f gender in postwar America, it is important to recall the observations of the 
cultural historian Micaela di Leonardo. As mentioned in the previous chapter, di 
Leonardo has highlighted the importance of examining Mead historically, not only as an 
authoritative expert on cultural anthropology, but also as an adept publicist, a scientist 
keenly aware o f conventional sensibilities and the political power structure o f the 
academic and governmental circles that she cultivated.^^ Mead’s own experience of 
postwar American culture unquestionably shaped her presentation o f primitive culture for
^  Micaela di Leonardo, Exotics at Home: Anthropologies, Others, American Modernity (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1998).
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“commodification” and public consumption. The scientific treatment of race and gender, 
in particular, di Leonardo noted, proved to be very important marketing vehicles for 
anthropologists such as Mead in the postwar decades.^^
In books such as Powder and Male and Female, Mead, the patriot, left little doubt 
as to her support of traditional American values. Indeed, some such as di Leonardo have 
claimed that Mead was not an anti-modem cultural relativist, but an imperialist who 
touted the superiority of Western s o c i e t y . T h i s  interpretation notwithstanding. Mead 
did market her anthropology o f gender in the 1940s and 50s not only as a fomm for 
discussing human malleability but also simultaneously as a means of scientifically 
reifying some aspects of traditional Western concepts o f male and female potentiality. 
Fellow social scientists criticized Mead for having reconstituted her research in order to 
maximize the mass-appeal o f her publications. Other critics saw Mead’s work as 
blatantly anti-feminist and highly detrimental to the women’s movement of the late 
1950s. Betty Friedan’s lambasting of Mead serves to illustrate, as di Leonardo has 
observed, the politics o f power relationships embedded in postwar American social 
science, and in Mead’s anthropological pronouncements on women in postwar American 
culture.
Di Leonardo’s study is a valuable treatment of the political economy of American 
anthropology and its negotiation by prominent anthropologists. Her accusations as to 
Mead’s alleged imperialism, ethnic elitism, and failure to engage American cultural 
hegemony, however, are misleading and historically misplaced. As several historians
Ibid., 169, 198. 
Ibid., 340.
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have observed, di Leonardo’s is a Marxist/feminist interpretation of the history of 
American ethnography and anthropology; she has judged their successes and failures on 
the basis of late twentieth-century feminist thought. As a postmodern history of feminist 
theory di Leonardo’s argument is questionable. As history, it is simply presentist and 
Whiggish. She is not the first scholar to point out the political and cultural subtexts of 
American anthropological research, nor its “commodification” in popular culture.^^ 
Mead’s published work does indeed reflect cultural and political preferences, and a 
concerted effort to accommodate a predominantly white middle class popular readership. 
Historical appraisals of social scientists such as Mead, Spock, Parsons, and Skinner and 
their negotiation of American politics and culture, however, are best kept within the 
parameters o f the society and time in which they lived. The politics of present day 
feminism should not be used as criteria for writing the history o f Mead, or Friedan for 
that matter, as public intellectuals.
As I have argued. Mead carefully balanced her message of reform against the 
political and social perspectives of her professional and lay audiences in popularizing her 
scientific wares. Like most social scientists. Mead valued the inroads that social 
scientists had made into American government in the postwar years. She strategically 
negotiated the many and changing borders of American culture and politics with the goal 
of preserving a place for herself in the power structure that was vital to her public career. 
This was no less true of Betty Friedan and her career as a leading feminist author in the
Consult the reviews o f di Leonardo’s book by Steven Hoelseber, “America the Exotic,” an essay review 
o f Barbara Kirsbenblatt-Gimblett, Destination Culture: Tourism, Museums, and Heritage (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1998) and Micaela di Leonardo, Exotics at Home: Anthropologies, Others, 
American Modernity (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1998) for The American Quarterly 52, no. 
1 (2000): 168-78. See also the review o f Exotics at Home by Julia B. Liss in The Journal o f  American 
History 86, no. 4 (2000): 1834.
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1950s and 60s. As Daniel Horowitz has observed reeently, Friedan’s navigation through 
Cold War politics and McCarthyism required her to conceal her “radical” past as a 
student activist, labor journalist, and Popular Front feminist in the 1930s. Cultivating a 
popular audience required Friedan to reinvent her image in the 1950s as an upper middle 
class housewife writing about the struggles o f women in liberating themselves from the 
domestic sphere.^^ Friedan’s negotiation o f Cold War politics in creating a forum for 
feminism must be considered when examining her contemporary critique o f Mead’s 
anthropology.
In her book. The Feminine Mystique (1963), Friedan targeted professional social 
science in general, and Mead in particular, for a full chapter’s worth o f criticism for 
scientifically legitimating traditional stereotypes about women and perpetuating their 
confinement to the domestic sphere.^^ The image o f the female in Western society, the 
“feminine mystique,” as Friedan termed it, entailed a distinct female nature, “mysterious 
and intuitive and close to the creation of and origin of life that man-made science may 
never be able to understand.” *^ Women, by this definition, possessed distinctive 
character traits that were bound uniquely to the biology of reproduction. “The feminine 
mystique says that the highest value and the only commitment for women is the 
fulfillment o f their own f e m i n i n i t y . A n y  aspirations beyond the domain o f home and
^  See reviews o f  Daniel Horowitz, Betty Friedan and the making o f  The Feminine Mystique: The American 
Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism (Amherst; University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1998) by Annelise 
Orleck for The American Historical Review  105, no. 2 (1999): 574-75 and by Nancy Gabin for The Journal 
o f  American History 86, no. 3 (1999): 1389.
See the chapter entitled “The Functional Freeze, The Feminine Protest, and Margaret Mead,” in Betty 
Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1963).
Ibid., 43.
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family, while encouraged on the one hand by Mead, also held the risk o f destroying 
fundamental female nature. Modem American society and its embrace of this mystique, 
Friedan argued, left women with only one straightforward goal for their lives — 
“Occupation: housewife.
For an institution that held such promise in liberating women from traditional 
social roles, Friedan felt that American social science in the postwar years had betrayed 
its most fundamental principles. Many in the ‘helping’ sciences, Friedan claimed, 
catered to the public demand for social adjustment in their research but avoided what she 
felt was their professional responsibility to battle against gender prejudice through 
objective scientific inquiry. In exploiting a growing market for expert advice on child 
rearing and family education, professionals invoked traditional conventions about family 
stmcture, and the bifurcation of the gendered self, in plying their therapeutic wares.
This professional trend had its methodological roots, Friedan argued, in a combination of 
Freudian conceptualizations o f the ‘psychological self,’ defined by fundamental 
instinctive drives (such as sex), with functionalist interpretations o f culture in sociology 
and anthropology. Anthropological functionalism, or the study o f the roles that 
individuals and groups play in a culture, was designed as an analog to the biological 
study of organisms in nature. It was meant to bolster the scientific credibility of the 
social sciences. When applied to the study of the American family, however, 
functionalism, far from liberating women, Friedan argued, had been used to justify the 
separate spheres of men and women.
Ibid.
101 Ibid., 135.
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The feminine mystique, Friedan claimed, was well represented among leading 
social scientists whose work enjoyed a wide popular readership. Friedan pointed to 
sociologists Talcott Parsons and Mirra Komarovsky, as well as Mead, as examples. In 
Parsons’ famous studies o f the American family, for example, he had openly endorsed 
conceptualizations of female nature that tied women biologically and culturally to the 
domestic realm. Acknowledging that women in the 1950s had the opportunity to break 
into male-dominated professions. Parsons nevertheless argued that the resulting stress on 
women, and the damage that it would do to the family, made liberation inadvisable. 
Sexual segregation. Parsons argued, preserved the integrity of the family; there was no 
room in contemporary postwar culture just yet for complete equality o f opportunity for 
the sexes.
The noted sociologist Mirra Komarovsky appeared to offer much the same 
assessment in her text. Women in the Modern World, Their Education and Their 
Dilemmas (1953).'^'* In this and many other educational texts on family planning that 
were geared toward women, professionals such as Komarovski and Parsons assented to 
traditional roles for women by using functionalist explanations. The structure of 
contemporary American culture, they claimed, did not really offer women any of the 
viable alternatives suggested by anthropological and sociological studies on women in
Friedan refers to statements made by Parsons in two articles that also reflect opinions in his well-known 
popular texts. See her references to Talcott Parsons, “Age and Sex in the Social Structure o f the United 
States,” and “An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification,” in Essays in Sociological 
Theory, Pure and Applied (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949), 89-103. See pages 69-88. See also Family 
Socialization and Interaction Process, ed. Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, James Olds (Glencoe, IL: Free 
Press, 1954).
Friedan, Mystique, 133.
Mirra Komarovsky, Women in the Modern World, Their Education and Their Dilemmas (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1953).
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various cultures. This, Friedan said, was the real travesty of modem social science.
Social scientists, in her opinion, had manipulated soeial seience purposely, hoping to cash 
in on their newfound social authority (and book sales) in the postwar years. Instead of 
“probing for deeper tmth,” as Friedan had hoped, scientists had used functionalism to 
market family planning in a way that supported the status quo for women.
As “the most powerful influence on modem women, in terms both of 
functionalism and the feminist protest,” and the “symbol o f the woman thinker in 
America,” Margaret Mead, according to Friedan, was one of the biggest threats to 
women’s liberation. In Friedan’s estimation. Mead and her message had by the late 
1950s become ubiquitous in American culture. “Margaret Mead,” Friedan declared, was 
“her own best popularizer — and her influence has been felt in almost every layer of 
American thought.” *^^*’ Mead’s theories of culture and personality had been disseminated 
in countless popular press articles and books, and taught to women across the nation in 
college courses on “anthropology, sociology, psychology, education, marriage and family 
life.” This had influenced profoundly the self-image of a whole generation of women. 
Mead’s theories o f gender and personality also were leamed by a generation o f science 
professionals in teaching, medicine, and psychiatry.
Mead’s opinions on female potential often seemed mixed and paradoxical. On 
the one hand. Mead, the self-made feminist and woman anthropologist, had popularized
Friedan, Mystique, 134-35. Friedan noted that this was part o f the reason why functionalism was 
rejected as a concept in the social sciences later on in the 1950s. It assumed a fixed culture that was not 
subject to transformation or change. See her reference to Kingsley Davis, “The Myth o f Functional 
Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology,” American Sociological Review 24, no. 6 
(December, 1959): 757-72.
Friedan, Mystique, 135-36.
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in the 1930s the “revolutionary” idea that gender typologies varied widely among
different cultures, and that human nature was flexible. But in Male and Female and other
publications in the 1950s, the era of both social containment and re-adjustment, this
message was mixed in with what seemed to be an endorsement of American gender
hierarchy. Oddly, it appeared that Mead used the biological determinism embedded in
Freudian conceptualizations of the self and the cultural anthropology of the “primitive” in
subscribing, at least tacitly, to standard American roles for men and women. Why,
Friedan wondered, had Mead muddied her message in Male and Female, a book that, as
Friedan lamented, had become a “cornerstone o f the feminine mystique.” '”^
Mead had extrapolated an ideal of female nature from primitive culture and
universalized it, arguing that biologically defined roles were not merely cultural
conventions but facts o f female nature.'®* This appeared to turn Mead’s entire thesis on
its head. Mead and other experts seemed to assert that the very fabric o f American
society in the 1950s depended on women not breaking with their time-honored roles, at
least not too much. Quoting from Male and Female, Friedan pointed to one example of
this confusing message. Mead had said,
It is of very doubtful value to enlist the gifts of women if bringing women 
into fields that have been defined as male frightens the men, unsexes the 
women, muffles and distorts the contributions the women could make, 
either because their presence excludes men from the occupation or 
because it changes the quality o f the men who enter i t ... It is folly to 
ignore the signs which warn us that the present terms in which women are 
lured by their own curiosities and drives developed under the same 
educational system as boys ... are bad for both men and women.'®®
' “'Ib id ., 138.
'“8 Ibid., 141.
This is the passage from M ead’s Male and Female that was used by Friedan to make this particular 
point. See Friedan, Mystique, 145 for her use of this quote as well as the original quote from Mead in Male 
and Female (New York: W. Morrow, 1955), 16-18, as cited by Friedan, page 384.
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In a culture where social science had been given authority in “ordering” American life, 
why, Friedan asked, were social scientists such as Mead not championing change on one 
of the most obvious fronts, as they had in the 1930s? Why had Mead seemingly gone 
back on all that her personal life stood for and betrayed the many women who emulated 
her example?"*^ Why did Mead change her opinion yet again in the 1960s in criticizing 
women for not reaching beyond the domestie sphere enough and getting more involved 
with a world in crisis?''^
Despite this attack most Americans saw Mead as a leader in the feminist 
movement. Undoubtedly, Mead designed her gender characterizations in the 1950s so as 
not to alienate herself from the public. She couched her messages o f human potentiality 
in terms that were amenable to predominant conventions about gender roles. In the 
1960s, however. Mead was free to argue female liberation in a time when social mores 
regarding marriage, family and community structure, and gender roles were being 
challenged openly on many political fronts."^ Still, Mead continued to have little 
patience for feminist politics that engaged in unproductive, petty contentiousness and 
anti-male sentiment.”  ^ She would not jeopardize her place in ‘establishment’
110
1 1 1
Friedan, Mystique, 146.
Friedan refers here to an excerpt in the Saturday Evening Post (March 3, 1962) from an introduction by 
Margaret Mead in Beverly Benner Cassara, et al., American Women: The Changing Image (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1962) where Mead makes these statements. See pages ix-xv, and the quote on page xii.
This is not to say that such challenges had not gotten underway by the 1950s. Revisionist scholarship on 
the history o f  1950s American women’s movements, as mentioned in chapter one o f the present study, cites 
many examples o f  organized opposition to gender discrimination and the pursuit o f  labor and employment 
rights by women in the workplace.
See the interview o f Mead by Eleanor Blau, “Dr. Mead, Lifelong Feminist, Says ‘Nonsense’ o f many in 
W omen’s Lib ‘Gets Us Nowhere,” ’ The New York Times (April 25, 1971): 55. See also an article by Sheila
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communities that she knew were vital in creating substantive reform. In this she 
represented the sentiments of many in the social sciences who had benefited from 
postwar sponsorship by government agencies. Politically, she had to play to multiple and 
opposing communities while also preserving an air of expert detachment.
This also seemed evident in Mead’s impatience with some of the politics of self in 
the civil rights movement. Her famous televised dialogues with the novelist and poet, 
James Baldwin, were collected for publication in the book entitled 4^ Rap on Race (1971). 
Their dialogue was billed as the “most important racial confrontation o f our time," 
between the most prominent civil rights intellectual and the foremost anthropologist of 
the day.*’’* Together Mead and Baldwin appeared on the Dick Cavett Show, the Michael 
Douglas Show, and the Today Show for these exchanges.” ^
Baldwin had spent his career writing novels, plays, and poetry that personalized 
the plight o f African Americans living in a segregated America. Baldwin believed that 
Americans still had much to atone for in a racist society. In their discussions. Mead 
declared that realistic solutions to racial problems should be sought instead. Mead 
refused to accept Baldwin’s confrontational agenda for the civil rights movement. She 
also rejected the idea of giving special consideration to one group discriminated against 
over another. Her opinions created an unexpected twist in their debates. As Mead 
repeated in their exchanges.
K. Johnson, “A Woman Anthropologist Offers a Solution to the Woman Problem,” The New York Times 
(August 27, 1972): SM7.
James Baldwin and Margaret Mead, A Rap on Race (London: Michael Joseph, 1971). See Anatole 
Broyard, “Poet and the Anthropologist,” review o f A Rap on Race, by Margaret Mead, The New York Times 
(May 21, 1971), 37. Quote taken from an advertisement for this book that was collected for the Margaret 
Mead papers at Columbia University Archives. Columbia University. New York City, NY.
115 James Baldwin and Margaret Mead, A Rap on Race (London: Michael Joseph, 1971).
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What I feel is this. We agree that we are both Americans. We agree in the 
sense o f responsibility for the present and the future. You have 
approached this present moment by one route and I have approached it by 
another. In the colors of our skin you represent a course o f victimization 
and suffering and exploitation and everything in the world. If you just use 
skin color, I represent the group that was in the ascendance, were the 
conquerors, had the power, owned the land — you can say anything you 
like. All right. Now here we both are ... Now is it necessary for you to 
narrow history down and express only despair or bitterness while I express 
hope? Is this intrinsic to our position at the moment? ... [C]an we both, 
nevertheless, stand shoulder to shoulder, a continent or an ocean away, 
working for the same future? I think this is the real problem."®
Mead’s responses to Baldwin were consistent with her desire not to let radical politics
seep into her proclamations about the self. They also may reflect an air of cultural
superiority that di Leonardo and others have noted in Mead’s writing. Perhaps because
o f this, many modem critics claim to detect a latent racial and cultural prejudice in
Mead’s research and opinions.'"
Mead’s distaste for radical activism spanned her entire career. Mead biographers
Hilary Lapsley and Lois Banner note not only her desire to accommodate politically
conservative audiences in government and the public but also the role that family history
"M bid., 233-34.
Aside from di Leonardo’s observations on this subject, these alleged cultural and racial biases have also 
been explored by Louise M. Newman in her essay, “Coming o f Age, But Not In Samoa: Reflections on 
Margaret M ead’s Legacy for Western Liberal Feminism,” American Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1996): 233-72 
and Subhadra Mitra Channa, “Gender, Feminism, and Margaret Mead: Her Study Sex and Temperament in 
Three Primitive Societies,” The Eastern Anthropologist 56, no. 1 (2003): 11-29. Di Leonardo and 
Neumann argue that M ead’s was an ethnocentric and imperialist anthropology that catered to the 
sensibilities o f the white middle class. Others have claimed that M ead’s descriptions o f  native peoples in 
Samoa, New Guinea, and elsewhere did, at times, employ conventional stereotypes about non-white 
people. See Jean Walton, Fair Sex, Savage Dreams: Race, Psychoanalysis, Sexual Difference (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2001) and the collected essays edited by Leonora Foerstel and Angela Gilliam, 
Confronting the Margaret Mead Legacy: Scholarship, Empire and the South Pacific (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1992), especially Foerstel’s essay, “Margaret Mead From a Cultural Historical 
Perspective,” 55-74. For a rebuttal to these interpretations see the recent scholarship by Lois W. Banner, 
Intertwined Lives: Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Their Circle (New York: Knopf, Distributed by 
Random House, 2003), 394-99.
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played in shaping her message of science-based social reform.” * Emily Fogg Mead had 
been a politically active suffragist and protest organizer in the 1910s. Margaret Mead, 
however, concluded that her mother’s progressive political activism had been ineffective. 
Substantive reforms should he based in scientific research rather that the politics of social 
protest.”  ^ Career women of Mead’s generation in the 1920s and 30s, as Rosalind 
Rosenberg has observed, also felt strongly that professional advancement and the 
“accommodation” of women in male-dominated fields would prove more valuable to the 
cause o f liberating women. This also could explain various instances where Mead 
avoided requests by feminists and civil rights activists for endorsement.’^ ’
There is little question, however, as to Mead’s scientific and professional 
dedication to the advancement of women and the cause o f civil rights. Mead actively 
supported civil rights legislation in the 1950s and wrote often about the scourge of 
racism. And despite her seemingly contradictory opinions about female potentiality in 
books such as Male and Female, as well as her long-running column in Redbook 
magazine (which was at the time subtitled, “The Magazine for Young Adults”) in the 
1960s, her association with such organizations as the American Council on Education in
Banner, Intertwined Lives, 362, 394; Lapsley, Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict: The Kinship o f  
Women (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1999), 307. Banner and Lapsley concentrate their 
scholarship on the professional and personal dimensions o f the close friendship between Mead and 
Benedict and their lives as women anthropologists.
Mead’s view is corroborated in several studies that include Banner and Lapsley (see previous note), as 
well as Rosalind Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots o f  Modern Feminism (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 208-09.
Ibid.
One particular instance from the 1930s is worth noting. In her article with Angela Gilliam, “Margaret 
Mead: From a Cultural/Historical Perspective,’’ in Confronting the Margaret Mead Legacy, ed. Leonora 
Foerstel and Angela Gilliam (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 101-58, Leonora Foerstel 
recounts that Mead turned down a request by W. E. B. Du Bois to contribute an article to an encyclopedia 
o f African American history in 1935. For another account see Lois W. Banner, Intertwined Lives, 394.
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the 1950s reflects a professional commitment to advancing the status o f women. Mead 
was a founding contributor to the Council’s Commission on the Education o f Women 
from its inception in 1953. The Commission was made up of a consortium of male and 
female deans and presidents o f leading colleges and universities who documented 
American women’s migration into higher education and the work force. Mead helped the 
Commission study women’s motivation in attending college, the personal conflicts 
presented by new careers, male prejudice in the work force, and effects on child rearing 
practices.
Louise Neumann has suggested that inconsistencies in Mead’s message about 
women in the 1950s and 60s, coupled with the stigmatization of her ethnography by 
Betty Friedan, led most members of the next generation of “second wave” academic 
feminists in the late 1960s and 70s to ignore her contributions. Revisionist ethnography 
and gender studies among leading feminist anthropologists such as Rayna Reiter and 
Michelle Rosaldo barely took note of Mead, claiming that she had not gone far enough in 
the 1950s in challenging gender stereotypes.’^  ^ Curiously however, other contemporary 
assessments o f second wave feminism suggest that Mead’s popular influence among
Commission president Opal D. David to Mead. 5 May 1958. American Council on Education, 
Container Number E 46. Papers and Correspondence o f Margaret Mead, Library o f  Congress Manuscript 
Division. Washington, D. C. See also the correspondence in Container Number 46 from September 14, 
1954 between Mead and then president Althea Kratz Hottel. Mead often discussed the conflicting roles of 
women in the column for Redbook, which ran for many years. In some instances she did seem to engage in 
gender stereotypes, only to draw back from them in others. And in other cases, she argued that the 
structure o f the American family should have been restructured altogether to allow women to fully explore 
their potential. For examples o f these opinions see Margaret Mead, “New Designs on Living,” Redbook 
135, no. 6 (October, 1970): 22, 24-25; “Margaret Mead Answers Questions about Drug Addiction, 
Primitive Humor, Male and Female Creativity, etc.,” Redbook 120, no. 5 (March, 1963): 28, 30, 32.
Michelle Rosaldo “Woman, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview,” in Women, Culture, and 
Society, ed. Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), 17- 
42. See page 26.
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college-age women was widespread. In a eollection of retrospective essays on leading 
feminists in American history, Alice Rossi noted the wide readership o f Mead’s Sex and 
Temperament (1935) in the 1 9 6 0 s . D e s p i t e  Mead’s own admonition in the 1968 
edition that the book was not a feminist tract, Rossi argued that it generated enthusiasm 
among women who viewed anthropology as a path to liberation and self-fulfillment. 
M ead’s celebrity as a public intellectual and noted feminist, her “blend o f intellectual 
brilliance and down-to-earth humanness,” as Rossi suggested, contributed to the popular 
perception that professional anthropology embodied the aims o f feminism, civil rights, 
and the search for self-identity in the late 1960s. As further proof, Rossi noted that 
thirty eight percent of women in graduate studies in 1969-70 were in anthropology.'^^ 
Mead often complained that those of her own generation such as Friedan and 
Baldwin hampered themselves with self-pity over past injustices and prejudiees. Her 
endorsement of young activists and social science professionals in the 1960s fit with the 
counterculture belief that the older generation could not be counted on to finish the job it 
had started in the early twentieth century. The true pioneers o f America’s future, they 
argued, were young adults. Likening them to the early American immigrants and the 
Manus o f the Admiralties, Mead argued that young Americans could make the quantum 
leaps in human potentiality and creativity that their parents could not.
See the entries in Rossi’s text entitled “Cultural Stretch: Margaret Mead (b. 1910),” and “Margaret 
Mead: Sex and Temperament," in The Feminist Papers: From Adams To de Beauvoir, ed. Alice Rossi 
(New York: Bantam, 1973), 653-57, 658-71.
Ibid., 654. See also Margaret Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (New York: 
Dell, 1968, cl963). See also the prefaces to the 1950 and 1963 editions in this volume.
126' Rossi, “Cultural Stretch: Margaret Mead,” 653.
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Mead centered her agenda for the self in the 1950s squarely on the experience of 
growing up in a postwar society. As the 1960s unfolded the Vietnam War, the civil rights 
movement, and greater awareness of urban poverty and environmental pollution all took 
center stage. The embrace o f social experimentation by the baby-boom generation in this 
decade proved the golden marketing opportunity that Mead (and Skinner) had sought in 
disseminating her reform agenda. Mead understood that, unlike the shakeup of World 
War Two, the rejection o f traditional American culture in the 1960s might bring 
wholesale reform. Young people during this period were openly discussing social 
problems and actively seeking out alternatives on many fronts, including family and 
community structure, sexuality, gender, marriage, and educational practices. Mead knew 
that her revelations about the diversity of human nature and culture would resonate with a 
generation that had rejected their parent’s values and immersed themselves in the radical 
politics of social protest and experimentation.
Mead’s rise to celebrity status as the worldwide spokesperson for the young by 
the end o f the 1960s attests to her success in rallying young Americans around cultural 
anthropology and holistic depictions of the re-humanized self. The postwar generation 
incorporated them into the politics of protest and the real-world search for alternative life 
paths. Mead’s science of human diversity was taken as justification for these 
explorations, and Mead publicly supported them in this endeavor.
The popular press coverage of Mead’s controversial opinions about the generation 
gap, recreational drug use, and American education illustrates her global currency among 
young people, and her use o f their opinions in presenting the message o f human 
potentiality. Mead, one reporter observed.
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[DJisclaims “belonging to the young” or wanting to be loved by them — “a 
temptation to be resisted at all costs” — yet there is no doubt that she uses 
the young as a tuning fork for her ideas, and that they, in turn, respond 
almost as a professional claque.... “I have traveled in 60 countries,” [Ken] 
Heyman [her photographer] says, “and I find that in dealing with the 
young, her name is a universal password — even in Russia.” '^^
Mead, who lived in the hotbed of counterculture that was the East Village in New York
City during the 1960s, centered much of her publicity campaigns on the experiences of
young people.'^* It is also worth noting that, as with Skinner’s Walden Two (1946),
Mead’s original study from the 1930s, Growing Up in Samoa (1928) also enjoyed a new
and considerably expanded readership in the 1960s, selling 100,000 copies a year by the
end of the decade.
Mead went so far as to formalize the cultural revolution o f the decade. Mead’s 
book. Culture and Commitment: A Study o f  the Generation Gap, first published in 1970, 
was a social manifesto similar to Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), and it 
sold 20,000 copies in its first year o f publication.*^® It outlined her theory of social 
evolution and the generation gap.'^' Mead divided all cultures into three basic categories 
according to their social evolutionary state. “Postfigurative” cultures were fixed and
™ David Dempsey, “The Mead and Her Message,” 23.
This fact comes from a 1958 interview article by Arthur Herzog entitled “A Visit With Margaret Mead,” 
in Think 24 (September, 1958): 9-11. See page 9.
David Dempsey, “Mead and her Message,” 1.
Ibid.
Margaret Mead, Culture and Commitment: A Study o f  the Generation Gap (Garden City, NY: Natural 
History Press, American Museum of Natural History, 1970). M ead’s ideas about the three phases o f social 
evolution, how the study o f primitive cultures informed an understanding o f modem cultures, and what 
social traits contributed most to their survivability, were articulated in a series o f  lectures collected for 
M ead’s book, Continuities in Cultural Evolution (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964). See 
especially M ead’s dicussion of what information about the “eeology” of the social setting was needed to 
learn how to cultivate environments in which genius and creativity could flourish. See pages 242-48.
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relatively untouched by change; their social structure stayed much the same in each 
generation. Examples o f postfigurative culture included the primitive societies that Mead 
had studied in New Guinea. “Cofigurative” cultures were in direct competition with a 
more predominant cultural tradition and were forced to adapt or do away with patterns 
that did not fit the new culture. Immigrant groups were good examples of these types of 
cultures. Rapid social change and the spread of technology, Mead claimed, produced 
“prefigurative” cultures. These cultures were disconnected permanently from older 
folkways.
A new generation of prefigurative, postwar Americans, Mead asserted, was 
charting a culture that their parents could not help them navigate. This immersion 
created the ‘culture gap’ between generations. Furthermore, Mead argued, the 
prefigurative youth culture needed careful study, since it would set future social patterns.
A particularly telling book advertisement for Culture and Commitment from 
January, 1970 reflected the public acknowledgement o f Mead’s role as a scientific 
spokesperson of youth and counterculture. It depicted a young man with long hair, beads 
draped around his neck, poised in a defiant stance, as if  scoffing at his elders. The 
caption read — “Margaret Mead listens to Him. Why Don’t You?” The caption for the 
ad read:
For four decades America’s distinguished anthropologist has been 
listening to people and learning from them. From the people who still 
work with stone tools to those young people who choose not to work at 
all. With compassion and concern she shows that, for the first time in 
human history, parents cannot teach but must learn from their children.
Both now find themselves in a science-fiction world where yesterday’s 
truths are today’s irrelevancies. Culture and Commitment goes beyond
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mere description of the generation gap. It offers courageous solutions to 
this worldwide dilemma.
Similar in tone and gravity to descriptions of Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity,
this characterization of Mead marked her as an expert prognosticator. Unlike Skinner,
however, Mead’s scientific image was of a wise mother tending to her new brood of
future-seekers, rather than of a detached laboratory scientist.
In the prefigurative conceptualization the youth rebellion of the 1960s could be
interpreted more accurately as a disjuncture between pre- and postwar cultures in
America. In Mead’s estimation America had essentially become a new country in the
postwar decades. In this new culture the search for identity, or the self, came to dominate
American protest culture and counterculture. New visions based on race, class, age,
gender, and culture — a multiplication of new types o f individuals — took shape on the
political landscape; this was due in part to the reform messages in Mead’s cultural
anthropology. Americans struggled in this period to understand what it meant to be white
or black, male or female, young or old, in an intemational/intercultural environment that
had been revealed by social science.
The search for identity also came to dominate the politics o f youth protest in
American higher education. “You can hardly be around a university without being aware
of questions the students are asking about ‘identity,”’ quipped the president o f the
American Anthropological Association, George M. Foster at a national APA meeting in
From a book advertisement for Culture and Commitment from The Natural History Press in The New 
York Times (January 18, 1970): 248. Copy collected for the Margaret Mead Papers. Columbia University 
Archives. Columbia University. New York, NY.
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1 9 7 0 , Being at the forefront of disciplines that were forced to address contemporary
issues in the 1960s, anthropology and the study of world cultures enjoyed widespread
popularity as yet another forum for self-discovery. As the noted anthropologist Sol Tax
observed in relation to Mead’s career as a popularizer, Americans had become more
interested since the end of the Second World War in comparing themselves to people
around the globe. Anthropology and other human sciences faced the demand for a
socially relevant and personally fulfilling educational experience, that education address
“problems as current as racism, as demanding as poverty, and as popular as ecology.” '^ "*
Just as scientific naturalism had challenged social science and democratic theory
in the 1930s, cultural relativity, it seemed, had come home to roost in the 1960s. The
search for individual identity saw a rejection of the postfigurative generation and a real-
world search by the prefiguratives for a new culture, and new human potentialities. Mead
joined American youth in the demand to help design an education tradition worthy of the
task. As for the cause of youth rebellion. Mead observed.
Youths including young teen-agers are rebelling against their lack of 
participation in the educational process which occupies such a large 
proportion of their lives. Here they share all the rebellions in the present- 
day world, where those who are being taught, cured, rehabilitated, 
governed or given welfare by those in charge are demanding that they be 
given some participation in determining how these things are to be 
done.... There is a questioning all over the world, by colonialized [sfc] 
peoples, by minorities, by women, of an order o f life in which others — 
teachers, administrators, social workers, members of other classes and 
races, and of the other sex — care for them, no matter how well intentioned 
the care may be.'^^
133 Taken from a quote cited by Israel Shenker, “Like the Tree o f Life, Anthropology Sprouts Many Buds,”
The New York Times (November 20, 1970): 43.
Ibid.
Margaret Mead, “Establishment Ranks Infiltrated by Dissent,” The New York Times (January 12, 1970):
51
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Technology and a world perspective had thus divided the pre- and post-forties 
generations completely. No other generation before or after, Mead observed, would ever 
have the same perspective.'^^ Young Americans, as Mead often described them, were like 
the early American colonists who left the Old World to explore personal and cultural 
frontiers in the new.'^^ America’s future, she contended, “must be centered in the 
children, those whose capabilities are least known, and whose choices must be left 
open.”'^ ^
In this and other versions of what I have ealled the ‘gospel o f the self,’ that Mead 
developed to address the self-actualization among women, minorities, youths and other 
groups in the postwar decades, there is a common prescription for solving the ills of 
society. If only Americans could free themselves from the psychology and social 
patterns of limitation. Mead promised, inequities and injustices could be resolved. Yet as 
we have seen, the politics involved in Mead’s dissemination o f this message to her peers 
and the public was not without negotiation and transformation.
As 1 have shown. Mead’s attention to the politics of race, class, and gender, 
although circumvented in her written work, was evident nonetheless to many of her 
readers who themselves had a vested interest in the message o f universal potentiality. In
See comments in the preface to Culture and Commitment, xvii-xx.
From a column in the Baltimore Sun newspaper entitled “Dr. Margaret Mead Tells How It Isn’t for 
Adults,” (November 14, 1968) on a lecture Mead gave in Maryland to an unidentified professional group. 
This article was collected for the Papers o f Margaret Mead. Columbia University Archives. Columbia 
University. New York, NY.
From a report for The New York Times on a lecture given by Mead at the American Natural History 
Museum. See the article “Margaret Mead Finds Hope in Rebellion o f Youth,” The New York Times (March 
16, 1969); 62. See John Leonard, review of Culture and Commitment, by Margaret Mead, “Dr. Mead vs. 
the Gloom Mongers,” in The New York Times (January 8, 1970): 39. This review copy was collected for 
the Papers of Margaret Mead. Columbia University Archives. Columbia University. New York, NY.
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the final chapter of The Feminine Mystique entitled “The Forfeited Self,” for example, 
Friedan observed that, in the case of the ‘feminine’ self. Mead and her colleagues had 
sent a conflicting message. Among the community o f humanist liberal-democratic social 
scientists that included Mead, Abraham Maslow, Erich Fromm, Karen Homey, and 
others, the philosophy of the self-actualized human being seemed to apply mostly to a 
male-gendered society. In playing to the conventions held by both her colleagues and the 
public at large, Friedan asserted. Mead’s anthropology of the self made the choice 
between the ‘liberated female’ and the ‘well adjusted’ housewife all the more confusing 
in the 1950s.
As di Leonardo claims. Mead’s popular image, even today, as a liberal-feminist is 
persistent but m i s t a k e n . U n l i k e  other reform advocates Mead did not radicalize her 
views on female potential or civil rights, nor did she couch her message to women in 
terms of an oppressive American culture. Instead she avoided these “power-relation” 
issues, as di Leonardo terms them, by sticking to the politically safe and expedient 
argument that a break with social norms and prejudices had to start with the individual’s 
rejection of what I will term the psychology o f  limitation, rather than by embracing the 
politics and ideology of v i c t i m i z a t i o n . T h e  psychology of limitation is related to 
Mead’s idea of human potential. Adaptive potentialities remain untapped, she claimed, 
when the individual is unable to look beyond his or her immediate psychological or social 
reality.
Mead’s politics o f the ‘prefigurative’ self in the young, as opposed to that in the 
gendered selves of adult men and women, was more consistent. In the 1950s, as I have
' di Leonardo, Exotics at Home, 363.
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shown, Mead was insistent that children not simply conform to social conventions, but 
that they act independently as well. In the 1960s Mead linked this message to the 
antiestablishment youth rebellion. In offering tacit support to the rejection of educational 
and social standards, Mead strategically re-introduced the question of women, minorities, 
and human potentiality in general. She aligned herself with the youth challenge to the 
‘establishment’ while also preserving her independence as a scientific expert. Clearly the 
political and social climate o f the 1960s and 70s left more room for Mead to politicize her 
messages about the self without risking ‘establishment’ abandonment, either in her own 
profession or in government circles. Certainly her preeminence by this time as a 
scientific icon also made this more feasible. As I have argued, however, scientific 
images of the self were not appropriated by public constituencies without qualification.
The Male and Female of Science and Popular Iconography by the 1970s
By the early 1970s, Mead and Skinner were both regarded as icons o f social 
science in American popular culture. Celebrity had allowed them to transcend academia 
and become public intellectuals and scientific sages, prognosticating the future of 
humanity in social manifestos that captured widespread readership and media coverage. 
As a soothsayer for postwar Americans, Mead, unlike Skinner, rescued social science 
from its earlier reputation as an exclusionary, impersonal, and enigmatic profession. 
Changing the public image of science and the scientist was. Mead understood, a 
prerequisite to constructing scientific institutions that were relevant to contemporary 
American culture.
Ibid., 366.
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The advent of the ‘corporate’ scientist in the 1950s, ensconced in the
military/industrial complex, contributed to what professional scientists themselves
recognized at the time as a growing rift between science and mainstream American
culture. Such sentiments were encapsulated in a report from the 1956 meeting o f the
American Association for the Advancement o f Science. Members of the Committee on
the Social Aspects of Science warned of an “impending crisis in the relationship between
science and American society.’’’"*'
This crisis is being generated by a basic disparity: At a time when decisive 
economic, political, and social processes have become profoundly 
dependent upon science, the discipline has failed to attain its appropriate 
place in the management of public affairs.’"*^
This phenomenon was well known already to humanists such as Jacob Bronowski who
had explored it in his book. Science and Human Values (1956).’"*^ Science had grown
exponentially in the years after the war, and Americans had recognized its potential to
either advance human progress or destroy it.’"’"* The proliferation o f technology fed the
public image of scientists and engineers as inhuman technologists rather than as creative
thinkers interested in human affairs.
Institutional expansion and specialization after the Second World War furthered
the image of the aloof, elite, and misanthropic scientist. Mead said. By mid-century
Quoted first by a reporter for The Nation commenting on the AAAS annual meeting held on December 
31, 1956. See D. Cort, “Thousands o f Scientists,” The Nation 184 (January 12, 1957): 33.
Ibid.
See the editorial in the same issue o f The Nation noted above entitled “Biggest Story o f the Year,” on 
page 30. See also Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York: J. Messner, 1956).
Cort, “Thousands o f Scientists,” 33.
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scientists had come to be regarded in popular culture as monkish and withdrawn. As
Mead said in her 1959 article for the AAAS journal Daedalus,
The scientist or the schoolboy (it is almost always a boy) who is identified 
by teachers and fellow students as a future scientist is set apart by the very 
nature o f his interests and is regarded by non-scientists as a person who 
has restricted himself by choice to the company o f other scientists, 
unsuitable [therefore] both as marriage partner and as friend.
The professional scientist, although admired and respected for his extensive training and
know-how, was portrayed often in the media as an alien being, as what Mead described
as an inhuman and “mad, godless ‘brain.’” In popular lore the scientist was interested
primarily in “dead things,” he was a cold, calculating machine, devoid o f human warmth
or a desire for discovery in the world of living nature. As Mead observed.
We are, in fact, in danger of developing — as other civilizations before us 
have developed — special esoteric groups who can communicate only with 
each other and who can accept as neophytes and apprentiees only those 
individuals whose intellectual abilities, temperamental bents, and 
motivations are like their own. A schismogenie process is under way that 
is self-perpetuating and self-aggravating.'"^’
This public image o f the scientist, of a eold and caleulating “brain,” was refleeted 
in a study condueted by Mead and her long time colleague in anthropology, Rhoda 
Metraux, that is still considered a classic. Mead and Metraux conducted the study for the 
AAAS; they surveyed attitudes about science and scientists among 35,000 American high 
school students. Their findings were published in Look magazine in 1958 in an article
Margaret Mead, Daedalus (Publication o f the American Academy for the Advancement o f Science) 88 
(1959): 139-46. Seepage 139.
Ibid., 140.
Ibid. See also M ead’s footnote reference here to “schismogenie” cultural phenomena in Gregory 
Bateson’s “Ethnological Contrast, Competition and Schismogenesis,” and “Epilogue 1958,” in Bateson, 
Naven: A Survey o f  the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture o f  the Culture o f  a New Guinea Tribe 
Drawn from Three Points o f  View, 2"‘* ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 171-97, 280-303.
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entitled “How American Youth Sees the Scientist: The Dangerous Godless Brain.” '''* 
Most students expressed respect for scientific contributions to society. But their view of 
the scientist almost always was de-humanized. Their image was o f an older bespectacled 
man in a white coat surrounded by the instrumentation o f the laboratory. Although he 
was wise, precise, knowledgeable, dedicated, and honest, he was also coldly objective 
and unfeeling, possessing few social skills. He was dull -  much like a disembodied 
brain. The scientist was either solitary in his endeavors, a lone “genius,” or he 
epitomized the “organization man,” a corporate scientist. He was described often as ill 
suited for family life, living on the margin of society, contributing great things but 
keeping to himself. In many respects Mead noted, these images “[a] 11 represent 
deviations from the accepted way of life, from being a normal, friendly human being who 
is like other people and gets along with other people.” '"'^
With respect to the popular iconography of science in the late 1960s and early 
70s, Mead and Skinner present an interesting contrast. Although Skinner had worked to 
connect his technologies o f teaching and his utopian visions to real-world human 
problems, his was still the picture o f a calculating, godless brain whose promise o f social 
salvation came at the price of individual freedom and autonomy. Although revered for 
his behavioral insights into human nature, Skinner was seen as a detached technologist 
and engineer.
Mead in the popular media, however, enjoyed a reputation as a culturally 
connected scientist and empathetic person who was concerned with both the everyday
Margaret Mead, “How American Youth Sees the Scientist: The Dangerous Godless Brain,” Look 22, no. 
2 (January 21, 1958): 20-27.
Ibid., 25.
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issues of living and the bigger problems of postwar society. Mead did not get her
insights on human nature from the laboratory on campus but from that o f primitive and
modem cultures from around the world. She listened and responded attentively to
postwar mothers and their children as they charted an unknown future. She understood
the frustration and rebellion of youth, women, and minorities in the 1960s and gave them
scientific legitimacy with her anthropological reflections on racism, feminism, and the
counterculture. To a public in need of guidance, as one commentator recalled in 1970,
Mead is a visible and willing plunger into modem social 
controversy who projects herself as a global prophetess on almost 
every subject that concems the human condition. To a society 
troubled by its own shifting folkways, and hungry for guidance in 
coping with them, she is a poor man’s anthropologist, a mediator 
between high emdition and the middle-brow mind.'^°
Mead, as the layperson’s social scientist, enjoyed a level o f celebrity and public exposure
that was rivaled by few other scientists. She gave television appearances and hosted
numerous public speaking engagements. She received (and gave back) endorsements by
politicians such as President Jimmy Carter and celebrated intellectuals such as Bertrand
Russell. Some regarded Mead as an American national treasure. In obituaries and
dedications upon her death in 1978 the “aura,” that was Margaret Mead was described
variously as a “national oracle,” a “general of modem feminism,” and “our own Madame
Curie,” with the wisdom of “an Old Testament Prophet,” in her ability to explain human
nature, and explain Americans to themselves.
More interesting, however, is how M ead’s scientific persona was framed in terms
of her gender. Americans seemed to find Mead especially appealing not only for her
150 David Dempsey, “The Mead and Her Message,” 23.
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scientific insights but also because of the way in which her status as a feminist, mother, 
and caretaker was intertwined with her presentation of human behavior in anthropology. 
Indeed, Mead often was described in these same dedications as the “grandmother of us 
all,” a “mother to the world,” a woman scientist whose outward appearance and manner, 
that of a wise, “homespun Midwestern woman,” by one account, fit well with her persona 
as a motherly figure to a generation of postwar Americans.’ '^ As Mead undoubtedly 
understood, being regarded as what one writer called “the den mother to all humanity” 
ensured her a common ground with her a u d i e n c e . T h i s  may explain why Mead was 
careful not to associate herself with the radicalized versions of feminism, counterculture, 
and civil rights movements in the 1950s and 60s.
In Mead and Skinner we have two icons of American social science; each 
encapsulated different images o f the self, methodologies of science, and politics of social 
management. Their public images were cast at least partly along gender lines. Skinner 
embodied the picture of male-oriented technocracy, with its dehumanizing, cold 
objectivity and attention to precision and efficiency. Skinnerian science was 
unemotional; it presumed no human uniqueness, no freedom or autonomy, and no inner 
life of the mind. Mead’s ‘motherly’ anthropology on the other hand reflected an 
organic/holistic view o f humans as thinking and feeling creatures intertwined with the 
inner life of personality and the outer world if  culture. Mead had embraced human
All of these characterizations are quoted from obituaries written on the occasion o f her death in 
November o f 1978. See the obituary articles “Grandmother o f Us All,” and Ken Wills, “Margaret Mead 
dead at 76, Prof Famed for Tribal Study,” in the Margaret Mead Papers, Columbia University Archives, 
Columbia University, New York, NY. See also Alden Whitman, “Margaret Mead is Dead o f Cancer at 
76,” in The New York Times (November 16, 1978): AT
This characterization was taken from an undated fund raising pamphlet entitled “A Reverence for Life,’ 
produced for the Margaret Mead Fund for the Advancement o f Anthropology sponsored by the American
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autonomy and aspects of neo-Freudian therapeutic psychology, whereas Skinner had 
rejected them as irrelevant. Mead took advantage o f her public appropriation as a female 
scientist depicting the American self from a mother’s viewpoint.
The gender politics of Meadian and Skinnerian visions o f the self also seemed to 
parallel liberal/Democratic and Conservative/Republican perspectives. The Meadian self 
embodied an open, democratic society with links to liberal progressive social science. 
Skinner’s vision o f the self, in contrast, was bom of technocratic progressivism. 
Taylorism, and the cult of efficiency. His audiences were often those in business and 
industry associated with economic and political conservatism.
Conclusion
In the postwar era Mead selectively used comparative cultural anthropology and 
her vision of human potentiality to help Americans adapt to an unfolding postwar society. 
In the postwar decades Americans were forced to re-think their conceptualizations of 
gender, methods of child rearing, and the stmcture o f family and community. This left 
room for social scientists such as Mead to chart new professional territory and launch 
careers as purveyors of expert advice in the mass media. Yet as we have seen. Mead’s 
message o f human potentiality among women, minorities, and the youth counterculture 
was not appropriated in an unqualified way. A multiplicity of scientifically inspired 
selves is evident in Mead’s marketing of the primitive ‘other’ in the 1950s and 60s, and
Museum o f Natural History. See related leaflets and articles on Mead in the Columbia University 
Archives. Columbia University. New York, NY.
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in the political rhetoric of her audiences who used these images o f the self for different 
political and personal goals.
As Mead had argued in countless publications during the 1950s and 60s the 
diversity o f human culture, and the complexity of personality development in each, 
demanded an interdisciplinary social science for exploring untapped human potential. 
Unlike the picture of programmable humanity that Skinner promoted in his utopia, Mead 
stressed the examination of world cultures in searching for clues about how human 
potential might be tapped. While their plans for cultivating the modem self differed 
considerably, Skinner and Mead, as demonstrated herein, share in what Fred Matthews 
has characterized as the broad professional enthusiasm for scientifically inspired social 
reform. Both Mead and Skinner recognized the centrality of research in education, for 
example. Like the individual in society, educational institutions needed to be capable of 
rapid adaptation to new social conditions. These aims are represented in Skinner’s 
technologies of teaching and in Mead’s rhetoric about the school as a community training 
center.
An emerging science of social modification. Mead argued, had to work against
the temptation o f reductionism. Society and social science were both complex affairs.
Mead argued against those in social science like Skinner who attempted to oversimplify
humanity and society. As she observed in 1960 of the popularity o f behavioral
technology and theory.
W e’ve now reached the stage where we’re ready to think about invention 
in the field of human behavior. But w e’ve come up against some snags in 
trying to make inventions in human behavior that are quite different from 
the snags that one faces in the physical sciences. There are some people 
who think that we ought to be able to do something like the Manhattan 
Project — just collect a bunch of good behavioral scientists, lock them up
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somewhere or even not lock them up, give them plenty o f money and a 
few computers and those other things that some people think go with the 
human sciences — a lot of rats. Or some people would allow Rhesus 
monkeys and chimps and grey-legged geese and a few other things and 
say “All right now, get on with it and create a peace bomb,” for instance.
Or something that will be as effective for peace as the atom bomb was for 
the war. Now those of us who were interested in this the last 25 years or 
so since w e’ve begun to try to make inventions on the human sciences are 
truly aware that it isn’t as easy as this. So far no attempts to solve human 
problems in which you sit down and work out a formula, and set up a 
procedure, and then announce that this is the way to save the world have 
so far worked.
Mead acknowledged the powerful attraction that promising technological inventions such 
as teaching machines held. Audiences in business and education. Mead observed, had 
clamored for such marvels. With the continued divergence between the experimental and 
therapeutic branches o f social science, the disciplinary unification necessary to “become 
conscious participants in [human] evolution” had not yet, as Mead observed, come to 
pass. Nevertheless, there were no tantalizingly quick escapes, no “crash programs to 
produce absolute solutions for human behavior rapidly,” as she said.'^"* The best 
prescription for contemporary social science and American society. Mead argued, was 
the continued study of cultures in learning how to create environments where human 
creativity could flourish.
Aside from professional debates over the future o f social science, the 
popularization o f Mead’s vision o f the self in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s was not without its 
own history in popular culture. As demonstrated here, the social and political 
implications o f  her vision, like that o f  Skinner’s were not lost on Americans struggling to
Margaret Mead, “Transcript o f  Address by Dr. Margaret Mead, Annual Meeting, The Menninger 
Foundation.” 8 October 1960, Menninger Foundation folders. Container E 80, Folder 1. Papers o f Margaret 
Mead. Library o f  Congress Manuscript Division. Washington, D. C., 4-5.
Ibid., 6.
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define themselves and their place in postwar American culture. Mead carefully modified 
the message of limitless human potentiality to cater to different public audiences. Mead’s 
refusal to enter the politics of radical feminism and civil rights activism indicated her 
awareness that scientific depictions of the self could not, by mere virtue o f their scientific 
grounding, transcend American social conventions. The politics o f postwar America had 
to be considered when marketing new visions of humanity. Only when the liberal- 
progressive self in Mead’s science of culture met with the era of social protest and 
counterculture in the 1960s did her hopes for its popularization achieve their greatest 
heights.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE JANUS FACES OF THE SELF IN AMERICAN SCIENCE AND CULTURE: 
EXPLORING THE CAREERS OF B. F. SKINNER AND MARGARET MEAD AS
CULTURAL PHENOMENA
In recounting the scientific and public careers of B. F. Skinner and Margaret 
Mead in the decades before and after the Second World War, my intent in this study has 
been to examine their contrasting depictions of human nature from a cultural, rather than 
a purely scientific, standpoint. Most of the historical scholarship on Skinner and Mead 
has been confined to internalist accounts of their contributions to social science. Some 
scholars have begun to connect the scientific and social philosophies o f Skinner and 
Mead more thoroughly to broader trends in the twentieth-eentury American experience. 
There is still a need, however, for scholarship that interconnects the historiography of 
American cultural history with that of the history of the social sciences. Addressing 
Skinner and Mead as representatives of American culture demonstrates on the one hand 
how such phenomena as progressivism and other social reform movements, technocracy, 
and changes in family and community structure influenced the scientific depiction of the 
self, and on the other, how these depictions informed debates about the fate of the 
individual in modem society.
The objective of this study has been threefold. First, I have addressed the lives of 
Mead and Skinner not merely with regard to their scientific achievements or their 
professional status but also as members of modem American culture. In connecting their 
early intellectual and scientific training to American progressivism, I illustrate how
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Skinner and Mead each began to craft research methodologies in the 1920s that reflected 
an active appropriation of social reform ideology. There existed both liberal-democratic 
and technocratic strains of social reform theory during the opening decades o f the 
twentieth century, and these perspectives had a significant influence on the development 
o f scientific methodology in the social sciences.
The careers of Skinner and Mead reflect two competing approaches to the self and 
to social engineering. Their scientific depictions of human nature were informed by their 
involvement with the politics o f social reform during the Interwar period, the Cold War, 
and the 1960s social protest movements. Mead and Skinner both believed in the adaptive 
potential of humanity and the importance of using science to manage and organize 
society; these were articles of faith in many progressive era reform philosophies. Despite 
this shared view, however, my narratives of Skinner and Mead demonstrate how their 
respective scientific treatments of the self led to very different approaches to 
contemporary social issues. Skinner’s mechanistic approach to the self and society in his 
unique brand of radical behaviorism was inspired by technocratic visions o f social 
management that emphasized control and efficiency. Both of these management themes, 
as historian Martha Banta has observed, were dominant in twentieth century American 
culture. Mead, on the other hand, drew inspiration for her cultural anthropology from the 
ideology of democratic social reform. Liberal democratic strains of progressivism, with 
their attention to the neglected voices of the poor, immigrants, minorities, and women, 
shaped her humanistic and holistic approach to the self. Humanism also figured heavily 
in Mead’s conception of an advisory, rather than a controlling and manipulative, role for 
social science in social administration.
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In discussing their fame as social critics in the 1950s and 60s, I also have 
demonstrated how Mead and Skinner helped re-map the boundaries between social 
science and American postwar culture during a time when the therapeutic “helping” 
professions enjoyed widespread public attention. Mead and Skinner contributed to the 
public authority of cultural anthropology and behavioral psychology respectively by 
crossing professional borders and seeking out public audiences. I have examined the 
rhetorieal, technological, and conceptual strategies that Skinner and Mead used to launch 
their careers as public intellectuals and scientific experts in the 1940s and 50s.
Skinner and Mead each skillfully employed marketing strategies to advance their 
scientific celebrity. The rhetorical styles of their published work for popular audiences, 
for example, reflected their keen desire to have scientific knowledge products become 
associated with solutions to human problems. Mead and Skinner each employed several 
metaphors related to the concept of social change — a central theme in intellectual, 
scientific, and popular debates about postwar American culture — to promote their 
respective visions o f the self and society. Both discussed the relationship between 
individuals and the social environment with regard to the evolutionary concept of 
adaptation. Both often invoked the venue o f the laboratory and the rhetoric o f human 
potentiality to discuss technologies and strategies of education and parenting reform, 
comprehensive plans for community management, and the improvement o f human nature 
through science. Skinner and Mead modified their knowledge products and social 
critiques to accommodate new reform constituencies in the 1950s and 60s, each of which 
had specific designs on the self.
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A second main component of my study addresses the popularization o f Skinnerian 
and Meadian seience, teehnology, and social ideology amidst public discourse on the 
changing image of modem humanity. I examine some of the particular ways in which 
Skinnerian and Meadian soeial theories and technologies were appropriated and used by 
Americans. Anxious parents, women entering the workforce, feminists, edueators, 
businesspeople, and young counterculture radicals, for example, had designs on scientific 
depictions of the self that went beyond what their inventors intended. In addressing the 
social reform ideologies and approaches to the self espoused by Skinner and Mead, I 
have made a more thoroughgoing examination o f how different groups of Americans 
appropriated them for use in adjusting to postwar life. In the 1950s and 60s, Mead, 
Skinner, and other prominent social scientists catered to a growing public demand for 
innovations in child rearing techniques and education, as well as for new insights into 
personal fulfillment, the social roles of men and women, and social management 
alternatives.
Skinner’s baby tender technology, for example, was not well received among new 
postwar parents who, despite Skinner’s assurances to the contrary, saw it as a 
dehumanizing technology. In Mead’s case, it is more difficult to assess the reception of 
her adviee literature on child rearing and human potential. Her mixed messages 
regarding female human potential in particular were singled out by critics such as Betty 
Friedan who accused Mead o f betraying the feminist eause. In the late 1950s and early 
60s, Skinner’s technologies of programmed instruction gained considerable commercial 
support from companies wanting to capitalize on the contemporary public debate about a 
Cold War crisis in American education. Public school administrators and the textbook
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publishing industry embraced a mechanistic vision of the student in experimenting with 
teaching technologies that were designed to maximize the speed and efficiency of 
learning. Many critics denounced these technologies, however, as yet another instance of 
technoeratic dehumanization. Despite their contrasting visions of the self, however, 
Skinner and Mead both looked to the business community for innovations in education 
reform. In the 1960s Skinner’s and Mead’s ealls to explore social management 
alternatives also became part of the counterculture challenge to the status quo. Groups of 
young communitarians sought alternatives to mainstream living during this period, and 
some interpreted Skinner’s Walden Two thought experiment as a humanistic, rather than 
a technocratic, blueprint for an experimental eommunity. Mead’s published work, 
speeches, and televised debates with prominent intellectuals also spawned a popular 
interest among college students for using comparative anthropology as a pathway to self- 
discovery.
The study of the reciprocal relationship between science and its many 
professional and public audiences demands that historians relinquish assumptions about 
the separateness and transcendence of science that continue to color much of the 
historical work on Skinner and Mead.' Scientific concepts, methods, language, and 
theories have histories that lie beyond the established epistemological and professional
For further discussion about these assumptions see Paul Forman, “Independence, Not Transcendence, for 
the Historian o f Science,” Isis 82 (1999): 71-86. See page 85. See also Roger Cooter and Stephen 
Pumfrey, “Separate Spheres and Public Places: Reflections on the History o f Science Popularization and 
Science in Popular Culture,” History o f  Science 32 (1994): 237-67, especially page 241. The tension 
between constructivist and idealist approaches to the history of science over the last three decades has 
resulted in fundamental changes in how historians address epistemological assumptions about science as a 
unique human endeavor. As Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfrey have argued, no special or “separate 
sphere” o f science exists outside o f culture. Although most historians would readily admit that history is 
not a philosophically impartial endeavor, historians o f science have at times allowed assumptions regarding 
the inherent social authority, transcendence, and linear progress o f science into their scholarship. Increased
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borders o f science. As many historians have observed, science is part o f culture, and its 
content often reflects this on both technical and ideological levels. The institutional 
organization of science, the use of language and rhetoric by scientists to achieve 
professional consensus and forge public authority, and the intermingling of cultural and 
experimental meanings in scientific terminology — these all reflect the entrenchment of 
science in culture. Conversely, historians also now recognize that public audiences do 
not passively absorb scientific knowledge products. These products do not remain 
conceptually inert. In their public consumption scientific ideas invariably undergo 
transformation.
Processes of conceptual exchange, mediation, and translation, as historians of 
science have discovered, also are not confined to science proper. Science and scientific 
communities are shaped in part by public audiences. These audiences have specific 
political, intellectual, philosophical, technological, and social designs on science’s utility 
and social function. Social and cultural histories of science in popular culture thus have 
challenged traditional “dissemination” models o f popularization and have undermined 
stereotypes about who science’s audience(s) really were. A truly cultural history of 
Skinner and Mead must therefore address the ethnography and geography of science in 
culture by examining their public audiences in postwar America.
A third and final aim of the present study is to explore how the juxtaposition of 
these two prominent social scientists enhances our historical understanding of the 
ongoing debate in modem American culture over the fate of the self. I will use my 
narratives on the public careers of Skinner and Mead as case studies in considering, by
awareness about such assumptions will be important, as Paul Forman notes, as we begin to explore the 
history o f the human sciences.
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way of conclusion, how conflicting images of human nature in modem American social 
science reflect a central cultural tension between the desire for unencumbered human 
freedom and independence on the one hand, and the need for mechanisms o f social 
control that will help society run well on the other. In detailing the public interpretations 
o f Skinnerian and Meadian visions of the self, I have argued that their reception in 
postwar American culture was nonlinear and multifaceted. The fact that Skinnerian and 
Meadian visions of the self catapulted their inventors to public celebrity in postwar 
American culture at the same time, however, indicates that Americans have learned to 
embrace both images of human nature. We apply both images of the self selectively in 
defining individual identity and refining our myriad systems of individual and social 
management in modem life.
In the following sections, I will further address the issues o f how scientists can be 
viewed as representatives of culture, how scientific social authority was established by 
Skinner and Mead in the postwar years, and how scientific visions o f human nature were 
translated and transformed by public constituencies. In concluding my discussion, I will 
offer suggestions on how my study can inform our understanding of the self in postwar 
American culture.
Artifacts of Culture: The Science of Mead and Skinner in the American Context
The aura o f scientific social management in progressivism at the tum of the 
century had a profound effect on the subsequent development o f the social science 
professions in the 1920s and 30s. An emphasis on environmental and behavioral
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approaches to human psychology, anthropology, and sociology became more prevalent in 
the research methodologies of social scientists. There were, however, fundamental 
differences in the way that progressive reform philosophies influenced the intellectual 
and scientific training o f social scientists. B. F. Skinner and Margaret Mead each 
represent a different legacy of progressive era approaches to human nature in the social 
sciences. Although neither of them thought of themselves as progressives, Skinner and 
Mead nevertheless patterned their respective research methodologies after technocratic 
and liberal-democratic visions o f social management that had their origins in progressive 
social reform movements. Skinner and Mead developed and modified these visions 
during the Interwar and postwar decades and drew upon cultural themes and social issues 
to construct their visions of the self. Invoking the symbolism of archaeology, Skinner 
and Mead can be examined historically as cultural ‘artifacts,’ i. e., as representative 
scientists whose careers reveal much about the connections between broader trends in 
American culture and the development of the social sciences.^
 ^This is similar to David Bakan’s characterization o f Watsonian behaviorism as one particular “cultural 
expression” o f progressive era reform ideology. See David Bakan, “Behaviorism and American 
Urbanization,” Journal o f  the History o f  the Behavioral Sciences 2 (1966): 5-28.
The analysis o f Skinner and Mead as artifacts o f American culture also relates to broader trends in 
the historiography of science itself. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the groundbreaking work o f Steven 
Shapin and the British school o f social studies in science, for example, introduced a more genuinely 
‘ethnographic’ approach to the study o f scientists and their professional and public audiences. See their 
investigation into how professional consensus and social authority were built through the design and public 
presentation o f chemistry experiments in the British Royal Society in the seventeenth century in the 
landmark study, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985). Scholarship on the lives o f scientists has also begun in the last two 
decades to address the epistemological relationships between their scientific philosophies and teehnological 
wares on the one hand, and their intellectual and social training in the broader culture milieu on the other. 
How, historians have asked, can scientists be studied as representatives of a particular culture? To what 
extent does their scientific work reflect personal opinions, values, and agendas that come from outside 
science proper?
Ethnographic, sociological, and statistical studies o f laboratory life by historians such as Bruno 
Latour and Stephen Woolgar were also begun in the late 1970s and early 80s. Known collectively as the 
sociology o f scientific knowledge (SSK), this literature played a key role in contextualizing experimental 
scientific practice as well as the production of scientific facts. Over the last two decades this area of 
scholarship has revealed how the rhetoric o f scientific writing, the processes o f communication and
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Although the social sciences saw their most important period of expansion during 
and after the Second World War, professional growth in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century followed a sharp rise in industrialization and urbanization. As older 
patterns of community, family structure, and work underwent transformation during this 
period, new forms of social administration were needed. Local control of the community 
was transferred to a growing cadre of professional managers who populated new 
bureaucratic agencies. By the end of the nineteenth century radical changes to the 
American social landscape had produced a number of political, corporate, municipal, and 
moral reform movements that encompassed progressivism. Many new organizations 
with grass roots, or with corporate/industrial backing, were formed to tackle the social 
problems o f urbanization such as poverty, urban decay, unemployment, immigration, and 
factory inefficiency.
Not all reform activity during the progressive era was populist. Less historical 
attention has been given to the fact that many progressive reform initiatives also 
originated among the ranks of middle and upper class professionals and industrialists 
who, under the banner o f scientific efficiency and expediency in industry and municipal 
administration, sought to increase and consolidate their social status and political 
influence. The need for information, scientific methodology, and expertise in running
consensus-building among professional networks o f scientists, the use of imagery and metaphor in 
describing natural phenomena, and the relationships between scientists and their audiences (both 
professional and public), factors into a sophisticated treatment o f the history science and technology. 
Scientific “facts,” from a sociological perspective, also have come to be seen as contingent, localized 
knowledge products, born of specific group contexts. For further discussion, see the classic study by Bruno 
Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction o f  Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage, 1979). See related comments in Jan Golinski, “The Theory of Practice and the Practice of 
Theory: Sociological Approaches in the History of Science, Isis 81 (1990): 492-505 and Patrick Curry, 
“Astrology in Early Modem England: The Making o f a Vulgar Knowledge,” in Science, Culture and 
Popular Belief in Renaissance Europe, ed. Steven Pumfrey et al. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1991), 274-91.
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bureaucracy marked a growth period for the management professions. It also saw the 
transfer of social authority away from average citizens and into the hands o f credentialed 
experts on many fronts. The professional classes invoked the virtues o f rationality, 
efficiency, organization and systematic control in all areas of urban administration, as 
well as in personal life. The promotion o f scientific efficiency as the pathway to social 
reform among these ‘management progressives’ mirrored a national fascination with 
efficiency, especially during the Roosevelt years.
A prominent embodiment o f this vision of scientifically inspired social 
management was Frederick W. Taylor. Although Taylorism is often associated with 
technocratic dehumanization, its emphasis on establishing control over human behavior 
in social and industrial engineering was a cultural theme that reverberated throughout the 
social sciences in the early twentieth century. It was one of the most influential 
expressions of a basic reform goal held in common by different groups o f progressives. 
Taylorism’s legacy among socially and economically conservative progressives is clearly 
seen in professional associations that were dedicated to the management of society by 
engineers. The promotional efforts of the Taylorites and the technocrats helped spawn 
the disciplines of human relations, industrial engineering, and business management in 
theI930s, 40s and 50s. Yet as historian Guy Alchon has observed. Taylorism was only 
one among several manifestations of management-oriented progressivism in the 1920s 
and 30s that were connected to both liberal-democratic and technocratic perspectives on 
social reform among philanthropists, social scientists, social workers, industrialists, and 
politicians.^ In considering the effect of early twentieth-century social reform ideology
 ^ See Guy Alchon, The Invisible Hand o f  Planning: Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
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on the development o f the social sciences, it is important, therefore, to observe that there 
were not merely two opposing progressive viewpoints on society and the self but an 
entire spectrum of ideas that social scientists selected from and combined in a host of 
different ways. This was certainly the case for Mead and Skinner.
Even in the early stages o f their careers in science, both Skinner and Mead 
incorporated progressive political perspectives on social reform and management into 
their scientific depictions of the self. These perspectives were informed and modified in 
successive decades through their experience o f national economic depression, national 
crisis, and world war. Their philosophical commitments to scientifically inspired social 
management, although originally inspired by different strains o f progressivism, 
nevertheless remained part of the social theories and visions o f the self that they 
developed and deployed in the public arena in the postwar decades. My analysis 
demonstrates that Skinner and Mead each used their research on human nature, 
contextualized as it was by the American experience, to engage such pressing societal 
issues as the viability of American democracy and the future course o f the individual, the 
family, the community, and the science of social engineering.
M ead’s roots in liberal-democratic progressivism stemmed from a reaction among 
humanist professionals against reductionism in social science, and against dehumanizing 
forms of technocracy in general. Humanist social science aimed to lift people up from 
poverty, racism, and ignorance through the holistic study of human potential and cultural 
diversity. Mead’s comparative cultural anthropology celebrated the individual and 
his/her unique potential. She and other like-minded colleagues combined their liberal 
progressive politics with scientific perspectives on the psychology and anthropology of
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the self in the 1920s and 30s. This community of psychologists, anthropologists, and 
sociologists, one that included Ruth Benedict, Lawrence Frank, Gardner Murphy, Edward 
Sapir, and John Dollard among many others, celebrated the inner life o f the self and its 
dynamic connection to a complex and multi-layered social environment.
It was through Boasian anthropology that Mead, unlike the mechanists and 
objectivists in soeial science, came to her view of the self as a dynamic whole, rather than 
as a collection of behaviors and traits. Her early research into the lives of both American 
immigrants and primitive peoples in Samoa and New Guinea illustrated for her the 
central role o f cultural change on variation in gender identity, adolescence, personality, 
and perceived intelligence. Her groundbreaking work in cultural anthropology served as 
a powerful challenge to the assumed universality o f Western cultural conventions.
Mead’s unique ethnographic methodology utilized interdisciplinary cultural studies and 
the use of various sociological, ethnographic, and psychological techniques to examine 
primitive and modem cultures. Mead’s “culture and personality” mbrie in the 1930s 
examined the broader dimensions o f culture through the lens o f the individual.
In Mead’s case, her popular books on Samoa and New Guinea and her academic 
research into the connections between culture and individual personality in the 1930s 
reflected her desire to challenge psychic and cultural reductionism and determinism in the 
social sciences. In assessing the ideological roots of Mead’s cultural anthropology, 
Rosalind Rosenberg has gone so far as to characterize her as a “progressive social 
engineer.” What is lacking in the Mead scholarship, however, as Mead’s own daughter
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has recently observed, is a history that examines her impact on post-World War Two 
debates about social reform."*
Mead used her comparative studies of gender, family, community, and social 
mores among primitive cultures to critique the American political system in the late 
1930s and its failure to deliver on the reforms promised by early twentieth-century 
progressives and their political and managerial inheritors. Mead deployed her cross- 
cultural studies o f cooperation and competition in the late 1930s to scientifically defend 
the superiority o f American democracy over fascism and communism. Democracy was 
being challenged on the home front and in Europe, and some Americans began to 
question its effectiveness in managing complex urban society. In response. Mead and 
her colleagues pursued scientific research that demonstrated the destructive social and 
psychological effects of fascism and totalitarianism (both highly competitive and 
dehumanizing systems of government) on individuals and cultures. In her highly 
rhetorical critique o f American culture. And Keep Your Powder Dry (1942), Mead 
publicly addressed the issue of American national character (a concept developed under 
the culture/personality ruhrie) and its unique suitability for the defense of democracy. 
Using the forum of child rearing and education. Mead warned, however, that a lack of 
parental clarity about the appropriateness of cooperative and competitive behavior in 
different social settings, for example, could undermine American democracy. Instilling 
indecision in the American child. Mead argued, was tantamount to building a nation that 
lacked the necessary resolve in facing a global war on democratic values. In Mead’s 
somewhat jingoistic exhortations against American isolationism in Powder at the
Rosalind Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots o f  Modern Feminism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1982), 207-37; Mary C. Bateson, “Continuities in Insight and Innovation: Toward a
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beginning of the war, she warned that democracy might be wiped out if American 
national virtues and character were not re-invigorated to fight fascism.
Mead’s public ruminations in Powder about the potential shortcomings of 
American national character paralleled her aetive involvement in the war effort. Her 
participation in wartime government committees afforded her the opportunity in the mid- 
to late 1940s to market the concept of national character to various government agencies 
and also to make a comparative assessment of social management agencies in different 
countries involved in the war. There was a pressing need in the immediate postwar years 
to build the kind of social infrastructure that could meet the ehanging needs of families 
and communities in molding and educating well-adjusted ehildren.
The British agency system embodied much of what Mead hoped eould be 
accomplished in the American context. She found mueh to praise in the centrality of 
“citizen advice committees” in British social services. Highlighting the spirit of 
cooperation between professional social scientist and members o f the community, Mead 
stressed the need for balance between bureaueratic social management and local 
community control. Professional social science in this regard should be fully integrated 
with British communities. Mead’s idealization o f the distinctively British style of 
participatory, group-oriented problem solving strategies, institutional flexibility in 
accommodating cultural diversity and local variations, and lack of professional arrogance 
and manipulation among social scientists and management personnel, were all 
characteristic of the type of social services that Mead hoped would emerge in the postwar 
American system. This system would be especially important, Mead thought, in 
counteracting the American tendency toward professional arroganee and an obsession
Biography o f Margaret Mead,” American Anthropologist 82 (1980): 270-77.
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with objectivity in the social sciences. Mead’s analysis of British social services for the 
Office o f War Information is an early indication of what would later become her fully 
formed philosophy of social management in the 1960s. In this system managers would 
be advised, but not controlled, by members of an interdisciplinary cadre of professional 
social scientists with expertise in a new ‘science of culture.’
In considering Mead’s perspectives on the proper role o f social science in social 
management, as I have shown, one can also elucidate the active incorporation of 
progressive liberal-democratic political philosophy into her scientific depiction of the 
self. Her vision of the individual as a unique, dynamic system of potentialities in 
harmony with cultural surroundings illustrates her liberal-progressive dedication to 
human dignity and liberation. Mead lobbied against the kind of scientific technocracy 
that worked against a more participatory and integrated society. American culture and 
American social science, in her estimation, had to undergo reformation together. Social 
science had to uphold a humanized self as well the democratic social values that made 
possible this vision of the self.
Although not directly influenced by Taylor or the Taylorites, Skinner’s emphasis 
on the precise control o f animal and human behavior in his scientific research, in contrast, 
was remarkably similar to the Taylorian obsession with control and efficiency in the late 
nineteenth-century industrial workplace. As with Taylorism and the gospel o f industrial 
efficiency, Skinnerian radical behaviorism eventually gave rise to technocratic visions of 
a science of society. Like Taylor, Skinner dedicated himself to ridding experimental 
methods o f all extraneous theoretical and philosophical speculation. In this endeavor 
Skinner (and other social scientists) was inspired by Baconian science, the physicalism of
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Ernst Mach, and the biochemical reductionism of Jacques Loeb. It is also telling of 
trends in social science toward precision and control that the environmental factor of time 
became central to Skinner’s development of operant behaviorism in the 1930s, just as it 
had for Taylor in his analyses of factory efficiency the 1890s. Martha Santa’s analysis of 
how the rubrics of systemization and organization infiltrated various quarters of 
American culture during the twentieth century suggests a comprehensive cultural 
embrace o f technocracy.^ This fact, as I have argued, can help us understand the 
ideological connections that existed between the phenomena of Taylorism and 
management progressivism on the one hand, and the rise of mechanism and reductionism 
in progressive era and Interwar social science on the other.
By the end of the 1940s Skinner had rejected democracy as an inefficient method 
o f social control. He had embraced, however, the scientific hegemony of psychology, 
specifically operant behaviorism, in explaining all human phenomena. Based on his 
animal studies of operant behaviorism in the 1930s, Skinner had gone on in the 1940s to 
conclude that they could be applied directly to the management o f human social systems. 
The rest of the social sciences, traditional government, and politics, Skinner felt, were not 
needed for the creation o f a true and pure science of society. Skinner moved quickly in 
the immediate postwar years to publicly extol the virtues of human behavioral design and 
engineering. His technological tinkering with baby tenders, his utopian thought 
experiments, his commentary on the scientific merits of different political ideologies, and 
his attempts to revolutionize education theory all reflected an approach to human 
resource management highly reminiscent of technocratic management progressivism.
 ^ See Martha Banta, Taylored Lives: Narrative Productions in the Age o f  Taylor, Veblen, and Ford 
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1993).
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Like management progressives and later generations of management scientists and 
technocrats, Skinner embraced the direct control of society by social engineers.
In his missile research of the 1940s, Skinner’s success at designing complicated 
behavioral profiles in pigeons encouraged him to begin thinking about organisms as 
experimental devices. This carried over into his subsequent experiments with human 
behavioral modification in designing and implementing the Air Crib. In attempting to 
market the Crib to parents as an efficient convenience technology, Skinner also entered 
the ongoing debate in American scientific and intellectual circles over the merits of 
cooperative versus competitive character traits in human society. Skinner sought to 
remove much of the theoretical and interdisciplinary complexity of these considerations 
with the use of behavioral technologies that straightforwardly addressed these traits in 
terms of environmental contingencies. Modify the environment o f the organism correctly 
in child rearing, he claimed, and the desired cooperative and competitive behaviors would 
ensue. For Skinner, the rules of complex, large-scale social management also flowed 
directly from experimentation with rats, pigeons, and human babies. His critique of 
American democracy in the 1940s and 50s was inspired by what he had learned in the 
laboratory. Skinner entered other ongoing debates concerning the merits of democracy as 
a system of social management with the same confidence in the universality o f operant 
behaviorism.
Depression, war, and an unstable political and economic climate in the immediate 
postwar years left many political scientists, intellectuals and social critics feeling 
uncertain about the ability o f American democracy to compete with communism on the 
world stage. The atmosphere o f the Cold War brought these cultural insecurities into
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even sharper focus. The air of political conservatism in the early 1950s, however, did not 
deter Skinner from publicly exploring the scientific merits of democracy. Archival 
evidence suggests that Skinner compared the behavioral efficiency of different forms of 
social, religious, and political control in Western history in thought experiments of his 
own design. Skinner compared theocracy, democracy, communism, socialism, and 
fascism on the basis o f their efficacy in exerting social control. Most o f these systems, he 
concluded, employed inefficient and coercive methods. Political philosophies and most 
methods o f unscientific social management, it seemed to Skinner, were not grounded in 
direct experimental analysis. Skinner’s emphasis on properly designed systems of 
behavioral control left representative democracy looking rather obsolete in procuring 
social and economic stability. Proper administration of the polity, according to Skinner, 
required direct scientific management.
Skinner thought that he had conjured up a solution to the problems of social 
management in the behavioral utopia of Walden Two (1946). In this particular thought 
experiment Skinner carefully mapped out a blueprint for social harmony on a small scale, 
one that he felt could become the model for a genuine science o f culture. Inspired by 
what he and other social scientists had hoped would be a golden era of social 
experimentation after the war, Skinner enthusiastically worked out solutions to the 
various problems associated with social dislocation in the pages o f Walden Two.
Utopian experiments, as has been noted, have often followed on the heels of 
industrial expansion and social change in nineteenth-century America. Real-world 
experimental communities were launched in response to the breakup of communities and 
a feeling of individual isolation amidst a vast, impersonal urban machine. In Walden Two
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Skinner pondered how such stresses on families and individuals might be alleviated under 
the aegis o f behavioral social engineering. Skinner tackled the problems o f child rearing, 
and changes in gender roles, contemporary social mores, and family structure in postwar 
American culture by envisioning a society wherein community functions were 
methodically and collectively addressed through behavioral science and the control of 
trained managers. In the decades after writing Walden Two, Skinner entertained serious 
inquiries by private groups and government agencies into constructing actual 
communities for research. Although Skinner never became directly involved in any of 
these projects, he often expressed his feeling that his thought experiment in Walden Two 
could inform the re-design o f contemporary bureaucratic social management 
infrastructure and place it on a more solid scientific footing.
In Skinner’s subsequent treatises on human behavior such as Science and Human 
Behavior (1953), Skinner argued that the sustainability o f modem technocracy also 
entailed a fundamental reassessment of the self. A science of culture, according to 
Skinner, could only succeed if human nature was assumed to be lawful and capable of 
being engineered to technocratic specifications. This view of humanity, he felt, stood in 
stark contrast to what he described as the Western myth o f human autonomy and 
freedom. In Skinner’s view, the behavioral self contained no mind, no inner world of 
causation. The central aim of social engineering would be to address only those parts of 
individual behavior that could be controlled effectively through direct manipulation. 
Culture and humanity for Skinner were devices/machines — matters of contingency and 
reinforcement. Traditional concepts of human dignity and freedom, he would later claim
390
in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), had to be expunged if the human race 
was to survive.
Skinner would have agreed with Mead that social science and American culture 
needed to change together. For Skinner, however, their combination would entail a 
vastly different approach to enhancing human potentiality. What Mead and Skinner did 
share was a faith in the adaptive, social-evolutionary potential of humanity and society, 
and a desire to craft technologies and strategies of social adaptation that would appeal to 
professional social administrators and the American public.
Scientists as Popularizers: Gathering Public Recognition and Social Authority
Steven Shapin, Paul Forman, and sociologist of science Thomas Gieryn have 
observed that, in the “cultural geography” of science, the boundaries delimiting the 
privileged space of science in culture are constantly redrawn. The construction of 
boundaries is not controlled exclusively by scientists but more often by those outside of 
elite science that draw upon its epistemic and cognitive authority for political and social 
ends.® The maintenance of these boundary lines often is tied to rhetoric, terminology, and 
methods of public presentation. As Gieryn asserts, such phenomena support the 
contention that much o f science’s credibility comes not from science proper, but from its
® See the introduction to Gieryn's book, Cultural Boundaries o f  Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: 
The University o f Chicago Press, 1999), as well as similar reflections in his article “Boundary-Work and 
the Demarcation o f Science From Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of 
Scientists,” Sociological Review A% (1983): 781-95.
391
intersection with the rest o f society. Historical methodology thus should, and 
increasingly does, reflect this observation.’
Skinner and Mead both used various linguistic, rhetorical, ideological, and 
technological tools to establish their authority as scientific experts cum public 
intellectuals in the postwar decades. In marketing their social reform philosophies and 
technologies of social engineering to the American public, Skinner and Mead helped tear 
down some o f the disciplinary borders separating academic psychology and anthropology 
from their emerging public audiences. Skinner and Mead, in fact, fall into the category of
 ^Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries, 15, 21.
Anne Secord, for example, has employed techniques in anthropology and sociology to study the 
history o f nineteenth-century Lancashire botanical societies and the phenomenon o f “artisan” botany 
among the expanding British middle class. Her study highlights the negotiation processes between 
professionals and lay enthusiasts in botany that were necessary to manage their interaction. This included 
negotiations regarding access to “boundary objects” (plants for study), as well as the social spaces (i. e., the 
publie meeting houses where botanical clubs met with professional botanists), where conceptual translation 
and exchange could take place. Secord points to the “multiplicity o f translations” among the networks of 
professional and “gentleman botanists” that gave meaning and practical utility to the objects o f study, and 
to botanical concepts. See Anne Secord, “Science in the Pub: Artisan Botanists in Early Nineteenth- 
Century Lancashire,” History o f  Science 32 (1994): 269-315. See also Adrian Desmond’s study o f 
nineteenth-century transmutation theory and its political translation by working class radicals in his article, 
“Riehard Owen’s Reaction to Transmutation in the 1830s,” British Journal fo r  the History o f  Science 18 
(1985): 25-50 and Roger Cooler’s study of the popularization of phrenology in The Cultural Meaning o f  
Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization o f  Consent in 19''' Century Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
This dynamic o f translation, exchange, and transformation also applies to the terminology of 
science. Roger Smith’s study o f the concept o f “inhibition” in nineteenth-century history o f psychology, 
for example, illustrates how the evolution o f scientific terminology can be used as a historical venue for 
exploring the scientific and popular meanings in shared language. The evolution o f modem experimental 
psychology and physiology, as Smith notes, lay not in the prescriptive philosophical and ideological 
declarations made by scientists, but in the actual use of terminology in both scientific and popular contexts. 
See Roger Smith, Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences o f  Mind and Brain (Berkeley: University 
o f California Press, 1992). Smith’s work confirms Paul Forman’s claim that meaning in scientific 
terminology is neither singular nor transcendent. Its use by many communities in and out o f professional 
science entailed a collection o f various meanings that were combined in different arrangements to suit 
specific demands. Conversely, as Richard Yeo has observed, changes in the traditional intelleetual 
authority o f British science in the first half o f the nineteenth century reflected the profound influence of 
broad cultural trends sueh as industrialization and the expansion o f the middle class, on professional 
boundaries and theories in science. The gap between institutionalized professional science and mainstream 
society was narrowed irreversibly in the nineteenth century by the eonfluenee o f science, theology, and 
culture, for example, in controversies over the scientific merits of phrenology, the political dimensions of 
Chamber’s Vestiges, and various aspects o f Darwinian evolution. See Richard Yeo, “Science and 
Intellectual Authority in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Britain: Robert Chambers and Vestiges o f  the Natural 
History o f  Creation," Victorian Studies 28 (1984): 5-31.
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“cultural amphibians,” a designation that historian Michael MacDonald has used in his 
history o f juridical authority in the Early Modem period, to denote individuals who 
migrate between the realm of professional elites and that of everyday culture.* As 
translators of social science to the public. Mead and Skinner both made their wares ‘user- 
friendly,’ by connecting them to the postwar experiences o f average Americans through a 
shared set o f concepts, physical objects, terminology. In this endeavor they were not 
alone. Technological revolutions and the centrality o f science in national and military 
policy in the twentieth-century postwar period placed science squarely in the center of 
American culture as never before. Among other such denizens of social science as 
Benjamin Spock and Talcott Parsons in the 1940s and 50s, there was a concerted effort to 
associate scientific research on the family and child rearing with social dislocation in the 
1940s. William Graebner has observed, for example, that Spock’s The Common Sense 
Book o f  Baby and Child Care (1946) was intentionally designed to play upon public fears 
o f social disintegration. As witb Skinner and Mead, Spock’s assessment o f American 
cultural integrity stressed the potentially disastrous effects of improper child rearing that 
might have contributed in the past to war, economic collapse, and experiments with 
fascism.^
Many social scientists in Spock’s professional circle, one that included Mead, had 
worked together on researching the issue of human aggression in the 1930s.'° Drawing 
upon the debate over its possible connection to large-scale social problems (problems that
* I draw this observation from comments about MacDonald in Cooter and Pumphrey, “Separate Spheres,” 
251. See MacDonald’s original article, “The Secularization o f Suicide,” Past and Present 111 (1986): 50- 
100 .
 ^William Graebner, The Engineering o f Consent: Democracy and Authority in 20’'' Century America 
(Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1987), 127.
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were also related to cooperation and competition in human nature), Spock portrayed the 
child as having inherently aggressive tendencies. If left unchecked, he claimed, they 
would result in violent behavior later in life. Collectively, these lapses in parenting could 
then contribute to a national culture of aggression. Problems with even the most 
mundane of childhood activities such as toilet training could, Spock alleged, later bring 
on feelings o f insecurity and frustration in adulthood. Spock, like Skinner and Mead, 
crafted his scientific rhetoric specifically to address public anxieties, thereby engaging 
public demand for techniques of social adjustment that would stave off this alleged crisis. 
This is not to say that they callously exploited or manipulated American fears about 
parenting, but that they were evangelical promoters o f applied social science who took 
the opportunity to market their wares.
Having learned valuable lessons about how to associate behavioral technology 
with convenience and reliability in his missile experiments, Skinner displayed his 
marketing savvy in reworking the technology of operant behaviorism into consumer 
products. In translating experimental science into the easy-to-use appliances o f the baby 
tender and the teaching machine, Skinner sent the message that the complexities of 
parenting and education could be managed and even eliminated. Tapping into a new 
consumer culture that promised a streamlined, futuristic world of better living through 
technology in the 1950s, Skinner cultivated the American appetite for efficiency and 
convenience in managing both the domestic environment and the classroom. Showcased 
in Ladies Home Journal, Skinner’s Air Crib device, for example, promised to make the 
control of the ‘anxiety bombs’ that children might become as easy as using a one-button 
machine. Although he had little success in creating a market for this device, Skinner had
Ibid., 129.
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much better luek with teaching machines and the concept o f programmed instruction a 
decade later.
Similarly, in the utopian venue of Walden Two, Skinner addressed some of the 
same social concerns as Spock had in his baby care literature about what to do with the 
family, the child, and individual adjustment to a changing culture. In the dialogue 
between representatives o f science, humanist skeptics, and average Americans, Skinner 
wove a tale o f scientific deliverance around T. E. Frazier, the behavioral mastermind of 
Walden Two, a character who served as Skinner’s mouthpiece. Skinner demonstrated his 
keen understanding of the American national idiom by using the imagery o f the 
nineteenth-century pioneer and utopian past, — of small, integrated communities that had 
re-created social integration and harmony from the ground up. Skinner’s was also a 
community version of a Thoreauvian journey into self-examination. Using these images 
o f past American glory and self-discovery, Skinner engaged a real-world American 
postwar identity crisis.
Although not as tangible as Skinner’s physical technologies. Mead used the 
concept o f national character to manage the complexities o f culture. Through scientific 
rhetoric, she offered American national character to the public as a venue for exploring a 
commonly held set of distinct personality traits. Mead’s social commentary highlighted 
those aspects o f the American self such as independence, industriousness, practicality, 
and a love of freedom that could contribute to a fully realized demoeracy. Like Skinner, 
Mead advocated a clean break with the past, but both also used iconic images of the 
pioneer to reinvigorate American national resolve. Mead wanted to spur Americans into 
reviving their national identity in the late 1930s and early 40s using the tools o f social
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science. For both Mead and Skinner, child rearing and education would increasingly 
become central to future social reform.
Like Skinner, Mead tried to promote the usefulness and expediency o f concepts 
sueh as national eharacter to government and military ageneies, but she too became 
frustrated in her attempts to convince them that such scientific wares could make 
conerete and lasting eontributions to wartime soeial management and postwar policy 
design. Later, Mead took her broad agenda for cultural analysis, social change and 
adaptation direetly to the American people in books like Male and Female and New Lives 
fo r  Old in the 1950s. In Male and Female, Mead presented examples of cultural diversity 
in order to liberate readers from standard models of family, gender, and personality.
As American life began to ehange in the postwar years. Mead encouraged her 
audiences to take comfort in the knowledge that this did not signal impending social 
collapse, but rather an opportunity to expand human potentiality. Mead worked 
diligently in her many publications, addresses, and interviews to convince Americans that 
fundamental social change was a good thing and that personal and familial flexibility 
should be embraced. After all, she observed, it had worked wonders for the Manus tribes 
in New Guinea. In this instance. Mead blatantly translated her ethnography of social 
transformation among the Manus tribes into an allegory about American national 
character and social progress. The lessons of human potential that were learned from the 
laboratories o f primitive culture, she argued, gave Americans a measure of “predictive 
control” over the future, something that they very much desired.
Although each of them held very different views of self and society, both Skinner 
and Mead employed the rhetoric of social change and the metaphors o f evolutionary
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adaptation and potentiality to discuss human nature and social progress. Adaptation and 
adjustment were central themes in the postwar American experience of changes in 
patterns of community and family structure, social roles for the sexes, child rearing, 
work, and education. These themes were also an important part o f ongoing revisions to 
evolutionary theory in the biological and human sciences during this time. Despite a 
departure from strict environmental determinism in these and other related disciplines, 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, especially the concepts o f natural selection and 
adaptation, continued to be importance for scientists like Skinner and Mead in 
constructing scientific theories of the self and in publicly critiquing American postwar 
democracy and culture.
Skinner and Mead both used the metaphors of adaptation and natural selection to 
discuss how the social environment in, for example, the family, the school, and the 
primitive island society, shaped individual eharacter and behavior. The main difference 
between their views on adaptive human potential concerned the expression o f individual 
human will in culture. Mead’s cultural anthropology celebrated the diversity of human 
potentiality and culture, while Skinner’s operant psychology was focused squarely on the 
effects of the immediate environment on isolated human behaviors. Unlike Mead’s, 
Skinner’s views of the self rendered irrelevant the consideration of mentality, individual 
agency, culture, and human history in engineering future society.
For Mead, the holist, the potential for ehange in human nature was made that 
much more expansive by the presence in each person of agency, or the individual 
capacity for active change to social conditions. Cultures certainly shaped the character of 
individuals; this was evident from Mead’s comparative study o f primitive cultures. But
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in a modem American democratic culture, self-knowledge, an awareness o f social 
change, and an understanding of the creative diversity of humanity (made possible 
through interdisciplinary social science). Mead believed, liberated the individual to play 
a more active role in defining the self in society. In Skinner’s mechanistic view of the 
self, however, humanity did not act, but was acted upon by the social environment; the 
self was literally no more than behavior and environment, and it did not entail mind, will, 
or autonomy. Compared to Mead’s view, Skinnerian social theory lessened human 
adaptive potential, since the parameters of potentiality were limited by the immediate 
contingencies o f the environment and by the agendas of behavioral engineers and 
planners. This sense of the Skinnerian self was enhanced in popular discourse by an 
emphasis on the active manipulation of subjects in precisely controlled laboratory 
settings. It was epitomized in the technologies of the Air Crib and the teaching machine. 
Mead’s notion of the laboratories of primitive culture, however, evoked the image o f the 
scientist as a naturalist in the field, someone (much like Darwin) who observed and 
described patterns of change to find regularities amidst diversity, but did not actively 
manipulate and control the environment in doing so.
In the 1950s Mead and Skinner successfully launched their public careers, and 
each of them enjoyed a wide readership in the popular press. Magazine articles 
recounted their many pronouncements on better living through social science. They both 
had successfully tapped into contemporary culture. Mead was already famous for her 
exotic accounts of primitive cultures in her 1930s ‘travel literature.’ Her audience thus 
was primed by the end of the 1930s for her reflections on world war and various social 
issues that she had begun to relate to the study of cultural anthropology. Skinner’s
398
journey into the limelight in the 1940s, however, was from relative anonymity. Although 
he had established his academic and scientific reputation in the 1930s with his book The 
Behavior o f  Organisms (1937), he as yet had no public notoriety. During the late 1940s, 
however, he did begin to enjoy the social prestige that came with his Harvard 
professorate. The high profile of Harvard University in America was a gateway for many 
o f its faculty into the public limelight. Harvard scientists and intellectuals often were 
called upon to comment on current events and controversies o f the day. Skinner took full 
advantage of this in showcasing his entertaining experiments with pigeons that were 
trained to play piano and ping-pong. Such scientific novelties made for good copy in 
popular magazines such as Time and Newsweek. They also provided Skinner with some 
o f the first important forums for his social theories. Even in these early science news 
stories he began to draw eonnections for readers between pigeons, human behavior, and 
the engineering potential of Skinnerian behaviorism (i. e., his thoughts on programming 
organisms for cooperation/competition).
Mead’s and Skinner’s commentaries on contemporary life, and their extended 
look at American culture in the 1950s, afforded them the kind of public recognition that 
few other social scientists ever enjoyed. The period o f cultural crisis in the 1960s amidst 
a new war in Vietnam, concerns over atomic energy and the Bomb, the environment, the 
counter-culture rejection of mainstream culture, and the expanding feminist and civil 
rights movements that had begun in the 1950s gave Skinner and Mead still more 
opportunities to tap into new public constituencies and build their status in American 
society.
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In the late 1950s and early 60s Skinner found ripe opportunities in the area of 
education to expand his reputation as a public intellectual. In what was perceived at the 
time as a Cold War era crisis in American education, new concerns over the obsolescence 
and inefficiency of schools in producing scientists became another dimension o f the 
‘space’ and ‘culture’ races. Skinner deployed his teaching machine inventions and his 
popular treatise The Technology o f  Teaching (1958) and sparked what is still regarded in 
education circles as a global revolution in programmed instruction. Interest in 
programmed instruction was especially strong among the ranks o f public education 
administrators, as well as corporations looking to invest in profitable education markets.
With the growing demand for faster techniques of teaching and learning in the 
late 1950s, Skinner single-handedly retooled progressive education theory to reflect the 
rubric of the programmable self. Skinner claimed that, like everything else in human 
nature, learning was a simple matter o f behavior patterns; it had nothing to do with mind 
or cognition. And as with any problem in operant behaviorism, it was the study o f the 
environment o f the organism that counted. In this case, teaching and the classroom were 
the foci of inquiry. Similar to Mead’s idea of a laboratory of primitive culture, Skinner 
portrayed the classroom as a laboratory for diagnosing and solving learning 
inefficiencies, and for solving the related social problems of crime, poverty, and racism. 
Skinner masterfully invoked the added image of the factory and mass production, and the 
convenience of fast and easy ‘appliances’ for learning and social adjustment. With the 
technology of programmed instruction, one could say that Skinner ‘Taylorized’ American 
behavioral psychology and education theory to fit public demand.
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In addition to these successes, Skinner’s Walden Two also experienced something 
of a rebirth in the 1960s. Young counterculture activists who were looking for a way out 
o f alienating technocracy looked to Skinner’s utopia and other social alternatives for 
inspiration. Interestingly, in some corridors of the counterculture Skinner’s book was 
interpreted as a humanist tract, and its descriptions of harmonious and interconnected, 
person-centered living struck a chord. Instead of the dehumanizing and mechanistic 
dystopia that humanist critics saw in the 1950s, a new generation of Americans 
appropriated Walden Two as a vision of non-manipulative social harmony set in the 
green, simple, and natural setting of the countryside, away from urban sprawl. In the 
early 1960s Skinner actively cultivated this re-interpretation in a new introduction to the 
book where he presented himself as an ally in the counterculture movement and a fellow 
resistor against the status quo.
The 1960s also saw a bona fide publicity coup for Margaret Mead whose global 
celebrity marked her off in the press as a veritable cultural “phenomenon” unto herself, 
and as a matriarch o f social reform and counter-culture politics. Part o f the reason for 
M ead’s universal appeal, as I have argued, is the care that she took to steer clear of too 
close an association with any one political constituency. This was necessary in order to 
preserve her aura o f scientific authority and her new role as an expert eommentator on a 
wide range of contemporary issues.
Indeed, Mead’s status as a “color commentator” on America made her the 
embodiment of professional anthropology. She helped redefine and politicize the 
discipline in the popular press and on college campuses in the 1960s as the premiere 
science o f social “adaptation.” As young students and feminists began to look to
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anthropology for insights into self-identity, they turned to Mead as someone intimately 
familiar with human potential and cultural diversity. Her legacy o f liberal-progressivism 
also marked her off as scientist who was sympathetic to the various protest movements. 
Mead had influenced a generation of young people, especially women, who increasingly 
came to see anthropology as a forum for self-discovery and liberation.
Modern Human Nature: Pathways of Appropriation in Postwar American Culture
Using their knowledge of reform ideology and American culture in crafting and 
marketing visions o f the self, both Skinner and Mead independently captured public 
attention. As I have argued, they mixed scientific research with non-scientific social 
issues and crossed the boundaries o f professional science into the mainstream. Each of 
them tapped into American anxieties about the fate of the individual and the survival of 
democracy and society. Their scientific messages about the fate of the self and the 
relationship between social science and society, however, were not “disseminated” intact 
into the culture, but were modified by different groups in postwar American society 
according to specific social and political agendas.
In turning from the discussion of strategies of popularization to the question of 
how messages about the self were actually received in American postwar society, I 
invoke Roger Chartier’s assertion that a genuine account of the “public” in historical 
scholarship must focus attention on those very communities that appropriate and use 
scientific and intellectual wares." It is now acknowledged in cultural historiography that
"  See Roger Chartier, “Culture As Appropriation: Popular Cultural Uses in Early Modem France,” in 
Understanding Popular Culture: Europe from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century, ed. Steven L.
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fixed categories and typologies of audience do not exist. Examining the social relations 
between eommunities of scientists and those outside of science is essential in determining 
how public appropriation takes place in particular contexts.’^
Lawrence Levine and Morag Shiach have observed, for example, that the 
examination of past-neglected groups, e. g., minorities, women, immigrants, and the rural 
poor, among many others, has challenged traditional historical assumptions about who 
the members o f a culture were and what their experience of it was like.’  ^ Historians must 
discover for themselves what categories to use in describing the various groups, political
Kaplan (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1984), 229-54; Cultural History: Between Practices and 
Representations, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
The “new historiography” in American cultural history and American studies that emerged during 
the 1970s and 80s came as a consequence, as Lawrence Levine and other cultural historians have observed, 
o f  novel approaches to the history of modem America beginning in the 1960s. Orthodox histories of 
nation-states, it was claimed, relied heavily on a smaller set o f well-worn and unexplored social categories. 
A new generation o f historians sought to replace such synthetic concepts as the “American experience” and 
“national character” with detailed depictions o f what was indeed a far more heterogeneous, diverse, and 
multi-layered social landscape, See Lawrence W. Levine, The Unpredictable Past: Explorations in 
American Cultural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3-5. Similar retrospectives on 
these developments in social and cultural history include George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective 
Memory and American Popular Culture (Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1990) and Andrew 
Ross, No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989).
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with nonscientific philosophies and political agendas. A particularly illustrative case o f  popular 
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Similarly, Greg Myers has tracked the public appropriation of nineteenth-century thermodynamics where 
concepts o f conservation and entropy were used by all manner o f social critics including Henry Adams and 
Joseph Carlyle to discuss socioeconomic and political theory. See Greg Myers, “Nineteenth-Century 
Popularizations o f Thermodynamics and the Rhetoric o f Social Prophesy,” Victorian Studies 29 (1985): 57- 
67.
Levine, The Unpredictable Past, 6-7; Morag Shiach, Discourse On Popular Culture: Class Gender and 
History in Cultural Analysis, 1730 to the Present (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 12-13.
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agendas, and social hierarchies that make up a local cultural context. There are no fixed 
or universal categories, but only those that arise in examining what Roger Chartier has 
described as the many pathways of public appropriation. By analyzing the processes of 
public appropriation and conceptual transformation of scientific concepts among different 
groups in the American public, the historian o f science can begin to understand how, for 
example, the public use of holistic and mechanistic visions of the self actually evolved.''* 
Over the course o f the postwar decades, parents, women, humanist critics, educators, and 
young people in the counterculture modified and selectively deployed Skinnerian and 
Meadian social science for a variety of different political purposes. The particular 
pathways of these appropriations are worth reviewing.
Part of the reason Skinner’s theories and technologies were controversial was that 
his approach to human nature brought into focus an American technocracy that many in 
the public understood already existed. His thoughts on behavioral engineering forced his 
humanist critics, for example, to confront a society that was already engineered to a 
considerable extent. Skinner had merely advocated formalizing the extant technocratic 
controls already in place using experimental behavioral analysis. It is in the context of 
his powerful explications concerning the fundamental tension between mechanistic and 
holistic images of the self in America culture that we must evaluate his reception among 
several distinct publics.
Roger Chartier, “Culture As Appropriation,” 229-35, 237, 252.
In studying public opinion through the analytical lens o f rhetoric, the cultural historian Gerard 
Hauser has noted that idea o f the ‘the public’ has similarly become an abstraction rather than a clear 
description o f real people. As historians began to recognize the diversity o f the American cultural mélange, 
the study o f the many publics that it entailed also got underway. See Gerard A. Hauser, Vernacular Voices: 
The Rhetoric o f  Publics and Public Spheres (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1999), 
especially pages 276-77.
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In the case of the baby tender, Skinner assented to a message in the helping 
professions for tight, yet non-aversive, controls on child rearing. He took this call to an 
experimental extreme, however, with a device that promised parents well-adjusted, 
healthy babies. But in the few attempts he made to market it, consumers made clear their 
feeling that the tender connoted very negative and dehumanizing images of the self. The 
Air Crib epitomized all that was impersonal and sterile about laboratory science. It 
smacked o f science run amok.
Such was the case with the initial reception of Walden Two. Skinner seemed to 
have vastly underestimated the immediate postwar anxieties o f Americans over political 
and economic instability. This was also indicated later on in such social phenomena as 
McCarthyism. As Americans rushed to rebuild the economy after the war, they were less 
inclined toward suggestions of radical social experimentation, especially when they 
smacked of the same scientific totalitarianism and dystopia portrayed in Orwell’s 1984 
(1949) and Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), and the real-world social experiments in 
Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. Again, despite Skinner’s repeated insistence that 
Walden Two was no such model, his readers thought otherwise.
Others in Skinner’s audience came from the ranks of the 1950s education industry 
and from public school administrators. Administrators, teachers, and a growing 
community of manufacturers in education technology found Skinner’s teaching devices 
more palatable than the foreboding vision of mechanized humanity that many thought 
was embedded in the Air Crib and Walden Two. The selective appropriation of learning 
technologies by educators and businesspeople did not involve as many of the same 
philosophical worries about mechanized humankind that parents had encountered in
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considering the Air Crib. Although his humanist critics again accused Skinner of 
legitimating the programmable self in teaching technology, education consumers were 
attracted to the practicality and seeming efficiency o f programmed instruction. Educators 
did, however, also pick up on the reform implications o f teaching machines and Skinner’s 
association o f them with liberal-progressive education theory. Education journals and 
industry literature often reflected an enthusiasm for the international potential of 
programmed instruction to help children with special needs, to raise minorities out of 
poverty, to revolutionize traditional notions of intelligence, and to help reform criminals. 
Skinner used these reform connotations in teaching technology to his advantage in 
aligning himself with the politics o f social reform in the 1960s.
In Mead’s case, one of her most important audiences was young American 
women. During the 1950s and 60s Mead examined their new and often combined roles 
as mothers, students, and feminists in her published work. Micaela di Leonardo has 
observed that Mead’s depictions of primitive women in Male and Female and other 
works, while celebrating human malleability, also subtly assented to mainstream social 
conventions about women’s exclusively domestic family r o l e s . I t  seemed to some 
contemporary and later-generation feminists that Mead actually cautioned women against 
going to far astray from their traditional roles so as not to undermine their self-images. 
Seemingly in response to this criticism by those like Betty Friedan, Mead later changed 
her message about female potential to appeal to a growing feminist contingent.
Betty Friedan’s critique of Mead’s anthropology in her book. The Feminine 
Mystique (1958), had laid bare what she felt was Mead’s embrace o f the traditional
Micaela di Leonardo, Exotics at Home: Anthropologies, Others, American Modernity (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1998).
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domestic ideal of women in the 1950s and her betrayal o f the feminist cause. Friedan 
claimed that, like Talcott Parsons, Mead had eschewed the issue o f gender prejudice in 
her book, Male and Female (1953), with subtle messages about how women might risk 
destroying themselves by modifying their domestic nature too much in an environment 
still hostile to their exploration o f things beyond the domestic sphere. In this instance 
Friedan cautioned young women against an uncritical acceptance of Mead’s scientific 
authority, and that o f other humanists in social science. Friedan felt that Mead, Parsons, 
and others were manipulating women and using scientific authority to increase book sales 
rather than to liberate women from culturally imposed limitations on their roles in 
society. Mead, Friedan claimed, had started out in her published work o f the 1930s with 
a message o f female liberation, withdrawn it in the 1950s, only to reinvigorate it yet 
again in the 1960s. These accusations, however, must be interpreted in light o f Friedan’s 
own aggressive agenda for feminism in the late 1950s, and that o f her feminist inheritors 
later on. What is clear from the historical record is that Mead disassociated herself from 
most feminist politics, agenda that she often described as petty and counterproductive in 
the cause for gender equity. Mead took a similar stance against the civil rights politics of 
those like James Baldwin. Mead’s image management one these scores indicate her 
unwillingness to jeopardize the inroads that she and her colleagues had made into 
mainstream media and government circles. Mead was thus always careful not to align 
herself too closely with social radicalism.
Both Mead and Skinner found enthusiasm for their social theories among the 
young. The previous generation of Americans, they felt, had lived through the 
Depression and the Second World War, and their receptiveness to fundamental social
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change was often cautious if not wholly negative. A new generation o f Americans in the 
1960s, however, was not saddled with the memory o f hard times. Skinner and Mead had 
always emphasized the centrality of children and young people in their work. Mead’s 
eelebration o f the young in this regard, and her public embrace o f their voices and 
concerns for social change contributed to her growing image in the 1960s and early 70s a 
their mother-spokesperson. In turn, her anthropology o f human potential and diversity 
was strongly associated with the emerging student culture of self-discovery on college 
campuses. As fellow anthropologists sueh as Sol Tax noted at the time. Mead was 
responsible for creating a thriving public demand for such anthropology. As a result, 
anthropology and social science professors were under increasing pressure to make their 
courses relevant to the emerging reform politics concerning racism, war, feminism, 
poverty, and environmental pollution, among other topics. In appropriating Mead, young 
people created a gospel of self-aetualization. A similar message o f personal fulfillment 
became part of the counterculture interpretation of Skinner’s views on social alternatives. 
Many young people saw his call for a return to a simpler and more earefully planned, 
social existence in Walden Two as proof o f his ultimately humanistic view of self and 
society.
Finally, in recalling how Mead and Skinner each used the rhetoric o f change and 
the metaphors of human adaptation and potentiality to discuss mechanistic and holist 
(passive and active) images of the self in society, it is important to note that their images 
as scientists were also interpreted by the public along gender lines. As previously noted 
in this study, the juxtaposition of Skinner and Mead as icons o f science in the 1960s and 
70s presents the historian o f science with the opportunity to examine how contemporary
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conventional notions of male and female character in modem America have played a role 
in defining methodological, philosophical, and political perspectives in social science. 
Skinner, in his emphasis on precision and control o f behavior in the isolated laboratory 
setting, was the picture of the enigmatic male scientist, a calculating and detached 
‘godless brain,’ supremely rational, but also socially less conneeted. Mead, much like the 
environmentalist, Rachel Carson, in the 1960s actively cultivated the mother-oriented 
persona o f a eulturally connected and politically conscientious scientist who was in touch 
with the rhythms of nature and humanity. Whereas Skinner’s approach to the passive self 
represented for many the dehumanizing effects o f scientific objectivity and unchecked 
technocracy. Mead’s anthropology o f active individual liberation and self-aetualization, 
and her popular image as a feminist, mother, and cultural caretaker, epitomized the 
naturalist’s approach to scientific inquiry and a healthy respect for human beings as 
unique in their creativity and potential. One possible line of future inquiry in the present 
study thus might address the many connections that exist between the politics of gender 
and the development of postwar social science, and also between gendered images of 
science and the ethics o f social management and engineering in American popular culture 
that have been partially explored herein.
The Janus Faces of the Self: Reflections on the History of Human Nature in Modern 
America
As many philosophers and historians have argued, there were several scientific 
revelations and social transformations in the nineteenth century that significantly altered 
traditional concepts o f the self. Scholars such as Charles Taylor and Roy Porter have
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noted the role of industrialization and machine culture, the rise o f evolutionary theory, 
social class stratification, and the concomitant changes in family and community 
structure associated with the rural to urban transition, as contributing factors in the 
scientific and philosophical departure from the idea of an autonomous self.'^ Even as the 
founders of psychology such as James and Freud negotiated theoretical space for a 
revised scientific image of self in the latter half of the nineteenth century, there was a 
growing awareness o f the self as an entity intimately intertwined with its urban 
surroundings. The self was a product of the social and industrial environment.
Charles Taylor has discussed the expression of this transition in nineteenth- 
century art and literature, especially with regard to the Romantic rejection of society as a 
machine and its diminishing effects on human dignity. Wordsworth, the German 
Romantics, Coleridge, Blake, and Shelley, for example, each attempted to reinvigorate 
the subjective image of the self by celebrating its connection to the powers of nature. 
Industrial modernism, however, had facilitated a phenomenological turn away from 
nature. In response, those like Henri Bergson, William James, and the Gestaltists began 
to explore the depths of the inner self. In this search for new sources o f subjectivity and 
meaning, they defended the claim that humanity and human experience were not 
reducible to environmental conditions and biochemical parts.
The nineteenth-century decline o f the “unitary” self did, however, open up the 
possibility for multiple definitions of humanity. The self at the dawn o f the twentieth 
century was understood not as a static entity, but a process of development, an ongoing
See Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present, ed. Roy Porter (New York: 
Routledge, 1997) and Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
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evolution, a “flow of experience” still open to a redefinition o f subjectivity. This was 
expressed in, among other things, the “epiphanic” art and poetry of Ezra Pound. Still, as 
Taylor notes, a twentieth-century immersion in scientific instrumentalism and a 
mechanistic worldview in science and soeial discourse has problematized the sentimental 
search for the subjective self in nature and the inner life of perception and cognition. The 
face and place o f the self in the modem age has been challenged on many fronts.
In the present study I have discussed the scientific and public careers o f two 
highly prominent social scientists in order to explore the effects o f broad twentieth- 
century soeial and cultural trends on the production, and subsequent public appropriation, 
of scientific visions o f the self. I have noted the influence that industrialization, 
economic depression, world war, and various social reform movements have had on the 
institutional, methodological, and political approaches to the self in soeial science. I have 
also noted the profound influence on these visions of philosophies of scientific social 
management that were pervasive in American culture. Ours is a culture that has 
embraced technology, science, and system building in the pursuit o f individual 
transcendence and social harmony.
As we have seen, this pursuit has been opposed by those who warn of burgeoning 
technocracy and the complete dissolution of human meaning. While the politics of social 
reform during the progressive era, the Interwar period, and the postwar counterculture, 
did not achieve the radical social countermeasures that many had hoped for, these 
movements unquestionably shaped the professional organization o f social science and 
scientific approaches to the self. The social sciences embraced the behavioral and 
environmental approach to the self at the beginning of the century because it promised a
Porter, Rewriting the Self, 11-12.
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greater measure o f control over human nature. As I have shown, however, philosophies 
of social engineering in the social sciences took on different and contrasting forms, with 
some scientists advocating technocracy, and others supporting a meliorative approach to 
social management. My exploration of the varied reform initiatives that emerged in the 
opening decades o f the twentieth century shows how visions of the self have been applied 
to both technocratic and liberal-democratic visions of society.
The scientific definition of mechanistic and holistic depictions o f the self also had 
important implications for how the American government, industry, and different sectors 
o f the public would implement the concepts and technologies o f social science. Indeed, 
as I have argued herein, the dynamic of appropriation between science and culture in this 
regard has been reciprocal, intermixing scientific and social meanings and practices in the 
process o f generating techniques for managing the self and society. This was especially 
the case during the postwar era when scientific experts-tumed-public intellectuals took 
advantage of fundamental changes in family, community, and work. The areas o f child 
rearing and education were particularly important venues for Mead and Skinner in 
expanding their public authority and marketing their scientific wares.
To reiterate, my purpose in the present study has involved two main objectives. 
First, I have attempted to explore the public careers of Mead and Skinner in a way that 
moves beyond their iconic status in disciplinary history. I concentrate instead on their 
roles as participants in, and expressions of, American culture in the twentieth century, 
especially the post-World War Two era. Secondly, I have examined the popular 
appropriation of Skinner and Mead, as well as their social technologies, strategies of 
adjustment, and theories of social management, as venues for exploring the public
412
discourse on the self in postwar American culture. Using these two historiographie foci, 
my analysis provides, for example, a fuller understanding of how such phenomena as 
Taylorism, management progressivism, social melioration, and other strains of 
progressive era social reform influenced the scientific training and research 
methodologies o f Skinner and Mead. I also provide insight into the unique rhetorical and 
technological strategies that Skinner and Mead used in transforming their scientific 
visions o f the self into platforms for social criticism and public discourse during the 
Interwar and postwar decades. In turn, I have described in further detail some of the 
speeific ways in which different groups of Americans have appropriated and used these 
images of the self in adjusting to modem American life. My study thus contributes new 
insights into the cultural history of the self in modem Ameriea.
Given my juxtaposition of these two prominent scientists whose approaches to 
human nature (meehanistic and holistic) stood in stark contrast to one another, one might 
ask for my historical judgment about which vision of the self was predominant, or, rather, 
which vision ‘won ou f in the late twentieth century. I do not believe that history 
provides a definitive answer to this question. Neither image was embraced exclusively; 
we do not live in either a humanist or technocratic utopia, or anything close to them. My 
research does indicate that both visions of the self were put to work in American culture 
at different times, for different reasons, depending on context, i. e., on what type of 
understanding or control over human nature was sought. As I have demonstrated, there 
were, for example, circumstances in which a particular community o f Americans used 
one vision of the self exclusively to promote personal, political, and business agendas.
At other times, Americans combined both visions o f the self in a curious and tentative
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(non-rational) embrace, one that reflected their commitments to technology and 
technocracy, as well as to the search for personal meaning and self-fulfillment in a 
changing culture. In my view, postwar American culture reflects a general awareness 
that both visions were necessary in balancing the individual’s desire for subjective 
meaning with the organizational demands o f living in a complex urban environment.
My analysis draws from the work of other scholars who have proposed a general 
historiography of the self, one that I have invoked in my particular study o f Mead and 
Skinner. As Philip Cushman and Nikolas Rose have observed, the predominantly social 
constructionist view of the self in psychology is context-driven.'* It is defined not only 
by the evolution o f technology and the urban complex but also by a number o f new 
analytieal criteria in the modem era that have differentiated the self according to class, 
gender, ethnicity, and age, among other things.’  ^ Since there is no longer a universal or 
unitary definition of self in either the social sciences or modem society, the 
historiography of the self. Rose argues, must look to the social practices in each culture 
for definitions and descriptions.^" This strategy, or what Rose has described as tracing 
the “genealogy” or “topography o f subjectification” to reveal the new “regulatory ideal of 
the se lf’ in modem culture, involves a number of different historical projects.^’ These 
include the study o f professional and institutional practices in science and society, the 
motivations o f individual social scientists, the teleological foundations of models o f the
See Philip Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural History o f  Psychotherapy 
(New York: Addison-Wesley, 1995); Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and 
Personhood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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self, the eonstruction o f ‘expert’ social authority, the social practices of public(s), and the 
structure o f the s t a t e . R o s e ’s historiography stands in contrast to that o f Charles Taylor 
who discusses the intellectual history of the self in terms of philosophical, literary, and 
artistic theory.
A Rose has observed, we mediate the complexity of mass society by invoking 
autonomy and dignity when defining our individual and national identity. Our ethics and 
values are also discussed in these terms. Yet this view of the self is only one among 
many that have been used in negotiating modem American culture.^^ The self is defined 
differently, for example, when discussed in religious, medical, economic, domestic, and 
military/industrial contexts.^"^ Fractionation of the self, as Rose observes, has also 
occurred with the rise of system theory and cybernetics. Its definition has been 
relativized through the study of psychology and anthropology. Feminists have observed 
that the self has been unfairly skewed toward patriarchy and a male-dominated image. 
Psychological study of the unconscious mind has challenged subjectivity. And 
deconstructionism has threatened to undermine subjectivity and self-identity altogether.
This is all to say. Rose argues, that both the subjectification and deconstruction of 
the self in these various contexts has a history in the actual social practices of science, the 
law, the family, industry, the military, and everyday culture.^^ Our technologies and
=2 Ibid., 23-33.
“  Ibid., 1-5.
I should note here that Rose briefly notes these as examples in his book, a work mainly devoted to 
historiography and its utility in liberal democratic social theory.
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social architecture, as well as our scientific and civic institutions, reflect this history. It is 
apparent in the way that social authority among experts and managers gets established 
through the construction and marketing of scientific knowledge products. In the case of 
psychology, as Rose observes, there is often parity between professional scientific 
epistemology and social convention.^’ The “techne” of modem psychology moreover has 
given way to, among other things, the reification of the calculable/quantified self, the 
management philosophies used to organize public spaces in factories and schools, an 
ethic for social administration that has shaped public values, and a host of personal 
organization practices.
What the historian thus should study in these various contexts, according to Rose, 
is the way in which real-world strategies, what Foucault called the “technologies o f the 
self,” came into existence for practical use in self-management and social organization.^^ 
In the modem era, multiple definitions of the self have been combined and used in 
myriad ways to balance individual needs with the demands of the ‘system.’ It is up to the 
historian to ask, as Rose notes, “[i]n what ways was this regime of the self put together, 
under what conditions and in relation to what demands and forms o f authority?” ®^
In the present study, I have engaged many of the same analytical categories 
recommended by Rose and others in tracing the relationships between institutional social
”  Ibid., 61. 
Ibid., 88-90.
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science, the careers of prominent social scientists, and the history o f American culture in 
the twentieth century. There are, however, some key distinctions between Rose’s 
delineation of the historiography of the self and my own use o f it in the cases of Mead 
and Skinner. First, I should point out that Rose is not the first to advocate the use of 
these historical criteria in doing the cultural history of science. The cultural history of 
science increasingly reflects an awareness of the interrelations between government, 
institutional science, scientific authority and expertise, individual scientists, and science’s 
public audiences. Historians have discussed, in turn, how these dynamics have shaped 
the production, transmission, and appropriation of scientific concepts, terminology, and, 
in this case, visions of human nature.
Secondly, although I share Rose’s emphasis on researching the “techne” of 
science and its real-world use in social practice, my project is not meant, as is his, to 
argue for a liberal-democratic revisionist history of social science. Rose makes clear in 
his recommendations for a “genealogy of psychology” that it must resurrect those 
humanist contributions to social scientific methodology and theory that have been 
marginalized, illuminating as he says “the parts that orthodoxy considers impure and 
shameful.” '^ This should be done, as he states, “not to denounce but to diagnose, as a 
necessary preliminary to the prescription o f a n t i d o t e s . A s  Rose argues, the history of 
humanist psychology can contribute to the realization of individual human potential by 
providing those technologies o f the self that, “promise to restore the subject to autonomy
Ibid., 80. 
Ibid.
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and freedom.”^^  Rose advocates the merger of market economy with liberal democracy 
through a social science that provides no less than a psychologically inspired rationale for 
humanistic government/''
My research herein is far less ambitious. My historical investigation into how 
scientific depictions of the self were incorporated selectively into social administration 
and public discourse is not meant to advocate either a liberal-democratic or a technocratic 
vision of future society. My analytical juxtaposition o f Skinner and Mead is intended to 
illuminate impartially the nature of ongoing debates in postwar America about the place 
and face o f the self in modem life. Indeed, one of my central aims has been to explain 
why Skinner and Mead were catapulted into public celebrity at the same time in the 
postwar decades despite their having promoted vastly different visions o f human nature.
I have argued that their public careers, taken together as expressions o f American culture, 
tell us new and important things about the nature o f this debate. I have endeavored 
herein to enumerate these contributions to our historical understanding.
Having said this, I also feel the obligation in closing this discussion to offer my 
personal appraisal o f the self in late twentieth-century American culture. Unfortunately, 
it appears to me that scientific depictions of the self and the ubiquity o f systems theory, 
cybernetics, bioscience, technology, and technocracy in America increasingly reflect a 
tendency toward dehumanizing mechanism in our behavioral approach to human nature 
and social management. The pervasiveness of unchecked capitalism and the rise o f a 
social ethic based on the moral economy of the market adds to this trend. As Christopher
”  Ibid., 79, 114-15. 
^Mbid., 100.
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Lasch has noted, we steadily are replacing politics with administration, morality and 
judgment with measurement, the machine for human labor, human resource production 
for education, and the market for culture.^^
I worry, as does Lasch, that the commodification (to use Micaela di Leonardo’s 
term) o f American social science and culture, which transforms democracy into 
consumerism, also renders meaningless the differences between the liberal humanist and 
reductionist behavioral depictions o f self.^^ Since the Second World War, both 
communities in the social sciences have been co-opted (although not entirely) into the 
corporate power structure that now dominates American society and polity. As Lasch 
notes, the difference between present-day humanist and behaviorist theory and coping 
technologies, both designed merely to survive a dehumanizing system, only differ in 
“style and e mphas i s . Technoc r a t i c  and democratic philosophies o f social engineering 
both contain the same disturbing moral and social implications that point to a departure 
from “moral responsibility.”^^  Moreover, it may not be possible to refute Skinner on the 
basis of an “environmentalist therapeutic ethic” of self-actualization. Indeed, as Lasch 
points out, the continued appeal of something resembling Walden Two is that it holds out 
the prospect o f an existence where there is “no need for moral s t r u g g l e . F o r  a society
Christopher Lasch, The Minimal 5eÿ"(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1984), 51. 
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simultaneously in pursuit of control, freedom, and human connection, even if contrived, 
this is hard for many to resist.'^'’
Given this, it does at times appear that liberal-humanist social scientists such as 
Mead, and present-day historians such as Rose, who have tried scientifically to gird 
human dignity, freedom, rationality, morality, and classical democracy in their work, are 
in the minority. They hope to draw us back from total immersion in a technocracy that 
has long since been set in motion. If Lasch’s commentary on the continuing 
humanist/Skinnerian controversy is any indication, such debates over future humanity 
and society are still very much in play."*' This crisis o f the self is not only apparent 
among academics, scientists, and intellectuals, but it also plays out on a regular basis in 
popular literary and cinematic media.
Indeed, most of us are aware, on some level, o f this ongoing crisis o f the self and 
society. But we don’t know what to do about it. As Lasch notes, we have in the last 
century and a half undermined our traditional ideology of the self and social practice in 
our social networks, in the family, and in the community, the home, and in education. 
We have so thoroughly subjected them to the rigors of expert scientific and bureaucratic 
(and commercial) management that their old integrity seems lost for good.'^^ Likewise, 
we cannot try, as did the Romantics, the Utopians, and those in the 1960s counterculture, 
to return physically or mentally to the garden. Our break with nature is also irreversible. 
And so, as Lasch argues, we are left with an existence where much of our time is spent
Ibid.
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surviving a system that is layered with dehumanizing activities and hollow social 
interaction in corporate and suburban life, where meaningful exchange and a sense of 
community have been replaced with endless artificial consumer amusements and 
diversions/^ We invest ourselves — our emotions, beliefs, and values — in things that 
have no genuine humanity in them. We are dissolving the self.
While I agree with some aspects of Lasch’s commentary on our millennial 
predicament, I do not share in his overly cynical ‘gloom mongering.’ I do believe that 
the self and social democracy in the Western, especially the American, context is 
increasingly in jeopardy because of the predominance o f technocracy, scientific 
instrumentalism and unchecked capitalism. But I do not believe that we are as yet over 
the brink and hopelessly lost, to brave a contemporary cinematic reference, inside the 
‘matrix.’
My reading of the history of modem science has caused me to wonder along with 
Lasch whether or not the rationalization o f self and society through technology has gotten 
us as much human ‘progress’ as we had hoped. With technologies o f convenience and 
adjustment, medical, ergonomic, informational, physical and otherwise, we have 
deceived ourselves into believing that basic human nature, our good old ‘selves,’ have 
somehow been transcended. Yet it is abundantly clear that human shortcomings, 
combined with, and tremendously amplified by, burgeoning technocracy, speak loudly to 
the contrary. Like Lasch, I support democratic social reform, environmental stewardship, 
and human freedom.'^’* But I am not sure that either the “moralistic philosophy of
Ibid., 57-59, 193-96. 
Ibid., 253.
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progress” embedded in hard-line liberal-democratic humanist social science, or 
liberal/conservative behaviorist perspectives, provide us with viable alternatives/^ We 
need a theory o f the self that is stronger, one that is not constructed merely as a means for 
surviving technocracy, but one, as Lasch argues, that can transcend it and return us, 
however gradually, to genuinely human community, ethics, and meaning in Western 
culture/^ Happily, as Mead would point out, Western society is not our only reference 
point. I find hope in the realization that corporate-driven Western technocracy has not 
yet overtaken the planet completely. We still have a good chance.
Lasch describes humanistic social science theory in psychology this way on page 228. 
Ibid.. 255.
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